Chinese strategies for returning emigrants to the homeland are key to their technological innovation and national power
Kennedy, Harvard PhD in political science and ANU Crawford school of public policy senior lecturer, 2015 (Andrew B., “Powerhouses or pretenders? Debating China’s and India’s emergence as technological powers,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 28, Issue 2, 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2014.995126, IC)
Technological creativity represents a key source of national power, a point long recognized by international relations scholars. New technologies not only spur economic growth and national prosperity, but can also provide states with leverage in international trade. New technologies from railroads to nuclear energy have also generated new sources of military power, at least for states that can surmount the financial and organizational hurdles to military innovation (Horowitz 2010). Moreover, nations vary widely in their innovative capacities. Long-cycle theorists, who have probed the connections between technology and national power with particular care, note that technological development at a given point in history tends to cluster in a single national economy, from which it diffuses throughout the international system (Thompson 1990; Modelski and Thompson 1996).
In this context, it is not surprising that technological innovation should be a pressing preoccupation for rising powers. To be sure, a rising state may simply be a ‘fast follower’, rapidly adopting new technologies invented elsewhere rather than creating them on its own. When the hurdles to imitation are high, however, the advantages of possessing a new technology first – both in the economic and military spheres – can be considerable (Milner and Yoffie 1989; Mueller 1997; Horowitz 2010). Indeed, the historical record makes clear that technological innovation often helps fuel the rise of new powers. Germany rose to economic prominence in the late-nineteenth century as it ‘institutionalized innovation’ in what David Landes called ‘the second wind’ of the industrial revolution (Landes 2003, 352). The rise of the United States in the early- and mid-twentieth century was not simply a function of its increasingly vast economy, but also technological leadership in areas ranging from electric light to mass production to air transport (Gordon 2004, 23–34). Following World War II, Japan's remarkable rise in automotive and information technology led to predictions that it would eclipse the United States as the world's leading economy, expectations that have faded as Japan has struggled to keep up in the age of the Internet (Drezner 2001).
Today's rising powers – China and India in particular – are certainly not content to rely on the outside world for new technologies. In 2006, China's National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020), or MLP, was launched to rapidly advance ‘indigenous innovation’ and to promote 16 ‘megaprojects’ in particular (State Council 2006). The MLP was spurred in part by dissatisfaction with China's role in the world economy, as well as a conviction that foreign companies would no longer transfer technologies, particularly advanced technologies, to Chinese firms (Cao et al.2006, 41). The document itself argued that ‘in areas critical to the national economy and security, core technologies cannot be purchased’ and that China should ‘take the initiative in the fierce international competition’. Yet the MLP hardly endorsed autarky: the document listed a range of shortcomings in China's own science and technology (S&T) system and concluded that international cooperation would be essential for China going forward. In 2010, China added a follow-on plan to speed the development of seven ‘Strategic Emerging Industries’ (SEI) – an effort to place Chinese companies at the forefront of technological innovation. While more targeted than the MLP, this initiative also represents a striking mix of technological ambition, nationalist anxiety, and international outreach.
Chinese attempts to build ‘indigenous innovation’ through returning emigrants to the homeland are key to its technological innovation—that gets militarized for cyberwarfare and allow for Chinese aggression against Taiwan
Mulvenon, UCLA PhD in political science and Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis Director, 2013 (James C., “Chinese Cyber Espionage,” testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing entitled “Hearing on Chinese Hacking: Impact on Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law,” 6/25/13, http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%20Chinese%20Hacking%20-%20James%20Mulvenon%20Written%20Statement.pdf, IC)
After more than thirty years of serving as the world's assembly point and export processing zone, the Beijing government has clearly made the decision to transform Chinese economic development by encouraging "indigenous innovation."xvi Since 2006, James McGregor and others have highlighted "Chinese policies and initiatives aimed at building 'national champion' companies through subsidies and preferential policies while using China's market power to appropriate foreign technology, tweak it and create Chinese 'indigenous innovations' that will come back at us globally."xvii In the information technology sector, McGregor notes "Chinese government mandate to replace core foreign technology in critical infrastructure -- such as chips, software and communications hardware -- with Chinese technology within a decade." Among the tools being actively used to achieve these goals are:
a foreign-focused anti-monopoly law, mandatory technology transfers, compulsory technology licensing, rigged Chinese standards and testing rules, local content requirements, mandates to reveal encryption codes, excessive disclosure for scientific permits and technology patents, discriminatory government procurement policies, and the continued failure to adequately protect intellectual property rights.xviii
Missing from this excellent list, however, are traditional technical espionage and technical cyber espionage, which many companies believe are already eroding their technical advantage. The logic for these latter approaches is clearly outlined by David Szady, former head of the FBI's counterintelligence unit: "If they can steal it and do it in five years, why [take longer] to develop it?"xix Rather than destroying US competitiveness through "cyberwar," former DNI McConnell argues that Chinese entities "are exploiting our systems for information advantage – looking for the characteristics of a weapons system by a defense contractor or academic research on plasma physics, for example – not in order to destroy data and do damage."xx
Examples of Chinese cyber espionage to obtain science and technology can be divided into two broad categories: external and insider. The 2011 NCIX report offers three illustrative examples of insider cyber threats:
David Yen Lee, a chemist with Valspar Corporation, used his access to internal computer networks between 2008 and 2009 to download approximately 160 secret formulas for paints and coatings to removable storage media. He intended to parlay this proprietary information to obtain a new job with Nippon Paint in Shanghai, China. Lee was arrested in March 2009, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of trade secrets, and was sentenced in December 2010 to 15 months in prison.
