no contagion from Angola or Mozambique to Comoros in 1997, pending confirmation from Alwahti.
Morocco 1971 (vs. forces of Mohamed Madbouh – State A could be Chad)
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No mention of Chad in C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 330-332. Does note (p. 332): “The blame was laid on Arab nationalists, inspired by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. In fact, most senior officers were Berbers, trying to protect their positions.”
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No mention of Chad in King Hassan II (Anthony Rhodes, trans.), The Challenge (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 147-151.
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Without a third source, I will code no contagion from Chad to Morocco in 1971, pending confirmation from Pennell. Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.
Morocco 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Chad or Mauritania)
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No mention of Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against Moroccan and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish withdrawal); I don’t really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the same conflict. (Assistance from Algeria noted, but onset was pre-1991.)
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No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983).
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No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).
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No mention of Chad’s contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad or Mauritania to Morocco in 1975, pending confirmation from Pennell (see just above – talks about this conflict pp. 337-342, also no mention of Chad). Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.
Algeria 1991 (vs. Takfir wa’l Hijra – State A could be Morocco, Mali, Niger, or Chad)
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Afghanistan Algeria, 1991. See below.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Does note: “When it comes to the various rebel groups, it is more difficult to establish both sender and exact recipient of the support, as much of it has been given clandestinely. What is certain is that a number of Islamic organizations, e.g. the Islamic Relief Organization, at times have made economic contributions to AIS and that Sudan supplied GIA with arms in the late 1990s [post-onset].”
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Does note (p. 63): “For young FIS sympathizers the violence experienced by their neighborhood in Les Eucalyptus was comparable with that in the city of Hama in Syria [1979], which symbolized the martyrdom of the Islamist Cause at the hands of an ‘impious’ state power.” Describes state of affairs in 1993, and seems like a bit of a stretch besides.
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On Takfir wa’l Hijra, “That small group included ‘Afghans’ (Algerians said to have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan), and its ideological affiliation was of Egyptian origin.” (p. 21, note 7) Suggests Afghanistan Algeria contagion, though only through a possibly marginal manpower contribution.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997) Does note: “Mostly composed of Islamic veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, these militants, known popularly in Algeria as ‘Afghanis,’ have formed groups like the GIA and the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA).” (p. 5) GIA did not emerge until later in the conflict (c. 1993); MIA again seems pretty small. So again I’d consider these influences to be marginal, but I should ask. Also notes influence of “Islamist radicals inspired by their brethren in Egypt and elsewhere” on nascent rebellion in 1980s (p. 83). Egypt itself didn’t have a conflict until 1983, but suggests the Syria 1979 conflict (vs. Muslim Brotherhood) had some impact on Algeria 1991. (Too vague to count as contagion.)
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No mention of potential State As in John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 247-265. However, notes that the MIA was actually a fairly sizable insurgent group (p. 263), suggesting Afghanistan Algeria contagion is genuine.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Morocco, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Algeria, pending confirmation from Ruedy.
Tunisia, 1980 (vs. Résistance Armée Tunisienne – State A could be Morocco, Chad, or Mauritania)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson, ed., Tunisia: A Country Study, Third Edition (Washington: Foreign Area Studies Series, American University, 1988), pp. 64-68, 269, 271, 273. Libya apparently supported the uprising, but Libya has not had a violent substate conflict.
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No mention of potential State As in Kenneth J. Perkins, Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 151-153, 159.
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No mention of potential State As in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Politicization of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 36-38. Notes the rebels were “backed by Algerian and Libyan intelligence” (p. 38), but neither state was in conflict at the time.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Mauritania, or Morocco to Tunisia, pending confirmation from Perkins.
Sudan, 1963 (vs. Anya Nya – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo or Ethiopia)
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No mention of either potential State A in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 21-35. Does note (p. 31): “By modern standards, the first years of the war were very modestly conducted. The guerillas were knit together very loosely and had no external military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols, or through the defection of Southern police or soldiers. Ironically, the Anya Nya obtained their first substantial quantity of military hardware only after the 1964 overthrow of Abbud, and then only through the unwitting generosity of the Sudanese government. The transitional government which replaced Abbud adopted a more interventionist foreign policy in the region and, along with other Arab states, supported the Simba movement in neighboring Congo. Shipments of weapons sent overland through Sudan to the Simbas fell into Anya Nya hands.”
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Scopas S. Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 145-168. Again the Simbas in Congo provided arms, but from 1964 on.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 125-141.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo or Ethiopia to Sudan in 1963, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail.
Sudan, 1971 (vs. Sudanese Communist Party – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Uganda)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Scopas S. Poggo, The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 176. I suppose the Congo rebels’ support for the southern war from 1964 on allowed the war in the south to continue, composing one of the grievances of the coup? Seems like a stretch.
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No mention of potential State As in Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. 148.
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No mention of potential State As in Edgar O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 60-67.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Uganda to Sudan in 1971, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail.
