Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf

Reduction to presence in Okinawa collapses US Access to the region – this is vital to deterring China War.

These changes in the US-Japan alliance shed light on the geopolitical importance of Okinawa. Okinawa holds two thirds of the US service members in Japan and is in close proximity to possible regional and global contingencies (Nikkei Weekly 2006). The American forces in Okinawa have extended from their traditional tasks to defend Japan and surrounding areas to the deployment to East Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Futenma, the US Marine Corps air station, is regarded as essential for sustaining the US capability to respond to regional and global crises. One aircraft in the Futenma Marine Base can carry “fully equipped combat-ready military units to any point in the world on short notice and then provide field support required to help sustain the fighting force” (Japan Times 2009). The Futenma base is also a backup of the air force in Kadena in Okinawa, the hub of the US force in the Asia Pacific. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Okinawa is in high readiness and has “the ability to prevent war, swift and lethal” (Kirk 2013, 49). Marines participated in fifteen operations in the past decade including humanitarian crises such as Operation Tomodachi in the wake of the tsunami near Tokyo in 2011. Recently, 45 marines and sailors in Okinawa were dispatched to the Philippines for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in November 2013 after the typhoon Haiyan. As US Lt. General Gregson mentioned, “Okinawa’s geographical importance makes it absolutely essential as a permanent base for US Marines in the Pacific” (Japan Times 2002).

The Japanese government understands the strategic importance of US forces in Okinawa to maintain deterrence against regional conflicts, such as contingencies in Taiwan and the Korean peninsula (See Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, 4). As Shigeru Ishiba, former defense minister of Japan, clearly noted, the relocation of the US Marines in Futenma outside Okinawa means that the force cannot play a deterrent role (Japan Times 2009).

Access is key – china’s growing A2/AD makes the ability to use japan as a hub for operations is crucial.

Today, emerging threats from cyber and space domains and advancing A2/AD capabilities suggest that the present understanding of SIASJ—“surrounding areas” and “rear area support”—is both operationally constraining and unrealistic and should be considered to encompass greater depth and breadth. Collectively, the security challenges of the 21st century speak to the need for a conceptual review of the current understanding and relevance of the concept with regard to both the defense of Japan and emerging security challenges. A main objective of the guidelines review process should be to determine how roles and missions can be apportioned to provide “assured access” for U.S. forces deploying from the Eastern Pacific to defend Japan against aggression.

China A2/AD Strategy causes extinction

The role of nuclear weapons is one of the most important aspects of the escalation question in North Asia, as China has a nuclear arsenal and Japan relies on US extended deterrence. If Beijing and Tokyo engage in conventional military conflict, the prospects of direct Sino-American nuclear escalation come into play more clearly. One of the main concerns about the possibility of such escalation revolves around America’s superiority to China in terms of conventional fighting power.41 While China is closing that gap, some American conventional systems allow Washington to threaten China with accurate, destructive strikes that Beijing cannot hope to replicate. Should Sino-American hostilities seem likely to intensify, China could be tempted to utilise its nuclear forces. In such a conflict, however, Beijing should be aware that any attempted nuclear attack on the US would be almost guaranteed to generate a swift and probably disproportionate nuclear response. Mutual fear of surprise attacks and inadvertent nuclear war could not be ruled out, but nuclear deterrence might well operate effectively.42

In the early stages of a conflict involving only China and Japan, the nuclear question takes on a different perspective. Beijing would still face the prospect of relative conventional-military weakness, especially when it considered the possibility of American support to Tokyo. But if China decided to escalate by threatening Japan with nuclear bombardment, it would have to weigh the credibility of American extended deterrence, some portion of which would almost certainly swing into action. At the very least, China would have to deal with the costs of a strong conventional response by the US.

One might expect that nuclear threats, implicit or otherwise, would remain in the background. Washington could regard the threat of a nuclear response as effective leverage, discouraging China from escalating a conventional conflict with Japan without the need for heavy US involvement in a conventional military contest. Similarly, China might remind Japan about the existence of its nuclear forces, so as to highlight the potential costs of conventional escalation. Testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during early hostilities – rather like the 2014 Russian test, apparently longscheduled, during the Ukraine crisis – could be such a signalling mechanism.