Meng Hong, a DuPont research chemist, downloaded proprietary information on organic light-emitting diodes (OLED) in mid-2009 to his personal email account and thumb drive. He intended to transfer this information to Peking University, where he had accepted a faculty position, and sought Chinese government funding to commercialize OLED research. Hong was arrested in October 2009, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of trade secrets, and was sentenced in October 2010 to 14 months in prison.
Xiangdong Yu (aka Mike Yu), a product engineer with Ford Motor Company, copied approximately 4,000 For documents onto an external hard drive to help obtain a job with a Chinese automotive company. He was arrested in October 2009, pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of trade secrets, and sentenced in April 2011 to 70 months in prison.xxi
External cyber threats to scientific and industrial data, believed to originate in China, have been well-documented in reports by outside vendors. Some examples include:
In its Night Dragon report, McAfee documented "coordinated covert and targeted cyberattacks have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies," "targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field bids and operations."xxii
In his Shady Rat report, McAfee's Dmitry Alperovitch identified 71 compromised organizations in one set of intrusions, including 13 defense contractors, 13 information technology companies, and 6 manufacturing companies.xxiii
In January 2010, Google reported a "highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property," including source code.xxiv Google claimed that the intrusion also targeted "at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors," and was corroborated in separate admissions by Adobe,xxv
In its GhostNet report, researchers at Information Warfare Monitor found 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries, including a range of political, diplomatic and economic target organizations such as Deloitte and Touche's New York office.xxvi The follow-on report, Shadows in the Cloud, identified additional targets, including Honeywell.xxvii Each of these reported intrusions were traced to IP addresses in China, and almost certainly represent only a fraction of the known hacks, given the reluctance of companies to report data breaches.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
It is also important to contextualize China’s interest in cyber espionage within Beijing’s threat perceptions of potential scenarios for military conflict. In the minds of the Chinese leadership, the available evidence suggests that the most important political-military challenges and the most likely flashpoints for Sino-US conflict involve Taiwan or the South China Sea. Should the late 1990s, the PLA has been hard at work bolstering the hedging options of the leadership, developing advanced campaign doctrines, testing the concepts in increasingly complex training and exercises, and integrating new indigenous and imported weapons systems.
Yet cyber operations are also expected to play an important role in these scenarios, necessitating intelligence preparation of the cyber battlefield. At the strategic level, the writings of Chinese military authors suggest that there are two main centers of gravity in a Taiwan scenario, both of which can be attacked with computer network operations in concert with other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The first of these is the will of the Taiwanese people, which they hope to undermine through exercises, cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, missile attacks, SOF operations, and other operations that have a psyop focus. Based on assessments from the 1995-1996 exercises, as well as public opinion polling in Taiwan, China appears to have concluded that the Taiwanese people do not have the stomach for conflict and will therefore sue for peace after suffering only a small amount of pain. The second center of gravity is the will and capability of the United States to intervene decisively in a cross-strait conflict. In a strategic sense, China has traditionally believed that its ICBM inventory, which is capable of striking CONUS, will serve as a deterrent to US intervention or at least a brake on escalation.xxviii
Closer to its borders, the PLA has been engaged in an active program of equipment modernization, purchasing niche "counter-intervention" capabilities such as anti-ship ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles and submarines to shape the operational calculus of the American carrier strike group commander on station.xxix According to the predictable cadre of “true believers,” both of the centers of gravity identified above can be attacked using computer network operations. In the first case, the Chinese IO community believes that CNO will play a useful psychological role in undermining the will of the Taiwanese people by attacking infrastructure and economic vitality. In the second case, the Chinese IO community envisions computer network attacks against unclassified NIPRNET and its automated logistics systems as an effective way to deter or delay US intervention into a military contingency and thereby permit Beijing to achieve its political objectives with a minimum of fighting. In both cases, China must conduct substantial computer network exploitation (the military term for cyber espionage) for intelligence preparation of this battlefield, and the alleged intrusion set into NIPRNET computer systems would appear to fulfill this military requirement.
