no contagion from the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, or Somalia to the D.R. Congo in 1996, pending confirmation from Emizet.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2007 (vs. BDK – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No positive mention of potential State As in Anneke Van Woudenberg, “‘We Will Crush You’: The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Human Rights Watch (2008), pp. 66-82. DRC’s Minister of the Interior claimed Angolan/Brazzaville support for BDK rebels, but HRW considers these claims unsubstantiated and so apparently does the UN (pp. 72-73).
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No mention of potential State As in David Lewis, “Up to 12 Dead as Congo Police Fire on Protestors,” Reuters (June 30, 2006).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2008): 63-68, p. 66.
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No mention of potential State As in United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” April 2, 2008, pp. 4-5.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola to D.R. Congo in 2007, pending confirmation from Van Woudenberg.
Uganda, 1971 (vs. Forces of Idi Amin – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan)
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Sudan Uganda, 1971. “Amin established control over the armed forces by eliminating rivals, promoting officers loyal to him, and recruiting mercenaries from former Anya Nya guerillas in southern Sudan.” Thomas P. Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 42. No mention of other potential State As.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo Uganda, 1971. “The next development that boosted the image and fortunes of the army was the Congo Rebellion of 1964-1965.” Enlarged the army, improved equipment, improved prestige. But a major spur for the coup was “the army fear that Obote was creating a rival to the army.” A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Apolo Milton Obote and His Times (New York: NOK Publishers, 1978), pp. 241, 245. No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1982), pp. 4, 9-10.
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No mention in Eustace G. Rutiba, Towards Peace in Uganda (Kampala: Nile Valley Pyramids Publishing House, 1986), pp. 11-12.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad or Ethiopia to Uganda, pending confirmation from Honey. Honey confirms in 5/17/10 e-mail.
Kenya, 1982 (vs. Forces of Hezekiah Ochuka – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Andrew Morton, Moi: The Making of an African Statesman (London: Michael O’Mara Books, 1998), pp. 132-139.
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No mention of potential State As in Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From ‘Harambee!’ to ‘Nyayo!’ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 145-150. Note, however, p. 2 for a reverse demonstration effect: “Kenyans from widely different parts of the country and walks of life spoke of the need to proceed cautiously so as not to follow the paths of their neighbors in strife-torn Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia.”
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No mention of potential State As in William R. Ochieng, A History of Kenya (London: Macmillan Kenya, 1985), pp. 154-155.
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No mention of potential State As in Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, “African Military Coups d’Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1984): 633-666, p. 636.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Kenya, pending confirmation from Widner. She says I’m probably right in a 5/18/10 e-mail but suggests I contact David W. Throup, which I did. Throup confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail.
Burundi, 1965 (vs. Forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan)
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Democratic Republic of the Congo Burundi, 1965. “This spiral of ethnicization [preceding the 1965 coup attempt] has been accelerated by external intervention: nearby Congo was a focal point for the Cold War; Burundi was a base for Chinese aid to the Kivu-based Lumumbist rebels. … Each camp has instrumentalized the ethnicism it found in the two countries: the ‘nonalignment group’ [in Burundi] were mainly Tutsi nationalists.” (Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), p. 313.) So Congo war Chinese presence in Burundi heightening of ethnic tensions. Also strong influence of Rwandan ethnic conflicts on Burundi; see below. No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan.
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“During much of 1963 and 1964, Burundi politics took the form of a three-cornered fight among the Crown, the Monrovia Group (Hutu), and the Casablanca Group (Tutsi). … What eventually brought this fragile balance of power to the verge of collapse was the sudden intrusion of East-West rivalries into the cauldron of Hutu-Tutsi competition. The key to this situation was the rapid escalation of the ‘Congo rebellion’ (1963-64) in eastern Zaire.” Brings in Chinese, which escalates Tutsi refugee / Casablanca faction coordination against Hutu. (Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 68) No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan.
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No mention of potential State As in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Nigel Watt, Burundi: Biography of a Small African Country (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), pp. 29-32.
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No mention of potential State As in Warren Weinstein and Robert Schrire, Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Foreign and Comparative Series: Eastern Africa, 1976, no. 23), pp. 6-17. Again the influence of the 1959 conflict in Rwanda is strongly emphasized. This is probably not included in my dataset because Rwanda was not a state at the time.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Ethiopia or Sudan to Burundi in 1965, pending confirmation from Lemarchand.
