no contagion from Israel or Lebanon to Iraq in 1961, pending confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail.
Iraq, 1982 (vs. SCIRI – State A could be Iran, Israel, Lebanon, or Syria)
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. The Iranian government has supported SCIRI from the start, but the anti-Shah coup in 1979 was not in itself a substate conflict (though it did kick off three separate substate conflicts, seemingly not related to Iraq 1982).
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No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 90.
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No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robert G. Rabil, “The Iraqi Opposition’s Evolution: From Conflict to Unity?” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, or Syria to Iraq in 1982, pending confirmation from DeFronzo [I forgot to ask about Afghanistan]. DeFronzo mostly confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail (has some nuance about the Iran connection).
Iraq, 2004 (vs. Al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, ISI – State A could be Iran, Israel, or Turkey)
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Afghanistan Iraq, 2004. “Ansar-controlled territories … were a stronghold where Kurdish Islamism converged with the ‘Arab Afghans.’ These Arab Afghans were Arab mujahideen who had traveled to join the Afghani jihad against the Soviets and then stayed on in training camps in the mountains of Afghanistan once the war was over. Many fled to Kurdistan after the U.S. assault on their mountain abodes in 2001 and 2002 and turned to training local Islamists. … One of these Arab Afghans is thought to have been Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” (Peter J. Munson, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 144-145) No mention of Iran’s or Turkey’s conflicts.
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Israel Iraq, 2004. “Over the next year [2001-2002], al-Zarqawi bounced between Iran and Kurdistan, where he was protected by Ansar al-Islam, and built up his army and a network of contacts. He frequented Syria and the Ain al-Halwa Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon, his prime recruiting ground.” (Peter J. Munson, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), p. 146) [Southern Lebanon is a disputed territory in the Israel 1990 substate conflict]
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Turkey’s or Iran’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 195-218. Does note (p. 212): “The key reason for the rise of the resistance insurgency was the perception that the United States and its partners had launched an unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Iraq for the purpose of seizing control of its energy resources and removing an opponent of U.S. and Israeli policies.” I don’t think this is a direct enough link to be Israel Iraq contagion – the key impetus for the rise of the insurgency was the U.S. invasion, and the Palestinian story appears to be pure rhetoric (some other grievance against the U.S. would have been found, or the mercantilist story would have stood on its own).
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No mention of MEK in Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (June 4, 2009).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran or Turkey to Iraq in 2004, pending confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail.
Egypt, 1993 (vs. al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya – State A could be Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, or Chad)
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Afghanistan Egypt, 1993. UCDP conflict summary: “Many Islamist activists instead became involved in jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and did not return to Egypt until the beginning of the 1990s. With this influx of battle-hardened veterans the situation in Egypt radically changed.” No mention of other potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (Iran and Sudan supported, but seems unrelated to their conflicts; October War of 1973 laid the foundation for recruitment, but this was a long-ago interstate conflict).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Hisham Mubarak, Souhail Shadoud, and Steve Tamari, “What Does the Gama'a Islamiyya Want?: An Interview with Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim,” Middle East Report, No. 198 (1996): 40-46.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Anneli Botha, “Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt,” Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 131 (2006), pp. 1-7.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Brief History of Egypt (New York: Facts on File, 2008), p. 223.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Egypt, pending confirmation from Botha. Botha more or less confirms in 5/31/10 e-mail.
Syria, 1966 (vs. Forces loyal to Nureddin Atassi and Youssef Zeayen – State A could be Iran, Iraq, or Israel)
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No mention of Iran or Iraq in UCDP conflict summary. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is mentioned in the sense that the Syrian defeat promoted a general destabilization of Syria post-1948, but this seems too distant and weak to be contagion.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 97-103.
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No mention of potential State As in Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 34-47.
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No mention of Iran in Martin Seymour, “The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the Break with Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1970): 35-47. Mentions the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but concludes its contribution to the 1966 coup was marginal and likely rhetorical (p. 43). The contribution of the Iraqi conflict seems rather complex, but overall this feels more like an internecine power struggle than a conflict somehow influenced by the events in Iraq (I should ask Van Dam).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1966, pending confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted.
Syria, 1979 (vs. Muslim Brotherhood – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, or Lebanon)
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Lebanon Syria, 1979. “In turn, the Lebanese civil war galvanized internal unrest in Syria, which only ended its own civil war in 1982.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21.
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UCDP conflict summary: “Tensions further increased within the country when Syria intervened on the Christian ‘rightist’ side in Lebanon's civil war in 1976; a move that seriously compromised the leadership’s legitimacy as an Arab and Muslim proponent.” No mention of other potential State As.
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Also refugee spillovers from Lebanon – Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 320. No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset. Does note that Arafat had an “early allegiance” to the Muslim Brotherhood, pre-1966, but this seems too distant and weak to be contagion. Also notes Iraqi government support for Muslim Brotherhood (p. 321), but this appears to be unrelated to the Kurdish conflict in Iraq.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 89-96.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1979, pending confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted.
