US space wep bad- hinder the colonization of space- innovation- science development- communications
Krepon and Clary 03- Michael Krepon with Christopher Clary, Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs Krepon received an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Franklin & Marshall College., Clary is currently a PhD student in the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., Space Assurance or Space Dominance?
What compelling need is there to weaponize space when American military superiority is so extensive, and terrestrial developments to extend U.S. power projection capabilities are so promising? One argument is that portions of the earth’s surface are not quickly reached by conventional U.S. power projection capabilities, and that space-based weapons could remedy this apparent shortcoming. Perceived gains by somewhat longer and quicker reach into the interior of, say, Russia, China, or Iran must be weighed against the resulting impairment of U.S. diplomacy, non-proliferation efforts, and alliance ties. Moreover, space warfare initiatives would threaten commercial networks on which advanced industrial societies have become increasingly dependent. They could also impair the continuation of an extraordinary phase of scientific exploration that fosters new insights about the origins and future of our planet, our solar system, and the mysteries that lie beyond.
Krepon and Clary 3 – Michael Krepon, served as the president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher Clary, Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, April 2, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,” Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf
The presumed additional deterrent value of U.S. space weapons is also questionable. If existing U.S. conventional military and nuclear superiority prove insufficient to deter, it is doubtful that the addition of space warfare capabilities would make an appreciable difference in an adversary’s calculus of decision. The search to strengthen or supplant nuclear deterrence by means of space warfare capabilities will therefore appear to many as a quest to escape from, rather than “enhance,” deterrence. When viewed though this lens, the pursuit of space weapons appears designed less for strengthening deterrence and more for negating the deterrents of potential adversaries. To the extent that this perception holds, the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons is unlikely to raise the nuclear threshold, as proponents claim. To the contrary, the use of conventionally armed "space-strike" weapons could prompt unwanted escalation by threatening the nuclear forces of a weaker foe. In this event, the United States will receive little or no applause of the choice of weaponry used in preemptive strikes.
SMIL Bad --- Economy 1NC
Space weapons are very expensive and hurt the economy
Hitchens 2 – Theresa Hitchens is Director of the Center for Defense Information, and leads its Space Security Project, in cooperation with the SecureWorld Foundation. Editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000, Hitchens has had a long career in journalism, with a focus on military, defense industry and NATO affairs. She also was director of research at the British American Security Information Council. Hitchens serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. April 18th, 2002, "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the long run that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities — raising the proverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial — with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.30
Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support---their defense doesn’t account for global crises properly
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Thus, the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between interdependence and economic crises. What then about the second question? Is there a correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state level are intuitive and well-documented (see, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 1997b), among others, argues that instability in the global economic system contributes tosocial disintegration and political conflict. Social unrest, regime change and even civil war have directly resulted from the vagaries of economic integration.3 Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline mayincrease the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transitionfrom one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is asignificant variablein understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find astrong correlationbetween internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with anincrease in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political sciencescholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependenceand do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created byeconomic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.