Why does the Chinese military believe that the deployment phase of US military operations, particularly the use of the unclassified NIPRNET for logistics deployments, is the primary focus of vulnerability? Since DESERT STORM in the early 1990s, the PLA has expended significant resources analyzing the operations of what it often and euphemistically terms “the high-tech enemy.”xxx When Chinese strategists contemplate how to affect US deployments, they confront the limitations of their current conventional force, which does not have range sufficient to interdict US facilities or assets beyond the Japanese home islands.xxxi Nuclear options, while theoretically available, are nonetheless far too escalatory to be used so early in the conflict.xxxii Theater missile systems, which are possibly moving to a mixture of conventional and nuclear warheads, could be used against Japan or Guam, but uncertainties about the nature of a given warhead would likely generate responses similar to the nuclear scenario.xxxiii Instead, PLA analysts of US military operations presciently concluded that the key vulnerability was the mechanics of deployment itself. Specifically, Chinese authors highlight DoD’s need to use civilian backbone and unclassified computer networks (known as the NIPRNET), which is a function of the requirements of global power projection, as an "Achilles Heel." There is also recognition of the fact that operations in the Pacific are especially reliant on precisely coordinated transportation, communications, and logistics networks, given what PACOM calls the “tyranny of distance”xxxiv in the theater. PLA strategists believe that a disruptive computer network attack against these systems or affiliated civilian systems could potentially delay or degrade US force deployment to the region while allowing the PRC to maintain a degree of plausible deniability.
The Chinese are right to highlight the NIPRNET as an attractive and accessible target, unlike its classified counterparts. It is attractive because it contains and transmits critical deployment information in the all-important time-phased force deployment list (known as the “tip-fiddle”), which is valuable for both intelligence-gathering about US military operations but also a lucrative target for disruptive attacks. In terms of accessibility, it was relatively easy to gather data about the NIRPNET from open sources, at least before 9/11. Moreover, the very nature of the system is the source of its vulnerabilities, since the needs of global power project mandate that it has to be unclassified and connected to the greater global network, albeit through protected gateways.xxxv
DoD’s classified networks, on the other hand, are an attractive but less accessible target for the Chinese. On the one hand, these networks would be an intelligence gold mine, and is likely a priority computer network exploit target. On the other hand, they are less attractive as a computer network attack target, thanks to the difficulty of penetrating its high defenses. Any overall Chinese military strategy predicated on a high degree of success in penetrating these networks during crisis or war is a high-risk venture, and increases the chances of failure of the overall effort to an unacceptable level.
Chinese CNE or CNA operations against logistics networks could have a detrimental impact on US logistics support to operations. PRC computer network exploit activities directed against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various units, timing and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. This is especially important for the Chinese in times of crisis, since the PRC in peacetime utilizes US military web sites and newspapers as a principal source for deployment information. An article in October 2001 in People's Daily, for example, explicitly cited US Navy web sites for information about the origins, destination and purpose of two carrier battle groups exercising in the South China Sea.xxxvi Since the quantity and quality of deployment information on open websites has been dramatically reduced after 9/11, the intelligence benefits (necessity?) of exploiting the NIPRNET have become even more paramount.xxxvii Computer network attack could also delay re-supply to the theater by misdirecting stores, fuel, and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission capability.
China tech rise now—challenging Silicon Valley
The New Economy 2012 (“Silicon Valley: The new contenders,” The New Economy, a quarterly magazine and website looking at technology and innovation in its wider business context, 1/18/12, http://www.theneweconomy.com/strategy/silicon-valley-the-new-contenders, IC)
In a bid to flaunt an innovation-based economy by 2020, China is advancing swiftly into the realm of technology, and is now considered one of the strongest contenders to seriously challenge Silicon Valley. Recognising the potential, foreign and native investors alike have raced to inject funds into the tech sector.
Although the Chinese tech environment is very much under development, its progress has passed the mere budding stage. Recognising the potential of the region, an increasing number of top-notch entrepreneurs and major technology companies descend on the country from across the globe, turning their back on the sun-drenched destination that previously held their attention. Indeed, if there is a country in the world revelling in brain gain, it’s China.
