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Civilian Casualties Scenario



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Civilian Casualties Scenario

Civilian Casualties



AT: Casualties Low

Drone strike casualties are huge and inevitable – it’s a question of reform


Hudson, 14- B.A. in International Relations and a minor in Middle Eastern Languages, Literatures and Cultures, focusing on the Arabic language. Studied international humanitarian law and public policy at the University of Oxford (Adam, “UN Human Rights Committee Finds US in Violation on 25 Counts”, Truth Out, 4/4/14, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/22887-un-human-rights-committee-finds-us-in-serious-violation)//KTC

Despite claims to the contrary, drone strikes kill a significant number of civilians and inflict serious human suffering. So far, US drone strikes and other covert operations have killed between 2,700 and nearly 5,000 people, including 500 to more than 1,100 civilians in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's figures. Many of those deaths occurred under Obama's watch, with drone strikes killing at least 2,400 people during his five years in office. Only 2 percent of those killed by drone strikes in Pakistan are high-level militants, while most are low-level fighters and civilians. In addition to causing physical harm, drone strikes terrorize and traumatize communities that constantly live under them. Drone strikes have lulled in Pakistan due to peace talks between the Pakistani government and Pakistan Taliban, which collapsed on February 17. The last US drone strike in Pakistan happened on Christmas Day 2013. In Yemen, drone strikes have continued. Several US drone strikes in Yemen occurred during the first 12 days of March. Last November, six months after President Obama laid out new rules for US drone strikes, a TBIJ analysis showed that "covert drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have killed more people than in the six months before the speech." It also was recently reported that the Obama administration is debating whether to kill a US citizen in Pakistan who is suspected of "actively plotting terrorist attacks," according to The New York Times. It is very likely these operations will continue. The Pentagon's 2015 budget proposal, taking sequestration into account, spends $0.4 billion less than 2014 at $495.6 billion, shrinks the Army down to between 440,000 to 450,000 troops from the post-9/11 peak of 570,000, and protects money for cyberwarfare and special operations forces. Cyber operations are allocated $5.1 billion in the proposal, while US Special Operations Command gets $7.7 billion, which is 10 percent more than in 2014, and a force of 69,700 personnel. While President Obama promised to take the United States off a "permanent war footing," his administration's policies tell a different story. The Obama administration is reconfiguring, rather than halting, America's "permanent war footing."


Yemen Scenario

1ac Yemen Long



First, signature strikes are inevitable but faulty intelligence creates civilian casualties which destabilize and create anti-american sentiment.


Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)

As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about whether drone strikes should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all the the arguments in favor, those those emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are particularly dubious. The term "signature strike" is used to distinguish strikes conducted against individuals who "match a pre-identified 'signature' of behavior that the U.S. links to militant activity," rather than targeting a specific person. The United States should not allow signature strikes because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential benefit. Leaving aside significant concerns about the legality of such strikes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of this approach in undermining terrorist networks.



The problem with signature strikes is that they open the door to a much higher incidence of civilian casualties--and this is where the danger lies. If the United States is choosing targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other known-terrorists, this falls short of the threshold for drone strikes set by the Obama Administration, perpetuates a disastrous U.S. image in Yemen, and serves to invigorate the ranks of those groups the United States aims to disable.

In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism policy in May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will only act against "terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." He did not, however, directly address the use of signature strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could be used in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, extensive signature strikes sparked a significant increase in anti-American sentiment. After years of drone strikes, 74 percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009) according to a Pew Research Center poll. The White House authorized signature strikes for Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have not employed this tactic to date. If true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties in Yemen means that faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame, which is perhaps even more worrisome.


Second, this is specifically true of Yemen — targeted strikes solve blowback and AQAP recruitment — it’s reverse causal.


