Links Our link outweighs any link turns – access to strategic locations makes it uniquely necessary
Kapoor 10 (Dr. Rajesh Kapoor Ph. D, Japanese Studies/International Relations is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi., “The Strategic Relevance of Okinawa”, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa_rkapoor_100610.html)
In the post-Occupation period, US troops and military bases in Japan have been instrumental in ensuring peace and stability within Japan as well as in East Asia. The geo-strategic location of Okinawa makes it the preferred site for hosting US military bases both in terms of securing Japan as well as for US force projection in the Far East. Okinawa’s distance from the rest of Japan and from other countries of East Asia makes it an ideal location to host military bases and thus extend US military outreach considerably. In the case of an eventuality, it is easier for the US marines, who act as first responders to exigencies, to take appropriate action well before the rest of Japan is affected. In addition, Japan cannot ignore the potential threat it faces from its nuclear neighbours including China, North Korea and Russia. The Russian and Chinese threats, as of now, can be ruled out. However, the North Korean threat is very much real and Japan has been building up its Ballistic Missile Defence system in collaboration with the US to cater for it.
Okinawa Prefecture includes a chain of hundreds of small islands. The midpoint of this chain is almost equidistance from Taiwan and Japan’s Kyushu Island. During the Vietnam War, the USFJ military bases particularly in Okinawa were among the most important strategic and logistic bases. In addition, strategists in Japan note that despite the country’s three non-nuclear principles, some bases in Okinawa were used for stockpiling nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Even today, US nuclear-armed submarines and destroyers operate in the vicinity of Japan, facilitated by a secret deal between the governments of the US and Japan. Moreover, having military bases in Japan also helps the US to have easy access to the strategically important five seas –the Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.1
Japan deterrence continually tested
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essential-deterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Calculating the deterrent effect of bases and/or forces is always an imprecise business. Perhaps the most important determinant is the degree of commitment and willingness of one country to sacrifice for another. To date, the US-Japan defense relationship and the maintaining of US bases on Okinawa for over 40 years after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan has maintained peace and stability in Northeast Asia. This has also had a calming effect in other parts of the region.
The Government of Japan obviously values the US bases on Okinawa or it otherwise would have closed them down — as is quite doable under the US-Japan Defense Treaty. However, the Japanese government must explain clearly and forcefully to the Japanese public why these bases are necessary for Japan’s national defense if it hopes to keep them. To date, no Japanese administration has done what is necessary in this regard. Maybe someday one will — as the more secure the US Okinawa presence, the greater the deterrent value.
Importantly, deterrence has never been tested quite like it is today. The US military presence on Okinawa is, as noted, operationally important and also a measure of the US-Japan political relationship. Our adversaries know this, although in both the US and Japan many observers and commentators downplay the deterrent effect of US bases on Okinawa.
Perhaps the ultimate test of the US Okinawa bases’ deterrent value is to remove the US military presence or drastically reduce it. Do so, and we will soon discover that they were a deterrent — and a good one indeed.
Forward presence in Asia enables the US to maintain strategic deterrence in Asia and respond to humanitarian disasters
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Okinawa’s location has become more strategically important over the past few decades. (See Figure 2.) In the post-World War II environment, Japan’s northern islands were seen as a bulwark to contain the Soviet Union’s Pacific fleet. Post-Cold War security threats include the potential flashpoints of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but more recent assertiveness by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea and East China Sea has drawn growing attention from Department of Defense (DOD) planners. The U.S. military presence in Japan, and particularly Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific region. The forward-deployed presence of the U.S. Air Force and Navy also allows for response to humanitarian disasters in the region, as demonstrated by the rapid U.S. assistance after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan and after the November 2013 super-typhoon in the Philippines. The deployment of MV-22 “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft to Okinawa reportedly has enhanced the operational capability of the Marines based there, because MV-22s have a greater range and faster cruising speed than the helicopters they replaced
Okinawa presence needed to stabilize the East China Sea
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
The intensification of the territorial dispute between Japan and China over small islands in the East China Sea has provided another rationale for the approximately 19,000 marines stationed on Okinawa. The main island of Okinawa is only 270 nautical miles from the disputed islets, called Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. The potential role of U.S. Marines in defending and/or retaking uninhabited islands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear, but the operational capabilities of the Okinawa-based Marines are aligned with the needs of such a mission.
