1. SOCIAL CONTRACT PROTECTS PROPERTY
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1947, p. 14.
Where shall we find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and the property of each associate, and by which every person, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself and remain as free as before? Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract gives the solution.
2. SOCIAL CONTRACT PROTECTS RIGHTS
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 1973, p. 181.
If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from ~t, I should say: ‘As long as a people is compelled to obey, and obeys, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, and shakes it off, it does still better; for, regaining its liberty by the same rights as took it away, either it is justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away.’ But the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.
3. SOCIAL CONTRACT PROTECTS COMMON GOOD
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU, 1974, p. 84.
As long as a number of men, having joined together, consider themselves a single body, they have only one will, which is directed toward the common security and well-being. The forces that move the state are then simple and vigorous; its principles are clear and illuminating; there are not tangled, conflicting interests; the common good is always so obvious that it can be seen by anyone with common sense.
4. ALL IN SOCIETY MUST SUBMIT TO SOCIAL CONTRACT TO RECEIVE ITS PROTECTION Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU, 1974, p. 19-20.
In order, therefore, that the social pact shall not be to an empty formality, it tacitly includes one stipulation without which all the others would be ineffectual: that anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free, for such is the condition which gives each citizen to his country and thus secures him against all personal dependence This condition is essential to the functioning of the political machine, and it alone legitimizes civil obligations, which would otherwise be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most outrageous abuses.
SEPARATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES MUST EXIST
1. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL MUST BE SEPARATED FROM EXECUTIVE ROLE Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 1973, p. 239. He who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted. It seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded ,and the prince and the Sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak, no more than a government without a government.
2. IT IS DANGEROUS TO NOT SEPARATE LEGISLATIVE FROM EXECUTIVE DUTIES Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 1973, p. 239.
It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them , or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote to it particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to private points of view. In such a case, the State being altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible.
USE OF STRENGTH DOES NOT PRODUCE CIVIL SOCIETY
1. MORALITY CANNOT BE DERIVED FROM PHYSICAL FORCE Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU, 1974, p. 11.
The strongest man is never strong enough to maintain his mastery at all times unless he transforms his strength into right and obedience into a duty. Hence the right of the strongest, a right that is taken ironically in appearance and established as a principle m reality. But will anyone ever explain what the term means? I do not see what morality can be derived from physical force.
2. MIGHT DOES NOT MAKE RIGHT
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU, 1974, p. 11.
For if might makes right, the effect changes with the cause: Any might greater than the first will take over its right. As soon as one can disobey with impunity, one can disobey legitimately, and since the strongest is always in the right, one has only to act in such a way as to be the strongest.
3. FORCE MAKES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS MEANINGLESS
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE ESSENTIAL ROUSSEAU, 1974, p. 11.
But what kind of right is it that ceases to exist when strength perishes? If a man is forced to obey, he no longer has any obligation to do so. It is clear that the word ‘right” adds nothing to force; in that connection, it means nothing at all.
SOVEREIGNTY IS A FALLIBLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
1. SOVEREIGNTY CANNOT GUARANTEE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL CONTRACT Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1947, p. 123.
It is even more impossible to guarantee the continuance of this agreement, even if we were to see it always exist; because that existence must be owing not to art but to chance. The Sovereign may indeed say: ‘My will at present actually agrees with the will of such and such a man, or at least with what he declares to be his will”; but it cannot say, “Our will shall likewise agree tomorrow”; since it does not belong to any consent to what might be injurious to the being from whom the will proceeds.
2. SOVEREIGNTY IS INDIVISIBLE
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1947, p. 24.
For the same reason that sovereignty is inalienable, it is indivisible. For the will is general or it is not; it is either the will of the whole body of the people, or only of a part. In the first case, the declared will is an act of sovereignty and constitutes law; in the second, it is but a private will or an act of magistracy, and it is at most but a decree.
3. AUTHORITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT ABSOLUTE
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Philosopher, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 1947, p. 25.
This error arises from our not having formed exact ideas of the sovereign authority, and from our taking for parts of that authority what are only its emanations. For example, the acts of declaring war and making peace are considered as acts of sovereignty, when in fact they are not so, because neither of these acts is a law, but only the application of the law, a particular act which determines the application of the law, as we shall clearly perceive when the idea attached to the word “law” is fixed.
Share with your friends: |