Contention III -- Taiwan

US presence in Okinawa is necessary to the defense of Taiwan – Taiwan takeover collapses overall deterrence and the global economy

Twinning 13 (Daniel, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He previously served as a member of the secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff and as Senator John McCain’s foreign policy advisor. “The Taiwan Linchpin”, http://www.hoover.org/research/taiwan-linchpin)

A related component of the strategic geography of Japan-Taiwan relations is the role relations play in facilitating regional access for the United States, which remains the primary security provider in East Asia and the Pacific. American ability to project power in East and Southeast Asia, as currently constituted, is dependent on allied control of Japan and Taiwan. The largest American forward-deployed troop concentration, on Okinawa, is as close to Taiwan as to the Japanese home islands. The United States’ responsibility for the defense of Japan invests the southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands with considerable strategic importance; similarly, U.S. ability to project power to defend Taiwan is dependent on the American military’s ability to operate from Okinawa. In short, U.S. bases in Japan reinforce the continued credibility of America’s military commitment to Taiwan’s defense, while a friendly Taiwan helps secure the southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands — the most likely route of any airborne or naval assault on America’s closest Asian ally.

U.S. plans for the defense of Taiwan require access to bases, logistics, rear-area support, intelligence, communication, and supply hubs in Japan. It is therefore unlikely that a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan would relieve Japan of the imperative to actively support, defend, and perhaps even fight with American forces. It was this realization, following the exposure of a lack of clarity in Japan over its role in supporting the United States during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, that led Washington and Tokyo to more clearly define the defense of Taiwan as a core area of alliance cooperation.7

Chinese control of Taiwan would, among other things, sever the sea lanes than connect Japan and its ally, the United States.

Hostile control of Taiwan which enabled projection of naval and air power from its territory would dramatically erode the United States’ ability to defend Japan. American bases on Okinawa would become less defensible and more vulnerable to embargo or attack. The ability of the United States Navy to secure the sea lanes around Japan would be called into question. This would raise doubts not only about the defense of Japan, but the security of the maritime routes connecting Japan to the economies of Southeast Asia, India, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia.

Okinawa serves not only as the frontline defense of Japan, but as the hub of American power projection into Southeast Asia. Hostile control of Taiwan would geographically sever the primary base of U.S. expeditionary forces in Asia from strategic regions like the South China Sea and the Indo-Malaysian archipelago. Asian states that have sought closer security ties with the United States, including Indonesia and Vietnam, might reconsider their strategic choices should Taiwan move from being a facilitator to an obstacle to U.S. power projection in maritime Southeast Asia.

Contention IV --Korea

Korea collapse inevitable—containing escalation is key.

Gobry 8-21—Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center [Pascal-Emmanuel, “Why North Korea's collapse is inevitable,” The Week, 8-21-2015, http://theweek.com/articles/572913/why-north-koreas-collapse-inevitable, accessed 9-28-2015]

The conflict is largely seen in terms of geopolitics, but it would really make more sense to look at it from the perspective of North Korea's domestic politics. Totalitarian regimes are mostly driven either by ideology or internal politics, not realpolitik as much. Nazi ideology was a better predictor of Germany's actions under the Third Reich than realpolitik considerations (which was the great mistake that both Neville Chamberlain and Joseph Stalin made in their dealings with Hitler).

In this case, North Korea's reigning ideology — Juche, a combination of communism, mercantilism, and racism — doesn't tell us much. What we do know is that Kim Jong Un is probably a weak leader, and is acting to shore up his support.

Even on its best days, the regime teeters on the brink of collapse, simply because most of its people are starving and unhappy. It would take only a tiny push for the straightjacket of terror that keeps the regime together to fall apart, for enough people to become more hungry than scared, and for enough regime thugs and mid-level officers to say, "No, not this time, we won't pull the trigger."

