File Title space weaponization good 2


SMIL Bad --- Hegemony 1NC



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SMIL Bad --- Hegemony 1NC




Space weapons kill hegemony – it leads to balancing and destroys military flexibility


Hitchens 2 – Theresa Hitchens is Director of the Center for Defense Information, and leads its Space Security Project, in cooperation with the SecureWorld Foundation. Editor of Defense News from 1998 to 2000, Hitchens has had a long career in journalism, with a focus on military, defense industry and NATO affairs. She also was director of research at the British American Security Information Council. Hitchens serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. April 18th, 2002, "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons," www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm
Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would not be able to maintain unchallenged hegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative power projection capability, due to other states' significant ability and probably inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power."31 Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is a unique advantage of being a military superpower.32  U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as military assets (especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also could even put U.S. cities at a greater risk than they face today from ballistic missiles.

US hegemonic decline causes nuclear transition wars


Ikenberry 08 (John is a professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)
Power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. As scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have described it, world politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever: long-term changes in the distribution of power give rise to new challenger states, who set off a struggle over the terms of that international order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system -- to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position. These moments are fraught with danger. When a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order. But when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues, and conflict -- perhaps leading to war -- becomes likely. The danger of power transitions is captured most dramatically in the case of late-nineteenth-century Germany. In 1870, the United Kingdom had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany and a significant military advantage as well; by 1903, Germany had pulled ahead in terms of both economic and military power. As Germany unified and grew, so, too, did its dissatisfactions and demands, and as it grew more powerful, it increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe, and security competition began. In the strategic realignments that followed, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, formerly enemies, banded together to confront an emerging Germany. The result was a European war. Many observers see this dynamic emerging in U.S.-Chinese relations. "If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades," the realist scholar John Mearsheimer has written, "the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war."

Hegemony 2NC --- Link Extension




Space weaponization kills heg and triggers war


MacDonald 9 – Bruce W. MacDonald, Senior Director of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, Winter 2009, “Steps to strategic security and stability in space: a view from the United States,” http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2907.pdf
It would be unwise for any country to seek space dominance, for quite practical and strategic reasons. There are many ways to attack space assets, and it is easier and cheaper to attack than to defend them, which would likely frustrate any sustained attempt at dominance and leave every country worse off. In trying to maintain dominance, any country would be at the mercy of unpredictably advancing space technologies that could favour another country. In the face of likely resistance to such a provocative and hegemonic posture, any country seeking to dominate in space would constantly be trying to stay ahead technologically to maintain this dominance, demanding large expenditures that would be a growing burden on other national security and economic needs. Such a situation would also be very unstable, especially if another country achieved a technological breakthrough that threatened to upset the previously dominant country’s hegemony. A crisis occurring in this context could provide a compelling incentive to the about-to-be-dethroned country to pre-empt before its space dominance slipped away.

Space weapons reduce US military superiority – opposing views are flawed


Hardesty 5 – Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy, member of the faculty of theNaval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department, "Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives," 2005, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA521114&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
In the event, this analysis indicates that space-based weapons, though in the short term increasing military capabilities, are in the long term very likely to have a negative effect on the national security of the United States. Specifically, I will argue, the vulnerabilities of space-based systems would largely negate their projected advantages. Further, potential enemies would react to U.S. deployments, either avoiding their effects or, more ominously, space-basing weapons of their own. These deployments would fundamentally reduce the current relative advantages the United States enjoys in conventional forces and strategic depth—reducing the time and distance in which effective defenses must be created. Arguments for the necessity of space-basing weapons are politically untenable, based on false assumptions, or narrowly focused on space-centric concepts that fail to integrate and take full advantage of capabilities of terrestrially based forces. Finally, I will propose a balanced policy and strategy that should optimize maintenance of relative advantages while hedging against uncooperative adversaries.

Space weponization for the us would be bad- due to military capability


Theresa Hitchens 2002(CDI Vice President, Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S. Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons)
[Spurring other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the ground on a worldwide basis — negating what today is a unique advantage of being a military superpower.32 U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as military assets (especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers, particularly in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also could even put U.S. cities at a greater risk than they face today from ballistic missiles.

The potential for strategic consequences of a space race has led many experts, including within the military, to tout a space arms control regime as an alternative. A ban on space weapons and ASATs could help preserve — at least for some time — the status quo of U.S. advantage (especially if coupled with U.S. moves to shore up passive satellite defenses). In a recent article in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Jeffrey Lewis, a graduate research fellow at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, makes a good case for an arms control approach, arguing: "If defensive deployments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the ground, then some measure of restraining offensive capabilities needs to be found to even the playing field.5"633



In any event, it is clear that U.S. policy-makers must look at the potential strategic and direct military risks, and the costs, of weaponizing space.]


Military space use bad could cause miscalc and loss of US credibility


Gallagher 5Nancy Gallagher, Nancy Gallagher is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. he has been an arms control specialist in the State Department, a Foster Fellow in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a faculty member at Wesleyan University. , Towards a Reconsideration of the Rules for Space Security,
- Even though the line between “benign” military-support satellites and “threatening” military space capabilities is less clear now than it was in the 1950s and 1960s, it is still valuable to differentiate between uses of space that enhance mutual security and those that are destabilizing. In scenarios where adversaries were both armed with anti-satellite weapons, there would be strong incentives to strike first. But space-based weapons can be destabilizing even if only one country possesses them. For example, one of the main arguments for space-based weapons is to shorten the response time between target identification and attack. A pre-emptive security strategy that places a premium on speed, however, quickly runs up against the limits of intelligence and human judgment. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States launched a number of fast, precise, lethal attacks against purported leadership targets, only to learn later that some attack decisions were spectacularly wrong. The United States pays a high price in lost legitimacy for such mistakes, especially when it goes to war with few allies and little foreign support. The “collateral damage” in these cases was relatively minor compared with the general carnage of war, but a single mistake could cause mass casualties if, for example, a precision attack on a biological weapons storage facility pinpointed the explosion a few meters away from where weapons were actually stored — close enough for the shock wave to rupture the containers and disperse the agents, but not close enough for the heat (and radiation, if nuclear warheads were used) to sterilize the pathogens.63




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