Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf

The status quo puts a cap on their scenario – the only chance of outside intervention is the lack of US presence

This answers any “alliance turns” arguments—its dependent on security arrangements – that means ONLY the squo/ DA solvesChina modernization will cause a war if they can’t understand Japanese intentionality – US forces are key

But China is also re-making its nuclear posture. It is modernizing its force, which has also brought a diversification of delivery systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons, especially of those weapons capable of reaching the United States. This modernization occurs in the context of a broader military modernization effort that gives China its own capacity for power projection into neighboring waters and in the new domains of cyber and space, with significant negative implications for a U.S. military strategy that depends on forward presence and maritime preeminence. China’s leaders and experts make the case that these new military capabilities are defensive in nature and, in particular, that its modernization of its nuclear force is aimed at maintaining a “lean and effective” deterrent under the no-first-use doctrine that remains credible in the context of improving U.S. conventional strike capabilities and missile defenses.8

China’s experts consider many of these concerns to be un-founded. They point out that China’s tradition of nuclear minimalism is deeply engrained and clearly reflected in a small force, a non-provocative doctrine, and a reluctance to give a prominent place to nuclear capabilities in the strategic relationship with the United States. They note China’s refusal to be drawn into an arms race.

It is important to note that China has its own analysis of the stability-instability paradox. In the thinking of China’s expert community, the modernizing strategic posture of the United States (specifically the introduction of conventional strike capabilities and ballistic missile defense) has increased U.S. confidence in conducting preemptive strikes on China and has encouraged a new boldness among U.S. allies in the region and greater assertiveness in advancing their claims in the maritime environment (and elsewhere), compelling a defensive response from China.

AT: Deterrence Fails

Deterrence is real---our evidence is based on an empirical analysis of states that have the potential to go to war---deterrence accounts for the decision not to go to war, which validates the entire disad

[Numbers changed to words: 384,865 to “three hundred eighty-four thousand”]

According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), a dyad is in a rivalry if they engage in a militarized interstate dispute. Thus, selecting all rivalries as cases of general deterrence would capture (by definition) all failures of general deterrence.4 However, deterrence in dyads that have not fought would be ignored, which is particularly problematic because those are the dyads where deterrence has always worked. Furthermore, identification of the length of a rivalry, and thus the span of general deterrence, requires the assumption that the rivalry begins either with the first dispute (and thus deterrence failed when it was attempted for the first time), or at some arbitrary length of time before the first dispute and after the last.5

Therefore, the rivalry approach is limited as a path to general deterrence case selection. However, one can safely assume that every state wishes to deter attacks against itself—this is the basic rationale for the maintenance of armed forces (Morgan 1983). This assumption is equivalent to the alliance portfolio literature’s assumption that every state has a defense pact with itself (Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Signorino and Ritter 1999).6 Hence, the difficult part of general deterrence case selection is not determining who makes deterrent threats (everyone does), but rather what states the threats are directed against. General deterrent threats are directed against any state that might consider an attack; these are states that have the opportunity for conflict.

Thus, the key to selecting cases of general deterrence is identifying opportunity for conflict.7 To identify cases where opportunity exists, I use the recently developed concept of politically active dyads (Quackenbush 2006a). A dyad is politically active “if at least one of the following characteristics applies: the members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through a colony, one of the dyad members is a global power, one of the dyad members is a regional power in the region of the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other, or one of the dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other” (Quackenbush 2006a:43). Quackenbush (2006a) finds that politically active dyads are able to identify opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict, while previous measures of opportunity such as politically relevant dyads and regional dyads are unable to do so. Thus, we can have confidence that all politically active dyads could fight if they had the willingness to do so. The goal of deterrence is to dissuade other states from attacking the deterring state. In other words, states seek to ensure that other states—those with the opportunity to attack—do not gain the willingness to attack, and they do this through deterrence. While other empirically verified causes of war certainly impact deterrence outcomes, opportunity is the key to general deterrence case selection.

