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SMIL Bad --- China War 1NC
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- US-China war leads to extinction
- China War 2NC --- Arms Race
- US weaponization causes China weaponization – perception is key
- US militarization leads to China militarization
- US space weapons bad – China arms race, accidental launch, and terrorism
- Space weaponization causes Chinese prolif
SMIL Bad --- China War 1NCSpace weaponization causes US-Chinese war over TaiwanZhang 5 – Hui Zhang, research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, December 5, 2005, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943 Historically, China’s stated purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against nuclear blackmail. Beijing’s official statements do not discuss potential responses to U.S. space weaponization, but many Chinese officials and scholars argue that China must ensure that U.S. efforts do not negate the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As one Chinese official stated: China is not in a position to conduct an arms race with the United States and it does not intend to do so, particularly in the field of missile defense. However, China will not sit idly by and watch its strategic interests being jeopardized without taking necessary measures. It is quite possible and natural for China to review its military doctrine and a series of policies on the relationship with big powers, Taiwan issues, arms control and nonproliferation, etc. Certainly, the best option for China is to reach an arms control agreement to prevent space weaponization, as it is advocating now. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, China would very likely develop other responses to neutralize the perceived threat. Because it is not clear what type of missile defense system the United States will finally deploy or whether the U.S. space control plans will be implemented, it is difficult to identify conclusively China’s specific countermeasures. Yet, there are certain options that it would be likely to consider. It should be noted that these discussions are based on China’s capabilities and do not characterize China’s intentions. US-China war leads to extinctionCheong 1 – Ching Cheong, Journalist at the Straits Times and Hong Kong Bureau 2001 (“China, Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism,” p. 7) The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military official disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its “non first use” principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. China War 2NC --- Arms RaceSpace weaponization causes US-China arms race and makes China change its nuclear policyBlazejewski 8 – Kenneth S. Blazejewski, master's degree in public affairs from Princeton, JD degree from the New York University School of Law, Spring 2008, "Space Weaponization and US-China Relation" www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf First, if the United States proceeds with space weaponization China will respond by bolstering its own military capabilities. 37 China’s response will seek to preserve the asymmetric threat it poses to US space assets and maintain its nuclear deterrent. Under each of the interpretations considered, China is not willing to allow the United States to build up its space weapons program unchallenged. In the least, China would develop additional ASAT weapons to which the United States would seek to develop effective countermeasures. 38 Alternatively or in addition, China could invest in more ICBMs and nuclear warheads, 39 acquiring the capacity to overwhelm a BMD shield. An option less likely in the near future, China could counter US space weaponization by deploying its own space weapons. Other potential Chinese responses include adopting a “launch on warning” policy or abandoning its no-first-use pledge. 40 Each of these strategies would seek to counter the effectiveness of US space weapons. The United States, of course, could always respond to China’s response, but such tit-for-tat policy making risks devolving into an arms race. Chinese officials claim that an arms race would “likely emerge” unless a negotiated solution can be reached on PAROS. 41 It is noteworthy, however, that under at least two interpretations, this is not China’s preferred outcome. Under the first and second interpretations, China will only proceed with further developing ASAT technology and acquiring additional weapons if it cannot be assured that the United States does not plan to weaponize outer space. US weaponization causes China weaponization – perception is keyZhang 11 – Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong, March/April 2011, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control,” Asian Survey, Volume 51, No. 2, pp. 318 This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doctrines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security. 23 US militarization leads to China militarizationChristy 6 – Donald P. Christy, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, U.S. Army War College, March 15th, 2006, "UNITED STATES POLICY ON WEAPONS IN SPACE," www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf Like Russia, China would need to evaluate the threat space weapons pose to their national security and respond accordingly. With a less mobile, more static strategic nuclear force, China may have less assurance than Russia that their forces could survive a first strike. If they perceive retaliatory forces could not penetrate a combined space and ground based missile to inflict enough damage to provide deterrent, space based defense may drive them to rapidly advance the capabilities of their strategic forces, increasing numbers, modernizing reentry systems and improving mobility. Regarding the most likely point of future conflict with China, the issue of Taiwan, any offensive or defensive space system that improves the United States’ ability to project force in the western Pacific Ocean will be seen as a threat. As a growing space power, China is perhaps in the best position to pose a threat to American space dominance. Regardless of our actions, China may pursue means to attack or defeat our space systems (weaponized or otherwise), but by developing space weapons first, the United States surely invites that conclusion. US space weapons bad – China arms race, accidental launch, and terrorismBlazejewski 8 – Kenneth S. Blazejewski, master's degree in public affairs from Princeton, JD degree from the New York University School of Law, Spring 2008, "Space Weaponization and US-China Relation" www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf I recommend that the United States accept a commitment to forgo placement of weapons in outer space. The costs of space weaponization simply outweigh the benefits. Above, I argue that China would respond to US space weaponization with some level of military buildup. In the least, this response would include the deployment of a more robust ASAT system capable of attacking and potentially eliminating space weapons. 52 After all, space weapons, like military satellites, make for vulnerable military targets. 53 The use of space-based weapons in a conflict must be discounted by the likelihood that they would be eliminated by Chinese ASAT attack. More importantly, increased ASAT deployment would have the counterproductive effect of exposing US satellites to greater threat. Aside from ASAT issues, Chinese response to US space weaponization would include an increase in China’s ICBM fleet and nuclear arsenal. Vertical proliferation cannot be in the interests of the United States, if only for the increased peacetime risks of accidental launch or the terrorist risk associated with increased availability of weapons technology and components. Finally, the United States should not discount the possibility, often cited by opponents of space weaponization, that the deployment of US space weapons would instigate a space arms race. Space weaponization causes Chinese prolifZhang 5 – Hui Zhang, research associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, December 5, 2005, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1943 One of China’s simplest options would be to build more ICBMs. Until now, although China has the smallest declared nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear-weapon states, its modernization efforts have been aimed more at quality than quantity. The current effort focuses mainly on enhancing the survivability of its strategic nuclear force through greater mobility. By contrast, the size of the force has grown quite modestly. Absent U.S. missile defense plans, China might be expected to build no more than 50 ICBMs by 2015. China’s plans could change significantly were the United States to deploy a more comprehensive or more operationally successful missile defense. To maintain a credible minimum retaliatory capability, the size and quality of China’s nuclear arsenal would have to shift. Predicting an exact response is difficult without knowing the specifications of a U.S. missile defense system, including the numbers of interceptors and the firing doctrine. However, one could project the potential changes in size of China’s nuclear arsenal based on a few simple assumptions. For example, China might need about 100-300 ICBMs to defeat the current U.S. system if that system employed 100-250 interceptors. Clearly, China would need even more warheads to penetrate a layered ballistic missile defense system. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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