Burundi, 1991 (vs. Palipehutu – State A could be Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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Rwanda Burundi, 1991. “The invasion of Rwanda by the Uganda-based, Tutsi-dominated RPF on October 1, 1990, brought Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Rwanda to an unprecedented level of intensity. In some localities, the result was a wholesale massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent Tutsi civilians. As the threat of a Tutsi takeover loomed increasingly large, popular sympathy for the Palipehutu correspondingly increased in the border areas [of Burundi]. Furthermore, as it became apparent that the Burundi government was doing nothing to prevent certain Rwanda refugees of Tutsi origins from joining the RPF and was possibly encouraging the move, the Rwanda authorities understandably responded in kind and gave their whole-hearted support to Palipehutu refugees in Rwanda. Although the evidence is lacking, it is not unreasonable to assume that some local civil servants in Rwanda might have been given a free hand to refugees to organize themselves and recruit adherents and might have looked the other way when they began to infiltrate back into Burundi.” Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 153-154. No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to Burundi 1991 onset.
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Rwanda refugee spillovers start to influence the conflict in “late 1994,” well after onset. “Initially, the conflict in Burundi was a purely internal affair. However, this changed drastically in the mid-1990s, when the country was drawn in to the conflict in neighboring Zaire/DRC.”
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1991 onset in Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 314-320. Again Rwanda matters, but the 1990 FPR conflict is not mentioned (Palipehutu violence was already underway by then).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Burundi in 1991, pending confirmation from Lemarchand. Lemarchand confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail.
Rwanda, 1990 (vs. FPR – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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Uganda Rwanda, 1990. “In October 1990, Rwanda came under attack from the Tutsis in Uganda. … The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had sprung up in Uganda, continued to fight with Rwanda for another three years. … The RPF was comprised mostly of 4,000 second-generation Rwandan refugees who had joined Uganda’s National Resistance Army.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 75)
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“The RPF invasion force consequently comprised well-trained troops with combat experience who had simply deserted their NRA positions and taken their weapons. They were under the leadership of a charismatic military commander, Major-General Fred Rwigyema. He was the most famous Rwandan refugee in the NRA. He had risen to become deputy commander of the army and deputy minister of defense. But then there had been growing resentment in Uganda towards the Rwandans and Rwigyema had been removed from office. Later it was decided that non-Ugandan nationals, including Rwandan refugees, were even to be precluded from owning land. It was this that was said to have prompted the invasion and the refugees’ attempts to regain the right of citizenship in their country of origin.” (Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 13-14) No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Uganda) in Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 320-329. Burundi 1993 influenced Rwanda 1994, but neither is coded as an onset.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 74-99.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, or Sudan to Rwanda, pending confirmation from Prunier. Prunier confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail.
Somalia, 1978 (vs. Forces of Abdulaahi Yusuf – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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Ethiopia Somalia, 1978. According to the UCDP summary of the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate conflict, Ethiopian instability (1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, among other conflicts) “led the government in Mogadishu to believe that it had a good chance of achieving its goal of incorporating the Ethiopian Ogaden region into Somalia.” Hence the Somalia invasion of Ethiopia (the Ogaden War). Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War led to the 1978 coup (UCDP summary of Somalia intrastate conflict). No mention of other potential State As.
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“The terrible defeat [in the Ogaden War] and the refugee influx … quickly led to widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’ … as different groups sought scapegoats to explain the debacle. Thus, hard on the heels of the Somalia retreat, an unsuccessful attempted coup was mounted against the regime in April 1978. … After the failure of the attempted coup, those who had escaped arrest regrouped, forming a guerilla operation called the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front.” (Ioan M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 67) Shows how the Ogaden defeat caused not only the coup but also the 1981 conflict with the SSDF. No mention of other potential State As. |
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No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Fourth Edition (Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2002), pp. 231-246.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in Hussein M. Adam, “Somali Civil Wars,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), pp. 169-179.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, or Uganda to Somalia, pending confirmation from Lewis. Lewis confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail.
Djibouti, 1991 (vs. FRUD – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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Ethiopia Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling Cauldron,” African Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211) No mention of other potential State As.
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“Despite significant levels of elite and popular support for the FRUD within Djibouti, it is also clear that at least a portion (exact figures are unobtainable) of the roughly 3,000 guerrillas come from Afar-inhabited territories of both Ethiopia and the provisional government of Eritrea. This situation is at least partially due to the large numbers of government troops, refugees, and, most significantly, light arms and weaponry that streamed into Djibouti in the aftermath of Mengistu’s overthrow in May 1991.” (Schraeder 1993, 212)
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Somalia Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling Cauldron,” African Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211)
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“In short, the Djiboutian civil war appears to be a largely internal conflict in which an internally based leadership lacks external military patrons but, nonetheless, enjoys the support of an undetermined number of migratory guerrilla fighters and a ready supply of light weapons from black markets in both neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia.” (Schraeder 1993, 214)
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset of conflict in UCDP conflict summary, though Djibouti shares ethnic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in Mohamed Kadamy, “Djibouti: Between War and Peace,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 511-521. Does note that the MPL, an early precursor to FRUD in the 1970s, was “much influenced by the Vietnamese struggle and the African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies” (515). Seems too loose and too long ago to be Angola Djibouti contagion.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in Amare Tekle, “International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-1996), Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No, 70 (1996): 499-509.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda to Djibouti, pending confirmation from Schraeder.
