Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange



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The United States federal government should offer bilateral participation in civilian and scientific space projects to the People’s Republic of China in exchange for the joint development of confidence building measures concerning the use and location of space assets.



Advantage 1- Space Arms Race



Lack of diplomacy ensures continuation of military build-up in space


Bennet et al 2015

James Bennet, Terry Tang, Robert Semple Jr., Linda Cohn, Vikas Bajaj, Francis Clines, Lawrence Downes, Carol Giacomo, Mira Kamdar, Ernesto Londoño, Anna North, Serge Schmemann, Brent Staples, Teresa Tritch, Jesse Wegman and Elizabeth Williamson. “Preventing a space war” NYTimes.com. 6-29-15. Website. Accessed 6-26-16. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/preventing-a-space-war.html?_r=0



Of all the places where conflict could erupt, space might seem the least likely, except in movies. But increasingly, it is becoming a contested environment posing new dangers. The United States sees this as a vital security issue. “Potential adversaries understand our reliance on space and want to take it away from us,” a senior Pentagon official, told Congress in March. And while everything from control of nuclear weapons to weather forecasting to cellphone use could be affected, the United States “is not adequately prepared for a conflict” in space with countries like China and Russia, he acknowledged. The specific concern is the security of thousands of satellites and vehicles, like the international space station, that orbit Earth. America has long dominated space, but many other nations also have valuable assets in orbit. Satellites enable the Pentagon to locate enemies on the battlefield, verify arms control treaties and ensure early warning if an adversary targeted the country with an intercontinental ballistic missile. In the Cold War, the United States and Russia engaged in limited testing of antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons. Now China, and to a lesser extent Russia, are actively developing such offensive capabilities, including jammers, lasers and cyber weapons that could damage satellite operations. A turning point came in 2007 when China conducted its first successful ASAT test by blowing up one of its own weather satellites. The hit unleashed more than 3,000 pieces of debris into space and fed suspicions about China’s intentions. Suggestions by Chinese experts that, in a conflict over Taiwan, Beijing might be able to shoot down an American early warning satellite only deepened American concerns. Preventing conflicts in space will require more diplomacy. China, which has shown little interest in focusing on the issue, agreed last week during talks in Washington to hold regular discussions on space cooperation and avoiding satellite collisions. Some concrete progress on these issues would be helpful when President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China hold a summit meeting in the fall. China and Russia have proposed a legally binding treaty that would ban the use of force or weapons in space, but most experts consider such a pact unverifiable. A more practical course would be for them to work with the United States and the European Union to establish norms for responsible behavior, including not to test ASAT weapons. A United Nations-convened meeting planned for July should aim to approve a code of conduct proposed by the Europeans, whether or not Russia and China sign on. The Obama administration is ready to invest more in defensive measures. Officials say an additional $5 billion will be spent over five years on projects like anti-jamming technologies. The Pentagon is also looking to build satellites with greater resiliency. All of the major powers have much to lose if the potential for conflicts in space escalates further.

This forces responses to focus on military approaches alone- both countries are gearing up because of mutual distrust


Freese 15 (Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. Published July 21, 2015 at chinausfocus.com. Accessed 06/27/16 http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-space-rhetoric/)

