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PHILOSOPHY CAN CHANGE THE HUMAN COND1T ION



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PHILOSOPHY CAN CHANGE THE HUMAN COND1T ION

1. PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CHANGES MORALITY

Alasdair Maclntyre. Professor of social philosophy at the University of Essex, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS, 1966. p.2.

The complexity is increased because philosophical inquiry itself plays a part in changing moral concepts. It is not that we have first a straightforward history of moral concepts and then a separate and secondary

history of philosophical comment. For to analyze a concept philosophically may often be to assist in its trans formation by suggesting that it needs revision, or that it is discredited in some way, or that it has a certain kind of prestige. Philosophy leaves everything as it is--except concepts.
2. MORAL PHILOSOPHY CAN CHALLENGE CURRENT HIERARCHIES

Alasdair Maclntyre. professor of social philosophy at the University of Essex, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS, 1966. p.3.

So the Athenians who condemned Socrates to death, the English parliament which condemned Hobbes’

Leviathan in 1666, and the Nazis who burned philosophical books were correct at least in their apprehension that philosophy can be subversive of established ways of behaving. Understanding the world of morality and changing it are far from incompatible tasks. The moral concepts which are objects for analysis to the philosophers of one age may sometimes be what they are partly because of the discussions by philosophers of a previous age.
3. PHILOSOPHICAL CRITERIA CAN ALTER MORALITY

Alasdair Maclntyre. professor of social philosophy at the University of Essex, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS, 1966. p. 13.

Thus the question of the criteria which are to be employed in moral evaluation cannot be clearly demarcated as moral but not philosophical, or as philosophical but not moral. Of course, to clear up the conceptual problems is not of itself to determine completely how we ought to act or to judge, but it does determine the limits of moral possibility in part. The task of the moralist and the task of the philosopher are not identical; but they are not entirely distinct either.

UNDERSTANDING HISTORY IS CRITICAL FOR INTERPRETING OUR VALUES

1. HISTORICAL STORIES PROVIDES A WAY TO UNDERSTAND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman & Thomas McCarthy, Professors of Philosophy, AFTER PHILOSOPHY:

END OR TRANSFORMATION, 1989, p. 381.

Shakespeare’s HAMLET is a striking literary example of the interweaving of moral and epistemological crises; Galileo’s and Newton’s synthesis of the natural sciences is one of the best examples of how epistemological crises may be resolved; and our present moral situation is a clear case of an unresolved crisis that goes to the very foundations of our social existence. The outstanding task of philosophy today is to understand the sources of the epistemological and moral crisis of contemporary culture and of the incommensurable values that it involves. On Maclntyre’s view, the construction of historical narratives plays a central role in accomplishing this task.


2. HISTORY PROVIDES AVENUE FOR EVALUATIONS

Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman & Thomas McCarthy, Professors of Philosophy, AFTER PHILOSOPHY:

END OR TRANSFORMATION, 1989, p. 381-2.

Above all, he(Maclntyre) is opposed to the consideration of arguments as “objects of investigation in abstraction from the social and historical contexts of activity and inquiry in which they axe or were at home and from which they derive their particular import”; in place of decontextualized argumentation he proposes a “particular genre of historical writing.” This kind of philosophical history is required not only for an adequate understanding of what a particular point of view is--making intelligible how it came to be advanced and in what type of situation--but also for an evaluation of its claim of rational justification.


3. VALUES AND MORALS ARE JUSTIFIABLE AT A PARTICULAR HISTORICAL MOMENT Kenneth Baynes, James Bohinan & Thomas McCarthy, Professors of Philosophy, AFTER PHILOSOPHY:

END OR TRANSFORMATION, 1989, p. 382.

When such claims involve alternative or incompatible conceptual schemes, they can be evaluated only historically, that is, in terms of the predecessors and rivals whom [a scheme] challenged and displaced.

More specifically, the case for the rational superiority of a scientific, moral or epistemological theory is made by showing that it is the best so far--that it transcends the limitations of its competitors (avoiding their defects while explaining them) and has successfully resisted all attempts similarly to transcend it (defeating all potential rivals while incorporating their strengths).


CATHARINE A. MacKINNON

LEGAL THEORIST 1946 -




Biographical Background


Catharine MacKinnon is a noted law professor who has become a lightening rod for controversy. As an adamant crusader against any and all pornography, MacKinnon has become a controversial legal scholar.
Known as “Kitty” to her family and friends, MacKinnon is the child of conservative parents; her father was a federal judge and deeply involved in the Republican Party in Minnesota. She was the third generation of women in her family to attend Smith College. She graduated magna cum laude with a bachelor’s degree in government.
She went to Yale Law School in the 70s where she worked with the Black Panthers and also supported anti-Vietnam War efforts. In addition to her law degree, she also earned a Ph.D. in political science from Yale.
All Pornography Must Be Banned

For many people, the issue of pornography is a complex topic. No one can easily define it, describe it, or defend it. However, in 1983, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin developed their simple, yet controversial definition of pornography. In sum, they describe pornography as the “graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words.”1 Under such a sweeping definition, MacKinnon believes any materials—such as films, books, and magazines—that contain these depictions should be banned. While the majority of people are confused about what is or is not pornography, MacKinnon is steadfast in holding to this definition.


One reason so runny people are uneasy with MacKinnon’s approach to pornography is that she advocates censorship by calling for a ban on all materials which fit under her definition. Many claim such a narrow definition violates the first amendment. MacKinnon defends her approach by pointing out that the harms caused by pornography do not justify protecting the free speech rights of its creators. As MacKinnon

explained in a 1993 interview, she believes pornography should not be viewed as free speech but as an act of discrimination against women, and therefore punishable.2 In essence, MacKinnon argues against pornography from a civil rights perspective.


Those who support MacKinnon’s perspective on pornography believe she truly understands the effects it has on society. As Charlotte Allen of The Washington Post put it, “MacKinnon sees the real harm of pornography: that it expresses and encourages the breakdown of the customary restraints on the libido that make up the social fabric in general and regulate relations between men and women in particular.”3
It would seem to be a logical extension of her years at Yale that MacKinnon would become involved in the anti-pornography crusade. While she was at Yale, she became active in feminist activities and actually created the first course to be included in their women’s studies program.4 Given her devotion to the women’s movement, it is somewhat disheartening to her that she now is the target of attack by many feminists, including Betty Friedan, Adrienne Rich, and Kate Milett, for her views on pornography.
Since the mid 1980s, MacKinnon has been working with Dworkin to enact pornography laws that are based on their theory. In the United States, most attempts have been struck down by the courts (or rejected by local governments) including an ordinance they helped to draft for the city of Minneapolis. However, their policy has been adopted in Canada.
What is unique about their definition of pornography is that it excludes any references to morality, or

“prurient interests,” which are standard in today’s obscenity laws. And even though most courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court still hold to the obscenity standard when analyzing questions of pornography, MacKinnon and Dworkin have introduced a new dimension to the debate.





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