Coding of potential substate conflict contagion cases for whether actual contagion occurred
Introductory note: Substate conflicts in State B are considered in turn; potential State As are listed in parentheses. Where actual substate conflict contagion is identified, it is noted as “State A State B, Year” and then a brief discussion of the nature of the contagion follows. The absence of contagion between a given State A and State B is also noted, generally when corroborated by at least three secondary sources. Finally, wherever possible, confirmation of the codings of non-contagion by an area expert is noted.
Example:
State B, Year (vs. Name of Rebel Group – State A could be State 1 or State 2)
-
State 1 State B, Year. “After falling to Communist insurgency, State 1 sponsored a rebellion in State B.” (Source citation 1). No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 1).
-
No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 2).
-
No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 3).
-
Hence I will code no contagion from State 2 to State B, pending confirmation from (Source 1 author). (Source 1 author) confirms in (date) e-mail.
United States, 2001 (vs. Al Qaeda – State A could be Mexico)
-
I can code this as non-contagion without consulting any sources; the Chiapas rebellion had nothing to do with 9/11.
Dominican Republic, 1965 (vs. “Military Faction” – State A could be Cuba)
-
Cuba Dominican Republic, 1965. The 1965 revolt was a “counter-coup” against a 1963 coup that had removed Juan Bosch, a left-leaning (but seemingly not Castro-influenced) politician (Jose Antonio Moreno, Sociological Aspects of the Dominican Revolution (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), p. 19). Among the groups that joined up with the counter-coup initially were “Castro/Communists” (John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 672-673). These were groups influenced by and often trained by Castro (A.J. Thomas, Jr. and Ann van Wynen Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Background Paper and Proceedings of the Ninth Hammarskjold Forum (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1967), pp. 3-5). So the revolution in Cuba was a contributing, though seemingly not primary, cause of the 1965 rebellion.
Trinidad and Tobago, 1990 (vs. Jamiat al-Muslimeen – State A could be Haiti)
-
UCDP conflict summary1 on Trinidad and Tobago has no mention of Haiti.
-
In a book-length interview of the coup leader, Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, there is no mention of Haiti as a contributor to the coup’s onset (Maximilian Christian Forte, Against the Trinity: An Insurgent Imam Tells His Story (Religion, Politics and Rebellion in Trinidad and Tobago) (Binghamton, N.Y.: Polaris-Australis Publishing Company, 1997).
-
Also no mention of Haiti in Sunday Advocate, “Special Report: The Agony of Trinidad,” August 5, 1990.
-
Also no mention of Haiti in Chris Searle, “The Muslimeen Insurrection in Trinidad,” Race Class, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991): 29-43.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Haiti to Trinidad and Tobago. Forte confirms in 2/5/10 e-mail.
Mexico, 1994 (vs. EZLN – State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua or Panama)
-
Guatemala Mexico, 1994. Between 1970 and 1990, between 60,000 and 300,000 Guatemalan refugees “moved across the border during the civil conflicts in that country” (Philip Howard and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Case of Chiapas, Mexico,” in Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Security (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 22, 26-27). These refugees contributed to a near-tripling of the indigenous population in Chiapas over that period, from 288,000 to 716,000 (ibid). Population growth caused “demand-induced scarcity,” which contributed to “resource capture” and “ecological marginalization,” increasing “grievances” and contributing to the onset of the rebellion (ibid, 49-50). No mention of the other potential State As in this chapter.
-
UNDP entry on Mexico has no mention of any potential State As.
-
No mention of any potential State As in Andrew Reding, “Chiapas is Mexico: The Imperative of Political Reform,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994): 11-25.
-
El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama do not appear in the index of George A. Collier with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas, Third Edition (Oakland, Calif.: Food First Books, 2005).
-
Hence I will code no contagion from El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Panama to Mexico. Howard confirms in 2/7/10 e-mail.
Guatemala, 1949 (vs. “Military faction” – State A could be Costa Rica)
-
No mention of Costa Rica in the following sources:
-
Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 11-12.
-
Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984), pp. 111-112.
-
Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 25.
-
Peter Calvert, Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 35, 76-77.
