General 1ac Frontline
HUMINT key to success to counter state and non-state threats.
Wilkinson ‘13
Kevin R. Wilkinson – United States Army War College. The author is a former Counterintelligence Company Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. This thesis paper was overseen by Professor Charles D. Allen of the Department of Command Leadership and Management. This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools – “Unparalleled Need: Human Intelligence Collectors in the United States Army” - March 2013 - http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590270
In the twenty-first century, the role of HUMINT is more important than ever. As employed during the Cold War, a significant portion of intelligence was collected using SIGINT and GEOINT methods. The COE assessment now discerns a hybrid threat encompassing both conventional and asymmetric warfare, which is difficult to obtain using SIGINT and GEOINT alone. Unlike other intelligence collection disciplines, environmental conditions such as weather or terrain do not hinder HUMINT collectors.12 HUMINT collection played a key role during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. OIF was initially a force-on-force ground war using traditional maneuver forces. After six months of conventional conflict and on the verge of defeat, the Iraqi armed forces, with the assistance of insurgents, employed asymmetrical warfare. The continuation of conventional warfare paired with the asymmetric threat created a hybrid threat. HUMINT is effective when countering a conventional threat that consists of large signatures, such as discerning troop movement. However, it becomes invaluable when presented with an asymmetrical threat that entails a smaller signature, such as focusing on groups of insurgents, which other intelligence collection disciplines cannot solely collect on.
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT key to stay-ahead of these risks.
Johnson ‘9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal "Intelligence and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via: http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place, plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition for scarce resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other reason, government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and—an especially elusive topic—the intentions of those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose of espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret services hope to provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest—the opportunity side of the security equation. Through the practice of espionage—spying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite term—the central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more thorough understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is available in the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be several missing pieces—perhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research; but often discovery of the missing secret pieces has to rely on spying, if they can be found at all. Some things— "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionals—are unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace the current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skill—say, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to satellite and sonar tracking. Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with machines, respectively known inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint consists of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations officers). -_Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predator—often armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces. Techint attracts the most funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that only human agents can provide insights into that most vital of all national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals— especially those adversaries who are well armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Those impacts cause extinction.
Ochs ‘2
Richard - Chemical Weapons Working Group Member - “Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately,” June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_.../abolish.html]
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
Ext. Yes Resource Wars ( ) Most probable conflict
Cairns 4
John Cairns Jr, Distinguished Professor of Environmental Biology Emeritus, Department of Biology and Director Emeritus, University Center for Environmental and Hazardous Materials Studies @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University – “Eco-Ethics and Sustainability Ethics,” Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, http://ottokinne.de/esepbooks/EB2Pt2.pdf#page=66
The most probable cause of this curious position is humankind’s obsession with growth. On a finite planet with finite resources, continued growth induces scarcity. Then, scarcity leads to resource wars, mass migration, political instability and, arguably most importantly, competition for increasingly scarce resources (e.g. oil). Equitable and fair sharing of resources, including those needed to maintain the planet’s ecological life-support system, will require both sharing and population control. Humankind is rapidly approaching the time when it will be attempting to manage the entire planet for sustainability. Half the world’s human population is living marginally or worse, and yet Renner (2003a) reports that military expenditures are on the rise. In 2001, a conservative estimate of world military expenditures was US$839 billion, of which the United States spends 36% and those states considered hostile to the United States spend 3% (Renner, 2003a). Even so, expenditures for the military are expected to continue rising (Stevenson and Bumiller, 2002; Dao, 2002). Even 25% of these funds would provide a much needed programme to develop alternative energy sources, which would also diminish the perceived need for resource wars. Renner and Sheehan (2003) state that approximately 25% of the 50 wars and armed conflicts of recent years were triggered or exacerbated by resource exploitation. Hussein persisted as a political leader by using resource money (in this case, oil) to maintain power by a variety of methods, including murder. The use of resource funds to maintain power is all too common (e.g. Le Billon, 2001). Ending such misuse of power and the resultant conflicts has proven impossible because it is difficult to displace the power elite (e.g. United Nations Security Council, 2002).
