NC Extensions: A/t - #7 “Chinese Aggression Turn” [1/4] 346

2NC Extensions: A/t - #7 “Chinese Aggression Turn” [1/4] 346

[Gabriel, former Professor of Third World Studies and Director of the Americas Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College; “What is the Chinese military doing in Latin America?;” Winter, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Marcella]

2NC Extensions: A/t - #7 “Chinese Aggression Turn” [2/4] 347

3) Scientific and historical studies all conclude China will inevitably overtake the U.S. in global power. The only question is whether they do so peacefully or angrily.
KISSANE, 05

[Dylan, Professor at the University of South Australia, “2015 and the Rise of China,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=dylankissane]

The United States peaked in its share of system power mid-century (1941) and has been in decline since. The accession of China and the European Union to the major power system has further assisted in the decline in the relative share of system power maintained by the world’s sole superpower. The decline remains slow but consistent, in stark contrast to the rising fortunes of China and even the relatively gentle rise in the Japanese power cycle. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this decline as evidence of the United States experiencing any significant decline in any specific capabilities. Indeed, between 1981 and 2001 the US saw actual increases in four of the six capability indicators.29 As Doran and Parsons note, it is not enough that a state experiences growth in the assessed capabilities in order to ‘grow’ their power cycle curve – the state must also ‘out-grow’ the rate of change of other states in the system under investigation.30 In effect, a state must be ‘running to stand still’ else it will face a decline in relative power as the United States has in the period post-1941. These somewhat superficial results, however, should not distract from the more integral and ultimately more significant implication which can be drawn from the power cycle curves of the United States, Japan and China. By extrapolating the polynomial power cycle curves over a longer time period, that is, continuing the current trend forward over time, the aforementioned critical points are seen to emerge within a short ‘window’ between 2015 and 2030. For strategists imagining future security challenges for Australia – and particularly those with an interest in Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific – this is the most important of the results which can be gained from power cycle analysis of international power politics. According to power cycle analysis, it would seem that the year 2015 is the beginning of the end for US predominance in international power politics. Figure 5 (below) illustrates graphically the continuing rise and decline of the three Asia-Pacific powers in the coming decades. By the year 2015 China will have overtaken the United States as the predominant actor in the major power system. Between them, the US and China will account for more than 50% of the total major power systems relative power, with Japan accounting for almost another 20%. Thus, when Paul Krugman questions whether the United States can ‘stay on top’ of the world economically, the answer must be a clear ‘no’.31 Further, as the forecasts here are based upon a power cycle methodology that balances military and economic capabilities, it may not even be possible to claim that US military dominance will also continue. The reality is that a new ‘Asian Century’ will begin to emerge around 2015 with the West, including Europe and particularly the geographically close Australia, forced to realise that the centres of global politics will not be in London, Paris and New York but rather in Beijing, Tokyo and on the American west coast. The rise of China and the resultant – because in a relative system the rise of one is the fall of others – decline of the US will be the defining features of early twenty-first century power politics. The world will not turn to the West but rather the West will turn to the new heart of global politics: the Asia-Pacific.

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4) China is inevitably turning into a global power. If the United States rejects a containment strategy, China’s emergence will be peaceful and stable.
GILL AND HUANG, 06

[Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Yanzhong, Director, Center for Global Health Studies at Whitehead School of Diplomacy, “Sources and limits of Chinese 'soft power'” Survival, 48:2, June]

Despite an expansion and successful use of soft power, China has not yet developed an ideal mix of soft-power resources to achieve desired foreign-policy objectives. The gap between an increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign policy and a closed and rigid domestic political system is responsible for the imbalance between three pillars of soft power: cultural attractiveness, examples set by domestic values and policies, and values expressed through foreign policy. This lack of balanced soft-power resources also accounts for Beijing's legitimacy and coherence problems in the exercise of soft power. Given the constant tensions between its foreign-policy objectives and the still-nascent soft-power resources, China still has a long way to go before becoming a true global leader. Nevertheless, we should expect China's soft-power resources to grow in the coming years. As China's soft power grows, it presents the international community with an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, China is shepherding its resources for the long-term goal of being a dominant player in East Asia and beyond. As and if Beijing achieves success in this pursuit, it will have enormous, and potentially negative, implications for the current balance of power in the region, and especially for the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, many aspects of China's foreign policy which substantiate its soft power - greater acceptance of norms governing international relations, peaceful settlement of disputes, mutually beneficial economic ties, recognition of the need to address non-traditional and transnational security problems such as terrorism, international crime and proliferation - are increasingly convergent with approaches advocated by the vast majority of the international community. How the major powers, and especially Washington, respond to this dilemma in the near to medium future will be a major factor shaping the stability of East Asia and the world. A neo-containment policy to prevent China's rise is not realistic, and - in light of Beijing's continued and nuanced use of its hard and soft power- is unlikely to be acceptable to many in the region and beyond. In addition, dwelling narrowly on countering the 'hard' aspects of Chinese power not only overlooks important Chinese soft-power gains, but could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by provoking Beijing to step away from the favourable aspects of its soft power and focus instead on throwing around its growing military and economic weight. Rather, concerned major powers and others in the international community should be even more active in deepening Chinese commitments where Beijing's foreign policy and practice converges with global norms. The leading powers should be prepared to reward China's responsible and constructive behaviours, but also be more willing to call out China as a scofflaw or obstacle when its policies run counter to China's own stated goals and to support widespread international norms and practice. For the United States, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's efforts to encourage China to become a 'responsible stakeholder' in world affairs is a conceptual step in the right direction - and an overall policy approach that many other major powers have already taken with China - but needs to be further advanced to see concrete action on China's part.

Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2011
2011 -> Voices of the Old Sea Norman Lewis
2011 -> Malevil Robert Merle
2011 -> The Elephant Keeper’s Children Peter Hoeg
2011 -> Jv packet •Mars Colonization Affirmative •Mars Colonization Negative
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2011 -> All America Looks Up to Virginia;” Virginia and the Declaration of Independence
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2011 -> The Battle of Frenchtown (1855), Washington Territory: the Political and Demographic Context rev 9/4/11
2011 -> Seti aff •seti neg •Asteroids Aff

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