The regime's attempt to black out all outside information has been showing cracks. Cell phones and DVDs (and probably Bibles) are streaming in from the Chinese border, where guards are easily bribed. This contraband is showing an increasing number of North Koreans that another way of life is possible. Various market-driven "reforms," while improving the lot of a few ordinary North Koreans, also highlight the regime's dons for what they are: corrupt kleptocrats, businessmen with guns.

It's against this backdrop that we need to look at the regime's recent actions. Everything suggests that Kim Jong Un feels himself to be in a position of weakness. He was allowed to succeed his father basically because the alternative was civil war and regime collapse. He needs a power base, and that means the military, and especially the more hardcore elements in the military. Hence the purging of Hyon Yong Chol, the grown-up in charge who probably thought the young Kim would be his puppet. Hyon was a military man's military man — formerly in charge of the regime's all-important nuclear program — but he was also close to the Chinese and (as far as we can tell given the murkiness of the regime) an advocate of mostly letting sleeping dogs lie.

Stirring up trouble abroad to shore up the base at home is the oldest trick in the tyrant's book, and there seems to be little alternative explanation to the artillery strikes. North Korea feeds itself two ways: Chinese aid, and nuclear blackmail against the West and South Korea. Purging Hyon alienated the Chinese, so now it's back to Plan B, a replay of Kim Jong Il's breakneck nuclear program in the 1990s that irked the Chinese. He played the Clinton administration for suckers, extorting food aid in exchange for nuclear promises never kept. (You would think a Democratic administration would learn the lesson of listening to a tyrannical regime's nuclear promises — but that's a subject for another day.)

So as we look at what is happening in the Korean Peninsula, the main question shouldn't be about balance of power, but about what we do when the North Korean regime collapses. Because it's certainly not a matter of if, but when.

To say that it will be a humanitarian disaster is an understatement — virtually all of North Korea's inhabitants are malnourished. But it will also be a security disaster, as countless weapons go unaccounted for, and the society devolves into anarchy. And of course, there's the question of nuclear weapons.

China will want to preserve its interests and keep a buffer between its borders and the American presence in South Korea. It will be reluctant to let international aid (an effort that will, by necessity, be led by the U.S.) into the country. At the same time, it will also be extremely reluctant, if not unable, to take on that duty itself.

Withdrawal of presence means that US forces can’t pacify unification—AND presence is key to ensure Japanese support for economic support post-unification

Klingner 9/28/15 (Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, distinguished graduate of the National War College, where he received a master's degree in national security strategy in 2002. He also holds a master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College and a bachelor's degree in political science from Middlebury College in Vermont “Allies Should Include Japan in Korean Unification Plans”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09/allies-should-include-japan-in-korean-unification-plans)

South Korea should play the predominant role in determining the course and pace of Korean unification. The United States would continue to serve as South Korea’s protector, ensuring Seoul’s security and national interests. Tokyo would play a secondary and reactive role in Korean unification. However, Japan’s importance should not be underestimated since its participation would be critical both in the military operations likely to precede Korean unification and in potentially providing extensive economic support after Korean unification.

Japan provides a critical base of support for U.S. forces defending South Korea during a conflict with Pyongyang. Seven U.S. bases in Japan are designated as part of the United Nations Command Rear, which maintains the status of forces agreement for U.N. forces in Japan during peacetime and would serve as a staging area during a Korean crisis.

U.S. military forces would need access to additional Japanese bases for strike and logistics operations. U.S. Marine Corps units on Okinawa are essential to allied security plans for responding to full-scale invasion by North Korean forces as well as to other military contingencies.

Japanese Self-Defense Forces could participate in important combat support roles, such as minesweeping to maintain sea lines of communication with the United States and the Korean Peninsula. Quite simply, the United States cannot defend South Korea without Japan, a point seemingly lost on the South Korean government and populace.

