Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf



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Contention I -- Alliance

Advantage one is Alliance

The US agreed to relocate the Futenma base 20 years ago but still hasn’t followed through - this is the biggest vulnerability in the alliance – only the plan makes relations sustainable


Tatsumi, Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, 6-24-15

(Yuki, “Abe’s Okinawa Problem,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/abes-okinawa-problem/)



The reason of Abe’s frustration with Onaga is clear. Onaga, formerly a member of ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who used to support Futenma’s relocation to Henoko when he was the mayor of Naha City, has not softened his stance against the existing plan to relocate Futenma Air Station. Onaga even visited Hawaii and Washington D.C. between May 27 and June 5, accompanied by a delegation of Diet and prefectural assembly members from Okinawa, to voice the prefecture’s opposition to the current government plan to U.S. lawmakers and government officials. If anything, the cool treatment he received in the United States — he could not get any official whom he met during his trip to sympathize with his positionseems to have hardened his opposition to the current plan. To be fair, the problem associated with the relocation of Futenma Air Station is not of Abe’s making. In 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, then the prime minister and head of the Democratic Party of Japan, promised that his government would look for an alternative to the current relocation plan that is “at minimum outside Okinawa.” With that promise, a sense of hope quickly emerged and spread in Okinawa that the Futenma relocation issue could be resolved under the new political leadership. When Hatoyama admitted nine months into his premiership that he had come to realize that the existing plan was indeed the best option available for Okinawa, disenchanted political leaders in Okinawa (who lost whatever little confidence they may have had in Japan’s central government) came together behind the banner of “no new construction in Henoko.” In other words, five years after Hatoyama left office, the Abe government still struggles to recover from the situation aggravated during the Hatoyama administration. Still, the reality remains that the relocation of Futenma Air Station has not been achieved almost 20 years after the U.S. and Japanese governments first agreed on it in 1996. The local government holds a great deal of authority in issuing various permits required for the construction of the replacement facility to proceed. Therefore, even if Onaga cannot stop the construction in Henoko, he can still make the process as difficult as possible for the Japanese government. Theoretically, Abe can counter these moves by trying to enact a Special Measures Law that would allow the central government in Tokyo to proceed with the relocation without having to subject the process to the approval by the governor and/or mayor, essentially overriding their authority. There is precedent for this — in 1996, the Japanese government revised the Special Measures Law to practically allow the Japanese government to continue to rent the land for U.S. military bases and other facilities from private landowners regardless of the owners’ request for the land to be returned. However, doing so prematurely would damage the Abe government as it has the risk of triggering anti-U.S. base sentiment across Japan. The approval rating for Abe’s cabinet is on the decline since the government hit a major speed bump in its deliberation of national security legislation after three constitutional scholars unanimously argued that the proposed legislation is “unconstitutional.” Under the circumstances, Abe will not want to force the issue. The current situation, where Futenma Air Station’s ultimate fate remains in limbo, is unsustainable. As Tokyo’s relationship with Okinawa remains deadlocked with no real prospect of a breakthrough, Futenma remains, as it was 20 years ago, one of the most tangible vulnerabilities for the political sustainability of a U.S. military presence in Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance writ large.

Marine presence is eroding the alliance - reducing the burden on Okinawa is key to the effectiveness of relations


Mochizuki, Associate Professor @ George Washington University, 13

(Mike, “Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific,” http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/chian/naha_port/documents/h24reporten-1.pdf)



As the United States and Japan look to a new phase in their relationship, with President Barack Obama beginning a second term and change likely in Japanese political leadership soon, they have some serious work to do. What the late great Ambassador Mike Mansfield called the greatest bilateral alliance in the world, bar none, a generation ago remains great. It features two of the world’s three largest economies, that are also two of the world’s best in the high-technology sectors; it bridges enormous cultural and geographic expanses because for all their differences, the Japanese and American peoples share common values and a desire for peace; it affords America irreplaceable basing and staging options while protecting Japan in one of the world’s most dynamic and turbulent regions. Yet it is underperforming. For more than a decade, the biggest issue within this alliance of giants has been what to do about 18,000 Marines, a relatively small force, on the very small island of Okinawa, and what to do about one particular Marine Corps airfield there. Japanese domestic politics are the immediate cause of the impasse in solving the problem, but much larger strategic and diplomatic stakes are at play as well. As long as the alliance stays bogged down over this matter, it will gradually and ineluctably atrophy, and it will be increasingly hard to describe it as the world’s greatest or most important. What to do? The bases in Japan are all highly useful, but only some are crucially important in a strategic sense in our judgment. A number of capabilities presently located in Japan out of convenience could be downsized without harm to the alliance’s posture, largely because alternatives exist that are militarily comparable or superior. A good analogy might be with the Obama administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe, whereby a technologically superior new approach also partially mitigated a diplomatic problem with Russia. Here the situation is different of course, but there do appear to be ways to reduce the Marine Corps footprint on Okinawa even further than now contemplatedand bring some of the Marines back to main American bases rather than Guam, as a cost-saving measure—while actually improving net military responsiveness for Asian contingencies. We develop these ideas below, while also addressing a number of other nettlesome matters within the alliance.