( ) Best studies prove
Heinberg ‘4
(Richard, journalist, teaches at the Core Faculty of New College of California, on the Board of Advisors of the Solar Living Institute and the Post Carbon Institute “Power Down”, Published by New Society Publishers, pg. 55-58)
This is a persuasive line of reasoning on the face of it, but it ignores the realities of how markets really work. If the global market were in fact able to prevent resource wars, the past half-century should have been a period of near-perfect peace. But resource disputes have instead erupted repeatedly, and continue to do so. Just in the past twenty years, resource disputes have erupted over oil in Nigeria, Algeria, Colombia, Yemen, Iraq/Kuwait, and Sudan; over' timber and natural gas in Indonesia (Aceh); and over copper in Bougainville/Papua New Guinea -and this is far from being an exhaustive list. In classical economic theory, all actors within a market system act rationally in pursuit of their own interests, and no one buys or sells without an expectation of benefit. In the real world, however, buyers and sellers enter the marketplace with unequal levels of power. Some economic players have wealth and weapons, while others don't; as a result, some have figurative -if not literal -guns to their heads persuading them to act in ways that are clearly not in their own interest. Lest we forget: the essence of the European colonial system was the maintenance of unequal terms of trade through military duress. While nearly all of the old colonial governments were overthrown after World War II in favor of indigenous regimes, much of the essential structure of colonialism remains in place. Indeed, some would argue that the new institutions of global trade (the World Trade Organization, together with lending agencies like the World Bank) are just as effective as the old colonial networks at transferring wealth from resource-rich poor nations to militarily powerful rich consuming nations, and that the failure of these institutions to enable the fair distribution of resources will ultimately result in a greater likelihood of armed conflict within and between nations. The new post-colonial international system works to maintain and deepen inequalities of wealth primarily through control (on the part of the wealthy, powerful nations) over the rules and terms of trade, and over the currencies of trade.
Ext. Bulk Collection Tradeoff Bulk collection causes data overload – makes law enforcement less effective.
Ward ‘15
Stan Ward – writer for the publication Best VPM and has been involved in writing and teaching for 50 years. This article internally quotes William Binney, a founder of Contrast Security and a former NSA official. “NSA swamped with data overload also trashes the Constitution” – From the publication: Best VPN - May 18th, 2015 - https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/19187/nsa-swamped-with-data-overload-also-trashes-the-constitution/
It has long been an argument of the civil liberties crowd that bulk data gathering was counter-productive, if not counter- intuitive. The argument was couched in language suggesting that to “collect it all”, as the then NSA director James Clapper famously decried, was to, in effect, gather nothing, as the choking amounts of information collected would be so great as to be unable to be analyzed effectively. This assertion is supported by William Binney, a founder of Contrast Security and a former NSA official, logging more than three decades at the agency. In alluding to what he termed “bulk data failure”, Binney said that an analyst today can run one simple query across the NSA’s various databases, only to become immediately overloaded with information. With about four billion people (around two-thirds of the world’s population) under the NSA and partner agencies’ watchful eyes, according to his estimates, there is far too much data being collected. “That’s why they couldn’t stop the Boston bombing, or the Paris shootings, because the data was all there… The data was all there… the NSA is great at going back over it forensically for years to see what they were doing before that. But that doesn’t stop it.” Binney is in a position to know, earning his stripes during the terrorism build up that culminated with the 9/11 World Trade Center bombing in 2001. He left just days after the draconian legislation known as the USA Patriot Act was enacted by Congress on the heels of that attack. One of the reasons which prompted his leaving was the scrapping of a surveillance system on which he long worked, only to be replaced by more intrusive systems.
AT: Accumulo
( ) Accumulo’s not responsive to our human intel internal link. Even if NSA can process a large quantity of data, the quality’s low unless HUMINT’s involved.
( ) Accumulo fails – Boston Marathon proves it doesn’t find the needle.
