Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange
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Confidence Building MeasuresQPQ SolvencyThe US should offer cooperation on civilian and scientific space activity with China in exchange for joint development of confidence-building-measures over space assets and militarizationBruce W. MacDonald in 2008, independent consultant in technology and national security policy management. From 1995 to 1999, he was assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as senior director for science and technology on the National Security Council staff., CFR Council Special Report No. 38 September 2008, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707 The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment. At the same time, the United States and China should both pursue diplomatic options to increase clarity and minimize misunderstanding on space-related matters, and reduce the chances of accidental conflict. This comprehensive mix of military and diplomatic measures is more likely to achieve U.S. space and larger national security objectives than either by itself. As important as deterrence is, however, it should not be the only objective. Given that deterrence failure in space is less unlikely than nuclear deterrence failure, it is in the interest of the United States to prepare for this possibility. Modest, traditional counterspace attacks— such as localized jamming of U.S. satellites and attacks against intheater ground stations—seem almost certain to occur at some point in the future and should not pose a major threat if protective measures and countermeasures are taken. The present asymmetry in U.S. and Chinese space assets affects deterrence. Given that China’s space presence is growing rapidly, the effect of this uneven dependence on space will lessen over the next fifteen to twenty years. In the meantime, the United States should have a clear set of asymmetric deterrence options available—such as inter- ference with internal Chinese lines of communication and control and overall conventional superiority—as a hedge until China’s space infrastructure becomes more substantial. In addition, Washington needs accurate estimates of China’s likely military and civilian space architecture, and improved understanding of China’s offensive counterspace doctrine. Some are attracted to a U.S. posture of dominance in space, and such a vision has superficial appeal. However, this attraction overlooks the serious difficulties that accompany it. Space assets are far more difficult to defend than to attack, and it will be well within China’s capability in the mid term to prevent the United States from attaining a dominant space position. Already China’s economy is growing as fast as that of the United States in absolute terms. One may wish otherwise, but the United States will not be able to maintain its near monopoly on space power into the future, though perhaps, with smaller margins, it can remain preeminent in space for many years to come. The United States faces an attractive space future if it does not let the best be the enemy of the good. U.S. space superiority is possible, but space dominance is not likely. Ground-based offensive assets are more survivable, and hence less destabilizing in a crisis, and are also likely to be less expensive and more reliable. Conversely, space-based offensive assets are vulnerable and have significant potential for crisis instability, offering huge incentives for adversaries to strike first. Thus, what the United States chooses to acquire as its offensive capability should first be evaluated against these criteria, as well as those suggested on page twenty. While the United States has too long abjured possible diplomatic approaches to space, the Bush administration has recently begun to make serious efforts to seek agreement with China and others on nonbinding confidence-building measures and rules of the road. Their efforts are commendable, worthy of prioritized effort, and should be encouraged. Despite differences of view between the United States and China on issues of space, diplomatic progress should be possible, given the overlapping interests of both. Policy Recommendations – The Department of Defense (DOD) should establish stability and space-asset protection as major U.S. objectives in space and work with the State Department to develop framework deterrence principles for U.S. counterspace policy that recognize the primacy of deterring attacks on U.S. space assets and maintaining stability in space. – The president and the National Security Council should modify national space policy to allow negotiated restrictions on the basis of verifiability and U.S. interests and discuss possible negotiating options with U.S. allies prior to beginning discussions with China and other space powers. – Defense and State should assess the impact of different U.S. and Chinese offensive space postures and policies on stability and deterrence in space through intensified analysis and “crisis games,” in addition to war games, to gain a better understanding of the strategic landscape of space and deterrence. – The National Security Council should evaluate the desirability of a “no first use” pledge for offensive counterspace weapons that have irreversible effects. – On a quid pro quo basis, State and NASA should discuss with China the opportunities for greater civilian space cooperation as a confidence-building measure. 36 China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security Program Recommendations – DOD should evaluate all future space programs and initiatives in terms of their contribution to stability and deterrence in addition to its other criteria and place greater emphasis on survivable groundbased offensive capabilities with reversible effects than on spacebased capabilities. – DOD should develop a broad suite of space-asset defensive capabilities, such as shielding, spoofing, avoidance maneuvers, “self-aware satellites,” and others commensurate with the importance of those assets to U.S. military posture. – DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should enhance U.S. SSA capability and augment it with corresponding space intelligence capabilities, as well as with their ability to monitor how U.S. satellites and others are behaving under potential or actual attack conditions. – The Air Force should pursue selected offensive capabilities meeting important criteria—including effectiveness, reversible effects, and survivability—in a deterrence context to be able to negate adversary space capabilities on a temporary and reversible basis. – DOD should diversify its means of providing space information and services across additional space and non-space assets to reduce vulnerability to attack and complicate adversary attack planning. – DOD should refrain from further direct ascent ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as China does, unless there is a substantial risk to human health and safety from uncontrolled space object reentry. Diplomatic Recommendations – The State Department and DOD should expand dialogue with China to establish rules of the road, codes of conduct, and other confidence-building measures, as well as to build upon current militaryto-military dialogue on space issues. 