Generous funding is not the only element that tempts the best in foreign minds to settle in China; the country’s culture of tech innovations is becoming a draw in its own right. China might be known as the copy cat above all others ≥ be it in the field of hand bag design, technology or otherwise – but there’s no doubt that the country has started to impress its surroundings with an environment that supports original ideas.
Already some native companies are rising to position themselves as world leaders in innovation. The Chinese internet conglomerate Tencent boasts a stock market value that hovers just below the names of leading lights such as Google and Amazon. Two other strong contenders are the leading e-commerce portal, Alibaba, and Huawei Technology, which has made its name pioneering next-generation mobile communication infrastructure. In the field of computer engineering as well, one of the fastest computers ever to be produced is the brainchild of Chinese engineers. Collectively, these forward-thinking companies and products have helped to boost China’s status to become viable forces in the tech sector.
As a way to flex its tech muscles to the world, China plays host to one of the world’s most important conferences on tech innovation and entrepreneurship. CHINICT is an annual event that has now been running for eight years and next set to take place in Beijing in May 2012. The conference attracts delegates from all over the world and the interest it generates is highly indicative of China’s growing status in the tech universe. As a result, the event has grown increasingly grandiose as the years have gone on.
China scenario – return key to economy Attracting overseas Chinese scholars back to China is key to their economy
Wang, Brookings Institute visiting fellow, 2010 (Huiyao, “China’s National Talent Plan: Key Measures and Objectives,” Brookings, 11/23/10, http://robohub.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Brookings_China_1000_talent_Plan.pdf, IC)
China has also enjoyed a huge trade surplus for a number of years. However, in terms of the exchange of rencai, it has suffered a major deficit. China has sent out 1.62 million students and scholars since 1978, but as of today, only 497,000 have returned to China. The fact that the total number of returnees is now close to half a million was helped by the financial crisis in some developed countries: over 100,000 students returned to China in 2009 alone. Although the total return rate is now around 30 percent, the U.S. Energy Department’s Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education for the National Science Foundation reports that the percentage of highly qualified Chinese rencai —such as U.S.-educated PhD graduates in the sciences and engineering—that remained in the United States stands at 92 percent, the highest in the world (in comparison, for these highly qualified rencai, India’s stay rate is 81 percent, Taiwan’s is 43 percent, South Korea’s is 41 percent, Japan’s is 33 percent, Mexico’s is 32 percent and Thailand’s is 7 percent).as can be see from the table below.xiii
China has begun to recognize that having financial resources is not enough: human resources must be prioritized in today’s knowledge economy. Therefore, methods for attracting human capital to China can have a profound impact on the country’s economic, political and social transformation.
Increasing national talent is key to transitioning the Chinese economy from manufacturing to information technology
Wang, Brookings Institute visiting fellow, 2010 (Huiyao, “China’s National Talent Plan: Key Measures and Objectives,” Brookings, 11/23/10, http://robohub.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Brookings_China_1000_talent_Plan.pdf, IC)
The national talent development plan can be viewed as a new national strategy to transform China from a labor-intensive country into a talent-rich one. Although this plan was established by the central government for implementation at the top levels of government, the example set by the central government’s talent plan has already led many Chinese provincial and municipal governments to establish local talent development plans. Through this, there has been a new emphasis placed on talent development in many regions, which are in need of talented individuals now more than ever before. Guangdong Province is a good example of this phenomenon, particularly since it has been hit hard by the global financial crisis and the subsequent closure of many labor-intensive manufacturing facilities in the province. There, CCP Politburo Member and provincial Party Chief Wang Yang chaired a study meeting for all top provincial leaders on this author’s book National Strategy—Talents Change World on May 22 of this year.xxxiii The aforementioned Foxconn serial labor suicides and the strikes at Toyota and Honda all happened in Guangdong this year. Thus, Guangdong needs to find a new strategy to upgrade its industries and maintain its growth. In 2007, Guangdong’s GDP, after overtaking those of Singapore and Hong Kong, surpassed that of Taiwan.xxxiv However, while the financial crisis was still impacting Guangdong in 2010 and it continued to face various new challenges to its economy, the daunting tasks facing Guangdong are not unique to the province; they are in fact challenges faced by the whole country.
Cheap labor has fueled China’s development miracle over the past three decades, but that model, focused mainly on manufacturing, requiring high resources and energy consumption and resulting in a heavy toll on the environment, has led China to a crossroads. China needs to find a new growth engine and a new effective stimulus, which will require changing the mindset regarding investment that has dominated the past 30 years. While China’s past success was built on its population dividend, its future growth will rely on the new strategy set forth by this newly adopted national talent development plan.
