Both Charles Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of the Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara and installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.” This suggests that without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as significant support from Burkina Faso.
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Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The Malian conflict may have been relevant in terms of arms supply. According to Stephen Ellis, large numbers of guns not needed when that conflict was ended found their way into the Liberian conflict (and almost certainly, therefore, into Sierra Leone also) probably traded through regional networks of Fula and Mandinka merchants also operating in diamond supply from Sierra Leone.” I believe the Mali conflict didn’t end until 1995, although there was a peace agreement in 1991, so this does not appear to be a case of contagion contributing to onset.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 79-84.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) in Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 436-455, p. 437.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford, U.K.: The International African Institute, 2002), pp. xiii-33. Does note, on p. 3: “[Prince] Johnson’s guerilla know-how formed these youthful recruits into an effective insurgent force. Drugged on crack cocaine, recruits deployed terroristic methods apparently reflecting a knowledge of Renamo tactics in Mozambique.” However, this influence seems purely tactical and also post-onset.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Mali, Niger, Senegal, or Togo to Sierra Leone, pending confirmation from Richards. Richards (in 4/30/10 e-mail, also cited at length above) alleges that both the Ghana and Togo coups had Libyan sponsorship – “certainly there were attempts to set up RUF-type rebellions in Ghana, Gambia and Zaire [and Togo].” Cites no specific evidence that these coups themselves influenced the RUF, and calls the links “quite marginal.” Suggests I look at the Yeebo book cited in his book.
Ghana, 1966 (vs. NLC – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, or Nigeria)
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Democratic Republic of the Congo Ghana, 1966. “Major A.A. Afrifa, one of the main [coup] plotters, felt that 43 Ghanaian soldiers had lost their lives in the Congo because of Nkrumah’s [overthrown in the coup] disastrous policies in that conflict.” This was a key grievance behind the coup. Roger S. Gocking, The History of Ghana (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 148. Also mentions another international influence on the military’s decision to revolt: the fear of Nkrumah’s upcoming intervention in Rhodesia (an extrastate conflict) (p. 138). No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 37-40, though he does note that Nkrumah “antagonized the West” with his “relentless support for African liberation movements” (p. 38).
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No mention of potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., Ghana: A Country Study, Third Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 32-37. Does note, as above, the military’s discontent with “Nkrumah’s aggressive involvement in African politics and by his belief that Ghanaian troops could be sent anywhere in Africa to fight so-called liberation wars” (p. 36).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Gabon, or Nigeria to Ghana in 1966, pending confirmation from Gocking.
Ghana, 1981 (vs. Forces of Jerry John Rawlings – State A could be Gambia, Liberia, or Mauritania)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 40-45.
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No mention of potential State As in Roger S. Gocking, The History of Ghana (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 179-193.
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No mention of Potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., Ghana: A Country Study, Third Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 42-53
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Hence I will code no contagion from Gambia, Liberia, or Mauritania to Ghana in 1981, pending confirmation form Gocking.
Togo, 1986 (vs. MTD – State A could be Cameroon, Gambia, or Ghana)
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Ghana Togo, 1986. UCDP conflict summary: “It was also claimed that the rebels had been backed by Ghana and Burkina Faso, who allegedly had assisted in recruiting, arming and training the rebels. However, these allegations were rejected by the two neighboring states.” Ghana’s coup, which brought Rawlings to power, seemingly returned it to an interventionist posture internationally by aligning more with Nkrumah (Mwakikagile 2001, 42-43). No mention of other potential State As.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 201-203. On Ghana, notes: “Civil unrest in neighboring Ghana … during the early 1980s triggered by bloody military coups in those two countries sent tens of thousands of refugees into Togo, causing a great humanitarian crisis and social instability.” (p. 202)
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No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 75, 96-97.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon or Gambia to Togo, pending confirmation from Houngnikpo.
Cameroon, 1984 (vs. Forces of Ibrahim Saleh – State A could be Gambia, Ghana, or Liberia)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in James Achanyi Fontem, Cameroon: Remember April 6 (Cathca Fund, 1993), pp. 1-90.