North Korea understands the importance of Japanese participation in military contingency plans and has sought to prevent it. In March 2013, the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command threatened, “The US should not forget that Anderson AFB in Guam [and] naval bases in Japan and Okinawa are within striking range of the DPRK’s precision strike means.”[10] On October 10, 2012, the North Korean National Defense Commission warned that its strategic rocket forces could hit the mainland U.S. and U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam.[11]

Failure of deterrence is the biggest threat – North Korea would target Japan first to take out the south’s defense absent US presence – that causes extinction & Collapses US security guarantees worldwide.,

Roberts 13 (Brad Roberts visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013. From 2009 to early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 9th August 2013 )

The renewed interest in extended deterrence in Northeast Asia follows from the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea with long-range missiles. Although the precise time when such capabilities will be operational is a matter of uncertainty and debate, sooner or later North Korea will have the ability to strike targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States with both conventional and nuclear warheads and perhaps also chemical and biological warheads.2

There is also uncertainty and debate about the strategic intentions of North Korea’s leader. On the one hand, he may intend to utilize these capabilities to deter military action by the U.S.-RoK alliance and to advance negotiations with the United States on a peace treaty that secures the North Korean state and regime for the long term. The following statement by Kim Jong Un, for example, seems to align with such intentions: “the time has gone forever when enemies threatened and intimidated us with atomic bombs.”3 On the other hand, North Korea has also stated that “Japan is always in the cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first.”4 This hints at an aggressive purpose—to employ nuclear threats to coerce its neighbors, to cover provocations at the conventional level, and perhaps even attack its enemies.

These North Korean capabilities and intentions pose three kinds of risks for Japan. First, North Korea may conduct further provocations by non-nuclear means, including perhaps against Japan. Second, there may be unwanted escalation on and off the Korean peninsula if and as North Korea’s leaders miscalculate and generate reactions from those attacked that potentially lead to war. Third, there may be outright aggression by the North. After all, its national strategy remains guided by the ultimate goal of reunifying the peninsula under its control. With nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Un may believe he now has the ingredients of success: an ability to take Seoul hostage with conventional and perhaps chemical weapons, to threaten attacks on Japan if it allows the United States access to bases and, if that fails and the regime’s survival comes into question, to threaten attacks on the American homeland if the United States does not settle for peace on Kim Jong Un’s terms.5 These are new kinds of risks that the U.S.-Japan alliance has not so far had to address. North Korea’s ability to strike at Japan with No Dong missiles presents a qualitatively different problem from the cold war problem presented by Soviet missiles such as the SS-20 pointed at Japan.

The possibility of outright aggression by North Korea cannot lightly be dismissed. Leadership in Pyongyang appears firmly committed to its reunification agenda. As one authoritative study has noted, failures of deterrence are not uncommon and typically occur when one or more of the following three factors is present: when the weaker state is highly motivated, when it misperceives some facet of the situation, and when the stronger state has some element of vulnerability.6 Given the mix of capability, motivation, and misperception evident in Pyongyang today, it is important that the deterrence posture of the United States and Japan be credible for this possibility. As argued above, a failure of deterrence here could have wide-ranging repercussions for other challengers to regional order and also to the credibility of U.S. security guarantees more generally.

Contention V – Disaster Response

HADR

Marines are key to disaster response—withdrawal kills assurance

Harkins 9/25/15 (Gina, Staff Writer, “More than 80,000 Marines are focused on the Pacific”, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/22/marine-corps-moving-15-percent-its-force-pacific/72395670/)

Responding to crises

The Marine Corps has been the first to respond or lead the effort for the last six major humanitarian crises in the Asia-Pacific region that required foreign assistance, Toolan said.

That makes Marines' presence in the region vital for an area susceptible to devastating natural disasters like typhoons or tsunamis. Marine air assets, including heavy-lift helicopters and MV-22B Ospreys, have allowed the Corps to deliver supplies to those in need and evacuate people trapped without food or water after a natural disaster.

Marines' ability to respond quickly to such events, like the April earthquake in Nepal that killed about 9,000 people or the typhoon that struck Saipan in August, demonstrates the U.S. commitment to partners and allies in the region, Toolan said.

Marines can expect to continue training for those types of contingencies in the region alongside troops from countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Fiji and Malaysia, he said.