Because most international relations data are based on annual observations, the year is the time period used for the cross-sectional time series data analysis conducted here. Therefore, each politically active directed-dyad-year constitutes an observation. Since general deterrence deals with the outbreak, rather than the continuation, of international conflict, I eliminate dyad-years marked by a conflict continuing from the previous year as well as ‘joiner’ dyads. Furthermore, I drop the directed dyad B→A in years with a continuing conflict in the directed dyad A→B.8 This results in a total of 384,865 [three hundred eighty-four thousand] politically active directed-dyad-years for the time period 1816–2000.9

Case analysis validates the entire disad

Stephen L. Quackenbush 10, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, January 2010, “International Interactions General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,” International Interactions, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 60-85

[Numbers changed to words: 384,865 to “three hundred eighty-four thousand”]

Case selection has been the biggest obstacle to the empirical analysis of general deterrence (Huth 1999). The only previous quantitative study focusing on direct general deterrence is by Huth and Russett (1993:63, emphasis added), who argue that “the population of enduring rivalries in the international system includes all dyadic relations in which a dispute created the possibility of one or both parties resorting to overt military force to achieve a gain or redress a grievance.” According to this line of reasoning, then, enduring rivalries are the proper cases for the study of general deterrence. Similarly, Diehl and Goertz focus attention on rivalries, whether or not they become enduring, and argue that “the rivalry approach provides a solution” (Diehl and Goertz 2000:91) to problems with deterrence case selection.

According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), a dyad is in a rivalry if they engage in a militarized interstate dispute. Thus, selecting all rivalries as cases of general deterrence would capture (by definition) all failures of general deterrence.4 However, deterrence in dyads that have not fought would be ignored, which is particularly problematic because those are the dyads where deterrence has always worked. Furthermore, identification of the length of a rivalry, and thus the span of general deterrence, requires the assumption that the rivalry begins either with the first dispute (and thus deterrence failed when it was attempted for the first time), or at some arbitrary length of time before the first dispute and after the last.5

Therefore, the rivalry approach is limited as a path to general deterrence case selection. However, one can safely assume that every state wishes to deter attacks against itself—this is the basic rationale for the maintenance of armed forces (Morgan 1983). This assumption is equivalent to the alliance portfolio literature’s assumption that every state has a defense pact with itself (Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Signorino and Ritter 1999).6 Hence, the difficult part of general deterrence case selection is not determining who makes deterrent threats (everyone does), but rather what states the threats are directed against. General deterrent threats are directed against any state that might consider an attack; these are states that have the opportunity for conflict.

Thus, the key to selecting cases of general deterrence is identifying opportunity for conflict.7 To identify cases where opportunity exists, I use the recently developed concept of politically active dyads (Quackenbush 2006a). A dyad is politically active “if at least one of the following characteristics applies: the members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through a colony, one of the dyad members is a global power, one of the dyad members is a regional power in the region of the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a global power that is in a dispute with the other, or one of the dyad members is allied to a regional power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other” (Quackenbush 2006a:43). Quackenbush (2006a) finds that politically active dyads are able to identify opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict, while previous measures of opportunity such as politically relevant dyads and regional dyads are unable to do so. Thus, we can have confidence that all politically active dyads could fight if they had the willingness to do so. The goal of deterrence is to dissuade other states from attacking the deterring state. In other words, states seek to ensure that other states—those with the opportunity to attack—do not gain the willingness to attack, and they do this through deterrence. While other empirically verified causes of war certainly impact deterrence outcomes, opportunity is the key to general deterrence case selection.

Some readers might be concerned that there is no attempt to determine whether the challenger actually intends to attack, and thus, whether the lack of an attack can meaningfully be considered general deterrence success. This issue does not actually pose a problem for the analysis here. The predictions being tested, from Table 1, are about particular game outcomes, not a dichotomous measure of deterrence “success” and “failure.” Furthermore, these predictions explicitly cover the case where the challenger has absolutely no interest in attacking. While the three non-status quo outcomes are essentially different categories of general deterrence failure, the status quo outcome is not necessarily the result of successful deterrence. For example, if Challenger prefers Status Quo to Defender Concedes, the only rational outcome is Status Quo. Although Challenger’s decision to not challenge the status quo in this case is not really “successful deterrence,” it is predicted by perfect deterrence theory.

