Millennial Speech & Debate Okinawa Withdrawal March pf
Contention VIII – China Encirclement
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Contention VIII – China EncirclementForward bases in North East Asia make interstate conflict and military adventurism likelyVine 15, associate professor of anthropology @ American University, 9-13-15 (David, “How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Undermine National Security and Harm Us All,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-bases-abroad_b_8131402.html) It is also not at all clear that bases enhance national security and global peace in any way. In the absence of a superpower enemy, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from U.S. shores are necessary to defend the United States -- or even its allies -- is a hard argument to make. On the contrary, the global collection of bases has generally enabled the launching of military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice that have resulted in repeated disasters, costing millions of lives and untold destruction from Vietnam to Iraq. By making it easier to wage foreign wars, bases overseas have ensured that military action is an ever more attractive option -- often the only imaginable option -- for U.S. policymakers. As the anthropologist Catherine Lutz has said, when all you have in your foreign policy toolbox is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. Ultimately, bases abroad have frequently made war more likely rather than less. Proponents of the long-outdated forward strategy will reply that overseas bases “deter” enemies and help keep the global peace. As supporters of the status quo, they have been proclaiming such security benefits as self-evident truths for decades. Few have provided anything of substance to support their claims. While there is some evidence that military forces can indeed deter imminent threats, little if any research suggests that overseas bases are an effective form of long-term deterrence. Studies by both the Bush administration and the RAND Corporation -- not exactly left-wing peaceniks -- indicate that advances in transportation technology have largely erased the advantage of stationing troops abroad. In the case of a legitimate defensive war or peacekeeping operation, the military could generally deploy troops just as quickly from domestic bases as from most bases abroad. Rapid sealift and airlift capabilities coupled with agreements allowing the use of bases in allied nations and, potentially, pre-positioned supplies are a dramatically less expensive and less inflammatory alternative to maintaining permanent bases overseas. It is also questionable whether such bases actually increase the security of host nations. The presence of U.S. bases can turn a country into an explicit target for foreign powers or militants -- just as U.S. installations have endangered Americans overseas. Similarly, rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, foreign bases frequently heighten military tensions and discourage diplomatic solutions to conflicts. Placing U.S. bases near the borders of countries like China, Russia, and Iran, for example, increases threats to their security and encourages them to respond by boosting their own military spending and activity. Imagine how U.S. leaders would respond if China were to build even a single small base in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean. Notably, the most dangerous moment during the Cold War -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- revolved around the construction of Soviet nuclear missile facilities in Cuba, roughly 90 miles from the U.S. border. The creation and maintenance of so many U.S. bases overseas likewise encourages other nations to build their own foreign bases in what could rapidly become an escalating “base race.” Bases near the borders of China and Russia, in particular, threaten to fuel new cold wars. U.S. officials may insist that building yet more bases in East Asia is a defensive act meant to ensure peace in the Pacific, but tell that to the Chinese. That country’s leaders are undoubtedly not “reassured” by the creation of yet more bases encircling their borders. Contrary to the claim that such installations increase global security, they tend to ratchet up regional tensions, increasing the risk of future military confrontation. In this way, just as the war on terror has become a global conflict that only seems to spread terror, the creation of new U.S. bases to protect against imagined future Chinese or Russian threats runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. These bases may ultimately help create the very threat they are supposedly designed to protect against. In other words, far from making the world a safer place, U.S. bases can actually make war more likely and the country less secure. Behind the Wire In his farewell address to the nation upon leaving the White House in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned the nation about the insidious economic, political, and even spiritual effects of what he dubbed “the military-industrial-congressional complex,” the vast interlocking national security state born out of World War II. As Chalmers Johnson’s work reminded us in this new century, our 70-year-old collection of bases is evidence of how, despite Ike’s warning, the United States has entered a permanent state of war with an economy, a government, and a global system of power enmeshed in preparations for future conflicts. America’s overseas bases offer a window onto our military’s impact in the world and in our own daily lives. The history of these hulking “Little Americas” of concrete, fast food, and weaponry provides a living chronicle of the United States in the post-World War II era. In a certain sense, in these last seven decades, whether we realize it or not, we’ve all come to live “behind the wire,” as military personnel like to say. We may think such bases have made us safer. In reality, they’ve helped lock us inside a permanently militarized society that has made all of us -- everyone on this planet -- less secure, damaging lives at home and abroad. Plan establishes stable relations with China that make cooperation on warming and stability effectiveBrowne 15 Andrew Browne is a Senior Correspondent and Columnist, WSJ, June 12, 2015, “Can China Be Contained?”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534 For its part, China is utterly convinced that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of containment. Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister (and himself a China expert), summarized Beijing’s perception of U.S. goals in five bullet points in a recent Harvard study: to isolate China, contain it, diminish it, internally divide it and sabotage its political leadership. To be sure, the new tension in U.S.-China relations is not anything like the Cold War stare-down that preoccupied Europe for decades, when NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks faced each other across lines that neither side dared to cross. But in one important respect, history is repeating itself: Both China and the U.S. have started to view each other not as partners, competitors or rivals but as adversaries. China’s missile and naval buildup, as well as its development of new cyber- and space-warfare capabilities, are aimed squarely at deterring the U.S. military from intervening in any conflict in Asia. Meanwhile, many of the Pentagon’s pet projects—Star Wars technologies such as lasers and advanced weapons systems such as a long-range bomber—are being developed with China in mind. So what, specifically, should America do? In one of the most hawkish of the recent think-tank reports, Robert D. Blackwill, a former U.S. deputy national security adviser and ambassador to India under President George W. Bush, and Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who also served on the National Security Council staff under President Bush, write that engagement with China has served to strengthen a competitor. It is time, they declare, for a new grand strategy: less engagement and more “balancing” to ensure the “central objective” of continued U.S. global primacy. Among other things, America should beef up its military in Asia, choke off China’s access to military technology, accelerate missile-defense deployments and increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. For Michael D. Swaine, also of the Carnegie Endowment, this is a certain recipe for another Cold War, or worse. He outlines a sweeping settlement under which America would concede its primacy in East Asia, turning much of the region into a buffer zone policed by a balance of forces, including those from a strengthened Japan. All foreign forces would withdraw from Korea. And China would offer assurances that it wouldn’t launch hostilities against Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. Such arrangements, even if possible, would take decades to sort out. Meanwhile, warns David M. Lampton, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, U.S.-China ties have reached a tipping point. “Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization,” he said in a recent speech. The West has been in this position before. Optimism about the prospects of transforming an ancient civilization through engagement, followed by deep disillusion, has been the pattern ever since early Jesuit missionaries sought to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Those envoys adopted the gowns of the Mandarin class, grew long beards and even couched their gospel message in Confucian terms to make it more palatable. The 17th-century German priest Adam Schall got as far as becoming the chief astronomer of the Qing dynasty. But he fell from favor, and the Jesuits were later expelled. The disappointment in the U.S. today is heightened by the fact that engagement with China has promised so much and progressed so far. Trade and technology have transformed China beyond anything that Nixon could have imaged, and the two countries are each other’s second-largest trading partners. China is America’s biggest creditor. More than a quarter million Chinese students study at U.S. universities. But the ideological gap hasn’t narrowed at all—and now Mr. Xi has taken a sharp anti-Western turn. Mao Zedong made the bold decision to cut a deal with Nixon, confident enough to embrace American capitalists even while pressing the radical agenda of his Cultural Revolution. Later, Deng Xiaoping struck a pragmatic balance between the opportunities of economic engagement with the West and the dangers posed by an influx of Western ideas. “When you open the window, flies and mosquitoes come in,” he shrugged. Today, Mr. Xi is furiously zapping the bugs. A newly proposed law would put the entire foreign nonprofit sector under police administration, effectively treating such groups as potential enemies of the state. State newspapers rail against “hostile foreign forces” and their local sympathizers. The Chinese Communist Party’s “Document No. 9” prohibits discussion of Western democracy on college campuses. And as Mr. Xi champions traditional Chinese culture, authorities in Wenzhou, a heavily Christian coastal city dubbed China’s “New Jerusalem,” tear down crosses atop churches as unwanted symbols of Western influence. The backlash against the West extends well beyond China’s borders. For decades, China accepted America’s role as a regional policeman to maintain the peace and keep sea lanes open. But in Shanghai last year, Mr. Xi declared that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” Washington feels a certain sense of betrayal. America’s open markets, after all, smoothed China’s export-led rise to become the world’s second-largest economy, and the two economies are now thoroughly enmeshed. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that mutual dependence will necessarily prevent conflict. Pre-World War I Europe was also closely entwined through trade and investment. Even the U.S. business community, once Beijing’s staunchest advocate in Washington, has lost some of its enthusiasm for engagement. James McGregor, a former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and now the China chairman of APCO Worldwide, a business consultancy, recalls helping to persuade U.S. trade associations to lobby for China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, which happened in 2001. That unity of purpose, he says “has been splintering ever since.” Today, “they all believe that China is out to screw them.” China’s fears notwithstanding, the Obama administration remains very much in favor of engagement. Last year’s high-profile deal on climate change showed that cooperation is still possible. Ahead of a planned summit in the U.S. in September, the two countries are hammering out an ambitious bilateral trade agreement. And it is often pointed out that not a single problem in the world, from Only plan makes cooperation effectiveSwaine 15 Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and has a PhD in Government from Harvard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 20, 2015, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is required to ensure long-term regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. “freedom of action” and a clear “ability to prevail” militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to China’s mainland borders. The United States would never tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given China’s expanding interests and capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along Beijing’s maritime periphery will virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and economically draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work together to address a growing array of common global challenges. U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders. Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military predominance in the Asia-Pacific region can be sustained on a consistent basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China could establish its own predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the long-term security environment in Asia, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,2 concluded that, while the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe, economically induced defense spending limitations that will constrain efforts to decisively keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline, that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains. This will occur despite Washington’s repeated assertion that the rebalance to Asia will sustain America’s predominant position in the region. Moreover, such largely economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the Asia-Pacific. Of course, a continuing U.S. capacity to shift military assets from other parts of the globe to Asia in a crisis or conflict could conceivably correct America’s relative military decline in the Western Pacific. But such a surge-based “solution” would require considerable time to implement, while any future threatening Chinese military action, for example, with regard to Taiwan or maritime disputes near its border, would almost certainly involve a very rapid strike aimed at establishing a fait accompli that could prove extremely difficult and costly to undo. Equally important, a growing day-to-day Chinese capability and presence along the Asian littoral and a perceived relative U.S. military decline in daily presence would inevitably affect the security calculations of other Asian states, especially American allies and friends, regardless of the overall ramp-up capacity of the U.S. military in any confrontation. In the current, increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship, a clear relative shift in day-to-day regional power toward China would likely cause such states to hedge more deliberately against a U.S. failure to prevail in a crisis or conflict by developing stronger, more independent, and potentially destabilizing military capabilities and/or by accommodating Chinese interests, possibly at the expense of the United States, for example, by spurning past or future security arrangements with Washington. The limits on U.S. maritime predominance do not mean that China will eventually grow into the position of Asia’s next military hegemon, however. The above-mentioned Carnegie reports also concluded that American military power in Asia will remain very strong under all but the most unlikely, worst-case scenarios involving a U.S. withdrawal from the region. While China’s regional military capabilities will continue to grow significantly in key areas such as submarines and surface warships, ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive aircraft, air defense, and joint warfare, they will not provide an unambiguous level of superiority over U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, and certainly not in any other region. Therefore, any eventual Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would almost inevitably fail, and not only because of U.S. capabilities and resolve, but also because such an effort would drive regional states much closer to the United States. The result would be either a cold or a hot war in Asia, with intensifying polarization, arms races, and an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts. The Chinese leaders understand this and hence might only seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting opportunistically and in a more limited manner) if American words and actions were to convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek were to require it. Such a belief could emerge if Washington insists on maintaining its own historical level of military superiority in Asia by attempting to neutralize entirely Chinese military capabilities right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace or to develop a force capable of blockading China from a distance. Variants of operational concepts currently under consideration in U.S. policy circles, such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control (the former designed to defeat Beijing through preemptive, precision strikes deep into Chinese territory, and the latter to throttle China via a blockade along the first island chain bordering the eastern and southern Chinese mainland), contain such features. Indeed, any effort to sustain U.S. predominance in the face of a growing relative decline in U.S. capabilities alongside steady increases in Chinese power and influence will almost certainly intensify the U.S.-China security competition, deepen tensions between the two powers, and greatly unsettle U.S. allies and friends. Fortunately, this zero-sum dynamic has yet to emerge, but growing suspicions and beliefs in both capitals—founded on the above clashing assumptions held by each side regarding the necessary conditions for long-term order and prosperity in Asia—are certainly moving events in this direction. Of course, a fundamental shift in the Asian power balance and its likely consequences will become moot if China’s economy collapses or declines to such a level that it is unable to meaningfully challenge American maritime predominance. Indeed, for some analysts of the Asian security scene, such a possibility is real enough to justify a rejection of any consideration of alternatives to such predominance. But the above-mentioned reports, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, found that such an adverse outcome for China is highly unlikely in any foreseeable time frame. Equally important, a major delay in adjusting to current and likely future realities due to a misplaced belief in China’s ultimate decline will make it far more difficult to undertake adjustments years hence, given both the long lead time required to implement them and the likelihood