Japan is the cornerstone of norm creation – the alliance is key to cooperation and preventing conflict


Walker, Transatlantic Fellow @ German Marshall Fund, 15

(Joshua, “Japan's Global Re-Emergence: How Japan's Active Diplomacy Strengthens the Foundations of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/japans-global-reemergence_b_7013506.html)



Japan has reappeared on the world stage. After 20 years of economic stagnation and a decade of political malaise, Shinzo Abe, in his second incarnation as prime minister, has won two major elections and is attempting to use his political capital to reform the sluggish Japanese economy. At the same time, he is placing a renewed emphasis on global affairs. Central to this has been the Abe's government effort to diversify Tokyo's international partnerships. Japan is forging closer relations across the Indo-Pacific and increasing dialogue with ASEAN. Farther abroad, Japan is deepening cooperation with Europe and reinforcing its security anchor, the U.S.-Japan alliance. Just when global rules and norms are being tested, Tokyo's proactive diplomatic outreach, aimed at strengthening the international system, is a welcome development for Washington. Japan has benefited tremendously from the U.S.-led international rules based order established after World War II and now seeks to stand-up to the threats that are challenging this order by strengthening its connectivity with other countries -- especially other democracies. Japan is seizing the opportunity to be not only a contributor to regional peace and stability, but an active player on the global stage. Japan's determination to be a global actor is underscored by recent contributions to international peace and prosperity efforts in combating the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Japan joined the United States and Europe in implementing sanctions against Russia. This position ran contrary to the prior Japanese goal of settling its longstanding territorial dispute with Moscow and securing much-needed energy resources from Russia. Sadly, Japan's increased global profile has not come without controversy or tragedy, witnessed most starkly by the recent public killing of two Japanese hostages by ISIS. The Abe government has sought to diversify Japan's traditional partnerships and policy instruments by pursuing a grand strategy of connectivity among democracies, while balancing its pragmatic and opportunistic relations with other states. This strategy begins with Japan's newly established National Security Council, and employs the use of a variety of levers including foreign aid, defense commerce, and multilateral diplomacy. Ultimately, Abe's success in this endeavor will hinge on his much-vaunted "Abenomics" -- economic policy aimed at resuscitating the sluggish Japanese economy. The success of this daunting task will likely determine whether Abe will have the political capital to sustain Japanese leadership abroad. There is little public appetite for Japan's international leadership role if direct interests are not at stake. Thus it is vital for Abe's government to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership as soon as possible, and clarify the benefits of various new trilateral partnerships involving Australia, India, and Southeast Asia. If Abe can succeed, a revitalized Japan, empowered to undertake important trade negotiations and reinterpret the traditional definitions of collective self-defense, is a welcome global development. Japan's proactive diplomacy is not a threat to the U.S.-Japan alliance; rather it is a tribute to it. By the same token, strategic diplomacy with partners in the region or elsewhere who share common interests but not values should be viewed as complementary to U.S. and European interests. Tokyo's diversification of its partnerships with like-minded powers in the Indo-Pacific and Europe along with the deepening of relations in Southeast Asia works to ensure a prosperous and strong Japan, which in turn guarantees regional stability. Rather than being a zero-sum game for the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is a force multiplier for both parties. The United States remains the indispensable link between the Atlantic and Pacific. In turn, Japan has a key role to play not just as an important ally of the United States in Asia, but also as the world's fourth largest economy, the biggest donor of international aid, and home to many of the world's most respected multinational businesses, assets that Tokyo can bring to bear in international affairs to reinforce global norms and the existing international order. Success in tackling its own domestic and economic challenges will ultimately determine the longevity of Tokyo's global renaissance. Japan's global emergence should be welcomed and encouraged by its partners to weather the challenges in the 21st century.