37 – The State Department and DOD should enter into discussions with China on a KE-ASAT testing ban, as the major near-term need is to address KE-ASAT on both sides, especially at geosynchronous orbit, where lethal space debris would last forever. – President Bush should offer China at least a mutual moratorium on further KE-ASAT testing, if not a formal agreement, and invite other countries to join. – As a confidence-building measure, the State Department and the Department of Commerce should review restrictions on commercial and scientific space activity with China, easing them where possible and prudent (subject to national security caveats) in return for greater Chinese transparency on its military space efforts. China Says Yes- Other Areas ProveChina agrees to CBM’s they already have proposed twoGlaser in 2014 (Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia; “A STEP FORWARD IN US-CHINA MILITARY TIES: TWO CBM AGREEMENTS” November 11, 2014; http://amti.csis.org/us-china-cbms-stability-maritime-asia/) In 1998 the United States and China established the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) to avoid accidents when their respective maritime and air forces operate in close proximity. Sixteen years of negotiations yielded little progress, until now. Two agreements on military confidence building measures were inked at the US-China summit in Beijing: notification of major military activities and a code of conduct for safe conduct of naval and air military encounters. Together, they hold out promise that despite persisting mistrust and ongoing preparations to deter and defeat the other side if conflict breaks out, the US and Chinese militaries can work together to reduce misperception, increase predictability, and lower the risk of accident that could result in inadvertent escalation in a crisis. Both initiatives were proposed by President Xi Jinping in June 2013 when he met with President Obama in Sunnylands. The accords are works in progress; the areas agreed to so far are limited, but there are expectations that these will be expanded through ongoing negotiations. In addition, there is an understanding that the agreements are voluntary and are not targeting a “third party.” The notification of respective major military activities will include two elements: defense reports and military exercises. The US will notify China when it issues reports such as the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the annual DoD report to Congress on military and security developments involving the PRC. China will notify the US when it issues its Defense White Paper and other such reports that it may produce in the future. Mutual notification of major shifts in defense policies will also be included. The two militaries will inform each other when they conduct major exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. The timing of notification of both reports and exercises will be left up to each side to determine, although the hope is that over time both militaries will move toward advance, rather than ex post facto notification. Notification of other major military activities will be discussed and added as annexes. The US hopes to reach agreement in the future on reciprocal notification of ballistic missile launches, including space launches. So far the PLA has been non-committal. China already has an agreement with Russia to notify each other of ballistic missile launches in the direction of each other’s territory that went into effect in December 2012. The maritime code of conduct will include guidelines for ship operators when they sail near each other at sea. These guidelines are based on internationally recognized rules of navigation including the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), and the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). In subsequent negotiations, the two militaries will negotiate procedures for deconflicting operations when aircraft encounter each other and between aircraft and ships. Beijing resisted concluding military CBM agreements with the US for years, even after the 2001 collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a US surveillance plane, primarily because it did not want to appear to give legitimacy to US close-in surveillance operations along China’s coast. Under Xi Jinping, however, China has signaled that it not only wants to avoid accidents, but also wants to establish a more cooperative relationship with the US military as part of an overall “new type of major power relations” that Xi first proposed in early 2012. Xi has apparently instructed the PLA to engage constructively with US military counterparts, including in joint exercises, and to avoid dangerous intercepts that could result in mishaps. Agreement on these basic military CBMs is a good start. As maritime patrols and aerial activities have increased in disputed waters and near contentious territories, so too has the risk of an accident that could spiral out of control. These steps, if implemented and followed by additional measures, can reduce the potential for mishaps between the US and Chinese militaries, as well as provide a template that can be applied to other regional military rivalries, such as China and Japan. Progressing to advance notification of major military activities and expanding the scope of military activities to include ballistic missile and ASAT tests will add more substance. Expanding the maritime code of conduct accord to include aircraft is essential, since air accidents are more likely and more dangerous than naval incidents. As is the case with any agreement, implementation is key, and the provisions in these agreements should be mandatory rather than voluntary when both sides are ready. Periodic meetings to discuss compliance and any violations that occur will also contribute to the shared goals of reducing misunderstanding and building a sustained and substantive bilateral military relationship. Situational Awareness Data SolvesUS and China should share space situational awareness dataBrian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf In a bilateral context, both countries should consider putting in place mechanisms that enhance the transparency of day-to-day nonmilitary activities in space. Recent efforts to enhance the sharing of space situational awareness (SSA) data between the U.S. military and Chinese satellite operators and to organize technical exchanges on space surveillance are good first steps.61 They should be followed by additional measures, such as technical exchanges and dialogue on conjunction assessment and collision avoidance procedures, as well as the creation of more robust communications channels between SSA data providers and Chinese satellite operators. At: China Steals Our TechCBM’s don’t cause technology imbalances sharing information results in better relationshipsSheffield in 2009 (Joseph L. Sheffield, Major, AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements “MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AND