China Weaponizing Now – General (3/3)
China is modernizing now in space to challenge the US
Hays, retired Airforce Lieutenant Colonel, 9
(Peter L., senior policy analyst supporting the plans and programs division of the National Security Space Office “Space and Sino-American Security Relations” http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf SPACE and DEFENSE Volume Two Number Three Winter 2009 accessed: 6/28/11 pg 30) TJL
China is moving more secretly but probably even more quickly and comprehensively in developing “a multi-dimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.”35 The PLA has deployed a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons and terrestrial jammers and is also exploring other counterspace capabilities including inspace jammers, high-energy lasers, highpowered microwave weapons, particle beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons. In addition, China is “researching and deploying capabilities intended to disrupt satellite operations or functionality without inflicting physical damage.”36 The successful Chinese ASAT test of January 2007 was perhaps most notorious for its dangerous irresponsibility in creating a persistent debris cloud that now accounts for more than 25 percent of all catalogued objects in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO),37 but the debris the test created should not obfuscate the system’s very significant strategic implications given the high-value U.S. assets it can hold at risk in LEO, difficulties in finding and tracking the road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) for the Dong Feng (DF)-21 (or SC-19) intermediate-range missile that launches the ASAT, and the extremely limited protection measures the United States currently has against this capability. Moreover, the direct ascent ASAT is just one of the many types of counterspace capabilities the Chinese are developing or have already fielded; it may not even be their most threatening or pervasive capability. It is more important to consider the synergistic and tailored benefits China is likely to obtain by employing many counterspace capabilities that operate in different ways against different orbital regimes and mission areas including hundreds if not thousands of high-power mobile terrestrial jammers, high-energy lasers with precision tracking capabilities at multiple sites, and potentially sophisticated in-space jamming and negation capabilities.
Space Race – US Posture Key (1/4)
Total US space dominance outlined by the National Space Policy pressures China and others into a space race
Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007
(Bao, “Deterrence Revisited: Space” China Security, Issue No. 5, p. 2-3, Winter, http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)
The latest U.S. National Space Policy (NSP) poses a serious threat to the national security of China. This new policy, released in October of 2006, sets out the George W. Bush administration’s vision for defending America’s security in space.1 It reinforces a unilateral U.S. approach to space security which is compounded by the U.S. opposition to any international treaties that limit its access to or use of space.2 Aggregately, Bush’s space policy pursues hegemony in space and poses a significant security risk to China that cannot be left unaddressed. The NSP presents a number of challenges to China’s security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for “hostile purposes.” This sets up an inequitable environment of “haves” and “have-nots” in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as “interference” by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America’s use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization– initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to “dissuade and deter” other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race.
Space Race – US Posture Key (2/4)
China not inherently bad – their aggression is only a response to U.S. aggression
Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011
(Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 30) EK
It is noteworthy that much of the above writings are in response to U.S actions and draw from U.S. literature on space power. Indeed, some of the more offensive oriented writings came in response to U.S. efforts to field ground based missile defense systems, which some Chinese see as a dedicated space weapon. 126 In fact, “within China it is widely believed that U.S. missile defense and space planning targets China.” 127 This fear was fueled by the Schriever space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force that were clearly aimed at simulating a conflict in space with China. 128 Larry M. Wortzel notes that “The PLA’s development of space warfare doctrine is not some self-made phenomenon. Rather, the PLA has carefully absorbed and is reacting to what the U.S. military has published on space warfare and counter-space operations.” 129
U.S. diplomatic space policies are not popular internationally – seen as threatening
Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011
(Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 51-52) EK
The U.S. diplomatic approach to space has not been popular abroad in the past decade. Many observers point to U.S. reluctance to discuss the weaponization of space in the CD and how the U.S. is consistently one of the only countries to vote against treaties like PAROS as proof the U.S. wants to weaponize space. U.S. doctrine also perennially speaks of the need to dominate space and prevent the freedom of access to others if needed, the antitheses of what many states in the CD promote. Compounded by export controls that prevent U.S. space alliances from developing too far, the U.S. has many blemishes on its diplomatic approach to space, which China could easily exploit. However, the NSP and NSSS reflect a renewed focus on diplomacy to achieve U.S. goals in space. The NSP lists a number of areas for U.S. Departments and agencies to seek greater international cooperation including human spaceflight, nuclear power for space exploration, debris monitoring, and long-term preservation of the space environment. 162
[NOTE: CD = United Nations Conference on Disarmament]
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