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3) Their arguments assume that China will inevitably be nationalist, and this causes conflict, but they have conceded our first uniqueness claim that Chinese leaders are keeping nationalism in check now so that they can pursue multilateralism. Perceived U.S. provocation will lead to radical foreign policy based on nationalism.
BRZEZINSKI, 05
[Zbigniew, national security affairs advisor to the Carter administration, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, Feb, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2740]
There will be inevitable frictions as China’s regional role increases and as a Chinese “sphere of influence” develops. U.S. power may recede gradually in the coming years, and the unavoidable decline in Japan’s influence will heighten the sense of China’s regional preeminence. But to have a real collision, China needs a military that is capable of going toe-to-toe with the United States. At the strategic level, China maintains a posture of minimum deterrence. Forty years after acquiring nuclear-weapons technology, China has just 24 ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Even beyond the realm of strategic warfare, a country must have the capacity to attain its political objectives before it will engage in limited war. It is hard to envisage how China could promote its objectives when it is acutely vulnerable to a blockade and isolation enforced by the United States. In a conflict, Chinese maritime trade would stop entirely. The flow of oil would cease, and the Chinese economy would be paralyzed. I have the sense that the Chinese are cautious about Taiwan, their fierce talk notwithstanding. Last March, a Communist Party magazine noted that “we have basically contained the overt threat of Taiwanese independence since [President] Chen [Shuibian] took office, avoiding a worst-case scenario and maintaining the status of Taiwan as part of China.” A public opinion poll taken in Beijing at the same time found that 58 percent thought military action was unnecessary. Only 15 percent supported military action to “liberate” Taiwan. Of course, stability today does not ensure peace tomorrow. If China were to succumb to internal violence, for example, all bets are off. If sociopolitical tensions or social inequality becomes unmanageable, the leadership might be tempted to exploit nationalist passions. But the small possibility of this type of catastrophe does not weaken my belief that we can avoid the negative consequences that often accompany the rise of new powers. China is clearly assimilating into the international system. Its leadership appears to realize that attempting to dislodge the United States would be futile, and that the cautious spread of Chinese influence is the surest path to global preeminence.
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5) There is no risk of conflict outside of U.S. containment policy. China will cooperate multilaterally and this solves nuclear war, but perceptions of U.S. hostility cause global instability.
PEI, 03
[Minxin, Sr. Assistant at China Program of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Domestic Changes in China,” US-China Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Marsh and Dreyer, p. 59]
On balance, the strategy of “hedged engagement” is a less risky strategy for the United States because a “preemptive” containment strategy is, at the moment, unnecessary, counterproductive, and costly. A complete breakdown of U.S.-China relations caused by long-term American strategic concerns without Chinese provocation or hostility would make China a determined foe of the United States and set off another major-power cold war in one of the world’s hot spots. The Asian region will become less stable as the restraining influence exerted by the engagement policy on Chinese behavior disappears. China would be less likely to cooperate with the United States on issues of vital interests to the United States, such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism.
6) Our evidence is reverse-causal. Multilateral China will work to strengthen international norms, but a unilaterally rising China will make conflict inevitable.
SUETTINGER, 04
[Robert, nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program and an affiliated fellow of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council director-Asian affairs for the National Security Council, China Leadership Monitory, No. 12, http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm12_rs.pdf]
In the 25 years since the inception of its reform and opening up, China has blazed a new strategic path that not only suits its national conditions but also conforms to the tide of the times. This new strategic path is China’s peaceful rise through independently building socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather than detaching from economic globalization.2 Zheng insisted that although China would rely mainly on its own strength, it needed a peaceful international environment to accomplish the task of lifting its enormous population out of a condition of underdevelopment. He also pledged that China would rise to the status of a great power without destabilizing the international order or oppressing its neighbors: The rise of a major power often results in drastic change in international configuration and world order, even triggers a world war. An important reason behind this is [that] these major powers followed a path of aggressive war and external expansion. Such a path is doomed to failure. In today’s world, how can we follow such a totally erroneous path that is injurious to all, China included? China’s only choice is to strive for rise, more importantly strive for a peaceful rise.3
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