Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf
Contention II – Cyber War
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- Cyber war is likely – states have the means and motive – escalates to accidental war
- Cyber attacks cause nuclear war – accidents
- And lashout
Contention II – Cyber WarRemoving the Futenma base is critical to cybersecurity cooperation – frees up diplomatic bandwidthSegal 13 (Adam, Mansfield Fellow based in Tokyo, “Rob Sheldon: Advancing U.S.-Japan Collective Cyber Capabilities (Part III: Cooperation)”, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/10/25/rob-sheldon-advancing-u-s-japan-collective-cyber-capabilities-part-iii-cooperation/) Most importantly, both sides need to commit to the principle of progress. Oddly, the person with arguably the greatest potential to slow cooperation in cyberspace is not in Washington or Tokyo, Moscow or Beijing. It is the Governor of Okinawa, who perhaps as early as this December will decide whether to approve plans for the realignment of forces in Okinawa. This is the greatest foreseeable determinant of the trajectory of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in 2014. If the result is another delay, Futenma is likely to remain the most pressing issue on the agenda. One need only compare the joint statement of the 2011 Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”), which included promising language on cyber, to the 2012 version, where cyber was never mentioned, to understand just how all-consuming Futenma can be for the alliance. But regardless of the outcome of force realignment issues—and for that matter, broader collective defense debates—Washington and Tokyo must commit to preserve bandwidth so that cyber cooperation can proceed. Cyber war is likely – states have the means and motive – escalates to accidental warBrake, international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 15 (Benjamin, “Strategic Risks of Ambiguity in Cyberspace,” http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/strategic-risks-ambiguity-cyberspace/p36541) As major powers increasingly rely on digital networks for critical services, the number of plausible network attacks, accidents, or failures that could trigger or exacerbate an international crisis will increase. The likelihood and severity of such a destabilizing event will also grow as long as norms of appropriate behavior in cyberspace are underdeveloped, timely and convincing attribution of attacks remains difficult, and the number of cyber-capable actors increases. Preparing for or responding to such a crisis is complicated by ambiguity in cyberspace, primarily regarding responsibility and intent. Ambiguity about who is responsible for a cyberattack exacerbates the risk that countries amid a geopolitical crisis will misattribute an attack, unduly retaliate or expand a crisis, or be unable to attribute an attack at all, thereby preventing or delaying a response and weakening their deterrence and credibility. Ambiguity of what is intended complicates a country’s ability to distinguish between espionage operations and activity conducted in preparation for a cyberattack. The United States has strategic interests in preventing and mitigating these risks, given its commitment to global security and overwhelming dependence on networked systems for national security missions, commerce, health care, and critical infrastructure. The longer it takes to implement preventive and mitigating steps, the greater the likelihood of unnecessary military conflict in and outside of the cyber domain. Cyberattacks are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact, including their capacity for physical destruction. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia have demonstrated an ability to conduct destabilizing cyber activity. Such actions—whether for destructive purposes, intelligence collection, or economic espionage—are designed to evade network defenses and can involve various means of deception to thwart attribution. Recent incidents have shown that U.S. adversaries can no longer assume they will be able to conceal their identities in cyberspace, but cybersecurity experts still lack agreed-upon standards for attribution; evidence for a credible and convincing attribution can take a long time to compile; and malicious actors continue to develop new means of obscuring responsibility. Moreover, unlike many cyber operations designed to exfiltrate large amounts of data, destructive cyberattacks can be made to operate with limited communication between the malware and controller, offering fewer forensic details to establish responsibility. Even when an attacker can be identified, public attribution will remain as much a political challenge as a technical one, given that competing allegations of responsibility will likely follow any public accusation. Without corroborating signals or human intelligence—which, if it exists, officials may be reluctant or slow to disclose—computer forensic data may be incomplete or too ambiguous to convince a skeptical public. Should a major cyberattack occur over the next twelve to eighteen months, or even beyond that period if sufficient preventive and mitigating steps are not taken, public pressure to respond could outpace the time needed to credibly attribute responsibility and, if desired, build an effective coalition to support a response. Over the same time period, ambiguity regarding the intent of cyber operations will also remain a challenge, leaving policymakers uncertain about whether malware discovered on a sensitive system is designed for espionage or as a beachhead for a future attack. The United States could face several plausible crises over the next twelve to eighteen months that would be complicated by the risks of ambiguity in cyberspace. These include destructive insider threats, remote cyber operations that threaten trust in financial institutions, and cyberattacks by foreign nations or nonstate groups against critical infrastructure systems that cause widespread panic and loss of life, or similar attacks against a U.S. ally. National Security