Konkel ‘13
Frank Konkel is the editorial events editor for Government Executive Media Group and a technology journalist for its publications. He writes about emerging technologies, privacy, cybersecurity, policy and other issues at the intersection of government and technology. He began writing about technology at Federal Computer Week. Frank is a graduate of Michigan State University. “NSA shows how big 'big data' can be” - FCW - Federal Computer Week is a magazine covering technology - Jun 13, 2013 - http://fcw.com/articles/2013/06/13/nsa-big-data.aspx?m=1
As reported by Information Week, the NSA relies heavily on Accumulo, "a highly distributed, massively parallel processing key/value store capable of analyzing structured and unstructured data" to process much of its data. NSA's modified version of Accumulo, based on Google's BigTable data model, reportedly makes it possible for the agency to analyze data for patterns while protecting personally identifiable information – names, Social Security numbers and the like. Before news of Prism broke, NSA officials revealed a graph search it operates on top of Accumulo at a Carnegie Melon tech conference. The graph is based on 4.4 trillion data points, which could represent phone numbers, IP addresses, locations, or calls made and to whom; connecting those points creates a graph with more than 70 trillion edges. For a human being, that kind of visualization is impossible, but for a vast, high-end computer system with the right big data tools and mathematical algorithms, some signals can be pulled out. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, publicly stated that the government's collection of phone records thwarted a terrorist plot inside the United States "within the last few years," and other media reports have cited anonymous intelligence insiders claiming several plots have been foiled. Needles in endless haystacks of data are not easy to find, and the NSA's current big data analytics methodology is far from a flawless system, as evidenced by the April 15 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 200. The bombings were carried out by Chechen brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the latter of whom was previously interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation after the Russian Federal Security Service notified the agency in 2011 that he was a follower of radical Islam. The brothers had made threats on Twitter prior to their attack as well, meaning several data points of suspicious behavior existed, yet no one detected a pattern in time to prevent them from setting off bombs in a public place filled with people. "We're still in the genesis of big data, we haven't even scratched the surface yet," said big data expert Ari Zoldan, CEO of New-York-based Quantum Networks. "In many ways, the technology hasn't evolved yet, it's still a new industry."
AT: Accumulo Solves Privacy
Accumulo doesn’t solve privacy – it can’t keep info secure on its own
Pontius ‘14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana State University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School – “INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO” - September 2014 - http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1
NoSQL databases are gaining popularity due to their ability to store and process large heterogeneous data sets more efficiently than relational databases. Apache Accumulo is a NoSQL database that introduced a unique information security feature—cell-level access control. We study Accumulo to examine its cell-level access control policy enforcement mechanism. We survey existing Accumulo applications, focusing on Koverse as a case study to model the interaction between Accumulo and a client application. We conclude with a discussion of potential security concerns for Accumulo applications. We argue that Accumulo’s cell-level access control can assist developers in creating a stronger information security policy, but Accumulo cannot provide security—particularly enforcement of information flow policies—on its own. Furthermore, popular patterns for interaction between Accumulo and its clients require diligence on the part of developers, which may otherwise lead to unexpected behavior that undermines system policy. We highlight some undesirable but reasonable confusions stemming from the semantic gap between cell-level and table-level policies, and between policies for end-users and Accumulo clients.
Accumulo won’t solve privacy – security features fail
Pontius ‘14
Brandon H. Pontius. The author holds a B.S. from Louisiana State University and an M.B.A., Louisiana State University. The author wrote this piece in partial fulfillment of a MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL. The thesis advisor that reviewed this piece is Mark Gondree, PhD. Gondree is a security researcher associated with the Computer Science Dept at the Naval Postgraduate School – “INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPLICATIONS USING APACHE ACCUMULO” - September 2014 - http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43980/14Sep_Pontius_Brandon.pdf?sequence=1
We commented on potential security threats facing developers that build applications based on Accumulo. We used a hypothetical application to illustrate potential user management concerns. We identified injection attacks that have been carried out against other NoSQL databases and may be relevant to some uses of Accumulo. We commented on Accumulo’s inability to enforce information flow policies. These examples serve to demonstrate that using Accumulo and it’s cell-level security feature is not a full solution to access control problems unless Accumulo is paired with well-designed enforcement mechanisms in the client application. We believe that the combination of our technical discussion of Accumulo’s cell-level access control enforcement, illustration of Accumulo integration in a larger application, and identification of potential security concerns may help future studies learn more about Accumulo information security and lead to development of more secure Accumulo based applications.
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