Greenfeild 13 — Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, where she leads the Yemen Policy Group, M.A. in International Studies and Middle East Studies from John Hopkin’s University, B.A. in International Relations from Tufts University, 2013 (“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists,” The Atlantic, August 19th, accessible online at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/, accessed on 6-25-15)

In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the wrong person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Among the casualties, however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had brought along for protection. The imam was working to dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately needs in a place like Yemen. Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal leaders in areas where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these attacks drive more Yemenis to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the eldest son of a man killed by a drone joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's killer and wants revenge. As the deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American sentiment grows. When drone strikes occur and non-combatants are killed, Yemenis lash out with protests demanding justice and accountability from the United States--which has not been forthcoming.

In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated, many Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is clear intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and plotting a specific and imminent act of terror against Americans. The problem with signature strikes is that they do not meet this threshold--not even remotely-- and they open the door for the U.S. to make grievous targeting mistakes and be seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency. Signature strikes target low-level militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.

Beyond signature strikes, there is a more fundamental question that we should be asking--a question of overall strategy: is the current drone program achieving our national security objectives? It is not just civil libertarians and human rights advocates that are sounding the alarm; a group of 30 foreign policy experts sent a letter to President Obama in March 2013 calling for an end to the current drone strategy. Even senior retired members of the military, including General Stanley McChrystal, believe drone strikes are counterproductive because of the blowback they foment among the local population.

Targeted killings may eliminate key al-Qaeda leaders, but when civilians die along with them, these strikes ensure that a generation of Yemenis, Pakistanis, or Somalis will blame the U.S. for killing innocent community members, exacerbating America's serious image problems abroad and creating a space for extremist ideology to take root. In short, the U.S. drone program not only undermines the long-term national security of the United States by fostering widespread anti-U.S. sentiment, it also undermines the legitimacy of the host country government, whose support the U.S. needs, and it provides fodder for jihadi rhetoric that strengthens the very groups the U.S. seeks to destroy.

Third, Yemen is a test case — success over AQAP prevents regional terror and instability, but failure emboldens radical groups and inflames regional rivalries.


Jarrell 14 — Matthew Jarrell, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Brown University, 2014 (“Yemen: The Importance of Success in a Failed State,” Brown Political Review, October 30th, accessible online at http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/yemen-the-importance-of-success-in-a-failed-state/, accessed on 6-22-15)

Regional Reverberations



As Yemen deals with this latest round of domestic upheaval, the visible reciprocal relationship between the nation and foreign interventionists remains. World and regional powers have consistently had a negative impact on Yemeni internal affairs, and in turn, Yemen’s problems are hardly confined within its borders. There are numerous parallels between Yemen and other Middle Eastern nations’ struggles: intense regionalism embodied by the north versus south dynamic is reminiscent of Libyan civil strife, and the Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions harken back to Syrian divides. The Islamic State, a powerful terrorist group with international ambitions, has derailed a domestic political order in Iraq in a similar manner as AQAP in Yemen. As a nation that is plagued by all of these different dilemmas, it follows that a “solution” in Yemen could help immensely in shedding light on how to counter terror in the region as a whole.

The first step to a more stable society is loosening the grip of destructive foreign interests. The lessons that can be learned by examining repeated foreign missteps in Yemen are many: Britain’s colonial division, Saudi Arabian and American unflinching backup of Saleh, and Iran’s meddling in the Houthi issue should all have been avoided. Furthermore, if any hope of a resolution exists in this war-weary republic, it will manifest itself through domestic dialogue between the competing factions; perhaps the recent entrance of the Houthis into mainstream political discussion will enable that. Ideally, all Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP, eliminating one of the world’s most active terrorist groups and serving as a model for national integration to the entire Middle East.

Fourth, Yemen Instability destroys regional stability — we have two internal links.



  1. Yemen instability ensures a steady flow of weapons and sectarian divides — causes regional draw-in and escalation.


Salmoni et al. 10 — Barak Salmoni, Associate Professor of International Security Affairs at the College of International Security Affairs, Ph.D. in Middle East Policy from Harvard University, B.A. in Middle East Studies from Brandeis University — Bryce Loidolt, Adjunct Professor of Middle Eastern Affairs at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, M.A. in Middle East Studies from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, B.A. in Middle East Studies from Middleton College — Madeline Wells, Research Assistant at RAND Corporation, M.A. in Islamic Studies from Columbia University, B.A. in Government from Cornell University, 2010 (“Concerns of Regional Powers,” Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, Published by the RAND Corporation, ISBN: 978-0-8330-4933-9, pgs. 281-283)