Ethiopia, 1960 (vs. Forces of Mengistu Neway – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo)
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No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Congo-Kinshasa’s contribution to coup onset in Harold G. Marcus, The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-1974, Second Edition (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995), pp. 116-123.
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No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 209-215. In fact, “a strong theme in the coup-makers’ pronouncements was Ethiopia’s backwardness, in contrast with the forward strides taken by several newly independent African states” (213), suggesting Katanga should have dissuaded them.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 1960, pending confirmation from Zewde.
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I will also assume no contagion from Iraq to Ethiopia in 1960 (since the Mengistu Neway coup was not pan-Arab in orientation).
Ethiopia, 1964 (vs. ELF – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan)
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Cuba Ethiopia, 1964. See below.
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Sudan Ethiopia, 1964. “The wider political scene has been very relevant to the growth of the ELF. Since Ethiopia was … one of Israel’s footholds in Africa (and allowing Israel to push aid through to the rebels in the Southern Sudan), it was not surprising that the ELF was able to call on Muslim support for an anti-American, anti-Zionist struggle. In 1965 the quantity of arms coming through Sudan became so obvious that the Sudan Government announced in June that it had discovered eighteen tons of Czech arms at Khartoum airport intended for the ELF. Syria and Iraq also supplied funds, arms and training [see below].” (Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 196-197) No mention of Congo-Kinshasa.
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Iraq Ethiopia, 1964. “Formed in 1961 by Eritrean exiles in the Middle East, … the ELF cast its struggle for Eritrean independence within a pan-Arab mould. This factor attracted much sympathy and support for it in the Arab world. Syria and Iraq, who regarded Eritrea as an integral part of the Arab homeland, became the ELF’s mainstay.” (Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 219) The Iraqi government was pan-Arab because of the 1958 coup there (and subsequent coups in 1959 and 1963). No mention of Congo-Kinshasa.
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 55-60. Mentions influence of FLN (Algeria), but this was not a substate conflict (it was an extrastate conflict). Also mentions demonstration effect/training from Cuba (p. 59), suggesting Cuba Ethiopia contagion that is out-of-region.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 1964, pending confirmation from Zewde.
Ethiopia, 1975 (vs. ALF – State A could be Chad, Sudan, or Uganda)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Peter Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 26-27, 65-66.
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No mention of potential State As in Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1989), p. 117.
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No mention of potential State As in Alex De Waal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 63-64.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1975, pending confirmation from Schwab. Schwab confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail. Afterward I code no contagion from Zaire to Ethiopia in 1975. I could ask Schwab again, but I’m pretty sure the Afar revolts were internal to Ethiopia.
Ethiopia, 1976 (vs. EPRP/TPLF and WSLF [different incompatibilities] – State A could be Chad, Sudan, or Uganda)
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Sudan Ethiopia, 1976. “Reinvigorated by the resumption of Sudanese backing and support from many other Arab states, and further strengthened through an agreement between the rival liberation movements for tactical cooperation in the field, the rebel forces launched a successful drive against the smaller garrison towns at the end of 1976.” (John Markakis and Nega Ayele, “Class and Revolution in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy, No. 8 (1977): 99-108, p. 106) No mention of other potential State As [this covers both EPRP and WSLF]
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This could be contagion depending on why Sudan supported the EPRP/TPLF. Consider the following: “Sudanese support [possibly during the 1980s] was also part of the larger Cold War drama, which involved … Ethiopian support for the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” (John Prendergast and Mark Duffield, “Liberation Politics in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 37) Considering the Sudan Ethiopia 1964 contagion discussed above, I think this was plausibly going on in 1976.
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SPLA didn’t exist until early 1980s, but Ethiopian support for southern resistance movements (leftovers from 1963-1972 Sudanese civil war) can be dated to 1976 – see Sudan 1983 below.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset [WSLF is not really mentioned] in UCDP conflict summaries, except:
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“During the conflict, Sudan, for its own geopolitical reasons, supported TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Force) and EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union).” Not sure if these “geopolitical reasons” are related to Sudan’s civil war.
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No mention of potential State As in Yohannis Abate, “The Legacy of Imperial Rule: Military Intervention and the Struggle for Leadership in Ethiopia, 1974-1978,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1983): 28-42.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 531-542.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Edmond J. Keller, “Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1992): 609-624. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF]
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No mention of potential State As in Adam Lockyer, “Opposing Foreign Intervention’s Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian-Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,” Paper Presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, September 25-27, 2006. [This covers WSLF only]
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 76-89, 182-190. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF]
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Hence I will code
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