Agency (NSA) Director Admiral Michael Rogers warned in late 2014 that he expects U.S. critical infrastructure—assets essential to the function of a society and economy, such as water supply systems, electric grids, and transportation systems—to be attacked, noting that multiple foreign nations and groups already possess the ability to shut down a U.S. power grid and several others are investing in the capability. Attacks like the publicly unattributed January 2015 cyberattack that severely damaged a German steel mill suggest the ability to bring about physical destruction through cyber means may be proliferating quickly. Of particular concern would be the proliferation of these capabilities among terrorist groups, which currently possess limited technical skills but destructive intent. As the number of cyber-capable adversaries grows, so too does the number of critical targets, especially as industrial control systems move to web-based interfaces and more common operating systems and networking protocols. The implications of any crisis will depend on the current geopolitical context; the type of networks that fail; and the extent of economic damage, physical destruction, or human costs that result directly from network failure or its cascading effects on public health, communication and financial networks, and the economy. A successful cyberattack against one or more critical infrastructure systems could endanger thousands of lives, halt essential services, and cripple the U.S. economy for years. Two plausible factors that could exacerbate such a crisis are intentional and inadvertent ambiguity. Over the past two years, Iran and North Korea have appeared most willing to conduct destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against U.S. and foreign targets while attempting to conceal responsibility. Tactics have included data wipes, destruction of computer hardware, and denial-of-service attacks. Russia and China have exhibited some of the most advanced capabilities, and actors in both countries have been linked to disruptive attacks during regional tensions. Actors in South Asia and the Middle East have also conducted operations in regional conflicts that could quickly entangle U.S. interests. During a crisis involving the United States or an ally, any one of these countries could conduct cyber operations that risk further destabilization. As the rate of operations grows, so too could the challenge of attribution, with each incident exposing tools and techniques that can be repurposed. Cyber activities that could not be promptly attributed have already appeared in several conflicts. Though most have rarely elevated beyond nuisance, others have caused significant damage or threatened escalation. In 2008, Russia-based actors launched a wave of attacks against Georgian targets, and similar malware appeared in operations against Ukraine in 2014. Japanese networks are frequently targeted, including during heightened Sino-Japanese territorial tensions and sensitive anniversaries, with origins reportedly traced to China. North Korean cyber actors are suspected of having conducted destructive operations that compromised South Korea’s national identification system—damage that may cost more than $1 billion and over a decade to repair. In 2014, U.S. officials blamed North Korea for destructive attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment, an American subsidiary of the Japanese company Sony. North Korean officials deny the country’s role in these attacks and will likely seek to similarly obscure their hand in attacks during future crises to deter or delay a potential American or South Korean response. U.S. officials suspect Iran’s involvement in a 2012 cyberattack against two energy firms, one in Saudi Arabia and another in Qatar, that destroyed data and crippled thirty thousand computers, possibly in retaliation for alleged U.S. cyber operations, and to demonstrate an ability to conduct similar attacks against U.S. targets. U.S. financial firms subsequently suffered tens of millions of dollars in losses resulting from Iranian denial-of-service attacks launched in retaliation for economic sanctions. In 2014, Iran became the first country to carry out a destructive cyberattack on U.S. soil when it damaged the network of Las Vegas Sands after its chairman advocated a nuclear strike against the country. Due to the difficulty of determining whether certain activity is intended for espionage or preparation for an attack, cyber operations run the risk of triggering unintended escalation. Espionage malware that could be reprogrammed to gain control of networks, such as BlackEnergy, which has been discovered on critical infrastructure networks, may be viewed by victims as one update away from becoming an attack tool capable of crippling energy supplies, water-distribution and -filtration systems, or financial transactions. Security scans of networks intensified amid heightened geopolitical tensions could reveal such malware and prompt fears of an imminent attack, even if the malware was implanted for espionage purposes long before the crisis began. The difficulty of predicting a cyber operation’s effects and the interdependency of networked systems increase the risks that an operation will inadvertently spill over onto sensitive systems or cause unintended effects. One example of ambiguity and the risk of misperception is the 2010 discovery on Nasdaq servers of malware similar to a cyber tool reportedly developed by Russia’s Federal Security Service. Initial assessments maintained that the malware was capable of wiping out the entire stock exchange. Only later was it shown to be less destructive, according to media accounts. Such ambiguities during periods of heightened geopolitical tensions pose significant escalatory risks. Information security experts have raised similar concerns about other Russia-linked activity and questioned whether aspects of the activity are intended to insert offensive capabilities into critical infrastructure systems for future use. Ambiguity also arises in the case of “worms”—self-replicating malware