The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) refers to the space environment as increasingly congested, contested and competitive.[4] Simply by virtue of the increased number of spacecraft in orbit certain space orbits are becoming more crowded, or congested. The United States, however, has more spacecraft creating that crowded situation than any other nation. As of January 31, 2015, the United States has 528 satellites in orbit, compared to China’s 132, Russia’s 131 and all other nations combined 434. Unless, however, it is the U.S. expectation that other countries would consider the unfettered use of space as a U.S. entitlement, it is perhaps neither unexpected nor unreasonable that space is increasing congested, and perhaps then by extrapolation contested and competitive. The contested and competitive aspect of the NSSS, especially with regard to China, also flows from rapid and expansive Chinese efforts to modernize its military to include space assets and counter clear U.S. military advantages by asymmetric means. This is where word play becomes especially dicey. Given that most space technology is dual-use, meaning of value to both military and civilian communities and difficult to determine whether the military technology is for offensive or defensive use, almost anything China does in space can be ascribed as threatening to the United States. Missile defense technology exemplifies the dilemma, and how words can shape perceptions. Whereas, for example, the United States has not officially tested anti-satellite technology (ASAT) since the 1980’s, the technical capabilities required for a successful ASAT program are very similar to those of a missile defense program, and the U.S. regularly conducts missile defense tests. In 2007, China conducted a high-altitude, kinetic-hit ASAT test against one of its own defunct satellites, and de facto labeled it as such, a test which created massive amount of space debris and for which it rightfully received considerable international condemnation. Subsequently, in 2008 the United States then destroyed one of its own malfunctioning satellites, ostensibly due to public safety concerns, using modified missile defense technology. The international lesson learned: Missile defense tests are politically acceptable while ASAT tests are not. Consequently, China has conducted “missile defense” tests — not ASAT tests — in 2010, 2013 and 2014. Similarly India, also known to have an interest in ASATs, has also initiated a missile defense program and Russia has raised the possibility of reinvigorating its missile defense program as well. Missile defense is defensive, and therefore acceptable, whereas ASATs are offensive and therefore indicative of space being contested and competitive. Given the accepted narrative of the space environment as congested, contested and competitive, the U.S. must have a response. In keeping with the apparent appeal of three-word catchphrases, the NSSS states that the United States must be prepared to deter, defend and defeat challenges in space. That provides the opportunity for the most Orwellian aspect to the space dialogue, a U.S. push for “offensive counterspace” (OCS). First articulated in 2004, Air Force counterspace doctrine details the planning and execution of operations against space systems and satellites, for both defensive and offensive purposes.[5] Offensive counterspace infers the potential inclusion of preemptive operations. Again, however, words are important, with the terms preemption and prevention inappropriately used as synonymous, as with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq as a preemptive action.[6] Since a 19th century formulation known as the Caroline test, preemptive self-defense has been upheld as within the bounds of customary international law if the necessity is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Prevention, however, are actions taken in the short term to fend off a longer-term, potential threat. As with Iraq, preventive actions are frequently referred to as preemptive, for political and legal justification. Given the ambiguous, dual-use nature of space technology and the difficulties that come into play with determining accountability for actions taking place hundreds, maybe thousands of miles in space, the potential for error in determining, anticipating and reacting to the activities of others is significant. Chinese space hawks are doing their share to up to provocative and bombastic rhetoric as well. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Chief General Xu Qiliang stated in 2009 that competition between military forces in space is “a historical inevitability.”[7] Though quickly contradicted by then Chinese President Hu Jintao, Qiliang continued to advance through the military ranks to the vice-chairmanship of the Central Military Committee, the first air force officer to do so. Overall, and in keeping with the government proclivity for tri-part descriptors, the space environment between the U.S. and China is one where misunderstanding, misinterpretation and mistrust prevail. China’s space program is rapidly expanding, but starting from a very low on the learning curve. Even though the United States military space budget is approximately $25 billion annually, ten times what China spends, that is seemingly not enough to adequately meet the challenge, and based on “revelations” in an April 2015 60 Minutes television broadcast the United States is in a Chicken-little, the-sky-is-falling position. Air Force General Jon Hyten stated that the 2007 Chinese ASAT test was a “significant wakeup call to our entire military. Until that singular event, I don’t think the broader military realized that that is something we’re going to have to worry about.”[8] Given that the 2001 Space Commission (chaired by soon-to-be Secretary of Defense Donald Rumseld) characterized space as becoming a battlefield along with land, air and the seas, and warned of a “space Pearl Harbor;” the 2002 Joint Doctrine for Space stated “The United States must be able to protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries;” and the 2004 Air Force Counterspace Doctrine stated that, “U.S. Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains spacesuperiority,” it’s hard to reconcile the apparent military surprise with the 2007 Chinese event. Further, it has been almost eight years since that event and the current policy shift. The policy shift appears to coincide with the 2014 Chinese missile defense/ASAT test. Rhetoric since then, as space analyst Victoria Samson at the Secure World Foundation phrased it, has been part of an effort to “prime the pump”[9] to a policy heavily skewed toward military operations. Specifically, “space control,” a term with a historically military, offensive connotation, has become the buzzword in national security space discussion. That term had been widely used by the George W. Bush administration, but put aside by the Obama Administration in favor of “strategic restraint,” a policy that included a full spectrum of policy options, including counterspace operations as well as diplomatic, multilateral approaches to shape the space environment. The latter now seem to have been deemphasized at best, or simply left in the dust. It is likely that the tone of space rhetoric will continue on its current course, focusing on military answers to challenges and threats. While those solutions are a necessary part of maintaining the space environment so it is available for all responsible space faring nations to use, they are necessary but not sufficient answers. Rhetoric and accompanying action must also include earnest efforts to shape the space environment.