Sudan, 1983 (vs. SPLM/A – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, or Uganda)
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Ethiopia Sudan, 1983. “In 1976, … a Sudanese government delegation to Ethiopia … was told quite explicitly by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that unless the Sudan ceased supplying the Eritrean rebels, Ethiopia would give active support to the Anya Nya remnants in Ethiopia who had refused to accept the Addis Ababa agreement. Nimairi’s support for the Eritreans, and subsequently for anti-Derg forces, continued despite this warning. Ethiopia’s support for various Sudanese dissidents dates from 1976. … The SPLA [had an] early dependence on Mengistu’s government.” (Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 59-60) No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset.
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No specific mention of State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Ethiopia’s Mengistu government aided the SPLM/A, but seemingly not as a result of any conflict (the 1974 coup that brought Mengistu to power was bloodless). Refugees from Ethiopia may have influenced the 1983 rebellion, but not enough detail is given.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia) in John Young, “Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias, and Peace,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97 (2003): 423-434.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Somalia, or Uganda to Sudan in 1983, pending confirmation from Johnson. Johnson confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail.
Iran, 1966 (vs. KDPI – State A could be Iraq, Israel, or Syria)
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Iraq Iran, 1966. “The KDPI did, nonetheless, succeed until 1966 in providing significant aid and manpower to Barzani’s KDP revolt in Iraq. The Shah might have even tolerated such assistance. … By 1966, however, he shrewdly decided to provide more aid to Barzani than that offered by the KDPI. By doing this, the Shah made the Iraqi Kurds more dependent upon him than the KDPI, after which he convinced Barzani to help him suppress the KDPI as the price for his support. Opportunistically, Barzani complied by demanding that Iranian Kurds cease opposition to the Shah. … Such a ridiculous framing of the issue led many to end their support of Barzani and return home to fight the Shah. In 1967 a dissident group within the KDPI (among those who had been forced out of Iraqi Kurdistan by Barzani) launched a guerilla offensive in Iran.” (David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 231-232) No mention of Israel or Syria.
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1966 Kurdistan conflict is not mentioned in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Israel or Syria in Mir Zohair Hussein and Stephen Shumock, “Kurdish Ethnonationalism: A Concise Overview,” in Santosh C. Saha, ed., Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction? (Oxford, U.K.: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 280.
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Hence (though missing a third source) I will code no contagion from Israel or Syria to Iran in 1966, pending confirmation from Romano. Romano confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail.
Iran, 1979 (vs. MEK, KDPI and APCO [three different incompatibilities] – State A could be Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, or Syria)
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MEK
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Israel Iran, 1979. UCDP conflict summary: “The group’s potential for violence was developed as members were sent to train in PLO camps in Lebanon and Jordan.” This was seemingly prior to the outbreak of the 1975 conflict in Lebanon (so Lebanon is not itself a sender). No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Nicole Cafarella, Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) Dossier (Center for Policing Terrorism, 2005). Significant support from Iraq under Saddam Hussein, but not related to any of the Iraqi substate conflicts.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Connor Norris, “Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK),” unpublished paper (available on Google Scholar), July 27, 2008.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Haggay Ram, “Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992): 426-439.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Israel) in Michael Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” Front Page Magazine, January 13, 2006.
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KDPI
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 233-238.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 107-114. KDPI leader looked to “the recent Iraqi Kurdish insurrection” and “hoped for support” from the KDP, but this was after a conventional armed confrontation with the Iranian state went badly in August 1979 (pp. 112-113).
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APCO
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Iraq Iran, 1979. “Soon after the revolution, Iran stopped effectively patrolling its border with Iraqi Kurdistan, permitting KDP forces to reorganize. In response, Iraq began supporting rebellion by Arab groups in the largely Arab-speaking and oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan.” (James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 84)
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No mention of other potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No additional information on this conflict available on Google Scholar.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, or Syria to Iran in 1979, pending confirmation from Ervand Abrahamian (a historian cited by Rubin). Abrahamian confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail (says Amal had links to Revolutionary Guard, but that is not one of the conflicts here).
Turkey, 1984 (vs. PKK – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, or Syria)
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Israel Turkey, 1984. “In September 1980 Ocalan settled in Damascus and, with Syrian government help, established training camps in the Bekaa Valley, where Syrian and Palestinian officers trained his followers.” (Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) Again raises the question of whether “Syrian government help” was related to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict; I suspect not (why would the Syrian state want to take down a secular regime in Turkey as a result of their conflict with Islamists?). No mention of other potential State As.
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Iraq Turkey, 1984. “From 1982 onwards, the Iran-Iraq war gave Kurdish organizations in northern Iraq … a free hand. … Relations between the Marxist PKK and Barzani’s conservative [KDP] were never very cordial, but the latter nevertheless allowed Ocalan’s followers to operate from [KDP]-controlled areas south of the Iraqi-Turkish border.” (Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Iraqi Kurdish support in late 1980s/early 1990s, but this was seemingly post-onset.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Sina Aksin (Dexter H. Mursaloglu, trans.), Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 286-287. Syrian support for PKK appears to be post-onset and unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 49-54. Notes (p. 50) “Syria was happy to provide the insurgents with refuge and allow them to organize on its own territory and in Lebanon, hoping to cultivate a political lever in its dealings with Turkey.” The “dealings” appear to be over water, hence totally unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict. Also notes (p. 50): “By 1983, the PKK also moved into Iraqi and Iranian territory, having reached an agreement of cooperation with Masoud Barzani’s [KDP] in northern Iraq.” Was the Iranian connection tied to Barzani or to the KDPI? (No; see below)
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No mention of Iran’s, Lebanon’s or Syria’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Michael M. Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey,” Conflict Quarterly (1991): 7-29. The Iranian support, limited anyway, was from the Iranian state and appears to have nothing to do with the KDPI.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Lebanon, or Syria to Turkey in 1984, pending confirmation from Gunter. Gunter confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail (says “Lebanon’s instability probably helped enable PKK training in that state,” but see argument below).
