Turkish Weekly 7/1 [2010, [JTW Analysis] Turkey’s Everlasting Fight Against PKK and The U.S. Variable European Union With Turkey, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/103921/-jtw-analysis-turkey%E2%80%99s-everlasting-fight-against-pkk-and-the-u-s-variable.html]
Relations between Turkey and the U.S. started to change in 2007, when U.S. policy towards Iraq entered in a new phase. The Bush Administration acknowledged the fact that Iraq’s stability could not be ensured without support from the neighboring countries, and Turkey was undoubtedly the most reliable country. As a consequence “The U.S. wanted to get Turkey’s help and Turkey’s expectation focused on the elimination of PKK. As a consequence, Turkish-American relations got better. However, Obama did not change dramatically towards the PKK and Northern Iraq” Yegin affirms. Nowadays, relations between Turkey and Northern Iraq are fruitful and friendly. Turkey is in fact Northern Iraq’s main FDI (foreign direct investment) provider, and also according to Professor Ihsan Bal, USAK expert on terrorism, the recent PKK attacks and Turkey’s retaliation onto Northern Iraqi territory is not likely to curb relations (see Latest Terrorist Attacks: What does it Mean for Turkey?, June 23, 2010). Indeed, in another recent piece (see Barzani in Ankara: Normalization of Relations, Distancing from PKK, June 9, 2010) Mehmet Yegin argues that U.S. gradual disengagement away from Iraq is likely to produce a substantial alteration of power distribution within Iraq. The central government is withdrawing power from KRG and it is in Barzani’s interest to keep good, which means economic, relations with Turkey alive.PKK presence in KRG’s territory is highly detrimental for the future of Turkish-Iraqi relations and Barzani’s differentiation between PKK and KRG is certainly a positive sign for either Turkey’s fight against territory and Iraq’s stability. However, the U.S. variable should not be forgotten. Mehmet Ali Birand on June 28, develops the thesis that the U.S. and Northern Iraq could easily have the better of PKK if only Turkey would demonstrate to swap something for it (see Turkey, U.S. negotiating over PKK in exchange for Iran, Hurriyet). The recognition of the Armenian genocide, smoother attitude towards Israel and harder stance against Iran could be assumed as ‘bargaining chip’ to trade vital intelligence over PKK maneuvers and support to fight it back. In 2007 the U.S. agreed to enhance a trilateral mechanism for information sharing to further strengthen the fight against PKK. It would be important to understand to what extent the recent attacks depended on the U.S.’ unwillingness to cooperate.
Cyprus CP 1NC
Text: The United States federal government should shift its diplomatic strategy to support Turkey in its conflict with Greece over Cyprus.
The CP solves Turkish distrust of the U.S. and spills over to other relations issues
Uslu 03 (Nasuh, “The Cyprus question as an issue of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American Relations”, Nova Science Publishers, page 43)
Thus, Turkish leaders thought that they had made extremely generous concessions on the Cyprus question and therefore expected that after the stationing of the UN force in Cyprus the United States would take a more pro-Turkish stance and pressurize Makarios and the Greek side to make concessions for a settlement of the problem. In Turkish eyes, this expected American attitude never materialized and on the contrary, American officials demanded more concessions from Turkey each time Makarios rejected a new American proposal. It was under these circumstances that Turkish Prime Minister Inonu made some statements severely criticizing the West and hinting change in Turkey’s traditional pro-Western foreign policy.In his interview with Time magazine in mid-April 1964, Inonu stated that while Turkey had done her best to preserve its alliance with the West, her allies had been competing with the enemies of the Western camp in destroying the Western alliance and warned that “if our allied do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up and then a new kind of world order will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place.” Criticizing lack of American pressure on the Greek side, which violated the Cyprus constitution and international agreements. Inonu said that, “I had trusted in the leadership of America, who had responsibility within the Western alliance, I am suffering now as a result of this attitude.” Turkish President Cemal Gursel expressed his dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Western powers on the Cyprus question in his stateroom on 16 April 1964. He said that if the NATO powers did not support Turkey in her national and just cause, i.e. her Cyprus policy, he would see it as an unfriendly action. The next day Turkish Defense Minister IIhami Sancar criticized the NATO alliance on the ground that it did not take serious and effective actions to protect peace in Cyprus and in the eastern Mediterranean, and it did not offer support for Turkey, which was a requirement for co-operation within NATO. On 21 April 1964, the semi official Turkish radios broadcast a comment which criticized the American inactivity on the Cyprus question, stating that the United States had to warn and pressurize Greece on its actions on Cyprus, otherwise the NATO alliance would lose its meaning, During the parliamentary debate on 5 May 1964, Nihat Erim, an influential MP of the Republican People’s Party which was in power, accused the United States and other NATO members of not condemning the Greek Cypriots and Greece, which violated the international agreements on Cyprus openly. Heasked: “If our allies show this hesitation in a small matter how can we trust them in more important matters such as national security and defense.” Empirically, taking Turkey’s side in the Cyprus conflict boosts US-Turkey relations