AT Mexican immigration solves Mexican immigration can’t solve – structural barriers means they wouldn’t be able to fill the IT industry
Alarcon, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte [College of the Northern Border] faculty member, 2000 (Rafael, “Migrants of the Information Age: Indian and Mexican Engineers and Regional Development in Silicon Valley,” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No. 16, May 2000, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2811q36q, p. 14-15, IC)
This comparative view of industrial policy in India and Mexico yields interesting insights. The Indian and Mexican governments went from an import substitution strategy of industrialization to economic liberalization at about the same time. In the case of Mexico this process has been more radical. The two governments faced a consistent policy on the part of IBM and responded differently. The departure of IBM from India and the absence of a strong domestic computer industry forced India to rely on imports from many sources. As a result of this, Indian programmers were forced to acquire a very eclectic training that is crucial in today’s global labor market for software production (Parthasarathy, 2000). During the 1980s, the city of Bangalore, "India's Silicon Valley" supplied in addition to software products, large numbers of highly skilled, low-wage software engineers and programmers who took jobs in the United States and other countries. Currently, it is estimated that there are nearly 140,000 Indian scientists working abroad (Stremlau, 1996). In contrast, the relative success of Mexico in creating a national industry to locally produce computers, is one factor that helps explain the relative small number of Mexican engineers and scientists who seek employment in the United States. Conclusion This article has shown that immigration policy has been a powerful instrument in the creation of immigrant “niches” in the labor markets. While Indians have clustered in the information technology industry, Mexicans have formed “niches” in low-skilled industries such as agriculture, The review of the relationship between immigration policy and the requirements of the information technology industry reveals two important conclusions. First, the changes on immigration policy of the mid-1960s instituted a selection process that facilitated the immigration of Indians with high levels of education. This is the main factor that explains why these immigrants are so highly educated and why they concentrate in the high technology industry. Portes and Rumbaut (1996) contend that unlike Europeans and some Latin Americans (such as the Mexicans), Asians and Africans could not use family reunification to enter the United States. There were few immigrants from those countries living in the United States; hence, the only path open to them was the use of occupational skills. For this reason, at least in the immediate period after the implementation of the act, most of the Indians who entered the United States using employment-based visas were highly educated. This initial movement created a strong network of highly educated Indian immigrants. That situation began to change as family reunification and refugee policy allowed the immigration of less skilled persons. On the other hand, the Mexican immigrants constitute the largest group of unskilled workers because geographical propinquity has lessened the selection process by lowering the economic and social costs of immigration. In addition, specific immigration U.S. policies, direct recruitment, and the development of social networks have encouraged the immigration of unskilled workers.
In regards to the effect of industrial policies in India and Mexico, Parthasarathy (2000) contends that the ability of Indians to become "global software engineers" is the result of industrial policies implemented by the Indian government supporting the development of the software industry. The departure of IBM from India in 1978, and the failure of the country to develop a domestic viable computer industry forced most Indian users to rely on imports that came from many sources. Thus, during the 1970s and 1980s Indian programmers learned how to work on a variety of platforms without being tied to any single one Parthasarathy (2000). In contrast, Mexico has solidified its role as the preferred location for inbond manufacturing in the electronics industry, and now expanding under NAFTA.
AT no labor shortage Even if there’s no labor shortage, high-skilled laborers massively boost the economy by increasing productivity
Nowrasteh, Cato Institute Immigration Policy Analyst, 2015 (Alex, “Allow Highly Skilled Immigration and Boost the Economy,” The Cato Institute, 1/21/15, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/allow-highly-skilled-immigration-boost-economy, IC)
As virtually all the research shows, attracting more high-skilled immigrants will stimulate economic growth and job creation by boosting innovation and productivity.
Hatch touted I-Squared by writing that even “[t]he president recognizes we face a high-skilled worker shortage that has become a national crisis.” Although there are tight labor markets for some high-tech occupations, the information sector is not one of them, and it’s by no means a national crisis. Wages for computer scientists, many engineers, and scientists are growing more quickly than for other occupations, but wage increases and a tight labor market are not the same as a shortage.
The real benefits of I-Squared wouldn’t come from filling jobs in “shortage” occupations, which don’t exist for most technology occupations, but from increasing the productivity of the American economy.
“The productivity gains from immigrant inventions and innovations are tremendous.”