Norms solve existential great power wars


Sachs 14—Jeffrey, D. is a Professor of Sustainable Development, Professor of Health Policy and Management, and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is also Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals “Ukraine and the Crisis of International Law,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jeffrey-d--sachs-sees-in-russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-the-return--with-us-complicity--of-great-power-politics

International law itself is at a crossroads. The US, Russia, the EU, and NATO cite it when it is to their advantage and disregard it when they deem it a nuisance. Again, this is not to justify Russia’s unacceptable actions; rather, it is to add them to the sequence of actions contrary to international law. The same problems may soon spill over into Asia. Until recently, China, Japan, and others in Asia have staunchly defended the requirement that the Security Council approve any outside military intervention in sovereign states. Recently, however, several countries in East Asia have become locked in a spiral of claims and counterclaims regarding borders, shipping lanes, and territorial rights. So far, these disputes have remained basically peaceful, but tensions are rising. We must hope that the countries of the region continue to see the great value of international law as a bulwark of sovereignty, and act accordingly. There have long been skeptics of international lawthose who believe that it can never prevail over the national interests of major powers, and that maintaining a balance of power among competitors is all that really can be done to keep the peace. From this perspective, Russia’s actions in the Crimea are simply the actions of a great power asserting its prerogatives. Yet such a world is profoundly and unnecessarily dangerous. We have learned time and again that there is no such thing as a true “balance of power.” There are always imbalances and destabilizing power shifts. Without some scaffolding of law, open conflict is all too likely. This is especially true today, as countries jostle for oil and other vital resources. It is no coincidence that most of the deadly wars of recent years have taken place in regions rich in valuable and contested natural resources. As we look back in this centennial year toward the outbreak of WWI, we see again and again that the only possible route to safety is international law, upheld by the United Nations and respected on all sides. Yes, it sounds naive, but no one has to look back to see the naiveté of the belief that great-power politics will preserve peace and ensure humanity’s survival.


Renewed focus is key to counter every transnational threat – including climate change and pandemics – the US and Japan need each other for successful climate talks in Paris this December


Elgin-Cossart, Senior Fellow at American Progress, 15

(Molly, “Mindful of Both Past and Present Challenges, Japan and the United States Must Work Together to Achieve a Progressive Future,” https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/04/27/111819/mindful-of-both-past-and-present-challenges-japan-and-the-united-states-must-work-together-to-achieve-a-progressive-future/)



