Relations impacts and cp’s


Uslu 03 (Nasuh, “The Turkish-American relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance”, pg 298)



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Uslu 03 (Nasuh, “The Turkish-American relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance”, pg 298)


The most important thing which triggered the widespread anti-Americanism in Turkey was the Turkish belief that the United Stated did not work enough to stop atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, which began at the end of December 1963, but continuously prevented the Turkish government from intervening in Cyprus to protect lives and rights of Turkish people on the island. President Johnson’s letter to Turkish P.M. Inonu in June 1964 further fuelled the anti-Americanism among Turkish people and brought radical changes in the thinking of Turkish rulers. Johnson had threatened theat NATO might not come to Turkey’s help if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey because of its intervention in Cyprus and he had reminded the Turks that they could not use U.S.-supplied weapons in their actions in Cyprus. While mainly leftist groups and university students arranged mass demonstrations against the USA and attacked American buildings in major Turkish cities, Turkish authorities showed their disappointment over the U.S. attitude with their statements. In one point Turkish Prime Minister Inonu hinted that Turkey could leave the Western camp. Nevertheless, frictions between the USA and Turkey on the official level did not last long. TO change the unpleasant image of the United States among Turkish people, U.S. leaders reiterated their commitment to Turkish secuirity, offered more financial assistance and voted against the UN decision in December 1965, which supported the Greek cause. Turkish rulers announced that it was not their intention to change their foreign policy line and leave the Western camp.

Cyprus = key issue




Cyprus solution is key to U.S-Greece-Turkey relations

Uslu 03 (Nasuh, “The Cyprus question as an issue of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American Relations”, Nova Science Publishers, page 43)


The future of Cyprus has always been determined by the outside powers. After being ruled by the Ottomans and the British for centuries, the powers of the Western camps set out the structure of Republic of Cyprus and became its guarantors. Turkey, Greece, the United States, NATO, and the European Union are the powers, which will have some kind of impact on a future Cyprus solution. The views and interests of these powers on the Cyprus question also inevitably affect the developments in this important matter. On the other hand, the Cyprus issue is an important factor that will be able to shape the mutual relations among the United States, Greece, and Turkey. The interactions between these three powers have importance to the extent that they will take part in the establishment of the new world order. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the Cyprus question in the context of conflicting and carrying interests of the concerned powers. Especially the vital importance of the Cyprus issue for Turkey and the American involvement in the matter has the potential to affect the future of Cyprus. The Turkish side’s reaction to the Greek and Cypriot-Greek side’s co-operation with the European Union in shaping the future Cyprus state representing the whole island and the American intervention in this development might create repercussions not only for Cyprus, but also for the region and the whole world. In this article, the recent events related to the Cyprus issue will be studied with constant references to views, interests, and interventions of the concerned powers. Especially the Turkish and American actions and approaches will be the main focus of the study.


Cyprus CP solves – misperception



The US is key to negotiating a solution – the CP reverses the status quo misperception that the U.S. is an agent of Greece

Yilmaz 05 (Muzaffer Ercan, assistant professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations (IR) at Balikesir University, Bandirma Economics and Public Administration Faculty, Bandirma/Balikesir. He earned his Ph.D in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia in 2002. He taught Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, “The Cyprus Conflict and the Annan Plan: Why one More Failure?”, http://eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/5/C5-S1-2-M4.pdf)



But on the other hand, despite its complexity and difficulty, the Cyprus conflict somehow needs to be resolved. The present situation, the divided status of the island, does not fit the agenda of global politics. It provides a negative example for growing secessionist movements around the world. Nor is the idea of double enosis, the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, which was actually proposed by the United States as an option in the 1960s, politically acceptable. It creates emotional problems for Greek Cypriots, who still harbor a wish to “own” the whole island, as well as for Turkish Cypriots, who have over thirty years’ experience in running their own lives and businesses as a separate community. A settlement can be reached in one of the two ways: Either the two communities themselves will reach an understanding or the international community will devise and impose a solution. The latter has actually been tried before, in the 1959 and 1960 Zurich-London Agreements, of which Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain were a part. That solution did not last. Although some scholars showed the quality of the agreements as the principal source of their failure (i.e., the agreements were too rigid, too much in favor of the Turkish community – Hampson, 1996: 540), it was indeed not the content of the agreements, but the very imposed nature of them that mainly bought about their downfall. As discussed earlier, both Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks basically viewed the Zurich-London agreements as the denial of their national aspirations, enosis and taksim, respectively. Thus, perhaps the best solution will be the one found directly by the parties themselves. Yet the major difficulty affecting policy making for years has been each side’s conviction that the other side has irredentist ambitions. The mutual fear of becoming victim again, being attacked one more time by the other side, perpetuates a hostile vigilance and an unwillingness to take risk. It is for this reason that intervention by third-party groups is essential if the cycle of mutual hostility is to be interrupted, and subsequently the conflict is to be carried forward. But who should be the right third-party, or parties? It might be thought that the United States (US), much more than any other third-party, can particularly be helpful, since it is the only power that has considerable influence over the four key players: the two Cypriot communities, as well as Athens and Ankara. Indeed, the US did intervene the conflict as a mediator from time to time. For instance, in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords, former assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke proclaimed that 1996 would be the year of the Cyprus settlement, working actually vigorously on the issue (See, Peacework 17, 1997). Later, in April 1998, he made another attempt, albeit without a positive result. Since then, the US has provided diplomatic support, either directly or via the UN, for a solution. However, in the eyes of most Cypriot Turks, the US, regardless of which party actually occupies the White House, is an agent of the Greek lobby (and thus the Greek government), which pushes for a Cyprus settlement only for domestic political reasons. Therefore, the US should be careful in pushing for an agreement, although it may help the parties to communicate and improve their relationships (passive mediation role).


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