For the cases that are selected (because they are politically active), I employ a directed-dyad-year unit of analysis. Within a directed dyad, the direction of interaction is important; for example, United States→Japan is one directed dyad and Japan→United States is another. The Unilateral Deterrence Game theoretically differentiates between the roles played by each state in a dyad, so employing directed-dyads enables empirical differentiation between the states in a dyad as well. Furthermore, since each state in a politically active dyad has the opportunity for conflict with the other, each state has an opportunity to challenge the status quo. Therefore, each state is considered to be a potential challenger. For example, in the United States→Japan directed dyad, the United States is Challenger and Japan is Defender, while in the Japan→United States directed dyad, Japan is Challenger and the United States is Defender.

Because most international relations data are based on annual observations, the year is the time period used for the cross-sectional time series data analysis conducted here. Therefore, each politically active directed-dyad-year constitutes an observation. Since general deterrence deals with the outbreak, rather than the continuation, of international conflict, I eliminate dyad-years marked by a conflict continuing from the previous year as well as ‘joiner’ dyads. Furthermore, I drop the directed dyad B→A in years with a continuing conflict in the directed dyad A→B.8 This results in a total of 384,865 [three hundred eighty-four thousand] politically active directed-dyad-years for the time period 1816–2000.9

Predictions are good enough---they can be based on specific knowledge and empirical data

Chernoff 9 Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

Maintaining deterrence does not lock in structural or gender violence--- it’s ethically mandatory to maintain deterrent force against the threat of large-scale violence

Lucinda Joy Peach 4, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, 2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 442-443

Antiwar feminists highlight an important issue often lacking in discussions of the morality of deterrence by emphasizing the unstated costs of the development, deployment, maintenance, and disposal of WMD, including the diversion of funds that otherwise might be available for social welfare programs, the costs of disposing of hazardous wastes, exposure to radiation, and so on. In addition, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as an inhibitor of armed aggression is dubious in the post-cold war era, dominated by “internal” armed conflicts that do not directly involve one (nuclear) nation pitted against another, and the growing threat of terrorist tactics such as those used by al-Qa’ida on September 11, 2001. Despite these costs, pragmatic feminist strategy deals with existing actualities, not utopian ideals. Deterrence has been “successful,” if success can be measured in terms of the lack of the use of nuclear weapons for nearly fifty years.

Looking “pragmatically” at human history – and the scant possibility that nations that have already developed weapons of mass destruction will voluntarily destroy them (all of them, that is) or be deterred from ever using them in the absence of a credible threat that such use would be met by equal or greater force – the possession of WMD for purposes of deterrence may be morally necessary, at least given current geopolitical realities. As military philosopher Malham Wakin suggests:

When we ask whether nuclear deterrence is the only effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in a total war, we must be sure to do so in the context of the actual world situation we now find ourselves in, a situation that includes a very large number of nuclear warheads in the possession of several nations and in least one of those nations many of those nuclear weapons are aimed at the United States and its NATO allies. In that realistic context is it reasonable to suppose that a nuclear balance is better calculated to deter total war than a nuclear imbalance?

Given the goal of pragmatist feminism to “end oppression,” including the domination and control of some nations and peoples by others, and given that the possession and threatened use of WMD have become one of the most effective means by which nations in the world today assert their power, deterrence is morally necessary to help ensure against the oppression of some nations or peoples by others armed with WMD.

However, since the goal of international peace and security can never be fully achieved while nuclear and other WMD exist, whether for defensive, deterrent, or other purposes, pragmatist feminists allow for the interim use of deterrence only in the context of active efforts by nuclear nations to bring about multilateral disarmament, such as that called for by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Pragmatist feminists thus disagree with the antiwar feminist rejection of any use of nuclear weapons, even for deterrence purposes, arguing for such use as a temporary, interim strategy through the process of mutual disarmament.

Therefore, while pragmatist feminists might agree with antiwar feminists that nuclear weapons never should have been invented or, once invented, never should have been tested or deployed or used as the basis for deterrence, that is not the reality we find ourselves in today. Yes, development and deployment must be factored into the ethical status of deterrence, as antiwar feminists suggest. However, these costs in and of themselves are not too high if viewed from the vantage point of the present, since much of the cost has, in effect, already been spent. The antiwar feminist point about the costs of development and deployment is highly relevant, however, to considering whether to build additional WMD for deterrence purposes.

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