Access Link Wall (China) Lillypad—China can launch missiles to anywhere in Japan – okinawa’s location in the ECS allos the US forward presence to deny ACCESS to another lilypad
Yoshihara 15 (Toshi, John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Orbis Volume 59, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 62–75)
In the naval context, Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles could be launched against fuel storage tanks, ammunition depots, dry docks, and pier-side facilities located at major naval bases. Warships and supply vessels fixed at their berths would be at risk. Civilian and military personnel, including shipyard workers critical to the proper functioning of the bases, could suffer casualties in a missile raid. A concerted Chinese missile campaign could thus deliver a major blow to the logistical foundations of Japanese forces and of U.S. forward presence in Asia. By disrupting the supply system and degrading repair capabilities, Beijing aims to choke off the allied capacity to conduct combat operations.
While successful attacks on bases in Japan would by no means constitute a war winner for Beijing, they almost certainly would complicate U.S. war planning while magnifying the tyranny of distance inherent to fleet operations in the vast Pacific. At the very least, crippling the region's basing infrastructure could help the PLA slow down or hold at bay U.S. and allied forces operating along the approaches to the Chinese mainland.
Conversely, this potential vulnerability underscores the centrality of Japanese bases to the U.S. strategy in Asia. Take Yokosuka, for example. It is the only facility west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. This base is also an indispensable forward logistical hub without which U.S. naval units would be forced to rely on a far more time-consuming supply chain located in Guam, Hawaii, San Diego, and Singapore. Yokosuka's strategic location, physical infrastructure, world-class facilities, and highly-skilled local work force are virtually impossible to replicate anywhere else in Asia.
US marine presence in Okinawa is key to the quality and strength of the deterrence balance in East Asia – withdrawal as a result of anti-base issues collapses the alliance.
Yukio 8/4/15 (Okamato, Foreign policy commentator and president of Okamoto Associates Inc. Graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Hitotsubashi University. Served as a career diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1968 to 1991, including a term as director of the First North America Division. Special advisor to the prime minister, 1996–98 and 2003–4. Research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies since 2012., “The Okinawa Issue and East Asian Security”, http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a04502/)
The deterrent is ultimately a matter of perceptions: It depends on the belief of neighboring countries that the Japan-US security arrangements are certain to operate. Absent this belief, the Japan-US Security Treaty becomes no more than a piece of paper. So the core of Japan’s deterrent power consists of the ongoing maintenance of a close alliance with the United States that leaves no room for doubt in the minds of other countries in the region.
If, however, a large-scale reduction of the US forces in Okinawa were to be conducted in the face of local turmoil without a sound basis in military thinking, it would create a big hole in the fabric of the deterrent. Neighboring countries would sense a power vacuum. Consider what has happened in the South China Sea: After the United States pulled out of Vietnam, China grabbed the Paracels, and after the Russians left, it pushed the Vietnamese off Johnson South Reef. And after the US forces left the Philippines, China took over Mischief Reef from that country.
If the Chinese judged that the US military had been driven out of Okinawa, it would greatly increase the likelihood of their grabbing the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from Japan by force. And once they landed on these islands, it would become very difficult to dislodge them. Doing so would mean undertaking a combat operation that could well result in the first deaths in action for Japanese armed forces since World War II. Would Japan actually fight to get the Senkakus back? It is possible that the Japanese government would instead declare its intention to “negotiate persistently,” a line it has often used, and that the Senkakus would remain under China’s effective control indefinitely, just as Takeshima has since South Korea took it over in the 1950s.
Second is the tripwire—absent joint basing we lose tripwire
Japan Times 12/25/14 (Citing Joseph Nye – phD from Harvard, “Nye suggests rotating U.S. forces in Japan around SDF bases”, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/25/national/nye-suggests-rotating-u-s-forces-in-japan-around-sdf-bases/#.VbkQHfmqqko)
As one reason for his proposal, Nye noted “the vulnerability” of fixed military bases to ballistic missile attacks from other countries, such as China.
He also underscored the importance of “making sure that there are Americans on Japanese bases, so that if a Japanese base is attacked, Americans are killed, which means that the Americans are immediately drawn into the defense of Japan.”
Nye also questioned whether the U.S. Marine Corps should continue to play its present role 10 years from now, and called for discussions on whether these forces are optimally deployed in Japan.
But even if Washington and Tokyo were to introduce a rotational system, it would be better to maintain U.S. naval bases as they are, including in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, he said.
Asked about the possible impact on the deterrence provided by the U.S. military presence in Japan, Nye said his proposal would still ensure a U.S. military presence in Japan, if the naval bases are kept intact.
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