that seeks out other computers to infect. Worms can spread so pervasively that their origin and intent can be difficult to infer from known victims. One worm, Conficker, spread to millions of computers and disrupted military communications in several European countries. Its creator and purpose remain unknown. Warning Indicators Indicators of activity with the potential to create or exacerbate an international political crisis include leadership statements of an intent to conduct or permit computer network operations against foreign networks; evidence of that intent, including research and development, budgetary allocations, or organizational changes, such as the creation of offensive cyber forces; the express or tacit acceptance of parastatal hackers; and a demonstrated capability to conduct computer network operations, including cyber-espionage and cyber operations against domestic targets. Tactical warning indicators resemble traditional conflicts, such as changes in the alert status of military units and an increase in crisis-related rhetoric. Indicators unique to cyber operations include increased efforts to probe foreign networks and an uptick of activity in online hacker forums discussing foreign targets and tools, techniques, and procedures appropriate for operations against them. Implications for U.S. Interests First, cyberattacks will eventually be part of every nation’s military strategy. The United States depends on information communications technologies for critical military and civilian services far more than its strategic rivals or potential adversaries. U.S. officials have noted an increase in computer network operations targeting state, local, and privately operated critical infrastructure, some of which have the potential to cause considerable harm to operations, assets, and personnel. Second, ambiguity in cyberspace elevates the risk that a significant cyber event amid a geopolitical crisis will be misattributed or misperceived, prompting a disproportionate response or unnecessary expansion of the conflict. Such an escalation would impair the United States’ prominent role and interest in global security and its commitment to international law. Third, U.S. officials’ ability to respond swiftly and effectively to cyberattacks is complicated by the difficulty of timely public attribution and ambiguity over what type of cyberattack would trigger a right to self-defense or security commitments to strategic partners. A failure to confidently attribute an attack or determine whether such activity constituted an attack could limit U.S. response options. Such confusion, uncertainty, and delay could weaken deterrence and the credibility of U.S. assurances, trigger a misperception of U.S. commitment, and undermine a U.S.-led coalition. Cyber attacks cause nuclear war – accidentsGady 15 (Franz Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Article quotes: James Cartwright, retired US Marine Corps General and eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York, and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/) Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the risk of accidental nuclear war, according to Cartwright, while ”the sophistication of the cyberthreat [to nuclear weapons] has increased exponentially.” “One-half of their [U.S. and Russian] strategic arsenals are continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice,” a policy report compiled by a study group chaired by the retired U.S. general summarized. “At the brink of conflict, nuclear command and warning networks around the world may be besieged by electronic intruders whose onslaught degrades the coherence and rationality of nuclear decision-making,” the report further points out. The War Games-like scenario could unfold in one of the following three ways: First, sophisticated attackers from cyberspace could spoof U.S. or Russian early warning networks into reporting that nuclear missiles have been launched, which would demand immediate retaliatory strikes according to both nations’ nuclear warfare doctrines. Second, online hackers could manipulate communication systems into issuing unauthorized launch orders to missile crews. Third and last, attackers could directly hack into missile command and control systems launching the weapon or dismantling it on site ( a highly unlikely scenario). To reduce the likelihood of such an scenario ever occurring, Cartwright proposes that Moscow and Washington should adjust their nuclear war contingency plan timetables from calling for missiles to be launched within 3 to 5 minutes to 24 to 72 hours. Reducing the lead time to prepare nuclear missiles for launch would not diminish the deterrent value of the weapons, Cartwright, who headed Strategic Command from 2004 to 2007 and was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before retiring in 2011, emphasized. However, the Obama White House has so far rejected the idea, particularly due to the recent deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. Also, Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, testified in Congress this month arguing “it did not make any great sense to de-alert forces” because nuclear missiles “needed to be ready and effective and able to prosecute the mission at any point in time.” Cartwright’s credibility may have also suffered among Washington policy circles ever since he has been under investigation for leaking information about the top secret Stuxnet virus – a sophisticated cyber weapon allegedly jointly developed by Israel and the United States – to the New York Times. Nevertheless, a co-authored paper, seen in draft by The Diplomat, argues that “cyber weapons and strategies have brought us to a situation of aggravated nuclear instability that needs to be more explicitly and more openly addressed in the diplomacy of leading powers, both in private and in public.” The authors, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York (and a regular contributor to The Diplomat) and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, have concluded that “Russia now sees U.S. plans to disrupt the