No scenario for escalation inevitable incentives for conflict minimization

Deterrence prevents Indo-Pak war.

Now, for the Indian decision to conduct nuclear tests. Pakistan, with covert Chinese help, was in the process of acquiring nuclear capability. The only objective of Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons was to offset the Indian superiority in conventional warfare, so that it could use nuclear threats to prevent a full-scale Indian offensive against itself in case of conflict. The Indian tests, and the resulting deterrent capability, restrains Pakistan from using nuclear threats as it now knows that India will respond in kind. Thus, far from achieving parity for Pakistan, as alleged by some columnists, the nuclear tests have cemented India’s superiority in conventional warfare, by pre-empting Pakistan’s quest for advantage in nuclear warfare. But will deterrence work? Or will it lead to annihilation of mankind? Nuclear deterrence works successfully as it has done for the last 50 years after the erstwhile USSR acquired nuclear capability. Those like CP Bhambhri and Arundhati Roy have regularly ridiculed nuclear deterrence on the ground that it doesn’t guarantee peace. They are correct. It doesn’t. But nothing else does. What nuclear deterrence does achieve is to severely minimise the chances of any country using a nuclear weapon against you, under the knowledge that retaliation will be full and forthcoming. Some analysts contend that nuclear deterrence should also be successful in preventing conventional conflicts. They cite the Kargil conflict as a failure of the deterrence theory. This is not true. Nuclear weapons may not act as a deterrent to traditional warfare. It is to be noted that during the Cold War, the US and the erstwhile USSR were involved in a number of indirect conflicts, as in Afghanistan. The restraint that has been observed by all nuclear weapon states even during times of conflict is a feather in the cap of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Moreover, with all its limitations, nuclear deterrence is the best way, short of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to prevent possible nuclear attacks on a country.

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.4 Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

Korea War

60 years of stability on the Korean peninsula prove war won’t happen -- deterrence checks it.

Kang, ‘10

[David, professor of international relations and business and director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, “Korea’s New Cold War,” 12-31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/koreas-new-cold-war-4653]

However, despite dueling artillery barrages and the sinking of a warship, pledges of “enormous retaliation,” in-your-face joint military exercises and urgent calls for talks, the risk of all-out war on the Korean peninsula is less than it has been at anytime in the past four decades. North Korea didn’t blink, because it had no intention of actually starting a major war. Rather than signifying a new round of escalating tension between North and South Korea, the events of the past year point to something else—a new cold war between the two sides. In fact, one of my pet peeves is the analogies we use to describe the situation between South and North Korea. We often call the situation a “powder keg” or a “tinderbox,” implying a very unstable situation in which one small spark could lead to a huge explosion. But the evidence actually leads to the opposite conclusion: we have gone sixty years without a major war, despite numerous “sparks” such as the skirmishing and shows of force that occurred over the past month. If one believes the situation is a tinderbox, the only explanation for six decades without a major war is that we have been extraordinarily lucky. I prefer the opposite explanation: deterrence is quite stable because both sides know the costs of a major war, and both sides—rhetoric and muscle-flexing aside—keep smaller incidents in their proper perspective. How can this be, when North Korea threatens to use massive retaliation and mentions its nuclear weapons in its rhetoric, and when the South Korean leadership and military is determined to "respond relentlessly" to meet any North Korean provocation? Local skirmishing has stayed local for sixty years. The key issue is whether a local fight could escalate into all-out war, such as North Korea shelling Seoul with artillery or missiles. Such a decision would clearly have to be taken at the top of the North Korean leadership. Especially when tensions are high, both militaries are on high alert and local commanders particularly careful with their actions. Without a clear directive from the top, it is not likely that a commander one hundred kilometers away from the military exercises would make a decision on his own to start shooting at Seoul. For their part, North Korean leaders have not made such a decision in sixty years, knowing that any major attack on Seoul would cause a massive response from the South Korean and U.S. forces and would carry the war into Pyongyang and beyond. After the fighting, North Korea would cease to exist. Thus, while both North and South Korean leaders talk in grim tones about war, both sides have kept the actual fighting to localized areas, and I have seen no indication that this time the North Korean leadership plans to expand the fighting into a general war.

Paki Instability

Crackdowns prevent serious instability.

Bandow 09 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, 11/31/09, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924, MMarcus)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

Won’t escalate -- Paki loose nukes aren’t a threat.

Innocent 10 - foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute (Malou, “Away from McChrystal and Back to the Basics,” Huffington Post, 6/28/10, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11934, MMarcus)

Pakistan has an elaborate command and control system in place that complies with strict Western standards, and the country's warheads, detonators, and missiles are not stored fully-assembled, but are scattered and physically separated throughout the country. In short, the danger of militants seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons in some Rambo-like scenario remains highly unlikely.

More ev.

Simon and Stevenson 09 – adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

The United States' next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties, increasing political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimately weakening them, which would only help al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of this dynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis displaced by the military campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability to handle the Taliban on its own are justified. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jihadists, as noted by Bruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's 60-day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities should not be given short shrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should its activities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban.

South China Sea War

New political moves stabilize South China Sea tensions.

