Capability & Will Wall Deterrence depends on the combination of capability and will—plan collapses the perception of Japanese will of the US to get involved into grey zone conflicts.
Santoro & Warden 15 (Santoro, David, and John K. Warden HOOCH DEBATE. senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS & WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age." The Washington Quarterly 38.1 (2015): 147-165.)
Effective deterrence requires a combination of capability and will. China and North Korea are both pursuing conventional and nuclear capabilities that, over the long run, could increase their relative power and allow them to more freely challenge their neighbors and the United States. But at present, Japan retains local air and naval superiority over China, South Korea enjoys a conventional military edge over North Korea, and the United States has conventional and nuclear dominance over both North Korea and China. The problem for both extended deterrence and assurance in the short-term is resolve. Georgetown professor Oriana Mastro argues that “[t]he belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it.”41 The exact same sentence could have been written about North Korea in 2010.
To overcome the perceived resolve deficit and thus strengthen both extended deterrence and assurance without unduly increasing the risk of war, the United States should demonstrate that it is willing to let allies accept slightly more risk in the gray zone. If Washington makes it clear, both publicly and privately, that it will back its allies even if they carry out certain limited escalations in response to gray-zone provocations, it will reverse the perception that the United States seeks to deescalate crises at all costs. For example, Washington could tell Tokyo that, should it deem it appropriate, the United States would not object to Japan using Maritime Self-Defense Force assets to respond to territorial incursions in the East China Sea. It could also give Seoul more latitude in defining the appropriate retaliatory targets in North Korea following a future provocation. Such steps would help reverse the perception that China and North Korea have a resolve advantage and cause Beijing and Pyongyang to question whether they can salami slice with impunity. They would also increase confidence in Tokyo
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and Seoul that Japan and South Korea can defend their interests with U.S. backing.
AT: Navy / Air Navy and Air forces are insufficient – only ground forces can deter aggression.
Stadler 10 (Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, “Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo American Center” http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100217-71.html)
There are some in Japan who say that the Navy that is based here is enough of a deterrent force. As someone who has served deployments on aircraft carriers, let me say that the technology at the disposal of the U.S. Navy is both sophisticated and devastating to adversaries.
Our outstanding sailors and naval aviators are a key component of deterrence in this region, but they are limited by what they can accomplish from the sea and using their aircraft.
And then there is the Air Force. Some of you know, I'm a fighter pilot. I flew F-4s and F-18s for most of my career, and I still take a helicopter up once in a while. The capabilities of our aircraft are stunning. The combat power of the U.S. Air Force, particularly when it combines efforts with the Japan Air Self Defense Force, is breathtaking.
And yet, if we have learned nothing else over the last 50 years, it is that air power and sea power alone are inadequate to fight wars, and are inadequate as deterrents.
In the days immediately following the attack on the World Trade Center, operations in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban were of necessity conducted exclusively with air power. Air power was able to destroy all Taliban and Al Qaeda targets, but it had no effect on the willingness of the enemy to discontinue fighting. U.S. ground forces were required to defeat the Taliban government.
And regardless of what you may think about the Iraq conflict, and I realize there are different opinions in this room, certainly a lesson from Iraq is the limits of air and sea power. Only ground forces were able to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq.
Ladies and gentlemen, in the Asia Pacific, U.S. ground forces are Marines. The U.S. army maintains soldiers in the Republic of Korea, but those soldiers are not expeditionary for the purpose of responding to emergencies elsewhere.
They are largely dedicated to remaining on the Korean Peninsula in support of the combined defense. This means the only deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines on Okinawa. Those are the ground forces assigned to defend Japan and to maintain security in East Asia. The notion that "we like the Alliance but we don't need or want ground forces" won't work.
It is impossible to deter, defend and defeat without the ability to deploy ground forces rapidly in times of crisis. The U.S. cannot meet its Alliance obligation to defend Japan and maintain regional peace and security without ground forces equipped with the appropriate capabilities and training. Without expeditionary ground forces, the deterrent power of our Alliance would be greatly weakened.
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