that mutual suspicions will have by then deepened to the point where neither side is willing to make the required accommodations. The Need to Transition to a Stable Balance of Power Thus, for both the United States and China, the primary future strategic challenge is to develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning away from U.S. maritime predominance toward a stable, genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific in which neither nation has the clear capacity to prevail in an armed conflict. This will be difficult to achieve and potentially dangerous, but nonetheless necessary, given the existing and future trends shaping the region. In general, true balance-of-power environments can at least potentially increase both risk taking and miscalculation, especially if one or both sides conclude that they must confirm or consolidate a perceived increase—or compensate for a perceived decline—in leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance specific interests, or manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not only a variety of crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high levels of mutual strategic reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each side’s freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along China’s sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that count most. Many knowledgeable observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense spending to mutual, limited concessions or understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance commitments and core interests.3 While many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both the underlying problem of clashing assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by inaccurate historical analogies about China’s past and domestic nationalist views and pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer recommendations designed to significantly alter the power structure in volatile areas along China’s maritime periphery, such as on the Korean Peninsula and in and around Taiwan, in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as sources of conflict over the long term. In order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power environment, specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources of future U.S.-China crises and the propensity to test each side’s resolve, and to enhance the opportunities for meaningful cooperation over the long term. In particular, Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable understandings regarding the future long-term status of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other foreign) military activities within the first island chain—or at the very least within both China’s and Japan’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Such understandings should almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.-China balance of power within them, thereby creating a de facto buffer zone along China’s maritime periphery. In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned (or loosely aligned) peninsula free from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by both the United States and China that a unified Korea would remain free from coercion and always open to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a continuation in some form of a greatly reduced security relationship with Washington, at least in the short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic and cruise missile strike capabilities. Of course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with South Korea under threat of attack from North Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of a stable balance of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a clear, credible understanding must be reached as soon as possible among the powers concerned regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem. In the case of Taiwan, any credible neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either side’s interests would require, as a first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions on U.S. arms sales in return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military production and deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible assurances that it would not use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island. In the past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force toward the island, viewing such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, as in the case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation on its right to employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall stable balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In addition, Beijing would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could only occur on the basis of a peaceful process involving the willing consent of the people of Taiwan, and b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many decades. For its part, the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it would neither place forces on the island nor provide any new level of defense assistance to Taipei, as long as Beijing abides by its own assurances. And both countries would need to consult closely with Taiwan and Japan at each step of this process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them. Regarding territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants, beyond clear security threats leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct and established legal procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed in every instance. That said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond accepted 12-nautical-mile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located within its so-called nine-dashed line and outside the territorial waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such understandings will likely become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate. In the larger conventional military realm, U.S. military primacy within at least the first island chain will need to be replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely be centered on what is termed a “mutual denial” operational concept in which both China and the United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)–type air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a sustained advantage through military means over potentially volatile areas or zones clearly prohibitive. In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides would possess adequate defensive capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close