Turkey, 1991 (vs. Devrimci Sol – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, or Lebanon)
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Israel Turkey, 1991. UCDP conflict summary: “Devrimci Sol has reportedly cooperated with Palestinian organizations since the late 1970s and in 1991 militants trained in Lebanon’s Syrian-held Bekaa Valley.” No Syrian conflict is remotely proximate; Syria does appear to have occupied the Bekaa Valley during the Lebanon War, but presumably it could have found somewhere else to train Devrimci Sol militants. Also, “This struggle was intensified in the beginning of the 1990s during the Gulf War when Devrimci Sol started a violent campaign against government and security representatives, as well as American ‘imperialists’ on Turkish soil.” This is contagion of an interstate war (U.S.-Iraq 1991), but is not related to any substate conflicts in Iraq. No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As in Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,” Center for Defense Information, November 4, 2002.
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No mention of potential State As (external support “unknown”) in U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2001), pp. 108-109.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon to Turkey in 1991, pending confirmation from Sözen (see below). Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.
Turkey, 2005 (vs. MKP – State A could be Iran, Iraq, or Israel)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary (it is Maoist, though).
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No mention of potential State As in START summary on TKP/ML-TIKKO (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=116).
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No mention of potential State As in Ahmet Sözen [Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus], “Terrorism and the Politics of Anti-Terrorism in Turkey,” in Robert W. Orttung and Andrey Makarychev, eds., National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p. 138.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Turkey in 2005, pending confirmation from Sözen. Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.
Iraq, 1958 (vs. Free Officers Movement – State A could be Israel or Lebanon)
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Israel Iraq, 1958. “One of the major impacts of the defeat in Palestine was the belief among many Iraqi officers and soldiers that they had lost the war because they had been betrayed by their own government. … The Iraqi army’s experience in Palestine, along with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Suez crisis and war of 1956, eventually combined to provoke the armed forces to do what the opposition political parties could not: destroy the monarchy and free Iraq from British domination.” (James DeFronzo [University of Connecticut], The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 35)
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The Egyptian Revolution, which inspired the Iraqi revolt, was also a product of the Palestinian conflict (“Similar to younger officers in the Iraqi military, Egyptian officers whose army had also been defeated in the 1948 war with Israel believed that the Egyptian government had betrayed its fighting forces, … leading to the shame of defeat” – p. 37).
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Lebanon Iraq, 1958. “The West … may have encouraged [Prime Minister] Nuri al-Said of Iraq to support [Lebanese President] Chamoun’s [rigged elections]. If so, then the West helped to tip Nuri’s already corrupt regime over the edge and to extinguish the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy. In Iraq … Kassem had formed an equivalent of Egypt’s ‘Free Officers’ organization, and when Nuri made clear his intention to help Chamoun the Kassem faction staged a successful rebellion to depose Nuri and King Feisal II. … In the summer of 1958 Nuri had perceived that if the Lebanese civil war resulted in a victory for the pro-Nasser Arabs then Iraq would be isolated. He had already given Chamoun moral and monetary support in May and June, and resolved in July to deploy an army division to Jordan for possible use against Syria. … On the morning of 14 July army contingents headed by Kassem, … ignoring instructions to bypass Baghdad on their way to Jordan, entered the Iraqi capital.” (Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 251-252)
Iraq, 1961 (vs. KDP – State A could be Israel or Lebanon)
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No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 47-50. The revolt was actually started on September 11, 1961 by a Kurd named Sheikh Abbas Mohammed; Barzani, who had become a hero in the Iran 1946 conflict, was not initially involved (pp. 47-48), and neither apparently was the KDP itself (p. 49). Thus Iran 1946 Iraq 1961 contagion is invalid.
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No mention of Lebanon in UCDP conflict summary. Israel supported the KDP, but apparently only from 1970 on (David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 193). Does note that KDP split from KDPI (Iran) in 1946, but apparently KDP was not involved in the initial onset of the Kurdish conflict in 1961 (see above).
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No mention of Lebanon’s or Israel’s contribution to onset in David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 188-193.
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No mention of Israel or Lebanon in James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 55-56. On the Iranian/KDPI connection, notes Barzani “began to prepare for armed conflict” in January 1961, but O’Ballance disagrees, writing “he had had no intention of rising in arms against the central government: he was drawn into revolt by circumstances” (1996, p. 47). I favor the O’Ballance account because it seems more detailed.
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No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 79-82.
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Hence I will code
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