Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff
Now Key – Space Dragons (1/2)
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- Now Key – Space Dragons (2/2)
Now Key – Space Dragons (1/2)Now is key – waiting will cede power to China Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown, 2011 (Daniel M., 4-15-11, “DOES CHINA HAVE A COMREHENSIVE, COORDINATED, AND CONSISTENT SPACE POLICY? IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS” A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, pg. 62 ProQuest, accessed June 29, 2011, EJONES) Not being proactive and assuming the status quo is sufficient is a dangerous policy. The U.S. and China are locked in mindset of mutual suspicion. Chinese leaders are allowing the Space Dragons to research and design counterspace weapons because they believe the U.S. will inevitably weaponize space. The U.S. takes China’s ASAT program and other questionable space missions as an affront to its space dominance and a potent threat to its space assets. If the U.S. does not become more proactive in shaping China’s thinking on space, by engaging it in ways like those discussed above, and taking the lead in shaping space as a cooperative environment, the status quo can quickly deteriorate into a security dilemma. Furthermore, one cannot assume the U.S. will be the leader in space forever. Avoiding action now could mean that in the future the U.S. will be faced with the inability to shape outer space as a domain or influence Chinese space policy to the same degree, a dangerous prospect for U.S. interests. Window is now – China has not handed the space reins to the Space Dragons yet Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown, 2011 (Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 48) EK Yet another explanation of these events could be bureaucratic confusion and the outcome of a stove piped institution in which inter-governmental communication is neglected. This no doubt plays a heavy part in many actions China takes, including in its space program. However, the discrepancies in China’s space policy have become clear enough at this point that the leadership, if they saw inconsistency as a problem, would have already begun to bring their policies into harmony. There is little visible evidence to suggest they have done so. The inconsistencies in China’s policy are clear, and yet there is little indication that the CCP is trying to reconcile them. Since there has also been no sign of China marginalizing its space program in favor of a particular policy path, one cannot now conclude that the Space Dragons, or any particular interest group, has paramount influence. Indeed, China actively sought to ensure that the different mission areas maintained course in the aftermath of the 2007 ASAT test. The evidence does, however, suggest that China’s space policy is indeed on a calculated multi-track approach, one that is guided by China’s top leadership Now Key – Space Dragons (2/2)Space Dragons influence in China would threaten China’s space program, increase possibility of conflict and ruin space research. Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011 (Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 42-43) EK If Space Dragons indeed have a significant influence on the policymaking bureaucracy, and begin to pursue their policy goal of gaining a military advantage, their policies can also irreconcilably complicate the other aspects of China’s space program as well. Space weaponization could make space an unsafe domain for fielding commercial satellites, launching civilian missions, and even threaten a manned space station, if the prospects of a conflict in space become more real. Not only could debris and other secondary impacts of such conflict indirectly threaten space assets, but certain platforms—especially commercial satellites, such as those for communication or imagery—could be directly targeted if determined to be aiding the enemy’s war fighting effort. Debris that could be caused by direct ascent weapons, like those that China tested, would also increase the risk to assets that China and other nations can field in space, thus potentially putting a cap on how much the world can gain from space. Clearly, these consequences would irreconcilably complicate the policy goals of Commercial Leaders and Audience Pleasers. China’s Space Dragons’ policies threaten U.S. and calls for space weaponization Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011 (Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 35-36) EK Space Dragons draw from Space Hawks and Inevitable Weaponizers and, based on available sources, represent what seem to be the most pervasive views in the PLA. Space Dragons believe that that the U.S. will inevitably weaponize space and that future combat scenarios will rely heavily on space as a domain of war. Therefore, in their view, China needs to pursue the weaponization of space to either pre-empt U.S. dominance, or be able to seriously challenge it. This group believes that military power and national security are of the utmost importance and that pursuit of this policy should be undertaken regardless of the costs to other internal space programs. |