Militarization of space causes an asymmetrical arms race and constantly escalating war – deterrence theory fails


Deblois 8, (LT. COL for the United States Air Force LT COL BRUCE M. DEBLOIS, Space Sanctuary A Viable National Strategy, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.pdf)

SPACE “militarization/weaponization” is not an “all-or- nothing” affair. For clarification, one can view military activities in space on a threat continuum (see table 1). As used here, space weaponization refers to anything greater than the cur-rent capability, which is roughly at the moderate threat level.Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense (DOD) on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: “Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead.”2 One cannot so readily make such an assumption. The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable 3 but must be weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short- term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and world-wide legitimacy of US constitutional values). At that level, many reasons suggest why the weaponization of space may not be the obvious “best” strategy. The purpose of this article is to articulate those reasons. Space- sanctuary advocates will appreciate what follows as a comprehensive summary of their position; likewise, space weaponization advocates will have to ad dress these issues if their belief (that American preemptive weaponization of space best serves this nation) is to remain on firm ground. The following summary of the case against space weaponization proceeds from the historical trend of US nuclear and space policy to consider domestic and international political concerns. It then addresses the space weaponization issue by briefly examining adversarial potential (the threat), tech no logical limitations, financial trade- offs, practical considerations of military strategy, and the emotional appeal of global security and well-being. This article is not meant to be an in-depth study of each facet of the debate; rather, it is a terse summary of the space-sanctuary argument aimed at opening the debate. Demonstrations of atomic weapons at the close of World War II and the prospect of nuclear weapons married to emerging ballistic missile technology ushered in a new era of international relations. Threatening to use military force had always been an instrument of diplomacy, but the potential for instantaneous, indefensible, and complete annihilation posed a new rubric in the games nations play. Thus, nuclear deterrence was born. Initial thoughts that such a threat relegated war fare to the shelves of history due to the prospects of massive nuclear retaliation proved naïve—sub sequent lower-order conflict did not force nuclear escalation. Symmetric nuclear capabilities among the pal powers weakened the credibility of their use, while asymmetric responses (guerrilla and terrorist tactics, aligning with nuclear-capable par ties, conflict protraction, etc.) still allowed lesser powers to test the resolve of the principals—particularly over issues of peripheral interest to those nuclear powers. Examples include Vietnam and Afghanistan. Visions of massive space superiority and the touted huge, coercive power advantage they provide will likely prove as bankrupt a notion as that of massive nuclear retaliation. In their logical evolution, both give way to strategies that recognize an international con text of reactive nations.Principal powers will simply not allow a space hegemon to emerge, and lesser powers may concede hegemony but will continue to seek asymmetric counters.The result will be a space strategy that better aligns with what evolved out of the nuclear dilemma: mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a common MAD logic developed across the globe (but primarily between the two players in the game—the United States and Soviet Union), nontraditional foreign-policy traits became apparent. Any move toward developing weapons or practices that increased the viability of the idea that one could “win” a nuclear exchange was perceived as destabilizing. Deterrence in the form of MAD had to overcome the notion of “winning”—one that could come in several forms: 1. A nation could survive nuclear attacks and prevail. Conceding offensive dominance was critical if MAD were to deter nu clear holocaust. One had to avoid an odd array of destabilizing practices and systems, including missile-defense systems and civil-defense programs. 2. A nation could use nuclear weapons on a small scale and prevail in a predominantly conventional conflict. The term theater nuclear weapons was an oxymoron—every nuclear weapon was strategic because it posed the threat of escalation. Limited use of nuclear weapons was destabilizing; hence, one had to avoid any such strategy. Prohibiting the development of the neutron bomb, in spite of the immediate tactical benefits it offered to outnumbered NATO forces in Europe, was a direct result of this logic. 3. A nation could launch a success ful first strike. Stabilizing approaches that reduced the viability of surprise via first strike were pursued. More than its name implies, if MAD were to prohibit a nuclear exchange, it had to be paired either with a reliable early warning capability allowing a reactive nuclear response or with a survivable second-strike capability. The United States pursued both: the former via space- and land- based early warning net works and the latter via submarine-launched ballistic missiles. From this experience, one can draw and apply les sons as the possibility of space weapons emerges. Clearly, these weapons offer the potential for instantaneous and indefensible at-tack. Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967(outlawing weapons of mass destruction [WMD] in space) prohibits complete annihilation, the threat of annihilation would still exist—it is difficult to distinguish space based WMD from space- based non- WMD. In simple terms, space weaponization could bring a new round of MAD. Although MAD success fully deterred a nuclear ex change over the past 40 years, it was a very costly means of overcoming the lack of trust between super powers. The dissolution of that distrust and the corresponding reduction of nu clear arms lie at the very heart of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START).Comparing the emergence of nuclear-tipped ICBMs with the accession of space weapons does yield some stark differences, however. There is no single threat to focus diplomatic efforts aimed at building trust, and there does seem to be some international support for the idea of coalescing a strategy supporting space sanctuary and deter ring third world space up-starts. Aside from these differences, though,one could assume the existence of proliferated space weapons and proceed with the thought experiment that a space-MAD strategy would emerge among the principal powers. Again, one would have to eliminate the notion of “winning” a space-weapons ex-change, and on at least the first two counts, one could do so: 1. It is logical to concede the offensive dominance of space-based weapons in low- earth orbit (LEO). Any point on earth could have a weapon pointed at it with clear line of sight; the potential of directed- energy weapons takes the notion of instantaneous to the extreme; and defense of every national asset from such an attack would prove next to impossible. 2. The same argument against the logic of “tactical” nuclear weapons would also apply to the “tactical” use of space-based weapons. Once they were used, any conflict could automatically escalate to a higher level. 3. The failing of a space-MAD strategy comes on the third count: early warning or survivable second-strike capability. Should space be weaponized and two space- capable foes emerge, there will be no 30-minute early warning window from which one actor could launch a counter attack prior to the impact of the pre emptive first strike. Furthermore, space basing is equivalent to exposure—no strike capability can be reliably hid den or protected in space in order to al low a surviving, credible second strike. Space- MAD weapons without early warning or reliable survivability logically instigate a first strike. This creates an incredibly unstable situation in which the viability of “winning” a space war exists and is predicated upon striking first (with plausible deniability exacerbating the problem), eliminating the “mutual” from MAD and only assuring the destruction of the less aggressive state. Obviously, this is not a good situation. Putting weapons in space could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy: we put them there be-cause we anticipate we’ll need them, and be-cause they’re there, we’ll be compelled to use them; hence, we needed them. The conclusion, then, of a nuclear weapons–space weapons analogy can only be that while the threats from each type of weapon are similar, the most successful strategy (MAD) for dealing with the former cannot work for the latter. Unlike the strategy for nu-clear weapons, there exists no obvious strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability. If the precedent of evading destabilizing situations is to continue—and that is compatible with a long history of US foreign policy—one ought to avoid space- based weapons. Further, even if one could construct a workable space-MAD strategy, the nuclear-MAD approach teaches that this is an intensely expensive means of dealing with mutual distrust between nations.