Key to prevent south Asian terrorism

Kolmannskog 8 – Norwegian Refugee Council (Vikram Odedra, April. “Future Floods of Refugees.” http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/resource_guides/Migration_and_Climate_Change/Future_floods_of_refugees.pdf

Sudden disasters and conflict

As a rule, sudden disasters tend to heighten dissatisfaction with the ruling government.37 Weak and/or unsatisfactory state structures are exposed during and after disasters. When a devastating typhoon hit Bangladesh in 1970, the country was part of Pakistan and dominated politically and militarily by (West-)Pakistan. The trifling aid and apparent indifference of central political leaders strengthened the Bangladeshi separatist movement. Pakistani oppression of the movement eventually lead to civil war and independence for Bangladesh in 1971.38 Hurricane Katharina (in the USA in 2006) illustrated that not only what we normally think of as developing countries, have their weaknesses and injustices revealed by climate change impacts. Where a conflict between two clearly defined parties has already entered a phase of reduced tension, natural disasters can represent opportunities to overcome entrenched differences.39 This may have manifested itself in for example the peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami and agreements on relief efforts between India and Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. (Related to earthquakes, neither of these natural disasters were influenced by climate.) According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), the sudden disaster conflicts are likely to occur more frequently in future: Firstly, regions at risk, particularly Central America, generally have weak economic and political capacities, making adaptation and crisis management very difficult. Secondly, storm and flood disasters along the densely populated coasts of the Indian subcontinent and China can cause major damage and trigger or intensify migration processes which in turn could trigger conflict.40 Parallel with the growing risk of sudden disasters, Bangladesh is furthermore plagued by political violence and a growing trend toward Islamist extremism Drought and conflict Water scarcity may trigger distributional conflicts. Water scarcity by itself does not necessarily lead to conflict and violence, though. There is an interaction with other socio-economic and political factors: The potential for conflict often relates to social discrimination in terms of access to safe and clean water. The risk can therefore be reduced by ensuring just distribution so that people in disadvantaged areas also have access to the safe and clean water. As already pointed out, a main problem today (and probably for the near future) is still the so-called economic water scarcity, and good water management can prevent conflict. Within states, groups have often defended or challenged traditional rights of water use: In semi-arid regions such as the Sahel there have been tensions between farmers and nomadic herders. According to The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change, 41 the droughts in the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s may have been caused partly by climate change and contributed to increased competition for scarce resources between these groups. The Tuareg rebellion in Mali in the beginning of the 1990s, is also mentioned as an example of a climate change-related conflict. Many of the drought-struck nomads sought refuge in the cities or left the country. The lack of social networks for the returnees, the continuing drought, competition for land with the settled farmers and dissatisfaction with the authorities, were factors that fuelled the armed rebellion. In the past there have been few examples of “water wars” between states. In fact there are several cases of cooperation (for example between Palestine and Israel), but these have generally concerned benefit-sharing, not burden-sharing. According to Fred Pearce, the defining crises of the 21st century will involve water.42 He sees the Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and its neighbours as the first modern “water war”, specifically over the River Jordan. Most of the world’s major rivers cross international boundaries, but are not covered by treaties. According to Pearce, this is a recipe for conflict and for upstream users to hold downstream users to ransom. This could be helped by internationally brokered deals for sharing such rivers. Soil degradation can also trigger food crises and further undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby leading to destabilisation, the collapse of social systems, and violent conflicts. Yet it is migration, rather than violence, that has been the typical response to the famines that have affected the most people.43 Migration influencing environmental conflict In research into environmental conflicts, the environmental change–migration-conflict linkage is one of the most frequently mentioned scenarios and topics for case studies, and several climate and security reports consider migration to be one of the most worrisome aspects of climate change.44 There is some empirical evidence that migration may trigger or exacerbate existing conflicts. Politicisation of ethnicity, the financial role of a diaspora and export of existing conflicts are possible connections between migration and conflict. Much focus has been on how forced migration can create environmental problems, and the UNHCR has operated programmes such as planting trees around camps. Their 1996 Environmental Guidelines recognised that “the negative environmental impacts associated with refugee situations must be better understood and dealt with.” Much of the forced migration related to climate change, is likely to be internal, regional and short-term or temporary. In transit or the place of destination, (particularly mass) migration may (be perceived to and/or) contribute to competition for already scarce resources such as land and water. During a drought people may move to a less affected region, resulting in rising demand there. A competitive situation is more likely where population growth is strong. Climate change may also lead to further increases in rural-urban migration because of the degradation of land and people searching for better livelihoods. This may result in growing slums and an increased competition for resources in cities. There may also be competition and potential for conflict when migrants return to areas of origin and issues arise such as ownership or rights of use. The conflict potential of migration depends to a significant degree on how the government and people in the place of transit, destination or return respond. Governance, the degree of political stability, the economy and whether there is a history of violence are generally important factors. • Sudden disasters such as storms and floods often highlight weaknesses of the government in power, thereby triggering or exacerbating existing intrastate conflict which in turn can trigger forced migration. • The degradation of freshwater resources can trigger intrastate conflict which in turn can trigger forced migration. Migration has been more likely than violent conflict as a response to famines. • The forced migrants can contribute to a competition for already scarce resources such as land and water, but several other factors, including governance, are important in determining conflict potential.