A2: Response Time Link Turn Alternatives can’t match Okinawa—ensures conflict management fails
Jenny Lin, Sasakawa Peace Foundation resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, February 2015, The US-Japan Alliance in Transformation: The Management of the US Marine Corps Futenma Airfield Relocation Facility (FRF), http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf
The US Marine Corps Futenma airfield is one of the seven bases for the United Nations Command (UNC) in Japan. Those bases were established in the 1950s to deter North Korea aggression, and to support South Korea by providing strategic and military assistance. Futenma‟s strategic purposes include, first, rapid response to contingencies in the region. Response time from Okinawa is a lot shorter than if the US military deploys from Honolulu or San Diego, which takes approximately 5 or 8 hours, respectively. And second, facilities at Futenma meet the requirement of US Marine Corps‟ doctrine on training and operation, namely the proximity of Marines to training and support facilities. Third, as a UNC rear command airfield, it provides logistics for a wide range of military activities, and accommodates reinforcement aircraft. Logistically, the airfield provides supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, and communications. In an event of conflict, the wait time for force and logistic reinforcement could be 1 to 8 hours, as they may be flying from Guam, Honolulu, or San Diego; thus the Marines must fight with existing resources but will need support. Therefore, to supply the Marines with proper reinforcements, it is essential that Futenma runways accommodate all type of aircraft. Currently at Futenma, two runways are available, each of 2,743 meter (9,000 feet) in length, which allows both fixed and non-fixed wing aircraft to land and take-off. The new security challenges: hybrid and volatile The 21st-century challenges are increasingly complex and more diverse than during the Cold War, which make a “black-and-white distinction between irregular war and conventional war.”149 At the end of the 20th century, Defense secretaries during the Clinton era150 supported the principle of a “two regional war” strategy, and maintained the readiness of US forces accordingly.151 But this principle was deemphasized in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); the new concept is to maintain readiness for a wider range of challenges.152 The justification for deviating from traditional force planning is backed by lessons learned from previous wars and because threats have evolved to hybrid challenges. The idea of “hybrid threats” was raised and supported by retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates. It means that US adversaries could use a combination of means to gain asymmetric advantage in conflict.153 In a 2009 address at the Maxwell Air Force Base, Gates said: “War in the future will often be a hybrid blend of tactics where a nation state might deploy a mix of crude and advanced weapons to limit options, disrupt freedom of action or deny access to key assets such as forward air bases.”154 To confront new challenges, Gates emphasized the importance of adopting a mixture of weapon systems that is flexible and versatile, to better meet a wide spectrum of conflicts while enhancing interoperability. Since Gates‟ departure, tensions have erupted in different regions. In the Asia-Pacific, the security situation is becoming more volatile as tensions rise between China and its neighbors. At the May 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel criticized Beijing for destabilizing the South China Sea, and said that its actions threaten progress in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, China‟s open disregard for the rule of law at sea,155 its unilateral action on announcing air defense identification zone, and its dismissal of claims by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all drawn strong reactions. In early 2012, the PLAN began executing Beijing‟s claim to almost the entire South China Sea by challenging the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal; in July that year, Beijing formally created Sansha City, which oversees its claims to territories in dispute with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared an ADIZ (air defense identification zone) over the East China Sea; and escalated its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In May 2014, Beijing put an oil rig in disputed waters that Vietnam claims as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Beijing‟s assertiveness and disregard for the rule of law have resulted in strong reactions from its neighbors. In May 2014, Hanoi confronted the PLAN at sea over Beijing‟s oil rig, and allowed protests against China‟s unilateral action.156 In