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VALUE OF LIBERTY DEMANDS FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND WILL



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VALUE OF LIBERTY DEMANDS FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND WILL

1. LIBERTY AND FREEDOM DEMAND POWER TO THINK

John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p. 315. All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz, thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Whenever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a mans power, wherever doing to not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary.
2. LIBERTY DEPENDS ON HUMAN VOLITION AND WILL

John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p. 316. So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or for bear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other:

where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.
3. LIBERTY DEMANDS THAT HUMANS HAVE THE ABILITY TO FREELY THINK

John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p. 316. A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest or vice versa; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water, (a bridge breaking under him,) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent.


4. LIBERTY BELONG TO INDIVIDUAL HUMAN WILL

John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p.323. The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of physic. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate.


5. LIBERTY ASKS WHETHER A HUMAN IS FREE TO THINK ABOUT STATE OF BEING John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p. 324. To return, then, to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free. Thus, I think, that so far as any one can by [the direction or choice of his mind, preferring] the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action and vice versa make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free. For if I can by [a thought directing] the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa, it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace: and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free.
6. LIBERTY DEMANDS FREEDOM TO ACT AND THINK

John Locke, British Philosopher, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 1954, p.317.

I think nobody will doubt it: and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther. For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifference of ability to act, or to forbear acting, there liberty, and our notion of it, presently ceases.

Jean-François Lyotard

Post-Modern Philosopher

For the past decade the term postmodern has been used in so many different ways and with so many different senses as to render precise specification of its meaning impossible. Frequently coupled with such other fashionable “post-” terms as postempiricist, postmetaphysical, poststructuralist, and postindustrialist, it expresses a consciousness of fundamental changes in culture and society. The extent of this shift seem clearest in literature and the arts. Discussing Lyotard will require an examination of: (1) knowledge, (2)

postmodernism, (3) legitimacy, (4) justice, and (5) application to debate
Lyotard contends that matters are less clear when one turns from modernity to postmodern thought in philosophy and social theory. Here the points of contrast between modernity and postmodernity are different: basic categories, principles, and institutions of the modern West. For Lyotard, it is the

specification of modem Western culture as fundamentally rationalist and subjectivist that provides the key point of contrast; for postmodernism in philosophy typically centers on a critique of the modern ideas of reason and the rational subject. It is the “project of Enlightenment” that needs to be critiqued, the separate knowing and moral subject that has to be decentered; the drive for unity and foundations, and the tyranny of

universal truth that has to be defeated. In addition, for Lyotard the object of postmodernism is to study the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies. Post-modernism designates the state of our

culture following the transformations that, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game



rules for science, literature, and the arts.
Lyotard integrated the term “postmodern” into philosophy, politics, sociology and society. The goal of postmodernism is the deconstruction of the concepts developed in and from the period of the Enlightenment For Lyotard the term “modern” refers to any form of knowledge that legitimates itself through discourse about discourse. Modernity is marked by scientific knowledge at the expense of narrative knowledge. Lyotard is adamant that the legitimation of knowledge relates to more practical questions of justice as well as questions of truth. For Lyotard, the term modem can be applied in this sense to any form of knowledge that legitimates itself through a metadiscourse of this kind, that is through the appeal to some grand metanarrative such as the progress of Reason and Freedom, the unfolding of Spirit, the emancipation of Humanity. By contrast, a discourse is postmodern if it challenges preaccepted values, beliefs, attitudes, and stories.
Lyotard chooses as the focus of his analysis not the will to power or instrumental reason but the principle of legitimacy. In this perspective, modernity is marked by a breakdown of narrative knowledge in the wake of the advance of scientific knowledge. At the center of Lyotard’s writing is that science falls into two distinctly difficult positions. Initially, science must rely on stories to justify its existence. The problem is that scientific standards of knowledge relegate stories to opinion. Second, the reliance on stories challenges the scientific mindset. The result, for Lyotard, is that science can no longer justify itself in the “modern” world view. The result is that we must understand a different type of legitimacy: One that is inherent in local language games. For Lyotard, language games are a form of moves and counter-moves where individuals interact in an attempt to understand. Important in this notion is that these rules are negotiated by the individual participants, not a priori imposed by society.
Lyotard is insistent that the legitimation of knowledge involves questions of justice as well as questions of truth; accordingly, he draws practical conclusions from his shift in perspective and points however vaguely, toward a new conception of politics. The principles are not based in the universality of reason and the need for consensus. Instead, principles must focus on the local character of all language, argumentation and legitimation and the need to undermine established agreements;. The intellectual forms are not the unifying and grounding metadiscourse and the grand met narrative but a multiplicity of small narratives and local meta-arguments; its underlying notion of justice appeals not to consensus but to the recognition of the specificity and autonomy of language games.
Postmodernism has become an important issue in contemporary philosophy. As such, debaters can expect more of the theories of Lyotard and others to make there way into debate practice. The debater should be forewarned that integrating postmodernism is difficult. One of the many reasons for this is that debate practice itself is inherently modern and self-constraining. The debater will be able to integrate postmodernism into a critique of any criteria or model to assess values. In addition, a priori societal agreement on any matters of action or values must be abandoned.


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