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No mention of potential State As in Tambi Eyongetah Mbuagbaw, Robert Brain, and Robin Palmer, A History of the Cameroon, Second Edition (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1987), pp. 137-141.
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No mention of potential State As in Victor Julius Ngoh, History of Cameroon Since 1800 (Presbook, Limbe, 1996), pp. 291-296.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Gambia, Ghana, or Liberia to Cameroon, pending confirmation from Palmer. Palmer says in a 5/12/10 e-mail that he doesn’t know.
Nigeria, 1966 (vs. Forces of Patrick Nzeogwu – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, or Ghana)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As in Charles U. Uwanaka, Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Events (1953-1967), Second Edition (Mafoluku, Nigeria: Pattony Publicity, 1986), pp. 5-41.
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No mention of potential State As (at least not by name) in Garba Ashiwaju and Olusegun Areola, eds., Nigeria: The First 25 Years (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1995), pp. 68-69, 106-109.
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No mention of potential State As in Richard Akinnola, History of Coup D’Etats in Nigeria (Lagos: Media Research and Resource Bureau, 1998), pp. 1-11.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Gabon, or Ghana to Nigeria in 1966, pending confirmation from Akinnola. Akinnola confirms in 5/12/10 Facebook message.
Nigeria, 1967 (vs. Republic of Biafra – State A could be Gabon or Ghana)
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No mention of potential State As in Armstrong Matiu Adejo, ed., The Nigerian Civil War: Forty Years After, What Lessons? (Makurdi, Nigeria: Aboki Publishers, 2008), pp. 3-47, 451-472. It is noted that the experience of Katanga made accommodation of secession out of the question (p. 42), but I doubt accommodation would ever have been on the table anyway.
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No mention of potential State As in Major General H.B. Momoh, ed., The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences (Ibadan, Nigeria: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000), pp. 3-63.
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No mention of potential State As in Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, The Biafra War: Nigeria and the Aftermath (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), except that Gabon was a channel for French arms to Biafra (likely post-onset, as corroborated by other sources, around 1968) (p. 105).
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No mention of potential State As in Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ebere Onwudiwe, and Rotimi T. Suberu, eds., The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath (Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archers, 2002).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Gabon or Ghana to Nigeria in 1967, pending confirmation from Adejo.
Nigeria, 2004 (vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and NDPVF [different territorial incompatibilities] – State A could be Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, or Sierra Leone)
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Guinea-Bissau Nigeria, 2004. “Given this background, the paper explores the origin of the present oil violence in the Niger Delta and how it has been intensified through the use of weapons that are primarily smuggled from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Cameroon.” Victor Ojakorotu and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, “Oil, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution (2006): 85-106, pp. 85-86.
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Liberia Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a source of black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This has provided Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37)
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“Violence in the Delta region blossomed in 2003 and 2004. In the lead-up to the 2003 elections, violence became a tool for politicians to gain power. This included the provision of small arms to groups to rally support for certain politicians and deter the opposition from challenging these politicians.” (Hazen 2007, 77)
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Sierra Leone Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a source of black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This has provided Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37)
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Democratic Republic of the Congo Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
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Sudan Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
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Somalia Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
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Afghanistan Nigeria, 2004. No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, although Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa was strongly inspired by the Taliban in Afghanistan (the leader called himself “Mullah Omar”).
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No mention of potential State As in Sofiri Joab-Peterside, “On the Militarization of Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria,” Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 21 (2007).
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No mention of potential State As in Sanusi Aliyu, Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno State (M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), pp. 78-92. Does mention that some members of the Nigerian Taliban trained with AQIM (from Algeria), but the numbers are quite small (~25).
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Hence I will code no contagion from Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea, or Senegal to Nigeria in 2004, pending confirmation from Joab-Peterside.
Gabon, 1964 (vs. Forces loyal to Léon M'Ba – State A could be Cameroon)
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No mention of Cameroon in James F. Barnes, Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 39-47.
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No mention of Cameroon in Brian Weinstein, Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 151-152.