June, Manila filed complaints in international court against Beijing.157 And in July, Prime Minister Abe announced a reversal of restrictions posed by Japan‟s Article 9 Constitution – regarding the right to collective selfdefense.158 Amid creeping advances in the Asia-Pacific, there is an array of security issues that needs the attention of the US: terrorism, cyber intrusions, drug and human trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and climate change. All of which underscores former Defense Secretary Gates‟ point: the US must be ready to confront a combination of threats, and the overall strategy must be supported by assets. Align strategy with assets: the role of the mega-float Given that future challenges will be both hybrid and conventional, building an unconventional base can boost future force readiness. In the 2014 QDR, the DOD addressed these challenges by recognizing the need to develop forces capable of responding to hybrid scenarios with a combination of high-and low-level threats.159 More specifically, the Defense Department outlined three pillars in its new strategy: 1. To protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters; 2. To build security globally, to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges; 3. To project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In the context of a possible conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, logistics in the green water (i.e., nations‟ littoral zones; for example, the South China Sea to the first island chain) will be key to deter and defeat aggressor(s). During peace-time, the mega-float can serve as part of the FRF; during conflict, it can function as an offensive vehicle. To realize this concept, the design of the mega-float/FRF is crucial. First, the length of the FRF runways must be appropriate. The length of the FRF runways should coincide with aircraft developments. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the length of the runway is justified by the aircraft designs, and required longest runway lengths of aircraft that will be making regular use of the runway.160 The current Henoko/FRF‟s two 1,600 meter-long V-shaped runways cannot accommodate all types of aircraft. Despite that the 2006 Roadmap specified that the USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft at Henoko/FRF, the replacement airfield should still reflect the development of all aircraft to be deployed by the US military. If not, Futenma‟s original capability will be lost.
Ospreys solve
Envall 15 – Envall 8/26/2015 (H.D.P. (David) Envall is a Research Fellow at the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University. Kerri Ng is a PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University, Will regional tensions shift the deadlock on Okinawa’s military bases?, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/26/will-regional-tensions-shift-the-deadlock-on-okinawas-military-bases/)
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may be close to achieving one long-pursued goal, the relocation of the controversial Futenma airbase in Okinawa. This has been a perpetual sore in the US‒Japan alliance. But recent international trends may be reshaping Okinawa’s base politics and pushing the two allies closer to carrying out the Futenma relocation. The Futenma controversy was triggered in 1995, after widespread protests erupted in Okinawa following the rape of a 12-year-old girl by US military personnel. The US and Japanese governments subsequently reached an agreement in 1996 to close Futenma following the construction of a replacement facility. Some Okinawans were willing to accept this relocation under certain conditions, but others viewed the arrangement as a perpetuation of America’s excessive military presence in Okinawa. The two national governments were content to live with the status quo, especially in the face of other more pressing issues, until change could be delivered on their terms. It was only in 2006 that they finally agreed on a clear plan for base realignment — including Futenma’s relocation elsewhere in Okinawa (to Henoko) — as part of a broader restructuring of the alliance. But this plan was not well received by those Okinawans who remained committed to the relocation of Futenma outside the prefecture. The resulting standoff was complicated further when the Democratic Party of Japan led by Yukio Hatoyama came to power in 2009–10. Hatoyama promised to review the 2006 agreement and have Futenma moved outside Okinawa (and perhaps even outside Japan). But the US strongly opposed this and US pressure on Hatoyama forced him to renege on his promise before resigning. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in December 2012, the Japanese government moved to resolve the Futenma impasse. In December 2013, Abe obtained the approval of Okinawan Governor Hirokazu Nakaima to begin landfill work at Henoko. But in November 2014, Nakaima lost the Okinawan gubernatorial election to Takeshi Onaga, a former LDP member who opposes the Henoko relocation plan. Since then, the prefectural and national governments have been at loggerheads. In March 2015, Onaga ordered that surveys on the new site be suspended on environmental grounds, only to be overruled by the national government. Then in July, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly voted to restrict the transport of sand to Henoko in order to block the ongoing landfill work. In early August, Onaga announced that he would nullify Nakaima’s land reclamation approval. In response, the Abe administration has suspended offshore preparatory work at Henoko until September to allow for further talks. The Futenma dispute has now persisted for so long that the international environment has been dramatically transformed since the crisis of 1995. The rise of China has come to dominate debates about the region’s future. In particular, China has begun to contest the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands more vigorously. This shift has strongly reaffirmed Okinawa’s strategic importance. Okinawa’s significance lies in its geography. It is an obvious location for a rapid deployment of forces in response to clashes around the disputed islands. This is reflected in recent changes in US and Japanese strategic thinking. Japanese strategic doctrine, for example, now highlights the need to be able to respond rapidly to ‘grey zone’, or low-level, disputes in the area. Okinawa, then, is firmly in the minds of strategic thinkers. The deployment of the MV-22 Osprey vertical take-off and landing aircraft to Okinawa improves response capabilities. Recent reports also suggest that plans are well underway for further, more substantial deployments of Japanese forces to Okinawa.In the newly-released Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation, the US and Japan ‘reaffirmed’ that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are ‘within the scope’ of the security treaty. At the same time, during Abe’s US trip in late April the two governments confirmed their ‘unwavering commitment’ to the Henoko plan. This indicates that although Onaga has warned that Futenma’s relocation will be impossible without Okinawan consent, regional insecurity is actually making Japan and the US more willing to endure local protests:the political costs of creating further discontent in Okinawa are now outweighed by the consequences of failing to stand up to China. Abe may now believe that, on the Futenma issue at least, he is close to success. That such an outcome will likely favour Abe’s security agenda is in no small part thanks to increasing regional tensions and China’s growing assertiveness.
Not sourcing the lift requirements for moving the marines further away
Klingner 12 (Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at heritage, “Don’t Strand the Marines on the Beach,” 4/27/12) http://dailysignal.com//2012/04/27/dont-strand-the-marines-on-the-beach/
The United States and Japan released a revised deployment plan for U.S. Marine Corps forces in the Pacific. It is an improvement over the 2006 Guam Agreement, but it still sacrifices alliance military capabilities for political expediency. The new plan is more flexible and operationally focused, since it maintains Marine Air Ground Task Forces rather than dividing Marine combat, command, and logistics components. But moving Marine units further from potential conflict and humanitarian disaster zones only makes them more vulnerable to the tyranny of distance endemic in the Pacific theater. The Marines already face a shortage of critical lift and mobility assets to fulfill their missions and privately grumble that the Navy shows no inclination to provide it. The Marines identified a need for 38 ships, the Navy provided 33, and the number has since dwindled to below 30. The Darwin Initiative—in which up to 2,500 Marines will rotate through training areas in Australia—is an excellent strategic move
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to affirm U.S. commitment to defending allies and partners in Southeast Asia. But the Pentagon continues to struggle in determining how it will “globally source” the manpower requirements. Without sufficient mobility assets, the U.S. risks stranding the Marines down under, unable to get into the fight over the horizon. A mobility shortfall in the Pacific is just one of the critical degradations of U.S. military capabilities that are already taking place due to massive defense budget cuts. And the shortfalls are only going to get exponentially worse under sequestration—a fiscal train wreck that the White House and Congress are ignoring.
They have the shit right there!