-
Piero Gleijeses, “The Death of Francisco Arana: A Turning Point in the Guatemalan Revolution,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1990): 527-552.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Costa Rica to Guatemala, pending confirmation from Gleijeses. Gleijeses tells me by e-mail on 2/4/10 to read chapters in Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. Pages 51-69 (some pages missing in Google Books) have no mention of Costa Rica. 42 Costa Rica references in the book, none near these pages. Search for “Guardia de Honor” Costa Rica turns up no results.
Guatemala, 1965 (vs. FAR I – State A could be Cuba)
-
Cuba Guatemala, 1965. “Inspired by the Cuban revolution in 1959, left-wing guerrilla groups started to take form in Guatemala in the 1960s as a response to a combination of effectively military governments and the continuation of a highly unequal form of land-ownership.” (UCDP conflict summary on Guatemala)
El Salvador, 1972 (vs. forces of Benjamin Mejia – State A could be Guatemala)
-
No discussion of inspiration or support from Guatemala in coup synopsis in James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador (London: Verso, 1983), p. 86. (In fact, Guatemalan government supported El Salvador government.)
-
No discussion of involvement in Guatemala in coup synopsis in Richard A. Haggarty, ed., El Salvador: A Country Study (Washington: Library of Congress, 1988), “The 1972 Elections.”
-
No discussion either in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of Revolution, Second Edition (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 62-64.
-
No discussion either in Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1988), p. 77
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by e-mail, 2/4/10, though he says, “The 1972 coup might have a number of indirect influences bearing in on it, including Honduras (don’t forget the war of 1969), Guatemala and Nicaragua.” To me that’s not really sufficient to code contagion.
-
Checked for Cuba El Salvador contagion if Cuba is added as a State A from 1968 to 1974. Based on Dunkerley, Armstrong/Shenk, and Anderson, there was no actual contagion.
El Salvador, 1979 (vs. ERP, FPL, FMLN – State A could be Guatemala or Nicaragua)
-
Nicaragua El Salvador, 1979/1981 (1981 was the year of the civil war onset in El Salvador).
-
1979: Anderson, Politics in Central America, 85: 1979 coup, which started the war, appears to have been supported by U.S., which did so to avoid another leftist victory like the one that had just taken place in Nicaragua (Armstrong and Shenk, 110: “The administration had ‘lost another country. El Salvador would pay the price”; 113: “Now the State Department was abuzz with plans to avoid ‘another Nicaragua’ by saving El Salvador.”). Dunkerley, The Long War, 126: “In El Salvador the Sandinista victory had an immediate effect; slogans appeared in the streets of the capital declaring, ‘Somoza today – Romero tomorrow.’ However, the regime had been losing its grip long before July [1979].” No mention of Guatemala in Dunkerley.
-
1981: As discussed at length in Chapter 4, the Nicaraguan regime was a critical enabler of the FMLN as it launched its “Final Offensive,” resulting in the Salvadoran civil war onset, in January 1981.
-
Cuba El Salvador, 1981. As discussed in Chapter 4 (see the section on Nicaragua to El Salvador), Cuba was another pivotal sponsor of the FMLN in the months leading up to January 1981.
-
No mention of Guatemala in brief account of 1979 coup in Elizabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 66.
-
Armstrong and Shenk, El Salvador, 66: Carpio, who founded the FPL, “stud[ied] the lessons of Latin America’s guerilla movements” before founding the party in 1972. But no specific mention of Guatemala, Nicaragua, or 1979. 106-113: No apparent involvement in these pages either. [Interestingly, Carpio explicitly rejected the Cuban foco model.]
-
No discussion of either Guatemala or Nicaragua in UCDP conflict summary on El Salvador.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by e-mail, 2/4/10.
Nicaragua, 1978 (vs. FSLN – State A could be Guatemala)
-
Cuba Nicaragua, 1978. The original founding of the FSLN in 1961 drew “inspiration … from the Cubans” (Eduardo Crawley, Nicaragua in Perspective, Revised Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 128). The Cuban government also directly assisted the FSLN throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although aid did not intensify until late 1978, after the civil war onset in Nicaragua (John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 133; Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 78-80).
-
No mention of Guatemala in UCDP conflict summary, although “The [FSLN] coalition had diplomatic support from France and various Latin American regimes within the OAS.”
-
No mention of Guatemala in Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 29-42.
-
No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Crawley, pp. 148-168.
-
No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Richard R. Fagen, “Dateline Nicaragua: The End of the Affair,” Foreign Policy, No. 36 (1979): 178-191.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Guatemala to Nicaragua. Confirmed by Walker, 2/5/10.