China Daily 6/28 – Chinese news agency (Tan Yingzi, “US to calm disputes over South China Sea,” China Daily, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-06/28/content_15530521.htm) // CB

With friendly tone with Beijing, nation preps for ASEAN summit Coinciding with the decision by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to meet Southeast Asian leaders next month, a senior US official said on Wednesday that the United States must maintain a sound relationship with China for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. On Wednesday, Kurt Campbell, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said "one of the most important things for us at the (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum is to make it clear, particularly to colleagues in ASEAN, that we are committed to a strong, stable and durable relationship with China". "It is our strong determination to make it clear that we want to work with China," Campbell told the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. Clinton and China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi are expected to meet in Cambodia for the ASEAN forum and roll out specific initiatives on humanitarian disaster relief and wildlife protection, Campbell said. Clinton's trip follows a series of recent diplomatic trips by the Obama administration in the Southeast Asia region, with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's trip to Vietnam and a visit by Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Philippines earlier this month. China has overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Campbell said the high-level visits show Washington's long-term commitment to regular engagement in the dynamic economic region. The US is also trying to persuade their European allies into a discussion about Southeast Asian affairs. European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton will be invited to the regional forum for the first time. "One of the areas that is dramatically lacking, in which is the remarkably little discussion or strategic engagement between Europe and US is on Asia," Campbell said. Clinton is also expected to lay out a multifaceted diplomatic approach at the ASEAN forum, including a specific economic initiative for Southeast Asia, though Campbell would not elaborate on details. After the forum, Clinton will take an economic envoy to Siem Reap, Cambodia, to meet business leaders to expand trade ties. Clinton's attendance highlights the challenges Beijing and Washington have been facing on Southeast Asian issues in recent years due to China's growing political and economic influence in Asia and the US' re-engaged diplomatic policy in the region. In 2010, Clinton waded into territorial disputes on the South China Sea by telling a security forum in Vietnam that a peaceful resolution over the Nansha and the Xisha islands were within the US' national interests. Beijing strongly objected at the time, saying Washington was interfering in Asian regional affairs and trying to hype disputes over the South China Sea. On the recent development of disputes between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, Campbell said the US has insisted on not taking a position and supporting current diplomatic efforts. Bonnie Glaser, an Asia-Pacific security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the US does not view relations in the region in zero-sum terms and it is not seeking to force ASEAN members to choose between the world's two largest economies. "Although the US and other media often pin blame on China, I think other claimants of the South China Sea also sometimes behave in provocative or confrontational ways that has generated concern from the US government," she said.

Mutual interests prevent escalation and shutting down SLOCs -- no one will risk it.

Gupta, ‘11

[Rukmani, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, 10-23, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way,” http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/?all=true]

The South China Sea issue – and China’s position on it – have been the subject of much deliberation, especially since the ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Hanoi last July. Indeed, it’s widely believed that the South China Sea will likely emerge as a conflict hotspot in the coming years. Evidence of this can be found in the heated rhetoric exchanged between parties to the dispute – most notably, China, Vietnam and the Philippines. A declaration by the United States that it has a ‘national interest’ in the region, meanwhile, was seen as a commitment to take an active part, much to Chinese chagrin. In recent weeks, statements by Chinese officials reasserting China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea, and warnings for India against investing in the region, are seen as signs of Chinese aggressiveness that could precipitate conflict. Suggestions for greater Indian involvement in the South China Sea disputes are made on the grounds that India must be forceful in its dealings with China. The continuation of ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) investments in Vietnamese energy fields is certainly advisable. In fact, there’s nothing to indicate that the Indian government is thinking otherwise. OVL’s presence in Vietnam isn’t a recent phenomenon. Its first joint venture for offshore oil and natural gas exploration in Vietnam’s Lan Tay field, along with Petro Vietnam and BP, became functional in 2003. Deals for the investments now in the headlines were signed in May 2006; this is a project that won’t be halted because of oblique Chinese statements. But what’s worrying is the suggestion that Indian involvement should extend to taking an active part in the territorial disputes themselves, and that India should actively extend its naval presence – either to protect OVL’s investments or to protect the sea lines of communication. A closer bilateral relationship with Vietnam, Vietnamese rhetoric on the South China Sea disputes and its history of standing up to big powers are offered as the rationale for India to engage and arm Vietnam to win a war in the South China Sea. These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated. It will also be pertinent to remember that the states involved deem the dispute as only one element of larger bilateral relationships. The South China Sea is by no means the only calculus through which smaller countries view their relationship with China. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, for example, has stated that the dispute in the South China Sea is but one aspect of the relationship with China. Vietnam, too, hasn’t let its relationship with China be stymied by the disputes over the South China Sea. The General Secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Beijing this month , with the joint statement issued there stating that the two sides would ‘actively boost co-operation’ in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. It was also agreed that negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be speeded up, military cooperation between China and Vietnam would be strengthened, a hotline between defence ministers established and contacts between high-level officials would be increased. As of July 2011, China, ranking 14th among Vietnam’s foreign investors, had 805 operational projects in Vietnam with a capitalized value of $4.2 billion. Furthermore, China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner since 2004. Bilateral trade between the two was valued at $27 billion in 2010. In the event of military hostilities, the first casualty would be the economic relationship, an outcome both countries are keen to avoid. Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.

No South China Sea conflict.

Joyner 98 – IR professor at Georgetown (Chris, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and Taiwan?, Spring, http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/lawreview/vol32/2/joyner.htm)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

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