Don Kirk 14, veteran correspondent and noted author on conflict and crisis from Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Northeast Asia, Master's degree in International relations from the University of Chicago, http://japanforum.nbr.org/scripts/wa.exe?A3=ind1401&L=LIST&E=quoted-printable&P=139597&B=---600603132-1990664861-1388667358%3D%3A27186&T=text%2Fhtml;%20charset=utf-8&XSS=3&header=1
What would happen in the case of a missile or air attack on the Okinawa bases clearly DOES fall under the rubric of deterrence value of the bases. That yarn about the pinpoint accuracy of a Chinese missile that purportedly shot down a satellite makes for fun reading, but Chinese missiles, like the NKorean versions that once terrorized Israel without denting Israeli military strength, would not be real effective against Okinawa bases. The bit about Futenma not having the ammo storage space is incorrect. Of course it does. Marine pilots, in any case, may pick up ammo at Iwakuni, not Kadena, since that's where they have most of their planes these days in view of anti-base protests around Futenma. The U.S. view is they need two air bases on Okinawa in case of hostilities. (Some armchair strategists no doubt disagree.) Henoko, 10 mins or so flying time from Kadena, would inevitably have storage facilities. Marine aircraft are not going to have to fly to Kadena or Iwakuni every time they reload. Please. Talk of turning Kadena into a marine air station is an abstraction (distraction, actually). By the way, it's easy to check on who's flying in and of Kadena from the fourth-story of the Up-Kitty restaurant bldg. beyond the main runway. That's where Okinawa Defense Bureau logs all flights, keeping decibel count etc. while spectators, including tourists from China, come and go. I saw plenty of USAF planes, no marine aircraft, when I was up there researching a book. I also got a sweeping view of Futenma air station from roof of admin bldg. of university -- almost no take-offs and landings. Not many helicopters, the odd cargo plane, no fighters (though I'm told they do go in there from time to time). Oh yes, storage facilities were clearly visible too.
A2: Marines Left Behind Plan wrecks the Marines left behind---critical mass and combined training is key
Schoff 13 – James L. Schoff, Senior Associate in the Carnegie Asia Program Focusing on U.S.-Japanese Relations and Regional Engagement, Japanese Politics and Security, and Private Sector's Role in Japanese Policymaking, July 17, "Getting Serious About U.S. Marine Relocation in Japan", http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/17/getting-serious-about-u.s.-marine-relocation-in-japan
Nakaima faces a difficult political decision on the landfill permit with important implications. His main priority is to close Futenma quickly and reduce the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa, and he criticizes the current Henoko plan as too slow. The majority of Okinawans want the marines to move off the island entirely, and the governor’s office has promoted an expedited “dispersal” alternative that would separate components of marines currently stationed at the Futenma Air Station and have them rotate around different existing Japanese commercial and military facilities in the rest of country. The dispersal concept is vague, but it essentially breaks up the marines in Japan into small units that would base and train temporarily at multiple locations outside Okinawa. This alternative is unworkable operationally because the marines need a certain critical mass and a reliable combined training regimen to maintain their capabilities and responsiveness. It also risks opening up a whole new can of political worms and inciting multiple local protests in these new host cities. Pursuing this “quick” solution would delay movement on the current plan and cause Futenma to stay where it is even longer than projected.
Multilat fails and is unsustainable.
Young et al 13 Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24, 2013, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation", http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation
*We do not endorse the ableist language.
The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is [destroyed] paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below.
Growing multipolarity.
The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur.
Institutional inertia.
The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power.
Harder problems.
As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).
Fragmentation.
The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.
A2: We don’t Know the Exact Number of Marines We Need
We may not know the exact number, but we must maintain some marines
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Although most strategists agree on the importance of Okinawa’s location for U.S. security interests in East Asia, there is less consensus on the particular number of marines necessary to maintain stability. For example, two prominent analysts suggested a rethinking of U.S. military basing in light of cuts to the U.S. defense budget and Okinawan obstacles; they argue that leaving a force of 5,000-10,000 marines on Okinawa while also pre-positioning supply vessels in Japanese waters and bringing most of the marines home to California would amply serve U.S. rapid response and deterrence needs.5 Defense officials continue to assert the need for substantial numbers of U.S. marines to be positioned in Asia, but have offered a degree of flexibility in their exact location; current plans would deploy marines on a rotational basis through Guam and Australia. Congressional concerns, as discussed below, have focused on cost and implementation, but have not argued that the Marine presence itself is unnecessary
A2: Other Bases in Asia
Japan is the most significant forward operating base in Asia
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is often labeled as “the cornerstone” of security in the Asia Pacific region, local concerns about the U.S. military presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa have challenged the management of the alliance for decades. The Japanese archipelago serves as the most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region; approximately 53,000 military personnel (39,000 onshore and 14,000 afloat in nearby waters), 43,000 dependents, and 5,000 Department of Defense civilian employees live in Japan. With the United States rebalancing its defense posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers.
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