Concerns of Regional Powers



Over the past three years, regional states have become increasingly involved in the GoYHuthi conflict. While San‘a has often referred to foreign (Libyan, Iranian) involvement as a way to explain Huthi persistence, neighboring govenments are concerned that the Huthi challenge aggravates the mounting threats to Yemen’s internal security. In this respect, the lack of adequate security along Yemen’s land and maritime borders increases the likelihood that terrorism, illicit trade, and weapons smuggling will persist throughout the region, raising the possibility that combatants in numerous substate conflicts will circulate transnationally, contributing to other simmering conflicts, or may be an element of regime propaganda focusing on the Huthis’ supposed foreign support. These issues pose a problem for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as Iran, while increasing the dangers in the ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea littoral. The regional threat perception caused by the conflict may also increase Sunni sentiment against alleged Iranian-Shi‘a encroachment in the Gulf.

Huthi violence in northern Yemen directly increases the threat to Saudi Arabian border regions. Although Yemen is not yet officially a part of the GCC, instability in a region that shares borders and security concerns requires a regional focus on boosting Yemeni security capabilities. Part of the security problem stems from the fact that much of Yemen’s border has never been satisfactorily delineated, despite recently heightened security coordination. Without consistent border security, the frequent frontier crossings by Yemeni tribesmen pose a concern to both states, in light of the Huthi challenge to the GoY. Additionally, tribal populations in the Saudi provinces of ‘Asir, Jizzan, and Najran (which has a large Isma‘ili and a small Zaydi minority) may identify with their Yemeni cousins. Specifically, although the Khawlan bin ‘Amr subtribes of Jabal Fayfa, Bani Ghazi, and Jabal Bani Malik have been on the Saudi side of the border since 1934, their members often travel back and forth for purposes of commerce. Given the geographical extent of GoY-Huthi clashes, these tribal sections may include some proHuthi members or may host small numbers of refugees from the conflict in Sa‘da. As we have seen, at different times the GoY has alluded to cross-border tribal support for Huthi fighters, while Huthi sources have alleged Saudi provision of funding and arms to the GoY, as well as cooperation in armed attacks on Huthi supporters.7 In the 2009– 2010 round of fighting, this became a regular theme of Huthi statements. More basically, unmonitored movement of population permits the proliferation of the enablers of regional strife, including weapons, funds, contraband goods, and ideas.

As seen in Chapter Five, the sixth phase of the war in Sa‘da has highlighted the conflict’s regional aspects and its potential for further transnationalization. Saudi Arabia has become directly entangled in fighting with Huthi forces on both sides of its border with Yemen and could persist in anti-Huthi operations. According to local analysts, Saudi involvement reflects frustration with GoY failures as well as a fear that a border open to Huthi movement could also permit the reinfiltration of al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) into Saudi territory, from which it had been mostly eradicated in 2003–2006. Toward the end of 2009, regional Arab fora, such as the GCC and Arab League, came out in support of Saudi actions to prevent “encroachment on Saudi and Yemeni sovereignty,” considering Yemeni security integral to that of surrounding Arab Gulf States. While Arab League and GCC states maintained the appearance of a united Arab front, their support for Saudi Arabia and the GoY lessens their ability to act as impartial mediators in any future conflict abatement process that might begin where the Qatar process ended.


  1. Yemen instability ensures Saudi proliferation — sectarian split creates a regional arms race.


Ashraf 15 — Maimuna Ashraf, Research Fellow at the Strategic Vision Institute, an international security think-tank, 2015 (“Muddle of Power Politics and Proliferation in Middle East – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, May 8th, accessible online at http://www.eurasiareview.com/08052015-muddle-of-power-politics-and-proliferation-in-middle-east-analysis/, accessed on 6-21-15)

Likewise, the Saudi military action in Yemen cannot be observed in disconnection to a US-Iranian nuclear deal. Evidently, the US is focusing on an approach to ensure a Balance of Power and blow a sectarian divide in the region, as it previously supported Iranian-led Shiite in Iraq and now reportedly is providing intelligence and mission planning to Saudi Arabia against pro-Iranian al-Houthis. The US does not want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon because Iran holds the conventional capability to target US and allied troops stationed in Middle Eastern region. Thus, the Iranian nuclear weapon developments would increase the threat radically for US. Whereas, if the Iran-US nuclear deal finalizes, the framework of the deal would probably lead to the lifting of sanctions from Iran, which may invigorate the Iranian economy to assist their military or nuclear ambitions.