or control key strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of weapon systems operating in the Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface and subsurface warships. That cooperation is necessary and sufficient to solve global warmingGao 14 Gao Hairan, Deputy Director and Assistant Professor, National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), focuses on China-U.S. relations on climate change and South-South cooperation on climate change, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, March 17, 2014, “How China and the United States Can Work Together to Tackle Global Climate Change”, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2014/03/17/hairan/ Climate change is one of the most severe environmental and socioeconomic challenges faced by human beings today. It is also a key issue of sustainable development and closely related to biodiversity, poverty alleviation, and the transformation to a low-carbon development path. As the world’s largest economies and emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, China and the United States must work together more cooperatively and with other countries to combat climate change and to help the globe build a low-carbon future. Anthropogenic GHGs emissions have had a huge impact on global warming since the Industrial Revolution. As such, curbing global climate change requires coordinated and coherent global action, as well as an overarching system that includes all major greenhouse gas emitters (GHGs) in the world. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol have been the cornerstone of international cooperation on tackling climate change since the 1990s. Still, major political differences remain between developed and developing countries. Developed countries believe that the current international climate framework should evolve over time and be dynamic enough to reflect economic and geopolitical changes. Developing countries, on the other hand, insist that developed countries should continue to take the lead in GHGs emission reduction beyond 2020, and developing countries should make efforts to cut their GHGs emissions according to their capabilities. Furthermore, from the developing countries’ perspective, abandoning the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and redefining the principle of common but different responsibilities (CBDR) is not acceptable. The current international political dilemma on combating climate change is twofold: first, how should we allocate valuable and limited GHGs emission space to various countries? And second, is this burden-sharing best accomplished through a top-down or a bottom-up approach? The former might accomplish this through an international, legally-binding agreement such as the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, and the latter through nationally determined, voluntary actions that may be related but not limited to countries’ QELROs, renewable energy development targets, poverty alleviation, and energy intensity. Therefore, finding a common denominator is crucial to mobilizing global consensus and action to curb climate change. As negotiations continue, one possibility in 2015 would be a general agreement that combines both the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This could be facilitated through a robust international measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) system with common accounting rules to ensure transparency and real emissions reductions by countries involved without undermining their long-term socioeconomic development or infringing upon national sovereignty. In addition, enhancing financial, technological, and capacity building support will also be key elements of any agreement, as they are of significant importance to help developing countries address climate change. As the two top GHGs emitters, economies, and energy users in the world, the actions taken by China and the United States are crucial to the realization of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and sustainable development on a global scale. In 2013, the total fossil CO2 emissions of China and the United States accounted for more than forty percent of world fossil CO2 emissions. Therefore, any successful effort to tackle climate change will need these two countries to work towards a solution either through the UNFCCC process or on a bilateral basis. Meanwhile, it also must be noted that China is different from the United States in various aspects, and should thus bear different responsibilities in tackling climate change. Recognizing the differences between the two countries politically will be helpful for effectively managing those differences, building a constructive partnership, and finding mutually acceptable approaches to cooperation without undermining their respective core national climate-related interests. Cooperation between China and the United States under the UNFCCC could ensure a successful 2015 global pact on climate change and further solidify bilateral cooperation under the current China-U.S. Climate Change Working Group (CCWG). As for the UNFCCC process, both countries should demonstrate their political willingness and commitment to it for the protection of climate as a global public good. In terms of bilateral cooperation, issues of common interest may include short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), shale gas, HFCs, nuclear technology, and the five thematic areas under the CCWG. The two countries must recognize that combating climate change, either through a UN-led multilateral process or on a bilateral basis, is of mutual interest to them, both economically and strategically. By working together, China and the United States may also find new domestic opportunities, such as economic restructuring and rebalancing investment, finance, and trade between them. This could also help ensure energy security and economic prosperity while moving towards a low-carbon development path. China-U.S. cooperation on climate may also contribute to building new models of major power relations between them and mobilizing global political momentum. In this connection, regular, open, and targeted exchange, dialogue and negotiation mechanisms on climate and energy should be further explored and utilized to improve mutual understanding. Northeast Asian solutions spill over and solve globallyBrettell, ‘7 – program officer for East Asia with primary responsibility for China at the National Endowment for Democracy (Anna, Security, Energy, and the Environment: the Atmospheric Link, appears in: The