China perceives space weaponization as containment
Zhang, Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science, 8
Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project onManaging the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Pg 41-42 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf, accessed July 1, 2011, EJONES)
Within China, it is widely believed that U.S. missile defense and space planning targets China. Many Chinese are skeptical of U.S. statements that the purpose of missile defense is to protect against “rogue” states. Even if North Korea successfully deployed a small number of nuclear-tipped ICBMs— a principal U.S. concern—it is highly unlikely that it would use them. What leader would risk national suicide by launching a nuclear attack on the United States? From China’s perspective, it seems untenable that the United States would expend massive resources on a system that has only “rogue” states in mind.45 Some missile defense advocates in the United States have not minced their words about the utility of the system for addressing Chinese capabilities. For example, Peter Brookes, advisor on East Asian affairs to the international relations committee of the U.S. Congress, said that the major motive that drives the United States to develop and deploy missile defense systems is China’s missile capability.46 Recently, Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III of the U.S. Air Force, director of the MDA, expressed clearly that the United States is expanding its preliminary missile defense system to address potential threats from China and others. He told defense reporters, “What…we have to do is, in our development program, be able to address the Chinese capabilities, because that’s prudent.”47 Chinese government officials are more inclined to believe these comments than stated U.S. purposes. As Ambassador Sha Zukang said, “Though the U.S. government has publicly denied that China is a major target of its NMD program, the history of missile defense programs and the acknowledged design capabilities of NMD show that the proposed system can be directed against China and can seriously affect China’s limited nuclear capability.”48
Numerous countries involved in space ensure conflict and escalation inevitable now
MacDonald, Council on Foreign Relations, ‘8
(“China, space weapons, and U.S. security” By Bruce W. MacDonald, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=lang_en&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=china+space&ots=OTkniE7uA-&sig=wC4ye20QpZY-ECCnrpPTf-Tr9yY#v=onepage&q&f=false, p. 3, 6.30.10, SWolff)
While China represents the most prominent challenge to U.S. space assets, it is not the only one. Russia and others are taking another look at space to counter U.S. military capability, and friendly countries such as India are reexamining space's role in this new era, in at least partial response to China's 2007 test. India's army chief of staff has stated that "the Chinese space program is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content," and another Indian general has observed that "with time we will get sucked into a military race to protect our space assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space."8 Such actions could possibly trigger responses from other regional adversaries as well. The strategic landscape of this new space era is largely unexplored and poorly understood. Nonetheless, certain objectives arc clearly in the interest of the United States. The risks inherent in space conflict, where vital U.S. interests are at stake, suggest that preventing space conflict should be a major U.S. security objective, and that all instruments of U.S. power, not just military measures, should be drawn upon to this end. The United States needs to deter others from attacking its space capabilities and bolster an international space regime that reinforces deterrence, the absence of conflict in space, and the preservation of space as an environment open to all. Such a regime would allow the United States to continue reaping the critical information and service benefits that U.S. military space assets provide.
Space Race – Causes Miscalc (1/2)
Space arms race triggers dangerous reactionary cycle
MacDonald, Council on Foreign Relations, ‘8
(“China, space weapons, and U.S. security” By Bruce W. MacDonald, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=lang_en&id=o0GkabrNftIC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=china+space&ots=OTkniE7uA-&sig=wC4ye20QpZY-ECCnrpPTf-Tr9yY#v=onepage&q&f=false, p. 3, 6.30.10, SWolff)
In a number of fora and military writings, China has unofficially indicated that the United States should not underestimate China in space or its ability to respond to U.S. military space initiatives that China perceives as a threat. Chinese specialists have stated that, in addition to protecting their satellites against U.S. offensive capabilities, China will develop a deterrent space force if there is no change in U.S. space policy, which they see as shunning any restrictions and reflecting U.S. attraction to space dominance. They have suggested that China would be prepared to deploy sufficient offensive counterspace capability to build confidence in its ability to deter U.S. use of weapons against Chinese space assets. This would not require China to match U.S. space-force deployments, but to have enough to deter. In general, as the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S.-China relations noted in 2007, "China does not need to surpass, or even catch up with, the United States in order to complicate U.S. defense planning or influence U.S. decision-making in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere." This could reflect Chinese thinking on space weapons, as well. China has openly announced its intention to build "informationalized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-twenty-first century;"* offensive counterspace capabilities would be an important component in this capability. Coordinating and executing any such attack would be difficult and fraught with danger for China. Some are concerned that an action-reaction cycle involving space weapons could result in an "arms race in space," even without actual conflict, making both the United States and China worse off than if neither went down this path.
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