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No mention of Cameroon in Charles F. Darlington and Alice B. Darlington, African Betrayal (New York: David McKay Company, 1968), pp. 126-141.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon to Gabon, pending confirmation from Barnes. This is kind of a strange intrastate conflict – the coup itself was bloodless, and it was only after French intervention to restore M’Ba to power (an intervention possibly motivated by other bloodless coups in Francophone Africa) that deaths occurred. Barnes mostly confirms in 5/13/10 e-mail.
Central African Republic, 1996 (vs. Forces of Cyriac Souke – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)
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No mention of potential State As in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As as they pertain to the 1996 mutiny in Allard Blom and Jean Yamindou, “A Brief History of Armed Conflict and its Impact on Biodiversity in the Central African Republic,” Biodiversity Support Program, World Wildlife Fund (2001), pp. 11-12. The conflict in the north is influenced by Sudan, Chad, and the DRC, but this appears unrelated to the mutinies (and onset after 1996).
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No mention of potential State As in Paul Melly, “Central African Republic – Uncertain Prospects,” WRITENET Paper No. 14 (2002), pp. 1-8.
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No mention of potential State As in Andreas Mehler, “The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic,” Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Paper No. 114 (2009), pp. 9-10.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda to the Central African Republic, pending confirmation from Melly. Melly confirms in 5/14/10 e-mail.
Chad, 1966 (vs. FROLINAT – State A could be Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Mario J. Azevedo, Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad (Ajanta Offset, India: Gordon and Breach Publishers: 1998), pp. 89-95. FROLINAT was formed inside Sudan, at Nyala (p. 92), but this does not appear to be related to the rebellion ongoing in Southern Sudan.
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No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Chad (Washington: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1972), pp. 119-127. Does note (p. 125): “The known members [leaders of FROLINAT] were exiles who operated from bases outside Chad; many had received guerilla and subversion training in Ghana before the overthrow of the government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 or in Algeria, Libya, Cuba, or North Korea. They had reentered Chad most often along the long and desolate eastern border with Sudan.” Again, the Sudanese connection doesn’t count because the Sudanese conflict at the time was in the south; as for the rest, only Cuba had an active substate conflict at the time of influence.
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No mention of potential State As in Thomas Collelo, ed., Chad: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988), pp. 188-189.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan to Chad, pending confirmation from Azevedo. Azevedo confirms in 5/15/10 e-mail.
Republic of the Congo, 1993 (vs. Cobras and Ninjas – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola)
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No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary; Angola and Chad intervened after the conflict had began (around 1997, which was by far the heaviest year in terms of casualties).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Mohammed O. Maundi et al., Getting In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press: 2006), pp. 85-91. Does note that the Cobras had elements from the DRC and Rwanda civil wars (p. 87), but these elements appear to postdate the 1993 onset by at least one year.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Sypros Demetriou, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle, “Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo,” Small Arms Survey Special Report (2002), pp. 4-5, 10-13. External actors are again mentioned in the context of the 1997 conflict only; arms purchases from abroad were apparently much more prevalent in the 1997 conflict than in the 1993 conflict.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Eaton, “Diagnosing the Crisis in the Republic of the Congo,” Africa, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2006): 44-69. International influences are again limited to the 1997 conflict.
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to 1993 onset in Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, “The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville,” African Affairs, Vol. 98 (1999): 37-54.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to the Republic of the Congo, pending confirmation from Eaton.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1960 (vs. State of Katanga and Independent Mining State of South Kasai – State A could be Ethiopia)
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These secessionist movements began in summer 1960, and the Ethiopian coup did not take place until December 14, 1960 (UCDP conflict summary). Therefore Ethiopia D.R. Congo 1960 cannot be a case of contagion.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1964 (vs. CNL – State A could be Ethiopia or Sudan)
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China Congo-Kinshasa, 1964. See below.
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No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of Ethiopia in Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 64-84. Does note that in late 1964 “President Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan flatly denied that any illicit arms for the NLC rebels had ever passed through his country” (p. 84). Also notes strong influence of P.R. China in terms of training NLC rebels (p. 69).
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No mention of either potential State A in Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 36.