These advancements might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, by primarily forcing Saudi Arabia to pursue such an option. The Saudis have already warned that they would acquire the atomic bomb if Iran becomes a nuclear power. Recently, Riyadh signed a memo of understanding with Seoul to build two nuclear power plants, whereas similar projects have already been taken place with France, Argentina and China.

Recently the US lifted its ban on military aid to Egypt, while Egypt has also announced the plan to build its first nuclear power plant with Russian help on the Mediterranean coast west of the port city of Alexandria. Egypt is being considered as another Sunni state in region, emerging as an atomic proliferate state. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) long ago ahead started constructing its nuclear reactor. Whereas, Israel’s nuclear plans are widely known, Israel is a non-party state to NPT, yet it already has a robust nuclear weapons stockpile in the region and is reportedly in quest of second strike capability. Now almost all the major powers of Middle East including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Turkey, Syria, Oman, UAE, Jordon, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt have either announced plans to produce nuclear energy or have signed nuclear cooperation accords. Yemen and Libya are the two states that have called off their nuclear programs. The predominant fear in the region is that most of the states in the region will join the nuclear arms race to secure themselves, following the Iran case or as result of ongoing regional power politics.



Conversely, the Yemen issue is widely affecting the Middle East, and the possibility of a South Asian state becoming embroiled in Yemen’s civil war is high because Riyadh has been leaning on Pakistan to join its military coalition, whilst the reports of secret Pak-Saudi nuclear cooperation are already being speculated. Thus, if the Yemen conflict gets complicated and Houthi rebels extend their vigorous aggression inside Saudi territory, then in such a worsening situation, Pakistan will be standing at a crossroad to decide about the level of its involvement in the conflict and scale of its cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Possibly, sighting the geopolitical calculus, a flat refusal would not be possible for Islamabad, while a direct involvement in Yemen would be taken as Saudi-led Sunni coalition arrayed against Iran that might ignite Pakistan-Iranian tensions and broader Shiite-Sunni conflict.

Fifth, Saudi proliferation ensures regional proliferation and nuclear war — it escalates and draws in other powers.


Edelman et al. 11 — Eric Edelman, visiting scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in US Diplomatic History from Yale University, B.A. in History from Cornell University — Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. from Harvard University in International Relations — Evan Montgomery, Senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, 2011 (“The Dangers of a Nuclear Armed Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, accessible online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nuclear-iran, accessed on 6-21-15)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.

Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

N-Player Competition

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.

More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.



Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.


Sixth, only the plan reverses the trend in time to solve — the Middle East could pass the brink for nuclear war at any moment.


London 10 — Herbert I. London, President of the Hudson Institute, Professor Emeritus at New York University, Ph.D. from New York University, 2010 (“The Coming Crisis In The Middle East,” Gatestone Institute, June 28th, available online at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east, Accessed 6-22-15)

The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger.

Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war]

Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War.

Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained.



In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course.

From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability.



For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses.

Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.



The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States' policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region.

Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, the U.S. has done nothing to forestall this eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. Further, despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region as well a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible.



As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those individuals seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration.

It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur, and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or will this be a war in which there aren't victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do?

This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe that it is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity -- a truly bad sign.

Seventh, instability causes AQAP positioning in Yemen that causes seizing of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.


