Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf

Contention V -- Deterrence

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Contention V -- Deterrence

Withdrawal is critical to rotational presence and burden sharing – improves deterrence

O’Hanlon, 12

(Michael, “Solving the Okinawa Problem,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/12/solving-the-okinawa-problem/)

In recent weeks the U.S. Marine Corps has begun to deploy the V-22 Osprey to Okinawa, Japan. The Osprey flies like a propeller plane but can take off and land like a helicopter, providing more speed than the latter but more tactical flexibility than the former. It has also reignited the long-standing debate between Japan and the United States over the future of the Marines’ presence on Okinawa. Critics have called the airplane unsafe and demanded its redeployment back to the United States. While flight data do not confirm this specific allegation, policymakers in Tokyo and Washington do need to realize they have an even bigger problem — and search for a new, less intrusive way of basing Marines on this small island at the southern end of the Japanese archipelago. The question of the Marines on Okinawa has been contentious for some two decades now. Numbering between 15,000 and 20,000 at a time there, they have constituted more than a third of the U.S. military presence in Japan, on an overpopulated island that itself represents well under 1 percent of the Japanese landmass. On top of those Marines, another 10,000 or so Air Force personnel continue to be based at the Kadena Air Base on Okinawa as well. The Marines have been resented locally not only for their sheer numbers, but for Air Station Futenma, which is surrounded by residential neighborhoods and schools in the city of Ginowan. The occasional accident there has put anxiety into the hearts of many who fear a worse accident in the future; moreover, as Okinawa is one of Japan’s only prefectures actually growing in population, local officials want the land for other purposes. There is a lot to say in defense of the Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. position, starting with the fact that these forces serve common alliance interests in a stable Asia-Pacific region. Washington has tried to work with Tokyo to relocate the base, the most recent proposal being to build an airfield on the shore of Henoko Bay farther north in a much less populated part of Okinawa. But Japanese national and local politics have repeatedly gotten in the way. In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed to relocate almost half the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam in the coming years to relieve pressure on Okinawa. And regarding the Osprey in particular, though it has suffered some famous accidents, as of August it had been statistically safer over its lifetime than the average Marine Corps aircraft. According to Marine Corps headquarters at the Pentagon, it has had a 20 percent lower rate of serious accidents per flight hour than the typical Marine helicopter or other aircraft — though admittedly its two recent crashes merit further public discussion to relieve understandable anxieties on Okinawa. All that said, the current relocation scheme appears stuck in the morass of Okinawan politics. This June, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s ruling coalition failed to win a majority in the prefectural assembly election. That fact puts him on the defensive. Given the public discontent about the Osprey deployment, the governor has little choice but to push harder in resolving the Futenma issue — without, alas, approving the Henoko site — as well as opposing the Osprey deployment. There is another problem with the Marine Corps’ plan for the region, concerning the airfield construction plan combined with the partial relocation to Guam. None of this is the fault of the Marine Corps, which has sought in good faith to find a plan that works for all. Alas, in addition to the political challenges the plan faces, it is also now associated with a price tag estimated by the Government Accountability Office to be up to $30 billion, split roughly equally between Tokyo and Washington. This at a time when sequestration threatens to lop another 10 percent off future Pentagon budgets, on top of the nearly 10 percent cut already in effect from the 2011 Budget Control Act. There is a cheaper, simpler, more promising way. It would bring more Marines home to the United States, where downsizing in the years ahead will free up space at stateside Marine Corps bases, and compensate by predeploying supplies in the broader Pacific region. This latter step would cost some money, but nowhere near the $30 billion saved by jettisoning the current plan, and it could be funded largely by Japan (since the United States would be helping the Japanese solve a local problem). Futenma would ultimately be closed, but first provisions would be made for limited Marine Corps use of other airfields on the main island of Okinawa and perhaps on smaller islands in the prefecture as well — together with full access to such facilities in times of crisis or war. Specifically, we would suggest leaving only 5,000 to 8,000 Marines on Okinawa and bringing the rest back to places like Camp Pendleton, California, rather than building new facilities for them on Guam. The United States would then station prepositioning ships with weapons and supplies for several thousand Marines in Japanese waters (to complement existing similar capabilities now already at ports in Guam) in order to allow the Marines who had been relocated stateside to return rapidly to the Western Pacific in a crisis. In addition, Marines based in the United States would rotate regularly to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct exercises with friends and allies, including Japan. Regarding airfields, we would counsel the following changes. Follow through promptly on the commitment to close Futenma and return the land to local control. To replace some functions of Futenma, build a modest helipad inside an existing Marine Corps base on the northern half of the island, where Okinawa-based Marines do most of their training now, so the logistical implications may be minimal (or even net positive). In addition, by agreement with Tokyo and the Okinawan prefectural government, the United States would seek authority to conduct some Marine Corps fixed-wing flights at the Kadena Air Base if necessary, provided the total number of takeoff and landings at that base decreases. To ensure that Kadena does not become busier on a day-to-day basis, the United States should base some Air Force planes now at Kadena elsewhere in peacetime — like Misawa in northern Japan, or even Guam. Finally, Japan could build a second runway at Naha international airport, which would aid the island’s economy in peacetime and provide more capacity for U.S. and Japanese military use in crises or war.* This plan is win-win-win. It saves money for both allies. It actually improves U.S. responsiveness to possible regional crises. And it finally extracts the United States from the quagmire that the Japanese and alliance politics of this issue have become. The United States and Japan have been bogged down by the Okinawa issue too long. The precious time and talent of policymakers have gone toward trying to solve a problem that has become almost insoluble. We need to look at this problem anew, address it, and finally move beyond it. The American defense budget crunch may be just the final impetus needed to motivate policymakers to fresh thinking and decisive action.