Lebanon, 1958 (vs. Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun Militia – State A could be Israel)
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The Lebanon conflict preceded the Iraq conflict in 1958, so Iraq cannot be a State A.
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Israel Lebanon, 1958. “Immediately after independence, Lebanon’s internal political balance was further strained by the influx of 120,000 refugees from Palestine following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.” (Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” MERIP Reports, No. 133 (1985): 17-19, p. 17)
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“[Early 1950s]: “The balance between religious communities, provided for in the [1943] National Pact, was precariously maintained, and undercurrents of hostility were discernible. The Muslim community criticized the regime in which Christians, alleging their numerical superiority, occupied the highest offices in the state and filled a disproportionate number of civil service positions. Accordingly, the Muslims asked for a census, which they were confident would prove their numerical superiority. The Christians refused.” (Thomas Collelo, ed., Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987)
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UCDP conflict summary: “Changing demographics (in favor of the Sunnis and Shiites) and differing views on what political alignments the state should pursue however soon created deep rifts in society.”
Lebanon, 1975 (vs. LNM/LAA – State A could be Iraq or Israel)
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Israel Lebanon, 1975. “Many Lebanese Muslims staunchly supported the Palestinians against Israel. … After both the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, they were appalled that the Maronite-dominated government did nothing to help the Arab cause against Israel. This was part of the powder keg of animosity between Muslims and Christian Lebanese that the PLO detonated.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 33. [Also Jordan 1970-1971 Lebanon 1975 according to Byman/Pollack, 21, but Jordan’s conflict is not included in the UCDP/PRIO list.]
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UCDP conflict summary: “Also, the massive influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon following the 1948 and 1967 Israeli-Arab wars had by the 1970s reached more than 300 000, this also tilting power in favor of the Sunnis since most Palestinians were of this religious persuasion. Amongst the Palestinian refugee population could also be found the forces of the PLO and other guerrilla groups who made up a formidable fighting force of over 15 000 men who were keen not to lose their last foothold on the Israeli border. The fact that the Palestinian groups in Lebanon also at times acted as a ‘state-within-the-state,’ building roadblocks and clashing with Christian militias and security forces, did little to assuage the fears of the Maronite elite. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon - and also the devastation it wrought on the country in the form of Israeli attacks, which especially embittered the southern Shias - thus became yet another contributing factor to the outbreak of the civil war.” No mention of Iraq or Kurds.
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No mention of Kurds in Edgar O’Ballance, The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
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Only sporadic mentions of Kurds in Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). They did emigrate from Iraq to Lebanon, but “in smaller numbers” (p. 131).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iraq to Lebanon in 1975, pending confirmation from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.
Lebanon, 1982 (vs. LNM/Amal – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, or Syria)
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Israel Lebanon, 1982. According to UCDP conflict summary, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 – motivated by the PLO insurgency – and its installment of Bashir Gemayel as President of Lebanon caused the LNM assassination of Gemayel, which started the intrastate war. No mention of Iran or Iraq in terms of onset. Syria’s support for the LNM is prominently mentioned, but it’s not clear that this is related to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict.
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No mention of Iran, Iraq, or Syrian conflict with Muslim Brotherhood in Edgar O’Ballance, The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 112-122. The Muslim Brotherhood is only briefly mentioned on p. 104, as the target of a Syrian bombing campaign inside Lebanon in February 1980.
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No mention of conflicts in Iran, Iraq, or Syria in Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” MERIP Reports, No. 133 (1985): 17-19.
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No mention of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Etienne Sakr, “The Politics and Liberation or Lebanon,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2005): 86-105. Iranian support for rebel groups from the “early 1980s” is noted, but this appears to be on the part of the Iranian government and unrelated to the MEK/KDPI/APCO conflicts of 1979. No mention of Iraq’s contribution to onset.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Syria to Lebanon in 1982, pending confirmation from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/3/10 e-mail.
Israel, 1949 (vs. Palestinian insurgents – State A could be Iran)
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No mention of Kurds/Iran in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Kurds in Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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No mention of Kurds/Iran in Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 257-349.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran to Israel in 1948/1949, pending confirmation from Tessler. Tessler confirms in 5/28/10 e-mail.
Israel, 1990 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, or Turkey)
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Lebanon Israel, 1990. UCDP conflict summary: “Harakat Amal initially held a relatively neutral stance towards the Israeli presence [in southern Lebanon], since it supported their actions against Palestinian militants. However, as Israel attempted to solidify its grip on the ‘security zone’ through the creation of an occupation-type administration, anti-Israeli sentiments began to grow amongst pro-freedom Shiite activists, most notably among Amal and Lebanese National Resistance fighters. Amal leader Nabih Berri began to oppose the Israeli occupation, and Hezbollah began to take form from the Lebanese National Resistance and dissident members of Amal around 1982.” No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset (Iran supports Hezbollah, but this is not related to the MEK/KDPI conflicts in Iran).