Panama, 1989 (vs. forces of Moisés Giroldi– State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua)
-
No mention of involvement of any of these states in the onset of the Giroldi coup in UCDP conflict summary. (Nicaragua did support the Panamanian government militarily, but as far as I can tell did not get directly involved in this conflict.)
-
These states are not linked to the Giroldi coup in Robert C. Harding, The History of Panama (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), pp. 103-113. The U.S. definitely helped Giroldi but seems not to have directly influenced the onset of the coup.
-
No mention of these states in Peter M. Sanchez, Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Canal (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), p. 170. Does note U.S. reticence about Giroldi: “U.S. troops in Panama did not seal off road access to the [Panama Defense Force general staff] headquarters, even though Giroldi had previously urged SOUTHCOM to do so. … The major was a Torrijista, and Washington feared that the PDF would continue its nationalist stance sans Noriega.”
-
No mention of these states in Russell Crandall, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 198-199.
-
No mention of these states in Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story, Second Edition (New York: Touchstone, 1992), pp. 194-206 (some pages missing in Google Books, though).
-
Hence I will code no contagion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua to Panama. Buckley confirms in 2/9/10 e-mail.
Colombia, 1964 (vs. FARC and ELN – State A could be Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela)
-
Cuba Colombia, 1964. “The new movements were primarily children of their times. As elsewhere in Latin America, … the Cuban revolution made a big impact on the small group of left-wing students. They were impressed by the way in which, in a little over two years, a tiny band of guerillas had taken power in a small Caribbean island, and the belief that a revolutionary situation existed in Colombia soon took root among the urban radicals. … Fabio Vasquez and a small group of mostly student activists were strongly influenced by Cuba … when, after receiving basic military training in Havana, they set up the Army of National Liberation (ELN) in 1964.” (Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin America Bureau, 1990), p. 165) No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role.
-
No mention of Argentina or Venezuela in Geoff Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI, 2004).
-
No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Forrest Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia (London: Verso, 2006).
-
No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2001).
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina or Venezuela to Colombia. Pearce goes back and forth in a 3/8/10 e-mail but seems to agree, saying she has “no direct evidence” of links and that the Argentine/Venezuelan conflicts were very different from the Colombian one. She suggests contacting “Leon Valencia, an ex-ELN member who now runs the Funcacion Arco Iris in Bogota,” which I will do if I decide to start interviewing insurgents (I need to think about how to approach them strategically).
Venezuela, 1962 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Cuba)
-
Cuba Venezuela, 1962. The navy coups (there were two) were part of a broader leftist insurgency in early 1960s Venezuela. There were two major leftist parties in Venezuela at the time, PCV and MIR – both of which were linked to the navy faction in Carupano. MIR leftists adhered to “Castro-Communism,” at least initially, and “admitted to being influenced by the success of the Cuban Revolution” (H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. Frederick, The History of Venezuela (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 107-109; Brian F. Crisp, “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela,” in John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156; see also Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 15-16).
Venezuela, 1982 (vs. Bandera Roja – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Peru)
-
Colombia Venezuela, 1982. One source of tension between the Colombian and Venezuelan states was “the appearance of the guerilla group ‘Bandera Roja’ (and their supposed link with the Colombian ELN)” (Raul F. Torres Aguilera, Venezuela and Colombia: Border Security Issues (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), p. 42). No mention of Argentina or Peru.
-
According to the UCDP conflict summary on Venezuela, “Bandera Roja emerged around 1970, when it split from MIR which at that time abandoned its revolutionary struggle and became a regular political party. Led by Carlos Betancourt and Gabriel Puerta Aponte, Bandera Roja wanted to overthrow the government and establish communist rule. Reportedly, it had links to the Cuban government as well as to other leftist guerrilla groups in Latin America, such as M-19 in Colombia. During the 1970s, Bandera Roja clashed sporadically with security forces. It also carried out high-profile kidnappings as a strategy to gain attention and as a source of revenue. In 1981, it was speculated that the group was behind a spectacular coordinated hijacking of three domestic aircraft carried out on 7 December, which ended with the hostages being released and the captors being taken into custody on Cuba. The conflict between Bandera Roja and the government of Venezuela became active in 1982, as the authorities conducted a crackdown against the guerrilla group, causing over 25 deaths.” No mention of Argentina or Peru.