Reducing presence in Okinawa is key to advance burden sharing and interoperability

Sugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13

(Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15, http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_106992.html)

Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is surrounded by densely populated residential areas in the midst of Okinawa Island. In December 1996, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed, as a part of the realignment of US bases in Okinawa, to return it "within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilitates are completed and operational." Although Tokyo and Washington later decided to build the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, the construction has long stagnated because successive Japanese administrations have failed to persuade Okinawa Prefecture to approve the landfill. Hopes of the two governments now hinge on the approval in the next few months of the landfill plan by the Okinawa government. Regardless of the decision by the Okinawa governor, however, the fundamental question will remain. Why should we consume money and energy for unpopular, expensive, and ineffective base-moving when the security environment and fiscal condition is so severe? Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility. Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining approval for a landfill permit from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community would eventually weaken the basis of the alliance. The financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General Accounting Office reported that the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the landfill and construction of the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the Japanese government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present US base realignment initiative fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately 9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft. Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind. First and foremost, Japan and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the present situation where the MCAS Futenma has potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also be allocated to share the costs of rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the helicopters and transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot remain on Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the FRF in the prefecture. While smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire division needs to relocate. Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to Hawaii and California rather than relying so much on Guam. Fourth, it is important that the departure of the majority of Marines based on Okinawa not be read as a retreat or a sign of decline of the alliance. Japan and the United States can create a framework to substantially compensate for the losses of deterrent capability. As a part of such efforts, US scholars Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon have suggested a new strategy to assure the swift and robust projection of the Marine Corps across the Pacific at a significantly lower cost. We should also discuss steps to augment alliance capacity in other areas, particularly the US air and naval presence based in other parts of Japan. The existing US base at Misawa in northern Honshu, home to an F-16-equipped fighter wing, could host more advanced F-22 aircraft, for example. Expanded Military Role of Japan Equally important, the role and capability of Japan's own defense forces should be expanded. Under the present US base realignment initiative, the government of Japan is expected to pay for relocation facilities, but not to play a larger military role. This scheme contrasts with the realignment of US Forces Korea where the Republic of Korea agreed to bear more military burden. If Japan really demands a smaller presence of US forces in the current security environment, it needs to step into the gap. Japan needs to invest more resources steadily in the defense of southwest of Japan. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the SDF should establish its own naval infantry unit. Improvement in maritime and air power as well as space and cyberspace security is more urgently required. More effective coordination between the SDF and the US troops would significantly improve the capability of the alliance. One of the most serious weaknesses in the current operation of the Japan-US alliance is the ambiguity and complexity about what the SDF can do in contingencies when "Japan is not under attack, but some kind of emergency takes place around Japan." The SDF will provide logistical support to US troops in such events, but the domain of the SDF activity must be limited to the "non-combatant area" as Article 9 of Japan's Constitution prohibits the use of force unless Japan is attacked. Although talk of amending the Constitution was not realistic for a long time, the situation seems to have changed. The Abe administration is trying to change the interpretation of Article 9 to admit the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, while others believe that such a substantial change should be made through a deliberative process of formal amendment. In either case, recognition of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, as well as relaxation of constitutional restraints on collective security, will clear the way for allied forces to coordinate more closely, based on military rationales. The SDF will also be able to increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities to share various levels of intelligence with the US military. It is therefore conceivable, for instance, that the Maritime SDF will assume a larger responsibility in the East China Sea and reduce the burden for the US Navy. Expansion of Japan's military role, however, must be very carefully designed. Neighboring countries in East Asia will certainly take it as a sign of Japan's resurgence as a military power. If they respond militarily, the region will face a new arms race and we will be less secure. To avoid such a clumsy outcome, prudence is required for both Japan and the United States. For example, the larger roles and missions for the SDF may be emphasized in the realm of logistical support to the US military and multilateral missions such as peacekeeping. At the same time, Japan needs to build confidence with its neighbors to reassure them that Tokyo is not embarking on a dangerous course. The Japanese government should express more candid reflection on its responsibility for the war in the Pacific, while China and South Korea could reciprocate with acceptance of genuine Japanese gestures of contrition. Japan should also construct a comprehensive China strategy that emphasizes not only deterrence but also proactive engagement. Military to military cooperation between the SDF and People's Liberation Army, including joint training or even coordinated activities in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, should be pursued as well. Faced with new realities, Japan and the US can no longer settle for a policy that merely clings to the existing plan. The leaders of the two countries should take this opportunity to demonstrate the viability and resilience of our precious alliance, yet again.