Economists at Rutgers and Princeton found that a 1-percentage-point increase in college-educated immigrants as a share of the population increased patents per capita by 9 percent to 18 percent. Economists from Harvard and the University of Michigan also found a 10 percent increase in the number of workers with H-1B visas in a city boosts the entire city’s patent output by almost 1 percent, a huge increase given the small numbers of H-1Bs relative to the workforce. They concluded that H-1B workers boost patents and innovation so much that they have a significant effect on long-term economic growth while also creating more jobs for Americans with similar skills.
The productivity gains from immigrant inventions and innovations are tremendous. From 1990 to 2010, 10 percent to 25 percent of the total combined productivity growth across 219 American cities was caused by H-1B workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) professions. Those large gains occurred not just because of patenting but because skilled immigrants have different skills than Americans with similar educations. A larger, more diversely skilled immigrant workforce in the STEM occupations boosts wages and jobs for American workers.
Influential research by University of California, Berkeley, economist Charles Jones found that 50 percent of U.S. productivity growth from 1950 to 1993 could be attributed to growth in the share of scientists and engineers in the workforce. I-Squared’s reforms to the H-1B system could more than triple the annual flow of engineers and scientists into the United States. If history is any guide, I-Squared’s increase in those occupations could jump-start the U.S. economy for decades to come.
The bill, of course, does more than liberalize the H-1B visa. It also boosts the number of employment-based green cards for highly skilled immigrants, more than doubling them by creating numerous exemptions. Skilled immigrants with green cards are very entrepreneurial, as are immigrants at every skill level.
Between 1995 and 2005, 25.3 percent of all technology and engineering firms established in the United States had at least one immigrant founder. In Silicon Valley, 43.9 percent of technology and engineering startups had at least one immigrant co-founder between 2005 and 2012. Company creation is a big driver of employment growth and innovation, and immigrants do a lot of it.
AT low-skill solves High-skilled immigration is uniquely key for entrepreneurship
Mustos, Eötvös Loránd University Master of Laws, 2014 (Anita, “The Age of Migration: Open Borders Pros and Cons,” Thesis submitted to Eötvös Loránd University Law University, consulting Boldizsár Nagy, Eötvös Loránd University department of international relations associate professor, 9/12/14, http://www.unleashingideas.org/global-entrepreneurship-library/sites/grl/files/anita_mustos_-_thesis_2014.pdf, p. 26, IC)
The contribution of highly skilled immigrants can be various: they fuel knowledge creation at the universities, offer technical skills combined with international cultural knowledge and diverse perspectives to the research and development teams of U.S. businesses. Also, they build up their own businesses and create jobs for inhabitants and for other immigrants. On the other hand, they enable employers to fill vacancies at the different levels of skills and experience continuum.
The case of low-skilled immigration is more complex. In one hand, they fulfil the demand for nontradable, -with other words- in-person services but also their overrepresentation in these jobs (child care, cleaning and maintenance, gardening, hairdressing or manicuring, health care etc.) may exacerbate the barriers that the lowest skilled individuals already face in the labour market, especially when the lessskilled nationals have to compete with cheap unathorized immigrant workforce.
H-1B key to innovation
Mustos, Eötvös Loránd University Master of Laws, 2014 (Anita, “The Age of Migration: Open Borders Pros and Cons,” Thesis submitted to Eötvös Loránd University Law University, consulting Boldizsár Nagy, Eötvös Loránd University department of international relations associate professor, 9/12/14, http://www.unleashingideas.org/global-entrepreneurship-library/sites/grl/files/anita_mustos_-_thesis_2014.pdf, p. 32-33, IC)
The rapidly growing and shifting high-tech industry requires a large pool of specific skills. The overwhelming majority of H-1B visas are issued to foreign professionals in STEM fields, such as information technology, life sciences, and materials sciences. These are typically engineers, scientists, doctors, nurses, professors, and researchers.62
The available supply for this specific demand cannot be measured by the sheer number of U.S. STEM degree holders. Foreign workers may outcompete but do not crowd out their native rivals. Wadhwa suggests also that the H-1B opponents do not take into account the lack of labor mobility or the number of STEM holders who decide to leave this competitive field of industry for other pursuits.