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No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 1948 War of Independence to the Present, Revised Edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), pp. 377-385. Syrian/Iranian support noted, but none related to a substate conflict in those countries.
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No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 29-42 (some pages missing).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 1990, pending confirmation from Harik.
Israel, 2006 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, or Turkey)
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Hany T. Nakhleh, The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications (Master of Strategic Studies Thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2007).
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No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (Leavenworth: The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 2006, pending confirmation from Harel. Harel confirms in 6/4/10 phone call.
Saudi Arabia, 1979 (vs. JSM – State A could be Oman)
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No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Oman in Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007): 103-122.
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No mention of Oman in Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998), pp. 395-396.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Oman to Saudi Arabia, pending confirmation from Hegghammer. Hegghammer confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.
North Yemen, 1962 (vs. Royalists – State A could be Oman)
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No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Oman in Jonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962-1967 (Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount, 2005), pp. 41-53.
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No mention of Oman in Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 195-208. This was a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but neither had yet had a substate conflict.
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No mention of Oman in Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1991): 483-506.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Oman to North Yemen in 1962, pending confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.
North Yemen, 1980 (vs. National Democratic Front – State A could be Oman or Saudi Arabia)
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No mention of Oman or Saudi Arabia in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). pp. 321-324.
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No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47.
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No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robert D. Burrowes, “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali Abdallah Salih Regime: 1978-1984,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985): 287-316.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Oman or Saudi Arabia to North Yemen in 1980, pending confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.
South Yemen, 1986 (vs. Yemenite Socialist Party - Abdul Fattah Ismail faction – State A could be North Yemen)
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North Yemen South Yemen, 1986. “Units of the National Democratic Front, which in 1982 were forced to retreat from the North into the South, reportedly joined in the fighting against [PDRY President] Ali Nasir.” F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47, p. 45.
Oman, 1972 (vs. PFLO – State A could be North Yemen)
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China Oman, 1972. See below.
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No mention of North Yemen in UCDP conflict summary (South Yemen supported the rebels, but this appears unrelated to the Royalist conflict in North Yemen).
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No mention of North Yemen’s contribution to Oman conflict in Fred Halliday, “The Arabian Peninsula Opposition Movements,” MERIP Reports, No. 130 (1985): 13-15. PFLO grew out of the Arab Nationalist Movement cadres in Oman, but this does not seem directly related to any particular substate conflict in the region (maybe Israel 1949, but this is a stretch).
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No mention of North Yemen in Fred Halliday, review of John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2008): 151-153. Does note (p. 151): “One place where Chinese support did make a significant impact for a few years was in the guerrilla war in Dhofar, southern Oman, when, from 1968 to 1973, China was the main military supplier, and ideological inspiration, for the guerrillas of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.” Suggests China Oman contagion.
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No mention of North Yemen’s conflict in John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a Modern State (Taylor & Francis, 1977), pp. 112-121.
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No mention of North Yemen’s conflict in Stephen A. Cheney, The Insurgency in Oman, 1962-1976 (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984). Does note: “Communist leanings trended to stronger ties with the new revolutionary regime in South Yemen, and garnered support from the People’s Republic of China, Iraq, and radical Palestinian organizations.” This was in 1967, five years before the conflict reached sufficient intensity for inclusion, and based on the sources above the support from the PRC seems the only one that is not marginal. (By 1975 Iraq had flipped to join the side of the Omani government; the Palestinian groups are small ones, like PFLP.)
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Hence I will code no contagion from North Yemen to Oman, pending confirmation from Halliday … who unfortunately died in 2010.
Tajikistan, 1992 (vs. UTO – State A could be Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Russia)
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Afghanistan Tajikistan, 1992. “Groups in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [saw] Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 113.
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“The flow of arms from Afghanistan showed the dangers of Islamic fundamentalist expansion into the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).” (Barnett R. Rubin, “The Fragmentation of Tajikistan,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1993): 71-91, p. 71) Also notes that the fall of Najibullah in Afghanistan in 1992 cut off a major source of external support for the Tajik government, heightening social strain (p. 73). Also, “the drug trade already thriving in much of Afghanistan expanded both within that country and amongst its neighbors, providing an independent economic base for warlords after the cessation of foreign aid to the Afghan combatants and their regional supporters” (p. 73). No mention of conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh); mentions of Pakistani jihadist support for IRP do not appear to be related to the MQM conflict in Pakistan.
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No mention of Pakistan or the conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh) in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in U.S. Institute of Peace, The War in Tajikistan Three Years On (Special Report 15, November 1995).
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No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in Dov Lynch, “The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2001): 49-72.
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Hence I will code
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