Full-scale nuclear war

Asghar 15 – Poli Sci Doctoral student @ University of New Mexico w/ research focus on nuclear security and disarmament [Rizwan Asghar, “Nuclear fears,” The News, July 27, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nv4fvzn]

Armed with more than a hundred nuclear weapons, India is overlooking a threat that could wipe out more than 1.5 billion people within the time span of a few days. The Modi government seems to be unaware of the fact that prosecuting sub-conventional conflicts in the form of state-supported terrorism could potentially escalate into a full-scale nuclear war. The current approach of the Indian military establishment aimed at asserting its regional leadership is likely to drive to trigger a mad arms race in the region.

Against this backdrop, the destabilising effects of the presence of nuclear weapons become more observable in that nuclear capabilities have enabled both countries to engage in sub-conventional conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of violence. And these sub-conventional conflicts will continue to persist in the years to come because conventional conflicts remain risky.
It is quite reasonable to assume that the region will continue to experience a high degree of unconventional and proxy wars in the years to come. These sub-conventional conflicts do not involve use of regular military force but their propensity to escalate to limited wars can entail unpredictably high levels of political violence. The goals in such conflicts could include disrupting enemy command and control centres or particular sites of strategic importance.
Many nuclear experts are of the view that Pakistan and India could become engaged in a limited war, entailing the use of nuclear weapons. The concept of limited nuclear war originated during the cold-war period when there were only a small number of countries with nuclear arsenals. At that point, the nuclear conflict scenarios involved only threats of confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. Today’s global security environment includes the nine declared nuclear-weapons states and there are deep concerns about South Asia as a flashpoint for nuclear wars.
New Delhi remains a dominant player in conventional warfare against Pakistan but the Indian military establishment is still in a paranoid state, seeking to promote violence at the level of insurgency and terrorism. Indian officials maintain that their country would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict but recent moves by the Indian military are raising uncertainty levels for Pakistan.
Nuclear South Asia is not like cold-war Europe because of the many differences between the Indo-Pak nuclear calculus and the dynamics of nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR. The bitter animosity between India and Pakistan has profound impacts on the decision-making approach of the leaders of both countries.
Pakistan and India do have the capability to pursue wars of limited aims but what makes these conflicts dangerous is the fear of operational failures and there is no surety to the fact that the war would be terminated once the initial goals are achieved. In addition, once initiated, the war might not remain limited in aims and consequences throughout the course of the campaign. So it is almost inevitable that, with limited nuclear war, there will be large uncertainties about the scope of conflict.

Contention VI—Alliance

US forward-deployed presence is necessary to project power in east asia – prevents a backlash and preserves the alliance.