Finally, the most simplistic argument against H-1B opponents lies in numbers. Research has found that a higher concentration of H-1B holders in STEM fields actually boost invention. The two-thirds of H-1B visas are issued for positions in the STEM fields and more than two-thirds of those STEM-based visas go to applicants from India and China where apparently more than fifty percent of the world’s undergraduate engineering degrees are earned.63
As Brookings’ data shows, H-1B holders are concentrated in metropolitan areas and in innovative research centers such as New York or the Silicon Valley where unemployment rates for bachelor degree holders are relatively marginal. This means that “where there is innovation and economic growth, there is a great demand for U.S. and foreign workers.”64
In conclusion, Vivek Wadhwa notes:
“In a global competition for talent, U.S. companies and institutions say they must seek the best talent, whatever the nationality of the candidate.”65
AT wages DA H1-B visa immigration doesn’t depress wages
Melugin, CEI Adjunct Fellow, 2001 (Jessica P., “High-Tech Immigration,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, Tech Briefing 2001, p. 37, IC)
The H1-B program is sometimes accused of exerting downward pressure on wages for US-born technology workers. But according to a Commerce Department study, “It seems clear from both government and non-government data, that the compensation level for IT professionals is both high and rising.” The study cites salary growth estimates ranging from 3 to 4 percent up to double-digit growth.7 So while it may be true that H1-B workers are preventing US salaries from skyrocketing (which would be to the detriment of consumers and the US economy in general), visa holders are certainly not depressing wages in the tech sector.
H1-B visas don’t result in unethically low wages for foreign-born workers
Melugin, CEI Adjunct Fellow, 2001 (Jessica P., “High-Tech Immigration,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, Tech Briefing 2001, p. 37, IC)
Because employers are obligated to pay H1-B workers at least the wage paid to their native-born counterparts, foreign-born workers are protected from inappropriately low wages. Very few instances of noncompliance with this requirement have been found. Close to 525,000 non-immigrant petitions were granted between 1991 and 1999; during that time, 134 violations were found, and only seven were determined “willful” violations of the law.8 Contrary to some critics’ accusations, an average of one intentional violation per year does not a slave-labor scheme make.
AT we go over cap Still has an economic impact
Kirkegaard, Peterson Institute for International Economics senior fellow with a PhD from Johns Hopkins, 2015 (Jacob Funk, “The Economic Scope and Future of US-India Labor Migration Issues,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, February 2015, http://www.wwww.piie.com/publications/wp/wp15-1.pdf, p. 9, IC)
Lines 10 and 11 in table 5 show the annual congressional H-1B cap and the date on which it was reached17 (and/or the number of petitions fi led on the first of day of visa availability). It is clear that the cap is of limited importance to the actual number of H-1B petitions approved each year: the numbers reported in line 1 show the approval of 3–4 times as many H-1B visas as stipulated by the cap. This is by legislative intent, as the law exempts all H-1B visas for continuing employment (grey-shaded areas in table 5), as well as H-1Bs for initial employment, if the petitioner is an institution of higher education (or its affiliated or related nonprofit entities), a nonprofit research organization, or a government research organization.18 In other words, the H-1B cap is applied almost exclusively to private businesses hiring new foreign employees on H-1B visas. And as table 5 shows, even those for initial employment can exceed the congressional cap substantially; indeed, the only time this was not the case was in FY2010. These data further highlight the importance of the H-1B program to nonprofit, research, and higher education organizations in the United States.
Since the mid-2000s, H-1B visas have become available on April 1 for the following fiscal year. The data (line 11) show that the congressional cap is frequently met within months—and in 2008 and 2009, during the Great Recession, the allocated number was exhausted on the very first day of availability.19 Thus in recent years US-located firms have, often for a number of months, not had access to new foreign high-skilled employees on H-1B visas. So although the actual number of H-1B visas exceeds the cap, it is a mistake to assume that the effects of the cap are uniform or that its economic impact is negligible.