command and control of its nuclear weapons as the only actual (current) threat at the strategic level of warfare.” Laura Saalman of the Asia Pacific Research Centre in Hawaii has also warned of the need to look at the impact of U.S. strategies and nuclear force posture on China in a 2014 paper titled “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear”. And lashoutTilford 12 Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, "Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast" 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power "every military base in our country." "Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out", he said. Which means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely. "Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power", said Senator Grassley. "So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions", he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, "preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation~’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country" (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY%26feature=relmfu ). A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an "Act of War" and could be met with a "full scale" US military response. That could include the use of "nuclear weapons", if authorized by the President. The plan creates a more equitable alliance which shores up effectiveness and responsiveness – reducing presence is key to Japanese independenceGross, senior associate of Pacific Forum CSIS, 13 (Donald, “The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War,” p. ebook) On another level, however, it was ill advised for current and former U.S. officials to effectively accuse Japan of undermining the alliance because Tokyo exhibited sensitivity to domestic opinion over a controversial deployment. The American accusation, coupled with implied and explicit threats to pull back its forces now defending Japan, shows deep disrespect for that nation's democratic system. It also ignores the views of Japan's ruling party and serious Japanese strategic thinkers who seek to advance their country's security and prosperity at a time of profound historic change in the region. Japan's vision of its future regional and global role is clearly built on the foundation of the ongoing U.S.-Japan alliance. If the United States intends to preserve and revitalize this alliance, it should accept and implement Japanese preferences rather than risk a schism based on narrowly conceived views of American Interests. In July 2010, following Hatoyama's resignation, Japan experts Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations and Yuki Tatsumi Of the Stimson Center in Washington Offered these observations on the Okinawa controversy that remain true today: It is time to end the corrosive effect this haggling over Futenma has had on our alliance. Fourteen years ago, (U.S. and Japanese leaders made a promise to the people of Okinawa to close Futenma; ten prime ministers and three presidents later, that promise remains unfulfilled. Our publics are increasingly frustrated with a lack of resolution, and until Futenma is closed, the alliance risks being held hostage to the inequality of concentrating so many U.S. military bases on Okinawa. (Shelia Smith) [Futenma] keeps the [Japanese and American] governments from discussing a broader range of common security concerns…[T]he world needs an economically and politically strong Japan to work with the United States to address a wide range of global challenges … (Yuki Tatsumi)47 A Better U.S. approach The United States should support Japan’s evolving foreign policy under the DPJ government for two reasons – it is good for Japan and it is good for America. As Japan’s longstanding and closest partner, the U.S. should be enlightened enough to accept the greater autonomy and independence of Japan, both regionally and globally. There are some Americans, of course, who feel uncomfortable unless Japan acquiesces to the decisions of its more powerful partner. They tend to believe that a Japan which does America’s bidding is the essence of the U.S.-Japan alliance. A far better view is that the U.S. should appreciate a more independent Japanese foreign policy as the sign of a mature ally that understands its identity, takes pride in its national values and strives to make major contributions to peace and prosperity, both regionally and globally. There is another, more self-interested reason to support Japan's foreign policy — a more autonomous, independent Japan that pursues a middle power strategy built on the U.S.-Japan alliance will strengthen and revitalize its relationship with the United States. But greater U.S.-Japan cooperation can only proceed apace if the U.S. relieves some burdens imposed by the security alliance. Dr. George Packard has called for the U.S. to relieve these burdens as a means of shoring up the overall relationship: The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on its territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the future course of the alliance. Above all, U.S. negotiators should start with the premise that the security treaty with Japan, important as it is, is only part of a larger partnership between two of the world's greatest democracies and economies. Washington stands to gain far more by working with Tokyo on the environment, health issues, human rights, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism. Fully settling the dispute over the relocation of the U.S. Marines base to the satisfaction of Japan also strengthens Japan's commitment to its military obligations under the alliance. An agreement of this kind would demonstrate America's respect for Japanese public opinion and the citizens of Okinawa, who daily bear the serious inconvenience of living next door to an active air base. It is shortsighted for the U.S. to push hard for basing rights that run up against the Japanese government's policy of creating greater equality in the alliance and more effectively asserting Japanese views. 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