Anzinger 14 — Niklas Anzinger, Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Syracuse University, 2014 (“Jihad At Sea - Al Qaeda’s Maritime Front in Yemen,” Maritime Executive, February 25th, accessible online at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Jihad-At-Sea--Al-Qaedas-Maritime-Front-in-Yemen-2014-02-25, accessed on 6-22-15)

Yemen’s state weakness due to fragmentation and ongoing conflicts allowed Al Qaeda and affiliates to take and hold territory, possibly enabling them to seize the Port of Aden. If Al Qaeda establishes safe havens in the southern Abyan province, supported by local Yemeni inhabitants, attacks at sea or in near by ports similar to the “USS Cole bombing” in 2000 could become a threat, increasing the danger to Red Sea shipping. Yet Al Qaeda is of secondary concern for the Yemeni government, with secessionist insurgencies in the north and the south threatening the state’s unity. Only a stable Yemen can effectively deny Al Qaeda a stable base in the long run.

In recent years, international shippers taking the Red Sea route have been primarily concerned with attacks by Somali pirates. Those attacks went down from 237 in 2011 to 15 in 2013 due to the Somali governments’ increased ability to fight and deter piracy, among other causes. However, another threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden looms. Yemen’s southern coastline is on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb which links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a critical maritime choke point where roughly 8.2% of global oil supply passed through in 2009. Its oil exports, accounting for 70% of Yemeni government revenue, make the country highly dependent on its declining reserves. Yemen is an Al Qaeda stronghold, second only to Pakistan (and possibly Syria more recently). It was a target of the U.S. “drone campaign,” with 94 strikes between 2002 and 2013 (Pakistan: 368). Al Qaeda aims to enforce rigid Islamic legislation in Muslim countries and establish a global Islamic Caliphate. According to its 20-year plan, Al Qaeda aims to subdue “apostate” Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It hosts a franchise in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), establishing safe havens in the governorates of Al Bayda’, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Lahji and Abyan, where it exerts considerable influence.

Yemen’s weak central state

Yet the Yemeni government, headed by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi since February 2012 after the 33-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh came to an end, has to deal with more than Al Qaeda. In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic in the north united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. United in name, Yemen, however, remained a fragmented entity rife with internal divisions. In 1994, a civil war between Saleh’s north and the secessionist south broke out. In 1997, a group called “Ansar Allah”, emerging from a Zaidi Shia religious organization, confronted the Yemeni government leading to armed uprisings and several rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010. In late March 2011, the defection of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the chief military commander in north Yemen, led to a security vacuum in the northwest that Ansar Allah seized to take control of Saada city where it continues fighting Sunni-Salafist tribes. His defection may, however, only be a symptom of the Yemeni state’s retreat to Sana’a, neglecting the north and the south. As a consequence, Hadi has to cope with internal struggles and two rebel movements, constraining his ability to fight AQAP.

Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea



Al Qaeda’s terrorism at sea emanating from Yemen has a tradition and method. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, an eminent jihadi strategist, defined several choke points as a target and outlined methods for disruption: blocking the passages using mines or sinking ships in them, threatening movement at sea through piracy, martyrdom operations and weapons.

On the Earth, there are five (5) important straits, four of them are in the countries of the Arabs and the Muslims. The fifth one is in America, and it is the Panama Canal. These straits are: 1. The Strait of Hormuz, the oil gate in the Persian Gulf. 2. The Suez Canal in Egypt. 3. The Bab el Mandib between Yemen and the African continent. 4. The Gibraltar Strait in Morocco. Most of the Western world’s economy, in terms of trade and oil, passes through these sea passages. Also passing through them are the military fleets, aircraft carriers and the deadly missiles hitting our women and children … It is necessary to shut these passages until the invader campaigns have left our countries. […]. — Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance Call”.

Eighth, Yemen instability spikes oil prices via straight cut off — perception alone triggers the impact.


Rosen 15 — Armin Rosen, Freelance journalist who has written in publications like The Atlantic, US News & World Report, and The Wall Street Journal — Internally citing an EIA report on the Bab el-Mandeb Straight, 2015 (“War In Yemen Could Threaten One Of The World's Most Important Oil Chokepoints,” Business Insider, March 26th, accessible online at http://www.businessinsider.com/war-in-yemen-could-threaten-one-of-the-worlds-most-important-oil-choke-points-2015-3, accessed on 6-21-15)

Oil prices are surging after Saudi Arabia began a military operation against Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in neighboring Yemen:

Yemen isn't a world-shaking oil producer, churning out a mere 133,000 barrels a day in 2013. Prices may have been jolted by the strong possibility that Saudi Arabia, which produces 11.6 million barrels a day, is entering a risky military conflict.

