Online appendix for "When Have Violent Civil Conflicts Spread? Introducing a Dataset of Substate Conflict Contagion"

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  No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 119-120. (Leader was a Marxist, but no mention of China.)
  
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  No mention of potential State As’ contribution to Darul Islam conflict in Bilveer Singh, “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004): 47-68.
  
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  No mention of potential State A conflicts in Liem Soei Liong, “Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988): 869-896.
  
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  Hence I will code no contagion from China, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to Indonesia in 1953, pending confirmation from Singh.
  

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  No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Peter King, West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), pp. 20-22.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Peter Savage and Rose Martin, “The OPM in West Papua New Guinea: The Continuing Struggle Against Indonesian Colonialism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1977): 338-346. Inspiration from Cuba is noted (pp. 342-343), but in the late 1970s, so no clear link to 1965 onset.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Carmel Budiardjo, “West Papua: Under the Indonesian Jackboot,” Human Rights Defender, No. 6 (1996).
  
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  Hence I will code no contagion from China, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South Vietnam to Indonesia in 1965, pending confirmation from King. King confirms in 6/19/10 e-mail.
  

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  No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, although FRETILIN was allegedly communist.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 167. The accusations of FRETILIN communism seems to be an Indonesian façade to justify invasion to the U.S.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor (Sydney: Otford Press, 2002), pp. 59-174. Does note: “The U.S. defeat in Indochina was quoted as evidence that independence can be won even against apparently invincible forces” (p. 129), but this refers to the interstate conflict in Vietnam, not the intrastate one. Indonesian suspicions of FRETILIN communism actually seem pretty unwarranted, and in any case the fear is probably more related to Indonesia’s own troubles with communism than to communism abroad. Quite a bit of inspiration from extrastate conflicts in Portuguese Africa.
  
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  No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, Third Edition (Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books, 2003).
  
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  Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to Indonesia in 1975, pending confirmation from Hill.
  

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  Based on UCDP conflict summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. Seemingly OPM was active in the early 1970s.
  

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  Cambodia  Indonesia, 1990. “Marijuana is sold to obtain weapons not only from Cambodia and Thailand but also from individuals in the Indonesian security forces.” (Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 28) No mention of other potential State As. Arms came from Thailand too, but the CPT conflict ended in 1982, and Schulze in his e-mail (cited below) says the Thai arms were “new” and “from the Thai military,” seemingly unrelated to the CPT conflict.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995), pp. 52-82. Bases in Malaysia are noted (p. 73), but these appear unrelated to communist insurgencies in Malaysia.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Geoffrey Robinson, “Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,” Indonesia, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157.
  
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  Hence I will code no contagion from Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines to Indonesia in 1990, pending confirmation from Schulze. Schulze more or less confirms in 6/20/10 e-mail, noting only the possibility of “some” weapons coming from the southern Philippines via Thailand.
  

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  Based on the following quote, I do not believe this is a legitimate re-onset: “By 1991, GAM had been virtually wiped out in Aceh. Three factors, however, ensured the organization’s survival. First, its leadership was safe in exile where it continued to make its case for independence. Second, a significant number of GAM members including military commanders found safe haven in neighboring Malaysia where GAM continued to exist as an insurgent movement among the refugees and supported by the Acehnese diaspora. And third, the DOM experience [Indonesian repression up to 1998] gave rise to a whole new generation of GAM. Almost every Acehnese family in Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh was represented among the victims, and when after the fall of Suharto nothing was done to address Acehnese demands for justice, this ensured that GAM not only reemerged but was transformed into a genuinely popular movement in the third and current phase from 1998 onward.” (Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 5)
  
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    Also: “By late 1991 it appeared that government troops had largely succeeded in crushing the rebellion, and in killing most of its top leaders, but Aceh Merdeka supporters continued to menace Indonesian forces thereafter.” (Geoffrey Robinson, “Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,” Indonesia, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157, p. 131)
    

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  No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in Anthony J. Regan, “Current Developments in the Pacific: Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict,” Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1998): 269-285.
  
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  No mention of potential State As in David Hegarty, “Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands,” State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper No. 3 (2003), p. 4.
  
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  No mention of potential State A conflicts in Herb Thompson, “The Economic Causes and Consequences of the Bougainville Crisis,” Resources Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991): 69-85.
  
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  Hence I will code no contagion from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Papua New Guinea, pending confirmation from Regan.
  

List of exceptions made to UCDP/PRIO conflict list: The China 1946 onset is excluded, as it is inaccurately coded (the insurgency involving the People’s Liberation Army began long before 1946); the Azerbaijan 1992 onset is excluded, as this was merely the continuation of the Soviet Union 1990 intrastate conflict (over Nagorno-Karabakh); the Azerbaijan 2005 onset is excluded, as I did not find it corroborated anywhere outside the UCDP/PRIO dataset; the Equatorial Guinea 1979 onset is excluded, as it was subsequently determined by UCDP/PRIO to not rise to the 25-death threshold; the Niger 1994 onset is excluded, as it appears to be a simple continuation of the Niger 1991 conflict; the Ethiopia 1989 onset is excluded, as it cannot be corroborated; in its place, I have added a 1996 onset in Ethiopia versus the ARDUF; the India 1992 onset is excluded, as it appears to be an uninterrupted continuation of the Nagaland insurgency (from 1956); the Burma onsets in 1992 and 2005 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the Karenni insurgency (from 1957); the Burma onsets in 1990 and 1996 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the Mon insurgency (from 1949); the Malaysia onsets in 1958, 1974 and 1981 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the communist extra-state conflict with the United Kingdom (from 1948); the Philippines onsets in 1946 and 1969 are excluded, as they appear to be the essentially uninterrupted continuations of the communist insurgency (from 1942); and the Indonesia onsets in 1976 and 1999 are excluded, as they appear to be the uninterrupted continuations of the West Papua insurgency (from 1965) and the Aceh insurgency (from 1990), respectively. Also, South Vietnam is coded as having a civil war until 1975, not 1964.