US-Japan alliance solves Senkaku deterrence

Bill Gertz 15, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, 4/29/15, “Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/

President Obama on Tuesday invoked U.S. military defense guarantees for Japan’s disputed East China Sea islands that have been the target of coordinated Chinese military provocations since 2012.

During a Rose Garden press conference with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Obama repeated a promise to defend the Senkaku Islands, a statement that is likely to anger China, which claims the uninhabited islands as its own, calling them the Diaoyu Islands.

“I want to reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including Senkaku Islands,” Obama said in a carefully crafted statement.

Additionally, Obama noted growing concern over China’s South China Sea assertiveness. Beijing has claimed some 90 percent of the sea as its maritime domain, putting it in conflict with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other regional states.

“We share a concern about China’s land reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea, and the United States and Japan are united in our commitment to freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion,” he said.

The presidential statement of support comes as Japan works to adopt a new interpretation of its pacifist constitution that will permit the use of weapons and military forces for collective self-defense and for so-called “gray areas,” such as remote island disputes. Legislation to codify the new legal interpretation is pending before Japan’s legislature.

The announcement also comes amid revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines that analysts say are designed to counter China’s regional aggression.

The treaty article mentioned by the president is part of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It states that an armed attack on either country would prompt action “to meet the common danger.” Other lower-level U.S. officials have made the commitment in the past. But it was the second time in two years that Obama mentioned the military commitment, giving it more political weight.

Chinese Embassy spokesman Zhu Haiquan said the Diaoyu island and its affiliated islands “are China’s inherent territory.”

“No matter what others say or do, the fact that the Diaoyu islands belong to China cannot be changed, and the determination and will of the Chinese government and people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not be shaken,” he said.

Zhu said the U.S.-Japan alliance was forged during the Cold War. “We are firmly opposed to making use of this alliance against the interests of a third party including China,” he said. “We urge the U.S. side to be discreet with what it says and does, honor its commitment of not taking sides on issues concerning territorial sovereignty, and do more to promote regional peace and stability, instead of the other way around.”

The president’s statement follows a similar commitment he made a year ago during his visit to Japan and further signals to the Chinese that the United States, while stating it is neutral in territorial disputes, affirmed that U.S. defenses could be used to assist Japan in any Chinese attempt to seize the islands by force.

John Tkacik, a former China specialist with the State Department, said Obama’s statement was significant. The Senkakus have been a central concern of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the islands were handed over to Japan by the United States in 1972, he said.

“Tokyo rightly considers the islands a touchstone of the alliance’s durability,” Tkacik said.

“The tenor of President Obama’s reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the alliance, and specifically the Senkakus, was at least as firm as past presidents, and actually may even be more explicit than any other president personally has given,” he added.

“It’s an indication that President Obama appreciates the gravity of the strain China’s aggressiveness in the Okinawa area has placed on the alliance.”

The strong statement is “a signal to friend and foe alike in Asia that the alliance is psychologically prepared for even new regional pressures—particularly from China,” Tkacik said.

The plan causes a shift to rotational presence – that is a win-win-win for deterrence

O’Hanlon, 12

(Michael, “Solving the Okinawa Problem,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/12/solving-the-okinawa-problem/)

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