The situation in Aden, a strategically decisive port city on Yemen's southern coast, was so bad that President Adb Rabbu Mansur Hadi reportedly had to flee the city, and the country, by boat rather than by air.



This means that Houthi rebels are contesting areas along the Bab el-Mandeb, the straits at the opening of the Red Sea and one of the world's crucial oil chokepoints.

According to the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) fact-sheet on global oil chokepoints, 3.8 million barrels of oil and "refined petroleum products" passed through the Bab el-Mandeb each day on its way to Europe, Asia, and the US, making it the world's fourth-busiest chokepoint.

The strait controls access to multiple oil terminals and to a oil pipeline co-owned by state companies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that transits oil between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, called the Suez-Mediterranean or SUMED pipeline.

The Bab el-Mandeb is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, "limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments," according to the Energy Information Administration.

The closure of the straits — or the perception of added risk of closure — could have huge consequences for the global oil market.

"Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost," the EIA fact-sheet explains. "In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb."

Sudan and South Sudan would also have their only oil terminal cut off from Asia-bound trade, as the countries' shared pipeline terminates in Port Sudan. And it would cut off Indian Ocean access to the Mediterranean sea as well as the SUMED pipeline, which can transit 2.24 million barrels of oil per day — more than the daily output of all but 13 of the world's countries.

Ninth, price shocks cause global economic collapse — causes a domino effect of economic decline.


Rentschler 13 — Jun Rentschler, Analyst at the World Bank, Consultant at the European Bank for Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University College, London, 2013 (“Oil Price volatility – its risk on economic growth and development,” World Bank, July 18th, accessible online at http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/oil-price-volatility-its-risk-economic-growth-and-development, accessed on 6-22-15)

Oil price shocks (i.e. sudden changes) can be transmitted into the macro-economy via various channels. In the private sector, a positive oil price shock will increase production costs and hence restrict output – with price increases at least partially passed on to consumers. Moreover, as prices for gasoline and electricity increase, households face higher costs of living, with the poor being particularly vulnerable. These impacts can have further significant knock-on effects and repercussions throughout the economy, affecting macro-indicators such as employment, trade balance, inflation and public accounts, as well as stock market prices and exchange rates. Thereby, the nature and extent of such knock-on effects depend on the structural characteristics of an economy; for instance, the more a country engages in oil trade, the more it is exposed to price shocks on global commodity markets. Countries relying on a high fossil fuel share in their energy mix, or on energy intensive industrial production, are also more vulnerable. Furthermore, oil price shocks on the international market might be amplified in specific countries, depending on the respective Dollar exchange rate and prevailing inflationary pressures.

While a given oil price increase may be perceived positively by oil exporting countries and negatively by importers, an increase in oil price volatility (i.e. consecutive positive and negative oil price shocks) increases perceived price uncertainty for all countries – regardless of their trade balance. Such oil price volatility reduces planning horizons, causes firms to postpone investments, and may require expensive reallocation of resources. Formulating robust national budgets becomes more difficult, as importing countries face uncertainty regarding import costs and fuel subsidies levels, and exporters face volatile revenues. This may be a particularly profound problem in budget constrained developing countries, which rely on oil exports as a main source of public revenue. In order to protect firms and households against price volatility on international markets, particularly in developing countries, governments often allocate large parts of their budgets to subsidizing fuel. These subsidy systems not only expose governments to significant budgetary risks, but result in significant environmental costs, benefit mainly the wealthier, create disincentives for energy efficiency, and crowd out resources from education, health and other investments in development.

Finally, global economic decline risks nuclear war.


Merlini 11 — Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Insitution, 2011 (“A Post-Secular World?,” Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2, April, pgs. 117–130, accessible online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2011.571015, accessed on 6-22-15)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.




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