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Hegemony Exts - Airspace vulnerable to attack



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Hegemony Exts - Airspace vulnerable to attack




U.S. airspace at risk of attack - detection and traffic control key


Bolkcom 06 (Christopher Bolkcom Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Homeland Security: Defending U.S. Airspace”, 06/06/06, AD: 07/12/12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RS21394.pdf | Kushal)
Effectively protecting U.S. airspace requires detecting threatening aircraft and cruise missiles, making decisions on how to address these threats (called “command and control”, or C2), and negating these threats. On June 9, 2004, a small aircraft carrying the governor of Kentucky flew into restricted airspace around Washington, DC. The misidentified aircraft caused panic among Capitol Hill employees, and two F-15s were scrambled to intercept the aircraft.4 This event suggests that 2½ years after the September 11 attacks, effective defense of U.S. airspace is still in question. Surveillance. Detecting and tracking airborne threats to the United States are complicated by environment and enemy tactics. The large volume of airspace that must be surveyed presents one key environmental challenge. Airspace over the continental United States is estimated at approximately 3 million square miles.5 Enemy tactics could include flying low to the ground, which makes detection difficult, or applying stealth technology, which reduces an aircraft’s vulnerability to radar detection. As the September 11th hijackers demonstrated, turning commercial or civil aircraft into weapons is another tactic that would make threat detection difficult. Command & Control. Expediently identifying airborne threats, and accurately verifying that they are not civilian or friendly military aircraft is a key air defense challenge. The large amount of air traffic within CONUS will likely make separating “friend from foe” difficult. FAA data show that on a given day, over 80,000 distinct domestic commercial aircraft movements (e.g., departures, overflights) take place over These 80,000 aircraft movements do not include international flights, or the approximately 200,000 civil aircraft in the United States that fly some 24 million flight hours annually. Nor does this number include military aircraft that fly within both civilian and military airspace. Air defense C2 over CONUS is further complicated by the fact that decision making will not be a solely military enterprise. Civil entities such as the FAA, and the U.S. Customs Service, and military authorities will require seamless communications and hardware interoperability to make effective decisions.

National airspace is at risk of attack


FAS 07 (“National Strategy for Aviation Security”, 03/26/07, AD: 07/11/12, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-47.pdf | Kushal)

Threats to the Air Domain Threats to the Air Domain are numerous, complex, and adaptive. While conventional military threats in the Air Domain continue and will likely increase in times of international tension or conflict, the greatest current threat, as demonstrated in the Heathrow plot of August 2006 reminds us of the continuing danger, and therefore the focus of the Strategy, is terrorism. Globalization, technological advances, the proliferation of WMD, and the emergence of terrorism as a global phenomenon have enabled threats to the Air Domain to extend in reach, accelerate in speed, and increase in potential impact. Aviation is a global enterprise with a distributed infrastructure and multiple access points. Successful attacks in the Air Domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic damage, and attract significant public attention because of the impact on the modern transportation system. Intelligence on threats to the Air Domain plays a critical role in assessing terrorist groups’ intentions and capabilities and requires regular update and review to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and the international community are taking appropriate measures. However, even the best intelligence will not uncover every specific terrorist plot because of terrorists’ efforts at operational secrecy. Threats focused on the Air Domain can be analyzed in two ways: by originator and by targets and tactics. Threat Originators There are three main originators of threats: terrorist groups; hostile nation-states; and other criminals. Terrorist Groups. Terrorist groups are politically, as well as religiously in some cases, motivated and use premeditated violence, usually against noncombatants, to affect a particular audience. Because of their clear intent to do harm to the United States and its interests, terrorist groups remain the most severe threat to America’s security. Their ultimate goal in the Air Domain is to conduct multiple, simultaneous, catastrophic attacks exploiting the Aviation Transportation System because of its visibility as a symbol of the U.S. global presence and economic influence. In addition, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and other successful or attempted attacks have inspired emulation. The terrorist threat is changing in form and intensity as terrorists’ intentions and capabilities change and countermeasures are instituted. Their techniques are adapting on multiple fronts, including modality of planning, complexity of attack, and style of execution. The type, location, and frequency of terrorist attacks cannot be reliably extrapolated from historical patterns, and therefore current threats must be regularly reassessed. Terrorist groups, best typified by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, pose several threats to the Air Domain. The most prominent threat is physical attack, discussed at greater length in 8 the Targets and Tactics section of the Strategy. Terrorists might also take advantage of the same tactics, techniques, and methods pioneered by criminals to counter immigration, customs, and border security measures to move people and materiel. They might deploy in regions of political and economic instability where aviation law enforcement is stretched thin or readily corruptible, bribe officials, use forged fraudulent documents, and make illegal transactions to hide their true intentions. Terrorists might use unsecured air transportation routes to transport arms, explosives, or operatives clandestinely to safe havens, training sites, or attack-staging locations. Ultimately, terrorists might use these access points and routes to transport more dangerous cargo, including WMD and their associated components. Such threats are particularly worrisome in areas where governments are weak or provide safe haven to terrorists. Hostile Nation-States. While most countries have an explicit interest in being able to operate safely, effectively, and reliably in the Air Domain, some pose threats, either due to actual hostile intent or weak infrastructure safeguards. For example, some countries directly sponsor international terrorism, providing training, funding, supplies, WMD and related components, and operational direction to surrogates. Other nation-states knowingly or unknowingly provide safe havens for terrorists who plan, prepare, or facilitate attacks or deploy materiel or operatives through the Air Domain. Some states have weak command and control over their aviation infrastructure, such as their internal air defenses or airport security apparatus, which terrorists can then exploit. Additionally, nation-states could present a military threat, such as cruise missiles, to the United States and U.S. interests globally in the Air Domain. Criminals. Criminals, including individuals and groups, use the Air Domain to pursue objectives that are illegal under U.S. law or international convention. Domestic extremists in the United States have not, to date, engaged in organized efforts to attack the Aviation Transportation System. However, there are potentially violent domestic groups and individuals who have extensive knowledge of the aviation sector coupled with a demonstrated expertise in manufacturing and employing targeted-attack techniques, including improvised or conventional explosive devices.

