Japan Aff Michigan



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Heg Decline Inevitable


US East Asian presence is still needed to deter Chinese Naval build-up

Buxbaum 5/31- BA in political science and economics from Columbia University (Peter, 5/31, “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html)

The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it." In response to the Chinese challenge, US strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle,' the subject of the new CSBA report. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon," noted Senator Joseph Lieberman, an independent from Connecticut, and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, at a recent Washington gathering. FREE Breaking Investment & Geopolitical Intelligence - Previously only available to Governments, Intelligence Agencies & selected Hedge Funds. Click here for more information on our Free Weekly Intelligence Report Spurring the need for AirSea Battle, CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch, is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war." A key objective of AirSea Battle, then, is to deny adversaries a quick victory. AirSea Battle, as outlined in the CSBA report, is a complex set of concepts, involving the development of specific military capabilities, such as long-range strike systems, and operating concepts, such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force, that would offset the Chinese buildup. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies, particularly the Japanese, and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. In a speech earlier this month, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. "The gusher has been turned off," he said, "and will stay off for a good period of time[...].[R]ealistically, it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities, especially in light of the budget squeeze. Gates has displayed a proclivity, as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year, towards developing a balanced, multifaceted defense posture. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats. In fact, according to the CSBA report, DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific, emphasizing, for example, short-range over than long-range strike systems. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power, China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally," said Krepinevich. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. US inability, real or perceived, to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability, including coercion or aggression." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted, Japan's current government, "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years," advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail, the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific, a new capability for them, but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. "Carrier operations are very complex," he said. "It took us 70 years to get where we are. "Besides," he added, "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. As Sun Tzu said in his classic, The Art of War, "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."
Heg decline inevitable- empiric similarities to other power declines

Vega 6/22- student at Stockholm School of Economics (Rocky, 6/22/9, “How US Military Supremacy is a Soviet-Style Poison Pill”

However, national defense is by far the largest portion of US discretionary spending, meaning it must be approved by Congress every year. That yearly green light says a lot about the priorities of the nation. How that singular focus comes about makes defense spending an interesting area to explore further. A recent article by author Tom Engelhardt, comparing the US military expenditures now to the Soviet Union just before its collapse, helps to explain why. From AlterNet: “Looking back, the most distinctive feature of the last years of the Soviet Union may have been the way it continued to pour money into its military — and its military adventure in Afghanistan — when it was already going bankrupt and the society it had built was beginning to collapse around it. In the end, its aging leaders made a devastating miscalculation. They mistook military power for power on this planet.” Is it possible that the US has forgotten most of its military strength has derived from its extraordinary economic success, and not the other way around? Here’s what Engelhardt thinks… “In the fall of 2008, the abyss opened under the U.S. economy, which the Bush administration had been blissfully ignoring, and millions of people fell into it. Giant institutions wobbled or crashed; extended unemployment wouldn’t go away; foreclosures happened on a mind-boggling scale; infrastructure began to buckle; state budgets were caught in a death grip; teachers’ jobs, another kind of infrastructure, went down the tubes in startling numbers; and the federal deficit soared… “…But here was the strange thing. In the midst of the Great Recession, under a new president with assumedly far fewer illusions about American omnipotence and power, war policy continued to expand in just about every way [...] As in the Soviet Union before its collapse, the exaltation and feeding of the military at the expense of the rest of society and the economy had by now become the new normal…” The “new normal” Engelhardt describes isn’t new because of the critical importance of US warfare. It’s new because of how severe the tradeoffs are now, given a more meager US pocketbook. Alongside entitlement spending, not to mention recent bailouts and stimulus, the nation has accumulated vast amounts of debt, which are not going to diminish and certainly can’t serve national interests well. Engelhardt continues: “Drunk on war as Washington may be, the U.S. is still not the Soviet Union in 1991 — not yet. But it’s not the triumphant “sole superpower” anymore either. Its global power is visibly waning, its ability to win wars distinctly in question, its economic viability open to doubt. It has been transformed from a can-do into a can’t-do nation, a fact only highlighted by the ongoing BP catastrophe [...] And if its armies come home in defeat… watch out.” The cost of maintaining the world’s largest military would naturally be astronomical, but, in addition, the costs seem to only escalate and become increasingly inescapable. Even outside of the expense, the distraction of US leadership by the worldwide operations of manpower, bases, weaponry, and new research, takes away from the ability of the White House and Congress to focus on severe problems at home. And, according to Engelhardt, the potential for mistaking military power for power more broadly could cause the US to go down much like the Soviets.

US influence on the decline- three reasons

Aznar 6/22- former Prime Minister of Spain (Jose Maria, 6/22/10, adaptation of a speech given to Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Policy, “ There's No Such Thing as a 'Reset' Button”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/22/there_s_no_such_thing_as_a_reset_button)

Meanwhile, the world is waiting for Washington to acknowledge its strategic responsibilities. America's liberal and democratic ideals are the foundation of today's international order. Since World War II, the United States has been the world's defining ideological, economic, scientific, strategic, and cultural force. Today, that order is under attack. First, there are the populist voices that have risen against our free market economy since the start of the current economic crisis. Their agenda is to alter our economic system -- they want to alter the consensus from limited state presence and individual risk-taking, to greater state intervention, more public authority, and less individual freedom. The second threats are the rising nations that feel that the current distribution of world power is unjust. They respond by undermining the policies of those they consider to be their rivals. I'm referring primarily to Russia and China, but also to populist regimes like Hugo Chávez's Venezuela. Third, there are the states and stateless forces that are trying to provoke a revolutionary change to the international system. Here, we can include nations like Iran and groups like al Qaeda.




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