Another major objective for Prime Minster Abe will be to focus public attention on Japan’s global citizenship since World War II and to cast a forward-looking agenda for bilateral cooperation. While the focus for Prime Minster Abe and President Obama will likely be acute challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, they also should use this moment to think about how the United States and Japan can collaborate to promote inclusive prosperity and environmental stability not just in Asia but also globally. Given the two nations’ shared values and a commitment to human rights, human security, democracy, economic opportunity, and confronting climate change, this should be natural. With both nations wielding substantial clout in the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the G-7, the G-20, and other critical elements of the global order, it is also practical. Elevating collaboration in these forums as a top pillar in bilateral relations should be a priority for both sides. Investing in people and prosperity The United States and Japan have contributed substantially to economic development worldwide, as well as to the global good. The United States was pivotal in establishing international institutions such as the United Nations, and it is the world’s largest contributor of official development assistance globally. Following World War II, Japan was a major recipient of international assistance but became a donor nation within a decade. Today, Japan is the world’s fifth-largest bilateral aid donor, the largest contributor to the Asian Development Bank, and a generous funder of multilateral initiatives such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Fund and the U.N. Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict initiative. These efforts are vital to preserving the security, rights, and freedom of people worldwide. Japan and the United States have been leaders in not only the quantity of assistance but also the quality. Their commitment to ending poverty and promoting health, food security, and other essential needs has been vital to global growth and progress. However, a new approach is needed: 21st century challengesincluding ending extreme poverty, more broadly sharing the benefits of globalization, and combating climate change—demand 21st century solutions. Despite great progress, significant challenges remain, and business as usual will not offer solutions. The challenge for global development is threefold: Ensure the rights and dignity of each and every person. Help economies move from poverty to prosperity. Work together to prevent and mitigate the effects of catastrophes—which know no borders—from pandemics to violent extremism to the effects of climate change and other environmental crises. Shared values—including individual rights, building inclusive and prosperous economies and societies, and providing for the global good—unite the United States and Japan and provide the foundation to tackle these challenges together. From Southeast Asia to Africa, the potential for joint investment is great. Crucially, the United States and Japan also realize that there is work to do at home too. Japan has unveiled ambitious plans to increase the number of women in its workforce, and the United States has taken significant steps toward universal health care and reducing carbon emissions. These domestic initiatives are integral to a new approach to development that sees development less as charity and more as sustainable global progress. Investing in the planet In the past decade, natural disasters have been on the rise in the Asia-Pacific region, which presages the impacts of climate change and other environmental problems, such as deforestation, in the coming decades. Agricultural productivity is at risk; rising sea levels threaten to displace more and more people; and food and water scarcity coupled with pandemic exposure have the potential to create a global public health crisis. If the United States and Japan are serious about fostering another 70 years of growth and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, climate change mitigation and resilience, as well as sustainable natural resource management, must be at the heart of bilateral cooperation. In terms of cutting emissions, the United States has already unveiled its international commitment and has reduced the carbon intensity of its energy consumption by 8 percent since 2005. Japan is expected to pledge a target 20 percent emission reduction by 2030 based on 2005 levels during the June G-7 summit. While dramatically reduced nuclear energy use in Japan makes aggressively reducing domestic emissions extremely challenging, the $4.5 billion that the United States and Japan have pledged to the Green Climate Fund will help developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change and further reduce carbon pollution. Technology, research, and technical assistance are other areas where the United States and Japan can make a great difference. Delivering advanced low- and zero-carbon energy technology from sources such as wind, solar, and nuclear power for future generations has great potential as an area of cooperation for globally shared prosperity and environmental security. Conclusion The United States and Japan cannot tackle the global challenges of the 21st century alone. Both have extensive partnerships and influence in regional and international bodies—from the United Nations to the G-20 and G-7, the Arctic Council, and the multilateral development banks. In the near term, Japan will lead the G-7 in 2016, an opportunity that offers tremendous potential. Working through these forums, the United States and Japan can collaborate with other nations to take action to build inclusive prosperity and tackle climate change. 2015 presents a particularly important opportunity to marry progress on climate, environment, and development with progress on both the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate Conference of the Parties.


Alliance key to norm setting in cyber – prevents conflicts deters aggression


Petretti, counsel in Morgan Lewis's Global Outsourcing, Technology, and Commercial Transactions Practice, 15

(Vito, “United States and Japan Form Cybersecurity Alliance in Hopes of Building International Norms,” http://www.natlawreview.com/article/united-states-and-japan-form-cybersecurity-alliance-hopes-building-international-nor)



On April 28, the United States and Japan reached an agreement to form a cybersecurity alliance between the countries. Faced with the growth of hacking threats from countries like China and North Korea and nonstate actors, the White House hopes to leverage the alliance along with other efforts to encourage the growth of international cyber norms. As Cory Bennett describes in The Hill article White House Unveils Cyber Part with Japan, “U.S. officials have publicly acknowledged that several countries — including Asian power China — are sitting on the United States’ critical networks, collecting data and possibly waiting to attack.” As part of the new alliance, Japan and the United States have agreed to share cybersecurity data such as threat data regarding hackers and assistance in strengthening cybersecurity infrastructure. The alliance also allows Japan to engage in some international cybersecurity initiatives. Bennett’s article describes the alliance as a step toward establishing broader international cybersecurity norms, noting that the countries agreed to develop “peacetime cyber norms” and to coordinate efforts with international organizations like the United Nations. The White House hopes that building international consensus behind some cyber norms will give the United States more authority to prosecute bad actors. Although the United States has expressed grave concern about the growth of hacking threats, particularly from state actors like China, it has been hesitant to retaliate. The Obama administration indicted five Chinese military servicemen last year on hacking charges, but this has been viewed as “a largely symbolic measure.” The new US-Japan cybersecurity alliance may be a model for future cooperation among other nations that may lead to new cyber norms and new policing of international cyber threats.



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