COOPERATION WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA” Published: April 2009; Advisor: Dr. Edwina S. Campbell Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539454.pdf) When considering confidence building measures with the Chinese, it is important to keep a long-term perspective. The U.S. must lead and encourage bilateral cooperation, even if the PRC is initially slow to follow. Over time, systematic CBM approaches will break down tensions and reduce ambiguity. Since the majority of U.S. security capabilities, which would be exposed during CBMs, are already available in open sources, DoD has little to lose from potential imbalances in information reciprocity.51 In the end, it is in the best interest of U.S. national security to take the lead in Sino-American military confidence building measures. In the long run, cooperating with the PLA will assist China in becoming a responsible global stakeholder, as USPACOM commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, and his Deputy Director of the Commander’s Action Group, Lieutenant Colonel Terrance McCaffrey, described: China’s rise will be important…While we must maintain our military capabilities to preserve regional [and global] security, interaction with China must also focus on what we can do to influence China’s development as a responsible global stakeholder…We improve understanding and reduce the potential for miscalculation during contingencies or emergencies. Our future efforts will emphasize opportunities for cooperation with China rather than areas of competition.52 There are DoD-PLA confidence building measures to pursue now. The first is an agreement to notify the other country’s military of any large military activities and training exercises. Since there are similarities between U.S. and China’s space capabilities, the DoD and PLA should also establish an annual space and satellite data exchange conference. This confidence building measure would improve understanding of ramifications of unilateral actions in the highly volatile space regime. DoD should also encourage systematic military exchanges at all levels, but target exchanges between lower-level officers with similar functional expertise. These exchanges are critical in improving the PLA’s integration into the international security structure in addition to improving its current track record of secrecy and limited cooperation. Although a wide variety of on-site visits and realistic war-fighting exercise observations are important confidence building measures to consider, it is more important for DoD and the PLA to cooperate and train in military-to-military exercises and real-world operations, especially where shared national security interests are involved, such as humanitarian assistance, maritime security missions, and search-rescue operations. CBM Solves Crisis/RelationsTransparency and confidence-building measures are key- they lead to information exchanges that diffuse crises, and form a basis for broader US-China relationsBrian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf Transparency and confidence-building mechanisms for managing tensions and crises. The prospects of banning or prohibiting the development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO technologies are slim. RPO technology has many legitimate peaceful uses and potentially significant commercial applications. Both the United States and China are likewise developing their direct ascent kinetic-kill technologies as a result of strong, but different, national interests that are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Moreover, verification challenges associated with the space domain will continue to impede any arms control initiative that is built on bans or limits on deployment of technology or capabilities. A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct ascent and RPO. TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs: information exchange on space policies, information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities.70 Improving information on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in the U.S.-China relationship in this domain. While determining a satellite’s exact capabilities and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000 human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all satellite operators.71 China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and, presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India, and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well.72 As SSA capabilities continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on responsible and irresponsible behavior in space.73 Such agreements should be aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches of national security satellites;74 signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons.75 Confidence building measures are key to prevent miscalculation and escalation in times of crisis-they also create the foundation for more robust agreementsBruce W. MacDonald in 2008, independent consultant in technology and national security policy management. From 1995 to 1999, he was assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as senior director for science and technology on the National Security Council staff., CFR Council Special Report No. 38 September 2008, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707 As the number of spacecraft, the amount of debris in orbit, and the demand for orbital slots and transmission frequencies increase each year, there is a growing need for all spacefaring nations and entities to cooperate so spacecraft can function without incident. Just as roads, airways, the broadcast spectrum, and other commonly used but finite resources require management, similar rules are needed to regulate “traffic” in space.22 Measures such as space traffic management and codes of conduct should be viewed as essential aspects of U.S. space policy. There is a need to build up “rules of the road” that all spacefaring states accept. This process will not be rapid, but gradually developing boundaries for acceptable action will provide the basis for a safer space environment and build trust that could make needed agreements possible. By proactively engaging the international community on these initiatives, the United States would demonstrate its leadership role in, and proper stewardship of, the space domain, as well as reap the resulting practical benefits. In terms of global security policy, space traffic management, codes of conduct, and CBMs can lay the foundation for a system in which nervous countries are reassured by sound data and a modus operandi that emphasizes observation, communication, and explanation, rather than fear-based reaction caused by limited information. Even on a voluntary basis, a code of conduct delineating the rights and responsibilities of spacefaring nations could provide a means to reduce the growing chaos in space and create international behavioral norms. Many variations of such a code have been discussed; one useful example is provided in Appendix I of this report. 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