AT domestic crowd-out Turn—high-skilled immigrants increase jobs for US natives—we have statistics
Zavodny, Agnes Scott College economics professor, 2011 (Madeline, “Immigration and American Jobs,” American Enterprise Institute, 12/15/11, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/-immigration-and-american-jobs_144002688962.pdf, p. 10, IC)
Immigrants with advanced degrees from US universities who work in STEM fields dramatically boost employment for US natives. During 2000– 2007, a 10 percent increase in the share of such workers boosted the US-born employment rate by 0.04 percent. Evaluating this at the average numbers of foreign- and US-born workers during that period, this implies that every additional 100 foreign-born workers who earned an advanced degree in the United States and then worked in STEM fields led to an additional 262 jobs for US natives. (See Table 2)
In addition, immigrants with advanced degrees in general boost employment for US natives. The overall share of workers who are immigrants with an advanced degree (from foreign and US universities) working in a STEM occupation is also positively associated with the native employment rate. During 2000–2007, a 10 percent increase in the share of workers who are immigrants with advanced degrees working in STEM boosted the US-born employment rate by 0.03 percent. This translates into every additional 100 foreign-born workers with an advanced degree working in a STEM occupation creating about eighty-six additional jobs for US-born workers. The estimates also indicate that simply increasing the number of immigrants with advanced degrees working in all fields, not just STEM, would increase American employment. A 10 percent increase in the share of all workers who are immigrants with advanced degrees boosted the native employment rate by 0.08 percent during 2000–2007. In other words, each additional 100 foreign-born workers with an advanced degree created about forty-four additional jobs for US natives.20 (See Table 1)
Immigration increases employment for native workers
Melugin, CEI Adjunct Fellow, 2001 (Jessica P., “High-Tech Immigration,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, Tech Briefing 2001, p. 37, IC)
Substantial economic evidence refutes the proposition that increased immigration decreases employment for native workers. Indeed, some studies, and considerable practical experience, show that the opposite is true. In California’s Silicon Valley, immigrants founded one out of every five firms and are currently running one-quarter of the high-tech companies. In 1998, these companies collectively provided more than 50,000 jobs and accounted for almost $20 billion in sales.5 One recent study shows that admitting an extra 50,000 H1-B workers would mean $5.5 billion in wealth transferred from other nations to the United States.6
No crowd-out—no reason to prefer immigrants
Melugin, CEI Adjunct Fellow, 2001 (Jessica P., “High-Tech Immigration,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, Tech Briefing 2001, p. 37-38, IC)
Another criticism often leveled against the H1-B program is that foreign workers displace native-born tech professionals. Given the number of high-tech jobs that are now unfilled, this claim makes no sense. It also assumes that US companies would rather hire H1-B visa holders than US workers. But why would they? As noted, a company cannot expect to save any money in wages because of the legal obligation to pay foreign-born workers and native workers equivalent salaries. Also, the time, trouble, and cost involved in obtaining an H1-B visa and in securing an H1-B candidate make native hiring far preferable to most employers. If qualified US workers can begin work immediately and with no hassles, why would anyone choose to navigate through a sea of fees, attorneys, specialized consultants, complicated forms, and long delays?
High skilled workers make up for any education subsidies and don’t crowd out domestic jobs
Nowrasteh, Cato Institute Immigration Policy Analyst, 2010 (Alex, “H-1B Visas: A Case for Open Immigration of Highly Skilled Foreign Workers,” Competitive Enterprise Institute, October 2010, https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Alex%20Nowrasteh%20-%20H1-B%20Visas.pdf, p. 13-14, IC)
It is often said that America is falling behind in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (known as the STEM fields). That is debatable, yet even if it were true that America is falling behind in these fields, the country’s number of scientists and engineers can be increased relatively quickly and easily by allowing the educated foreigners of the world to migrate to the U.S.
As mentioned previously, less than 1 percent of H-1B applicants had less than a bachelor’s degree, 43 percent had a bachelor’s degree, 41 percent had a master’s degree, 11 percent had a doctorate, and 5 percent had professional degrees.64 They are a highly educated group and many of them pursue educational opportunities in the United States prior, during, or after becoming H-1B workers. The number of STEM degrees awarded to foreign students studying in America is substantial. Between 2003 and 2007, nonresident aliens earned 143,391 bachelor’s degrees, 255,267 master’s degrees, and 49,532 doctorates in STEM.65 According to estimates based on survey data and an assumed annual emigration rate of 3.2 percent, 50,187 bachelor’s, 117,634 master’s, and 14,960 doctorates from the group above would have remained in the U.S. had visa rules allowed them.66
Foreign-born graduate students do not crowd out American students from advanced programs.67 They tend to fill new spots rather than displace qualified Americans.68 The number of PhDs awarded to Americans has not changed in recent decades, but the departments have expanded tremendously to accommodate increasing numbers of foreign students.
Additionally, highly skilled, foreign-born workers do not use public education funds. Education is the single largest component of state and local government spending, absorbing roughly a third of all state and local expenditures.69 The average per pupil cost of public primary and secondary education is approximately $9,600 per year.70 Highly skilled foreign workers on H-1B visas are, by and large, already educated once they receive their work documents. They do not receive state funding for primary and secondary education.
Students already working in the U.S. on H-1B visas can typically receive in-state tuition for state universities if they become residents of the state in which they are working. This may qualify as an example of taxpayers subsidizing the education of foreign-born workers—though the workers still pay. This is a relatively minor problem that would be best addressed by states reforming their in-state tuition policies. Moreover, if highly skilled foreign workers were allowed to live and work in the U.S. indefinitely after completing their education, the increased tax revenue would more than offset the modest public education subsidy. The amount of annual federal tax revenue foregone by forcing STEM graduates to leave the country is approximately $3.6 billion.71 That makes up for state university subsidies.
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