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Exts – Indian Soft Power K/T Demo



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Exts – Indian Soft Power K/T Demo




Indian credibility is key to global democracy. Counter-models China.


Austrevicius and Boozman ‘8 (Petras and John, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “060 ESCTER 08 E - The Rise of the Indian Economy: Transatlantic and Global Implications”, http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1472)

V. INDIA AS A DEMOCRATIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL - AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CHINESE MODEL 27. The rise of East Asia has recast both the theory of economic development and the policy prescriptions for states intent on developing their societies and economies. During a visit to South Korea in 1989, Manmohan Singh was shocked to learn how a country that in 1945 stood roughly at India's level of development had within 40 years seen its per capita income soar to a level ten times higher than that of India (Yergin and Stanislaw). 28. Now that India is reaping the benefits of its own economic liberalization and market opening, it is likely, in turn, to become a model for other developing countries caught in the poverty trap. Since the end of the Cold War, India has consciously linked its development path to its democratic ideals. In 1999, it became one of the ten founding members of the Community of Democracies initiative. Prime Minister Singh said soon after assuming his office: "If there is an idea of India by which India should be defined, it is the idea of an inclusive, open, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society... We have an obligation to history and mankind to show that pluralism works... arian in varying degrees, are an aberration" (Mohan, Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007). 29. India's willingness to projectLiberal democracy is the natural order of political organization in today's world. All alternative systems, authoritarian and majorit these particular values not only distinguishes it ideologically from its regional rivals, China and Pakistan, it also reinforces the democratic position it shares with Western governments. India, however, is still reluctant to break fully with its historic non-alignment and is not rushing into join new alliances that would mark a radical break with its traditional international posture. 30. India has also become an agent of regional economic liberalization, an engine of regional growth, and a strong advocate of a South Asian Free Trade Area. A framework agreement signed in 2004 ultimately aspires to ensure that 1.4 billion people from India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives can engage in free trade by 2016. India has also been negotiating a trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council and the South African Development Community. 31. It has become something of a truism in the West to suggest that market reforms go hand in hand with democratic reforms. In Europe this correlation seems to have been confirmed in Central and Eastern Europe, and the link has doubtless been strengthened by the signals that both the European Union and NATO have sent out to aspirants for membership. Yet, the connection between democratisation and economic liberalization is hardly an automatic one. This is perhaps most evident in China, where the Communist Party continues to exercise total hegemony over political life, even as it has granted market forces space to operate autonomously. India, however, offers an important alternative to the Chinese model. 32. Most Western countries and the so-called Asian Tigers established universal suffrage only after industrialization. This particular line of development limited the political impact of political resistance to dramatic social and economic change emanating from those society groups slated to suffer over the short to medium term as a direct result of these changes (Stiglitz). India, by contrast, is managing this upheaval democratically. India's capacity to build democratic consensus perhaps explains the sometimes slow pace of reform. Interestingly, India's overall wealth disparity is lower than China's and its Gini index, which measures income inequality on a scale of 0-100, stands at 33 as compared with 45 for China. This suggests that India's redistributive policies, which do slow growth, may also moderate increases in income disparity. 33. Rapidly growing democratic societies must respond to political pressures to correct widening wealth gaps that often accompany economic take-off. India's political elite has worked to contain this wealth gap, but balancing equity with dynamism is hardly an easy task. A 2004 National Election Study showed that India's poorer people believe that reform has essentially benefited the rich. "Economic reforms are viewed by the poor masses as a revolution primarily for everyone but them. Economists may recommend a more passionate embrace of neo-liberalism as a solution to India's poverty, but the poor appear to have plenty of reservations about economic reforms - and they have voting clout in India's democracy" (Varshney). 34. This is precisely why the governing party has sought to balance growth with equity by defending selected elements of the old economic interventionist order. Politically, it is very difficult to inflict short-term pain upon vulnerable groups in order to lay the groundwork for gains that will only be generalised over the long run. In essence, political and economic cycles are not operating in a synchronized fashion, and this paradox is acutely felt within India's ruling establishment which appears reluctant to move quickly on further labour market reform, deregulation and privatisation. This may be the cost of democratically rooted economic reform, but it could also be a source of strength if it ultimately manages to build a broader consensus about markets and their role in generalizing prosperity. 35. India is highly diverse and has generally has done a remarkable job in integrating various ethnic communities into the mainstream of national political and economic life. But the record is not perfect and there are real tensions. The recent rise of a radical brand of Hindu nationalism represents perhaps "the greatest threat to secular constitutional vision of the liberal state" (Perkovich). The outbreak of severe violence in Gujarat in 2002, in which as many as 2,000 Muslims were killed after 58 Hindu campaigners were burned on a train, is the kind of event that in other circumstances could trigger broader instability. This is why India's leaders cannot allow the largely successful efforts to foster inter-ethnic dialogue to be derailed. A growing wealth gap between India's Muslim and Hindu population is an ongoing source of some worry, but there are others as well ("Don't blame it on the scriptures"). That said, India's democratic institutions do provide a powerful vehicle for building dialogue and compromise. 36. One cannot ignore this democratic factor when comparing India and China. The political architecture of the two countries shapes the structures of their economies and the manner in which economic policy is conducted. In a genuine democracy, neither the central state nor state governments are positioned to impose reform from above without consulting their voters and, indeed, generating some degree of consensus among them. In as highly heterogeneous society as India, this can be a painfully slow process and one characterized by myriad setbacks and compromises. India's democratic deliberations are conducted through highly articulated political structures - democratic parties, civil society organizations, and locally elected officials, many of whom, crucially, are women. This process helps define problems and sets the country on a course to solve them. This speaks volumes about India's stability. Indeed, it is this unique brand of democracy, perhaps more than any other factor, that has held together this highly diverse and very poor country for so long. India's challenge today is to build parallel economic institutions more fitting for a modern democratic and globally integrated society. The challenge is serious because the state remains highly inefficient and partly wedded to archaic ways of organizing economic life. 37. India continues to attach great importance to its domestic market, and, unlike China, it is not utterly focused on exports. It gives a certain priority to consumption over investment. India's income growth is reflected in rising consumption, which in 2005 accounted for some 64% of GDP. This is significantly higher than the 58% figure for Europe and 42% for China (Gurcharan, Das "The India Model"). Domestic demand driven growth could help insulate India somewhat from global downturns, and it suggests that what some see as the East Asian export-driven development paradigm may not be the only path to greater prosperity. India may represent a more politically safe path to modernization because it has combined global integration with a relatively smaller domestic wealth gap. 38. Private entrepreneurs have played a central role in India's rapid growth, while state-owned companies and foreign firms have been the engines of China's export-led growth. China's lending institutions continue to favour state-owned companies, while private firms receive only 10% of recorded available credit. The figure in India is 80%. But these numbers might be less revealing than they suggest, given the Chinese propensity to engage in self-financing or family networks to raise investment capital. It is worth noting as well that while privately held Indian firms account for much of India's foreign trade, in China most exports are generated by non-Chinese firms. This partly reflects ongoing restrictions on foreign firms operating in India, but it also reveals much about Indian entrepreneurialism (Perkovich).




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