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No mention of either potential State A in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working Paper No, 63 (2003), pp. 10-14.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Ethiopia or Sudan to D.R. Congo in 1964, pending confirmation from Emizet.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1977 (vs. FLNC – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola)
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Angola Zaire, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “In March 1977, the FLNC launched a military campaign from Angola with the objective of toppling the regime of President Mobutu. The FLNC was mainly made up of ex-Katangan gendarmes who after the Zaire (Katanga) civil war had helped the Angolan government fight their rebel groups.” No mention of other potential State As.
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Cuba Zaire, 1977. The Cuban government “had been supplying arms to the FLNC, as Mobutu favored the Chinese form of Communism over that espoused by Moscow” (Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 115).
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No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 108-122. On Angola, notes that “Mobutu declared that no expense would be spared in relation to the Angolan struggle for freedom” in 1975 (p. 109).
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No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), pp. 41, 59.
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No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working Paper No, 63 (2003), pp. 15-20. On Angola: “With the victory of the MPLA in Angola, the Katangan gendarmes were unemployed and sought to return to the Congo and reclaim their region (now named Shaba) under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (Front pour la Libération Nationale, FLNC).” (p. 17)
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Thomas P. Odom, Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978 (Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993).
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No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Peter Mangold, “Shaba I and Shaba II,” Survival, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1979): 107-115.
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Hence I will code no contagion from Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, or Uganda to Zaire in 1977, pending confirmation from Emizet.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1996 (vs. AFDL – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola)
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Rwanda DRC, 1996. “Spillover can … cause other civil wars in neighboring countries — just as the civil war in Rwanda triggered the catastrophic civil war in next-door Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 2.
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UCDP conflict summary: “Events in Rwanda played an important part in the early stage of the conflict. During the first phase, Rwandan troops assisted AFDL, aiming to both root out the Hutu militia operating from Zairian territory and to topple Mobutu, who had supported the previous regime in Rwanda, and who accepted the presence of the armed Hutu groups on Zairian soil. Also, Uganda provided much needed military training and troops to AFDL, albeit never openly admitting to doing so. Most analysts conclude that Uganda’s involvement was mainly based on security concerns, as anti-Museveni rebel groups ADF (Alliance of democratic Forces), WNBF (West Nile Bank Front) and LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) operated out of Zairian territory. The only state openly admitting to sending troops in aid of AFDL was Angola, who had the same motivation as Rwanda and Uganda. Mobutu had for years supported Angolan rebel group UNITA, allowing the rebels to launch attacks from Zairian territory.”
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Uganda DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Uganda] was formed around a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from bases in the Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 122. [Also Rwanda DRC, 1998, Sudan DRC, 1998 and Uganda DRC, 1998. The 1998 conflict is not listed by UCDP/PRIO; it is lumped in with the 1996 war.]
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Angola DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Angola] was formed around a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from bases in the Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 122.
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Burundi DRC, 1996. “The Zairean government accused Burundi and Rwanda of provoking the conflict, and of arming and training the Banyamulenge militia. This was denied. … Kabila had been aided considerably by regular military elements from Rwanda and Burundi, especially in terms of organization, administration and supplies.” (Edgar O’Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 164, 175. No mention of other potential State As besides Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola.
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2/5/11: Changing the coding below to non-contagion; it’s too convoluted, and you would have to believe that the LRA would not exist (or shelter in Zaire) without Sudanese state support.
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Sudan DRC, 1996. “Soon to join Rwanda were Uganda and Angola. … Uganda had also suffered assaults by rebel groups which were based inside Zaire. Anti-Museveni movements that were supported by Sudan were attacking from the region.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 79) So Sudan’s war Ugandan support for SPLA Sudanese support for LRA Ugandan invasion of Zaire to neutralize LRA. A bit of stretch, maybe. No mention of other potential State As (besides those noted above).
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No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in UCDP conflict summary.
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No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (London: Zed Books, 2007). Does note that “Somalia syndrome” discouraged as U.S./UN intervention in Rwanda, which perhaps played some role in the Congo events (p. 153).
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Hence I will code
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