-
Could be Cuba Venezuela, 1982 contagion, but a CIA report says of the 1981 Bandera Roja hijacking incident, “Eleven gunmen hijacked three Venezuelan airliners on domestic flights, ultimately diverting them to Havana. … Their demands, which included a ransom of $10 million and release of seven Venezuelan political prisoners, were not met. They were taken into custody by Cuban authorities.” (Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorist Skyjackings: A Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 1982,” July 1982, declassified, available online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53824134/Terrorist-Skyjackings-A-CIA-Report, p. 3). Sounds like Havana was no longer supporting Bandera Roja at conflict onset, and support in 1970 leading to onset in 1982 is too tenuous to be considered contagion.
-
No mention of Argentina or Peru in Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Venezuela: A Country Study (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 208.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina or Peru to Venezuela in 1982, pending confirmation from Gott.
Venezuela, 1992 (vs. Forces of Hugo Chavez – State A could be Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, or Suriname)
-
No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of any potential State As in H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. Frederick, The History of Venezuela (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 141-145.
-
No mention of any potential State As in Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 35-80.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname to Venezuela in 1992, pending confirmation from Gott.
Suriname, 1986 (vs. SLA/Jungle Commando – State A could be Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela)
-
No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of any potential State As in H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, “The Maroon Insurgency: Anthropological Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname,” in Gary Brana-Shute, ed., Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname: Old and New (Williamsburg, Va.: Studies in Third World Societies, College of William and Mary, 1990, pp. 159-188).
-
No mention of any potential State As in Scott B. Macdonald, “Insurrection and Redemocratization in Suriname? The Ascendancy of the ‘Third Path,’” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1988): 105-132.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela to Suriname. Macdonald confirms in 3/11/10 e-mail.
Peru, 1965 (vs. ELN/MIR – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, or Cuba)
-
Cuba Peru, 1965. UCDP conflict summary says: “The major leftist political party, APRA …, moved toward the right in an attempt to create coalitions that would enable it to gain political power. Alienated by this shift and inspired by the Cuban revolution, many members split from APRA and formed new, more radical groups. One of these people was Luis de la Puente, who formed MIR … in 1962. ELN … emerged from a similar split in the PCP …, also in 1962. … The two guerilla groups began their armed struggle in 1965.” No mention of other potential State As.
-
No mention of the other potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 227.
-
“Presumably the Bolivian revolution made a great impact on de la Puente, who was jailed … in 1954 for attempting to foment a similar revolution in Peru” (Leon G. Campbell, “The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerilla Movement, 1960-1965,” Latin American Research Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1973): 45-70, p. 52. Suggests a weak Bolivia Peru link (outside the scope of the dataset), but no direct mention of the role of the other potential State As.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 1965, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10.
Peru, 1982 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela)
-
No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New York: Facts on File, 2004), pp. 236-242
-
No mention of potential State As in Orrin Starn, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, eds., The Peru Reader: History, Culture Politics, Second Edition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 319-321.
-
No mention of potential State As in David Scott Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1986): 127-146.
-
In David M. Burns, The Evolution of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: A Topical Analysis (M.A. Thesis, Texas Technical University, 1987), there is a mention of M-19 (Colombia) training Sendero recruits (p. 39), but no mention of Colombia’s link to the origins of the conflict nor of any other State As.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 1982, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10.
Peru, 2007 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Colombia)
-
Colombia Peru, 2007. “On October 9, 2008, the group launched its most violent attack in a decade, killing 13 soldiers and two civilians. Further attacks have followed, resulting in 33 deaths and 43 injured soldiers. These attacks have led to a reevaluation by the military of its tactics and of Sendero’s strength. … The military also says the guerrilla group is better armed than previously thought. Sources for their weapons include … possibly … the Colombian guerrilla group [FARC]” (Maureen Taft-Morales, “Peru: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 21, 2009, p. 9).
Bolivia, 1952 (vs. MNR – State A could be Paraguay)
-
No mention of Paraguay in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
-
No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Waltraud Queiser Morales, Bolivia: Land of Struggle (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), although some radicalization did occur in Paraguayan POW camps during the interstate Chaco War (p. 67).
-
No mention of Paraguay’s role in 1952 uprising in Robert J. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of its Politics (New York: Praeger, 1982).
-
Hence I will code
Share with your friends: |