Only NextGen can successfully integrate UAV systems into civilian airspace


Defense Update 09 (Online Defense Magazine, “Operating UAVs in Crowded, Integrated Airspace”, 2009, AD: 07/10/12, http://defense-update.com/features/2009/july/uav_in_civil_airspace_040709.html | Kushal)

UAVs will soon fly with manned aircraft in commercial airspacesays avid Vos, Senior Director Control Technologies at Rockwell Collins.¶ “The growing demand for unmanned systems among military and government users is motivating the industry and government to find the ways to integrate manned and unmanned assets to operate safely in a common airspace” Vos added. UAV operations have grown in this decade from 167 systems operated by the military in 2001 only 167 UAVs operated mainly by the military and government in 2001 to 5,500 flying today. “Today, many UAVs are already flying in an airspace crowded by manned aircraft. ”Vos noted. An example for such integration is the airspace around Balad airbase in Iraq, where military helicopters, fixed wing military aircraft, commercial passenger aircraft, FedEx and UPS cargo planes are flying alongside unmanned aircraft, such as the Global Hawk, Predator and Hunter UAVs, performing 20-30 daily sorties from the airbase.¶ ¶ Although integration of UAVs in Civil Controlled Airspace is not yet cleared in standard regulations, unmanned aircraft are already supporting civilian emergency operations as well. In recent years UAVs were flying missions inside civilian airspace in the USA, monitoring disaster areas and emergency operations along the Red River flood area in North Dakota, surveying hurricane damage along the Gulf of Mexico, spotting fires in the Southern California mountains, surveying the Arctic and assisting police operations on a pilot test program in Los Angeles.¶ ¶ Vos was the founder of Athena Technologies acquired by Rockwell Collins last year. “Compared to the early unmanned systems, which hade limited situational awareness and poor safety record, today’s aerial vehicles are designed with high level of redundancy – dual, triplex and even quad redundant systems are currently available” Vos said. In addition, aviation certified engines, advanced, affordable integrated avionics that can offer automated takeoff, landing and mission control. “Automatic landing provides an essential element to another safety feature – a ‘Panic Button Emergency Landing’ enabling operators to safely abort a mission over populated area, without risk to the surrounding area” Noted Vos. After being implemented and proven in UAVs, Vos expects such essential capability could be introduced back into manned aircraft, to improve flight safety and avoid collateral damage on the ground, in case of emergency. Other elements contributing to UAV flight safety are advanced sensors offering better situational awareness; in the near future, structure damage fault tolerance will become reality, enabling a UAV to recover from bird strikes and in-flight failures.¶ ¶ According to Vos, once UAVs can automatically takeoff, land and perform emergency procedures enabling them to safely fly in civil airspace, their integration into the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is required. While future NextGen ATM will support such integration, the platforms should have the means to maintain situational awareness, adherence to flight control, rules and procedures and is key to maintain flight safety. These capabilities can be supported today in the larger platforms, that have enough space and power capacity to operate communications, datalinks, IFF and 4D navigational equipment, as well as built-in capabilities to perform collision avoidance, due regard and weather radar.



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