Environmental Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation Over Energy, Resources, and Pollution, edited by: In-tʻaek Hyŏn, Miranda Alice Schreurs, US Institute of Peace Press, Google Books, pg 109) Regional cooperation on climate change and energy security should lead to a decrease in the region's overall C02 emissions, which has global significance. Moreover, shared environmental problems can lead to ¶ regional collective action or cooperation, which could increase interde- ¶ pendence, confidence, and trust among nations in the region.81 Coop-erative activities initiated by climate change institutions in the region can contribute to global efforts to combat change and promote greater national participation in global environmental forums than would exist in the absence of these institutions. Already these forums have contrib- ¶ uted to the advancement Of global climate change models, assisted ¶ countries in Asia and the Pacific in preparing for the impacts Of climate ¶ Change, helped raise awareness Of climate change among citizens, and ¶ helped put pressure on nations to take action to reduce emissions that ¶ result in climate change. ¶ CONCLUSION ¶ Nations in the region of Northeast Asia face some of the most challenging and complicated atmospheric pollution problems in the world, ¶ including acid rain, dust storms, and high levels of greenhouse gas ¶ emissions. The negative externalities of these problems affect states in the region and the world. Moreover, none of these problems has reached ¶ its peak. Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now is key to avoid catastrophic collapse Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510, accessed 8-31-14. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6] The impacts of climate change are racist and are falling disproportionately on the global south—they are happening now Butler 09 (Simon, maintains an Australian-based ecosocialist blog devoted to the struggle for a safe climate and an inhabitable planet, 12/4/09, “The racism of climate change” Climate change Social Change) http://climatechangesocialchange.wordpress.com/2009/12/04/the-racism-of-climate-change/ The impacts of climate change are also racist. Or more precisely, dangerous climate change will impact first on those who have done least to cause the problem. That rising sea-levels will soon make many island nations in the Pacific Ocean uninhabitable is just one example of this gross climate injustice. But throughout the global South, the prevailing poverty and underdevelopment will inflame the effects of climate change. A critical issue will be food-security. About 1 billion people are already starving worldwide — almost all in the South. But the United Nation predicts changing weather patterns and water losses caused by global warming could cause a 25% drop world food production by 2050. Many of the business-as-usual solutions to climate change are racist. Carbon offsets are based on the idea that corporations in the rich countries can pay carbon projects in poor countries to make emissions cuts instead. In effect, offsets allow the biggest polluters to export responsibility for cutting greenhouse gases. Critics have decried the system as a new “carbon colonialism”. The fast-growing market in offsets, which makes the carbon stored in forests a valuable commodity, has already led to evictions of tribal peoples from their forests in some countries. A November 23 report by Survival International said the Ogiek hunter-gatherers of Kenya “are being forced from the forests they have lived in for hundreds of years to ‘reverse the ravages’ of global warming”. The biofuels industry is another example of a “response” to climate change that compounds problems for the world’s poorest. Because it uses food to feed cars instead of people, its expansion will worsen climate change-induced food shortages Racism is an ideology that justifies inequality and oppression. It’s not just about hate crimes, vilification and discrimination — although these are very real consequences of racism too. In particular, racism works to make ordinary people in places like Australia to become desensitised to poverty and injustice elsewhere. No one will escape the impacts of global warming. But the rich nations are far better placed to adapt and secure scarce resources for themselves — at least in the short-term. Meanwhile, Oxfam predicts up to 200 million people in the South will be climate refugees by mid-century unless radical action is taken to curb emissions. The governments of the first world will be able to get away with business-as-usual on climate change as long as racist ideas, even subtle ones, prevail. Ending the threat of climate change requires ending the right of the vested interests, primarily the world’s big corporate polluters, from continuing to pollute the planet for profit. Most of all, it’s a struggle to keep all remaining fossil fuels in the ground. This requires a movement of global solidarity. Informed and determined people in each country have to force this change. Racism is one of the biggest barriers to building this kind of movement. Combining radical critique with concrete action to address climate change in the short-term is key to achieve societal transformation Christian Parenti, Professor, Sustainable Development, School for International Training, Graduate Institute, “Climate Change: What Role for Reform?” MONTHLY REVIEW v. 65 n. 11, 4—14, http://monthlyreview.org/2014/04/01/climate-change-role-reform, accessed 4-24-14. These measures could be realistic and effective in the short term. They are not my preferred version of social change, nor do they solve all problems. And achieving even these modest emissions reducing reforms will require robust grassroots pressure. If capitalism can transition off fossil fuels over the next several decades, that will merely buy time to continue struggling on all other fronts; most importantly, on all other fronts of the environmental crisis. The left needs to have credible proposals for dealing with the short-term aspects of the climate crisis as well as having a systematic critique and vision of long-term change. Both should be advocated simultaneously, not pitted against each other. We are compelled by circumstances to operate with multiple timeframes and at multiple scales. Reforms and reformism is an important part of that. Given the state of the left globally, which outside of Latin America is largely in disarray, achieving socialism will take a very long time indeed. Thus, the struggle for climate mitigation and adaptation cannot wait for revolution. 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