Przystup 15 (James J. Przystup Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, March 2015, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 18)

For over six decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. forward-deployed presence in Japan have served as the foundation for stability, prosperity, and security in the AsiaPacific region and beyond. For the United States, the ability to project power and meet security commitments to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and allies across the region and to assure partners of its continuing presence in the region remains directly dependent on the alliance structure. For the United States, the alliance with Japan is the foundation of its regional and global security strategies. The ability to project power nearly halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS Independence was then home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan—and the deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf to support Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom again underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Today, the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region are engaged in updating and strengthening the alliances to address the security challenges of the 21st century. It is in this context that the United States and Japan in 2014 are now engaged in reviewing the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The present review takes place against the background of previous efforts to enhance alliance-based security cooperation—namely, the defense guidelines of 1978 and 1997.

Contention VII—Gradualism

Military presence prevents Article 9 from being an excuse for rapid modernization and Japanese re-arm

Singh 15 (Bhubhindar Singh, Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore.“The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term Defensive Strategy” asia policy, number 19 (january 2015), 49–64 http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_Singh_January2015.pdf)

The continued resilience of the U.S.-Japan military alliance is a third reason to support the conclusion that the expansion of Japanese security policy would be a source of stability. The United States has served as a key source of regional stability and provider of security guarantees for Japan through the 1951 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the two states (revised in 1960). Buttressed by strong domestic support in Japan, this alliance became a pillar of Japanese security policy throughout the Cold War, and this continues to be the case today (especially outside Okinawa). A key aspect of the treaty was the stationing of U.S. troops in a network of military bases in Japan in exchange for the United States’ security guarantee. This arrangement has anchored the U.S. military presence in the region and provided a critical source of regional stability by reassuring allies, deterring adversaries, facilitating the United States’ ability to project force abroad when called on to do so, and guaranteeing the freedom of the global commons.27 Apart from their role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the region, the U.S. military presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance also serve as an important check against any expansion in Japanese security policy that could destabilize the region. This is especially important for reassuring Japan’s neighbors, who harbor a strong sense of suspicion and mistrust of Japan stemming from their colonial history. The United States is cognizant of this dynamic. Thus, even though Washington supports Japan implementing a more activist security policy, it is also in the U.S. interest to ensure that this development contributes positively to regional and global security.

Fear of abandonment is the key driver in Japanese nationalism and belligerence – US forces are key to interoperability as strategy instead of pre-emption in greyzone conflcits.

Lee 15 (Sheryn Lee Associate Lecturer in Security Studies at the Department of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University, and a PhD Candidate at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University. “Crowded waters Naval competition in the Asia–Pacific”, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/crowded-waters-naval-competition-in-the-asiapacific/SR80_crowded_waters.pdf)

In July 2014, reflecting the belief that Japan’s current defence policy constrains its ability to protect fundamental interests, the cabinet of Prime Minster Shinzo Abe announced a ‘reinterpretation’ of Article 9 the country’s Constitution to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to exercise the right of collective self-defence under certain conditions.9 In April 2015, the US and Japan agreed on revised Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation, which could lead to an enhanced operational role for the JSDF.10

Fear of US abandonment and China’s rapid military modernisation are also key drivers of Japan’s military modernisation. Its Defense White Paper 2014 identifies China’s increased military reach as a principle factor influencing Japan’s defence planners. Sovereign territorial claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and fears of China’s increased power projection, have led to action–reaction dynamics between the JSDF’s and PLA’s modernisation programs. Japan is also concerned about the protection of its sea lines of communication due to its high dependence on seaborne supplies of natural resources, energy and food.11

Although the Obama administration has underscored the US rebalance to the region, the Defense White Paper recognises that there are concerns about America’s ability to commit amid fiscal constraints and deepening defence sequestration. This is worrying for the future of the JSDF force structure, particularly in the naval space, as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) serves as an adjunct to the US Navy. A key reason for investing in sophisticated equipment—such as ship-based SM-3 missiles, 42 F-35A Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) and Aegis combat systems—was to signal to Washington that Tokyo is willing to invest more in compatible and interoperable equipment.

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