Space attacks escalate to nuclear war – this causes miscalculation between the two powers


Lamrani in 2016, Omar, Omar Lamrani focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to better prepare for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological advancements in the coming decades could allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space attack.


A space war would destroy capabilities that are key to US power projection and the global economy- all economic and military systems depend on them


Brian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf

Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security. At the strategic level, they enable communications with U.S. nuclear and strategic forces. Space capabilities are also essential to the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties and form the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. At the operational and tactical levels, space capabilities are the essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S.—and the global—economy. Recent studies have estimated that the Global Positioning System (GPS) alone contributed more than $68 billion to the United States’ economy just in 2013.10 U.S. satellites also provide essential data to improve weather forecasting and modeling, the value of which is hard to measure but is likely in the billions. The global space economy is currently estimated to be more than $330 billion a year, with likely trillions more in indirect benefits to everything from crop management to international banking and trade, all of which benefits U.S. national and economic security.11

Loss of US hegemony leads to widespread use of nuclear weapons


Tooley, 3-19 – [Mark Tooley, Graduate from Georgetown University, Work at the CIA, 3-19-2015, Christianity and Nukes American nuclear disarmament will not leave the world safer or holier, The American Spectator, http://spectator.org/articles/62090/christianity-and-nukes] Jeong

Much of the security of the world relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which continues to deter, protect, and intimidate. Doubtless China would vastly expand its own relatively minimal nuclear arsenal and seek parity at least with Russia absent overwhelming U.S. power. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is engorged far beyond its strategic needs, and that arsenal has in fact been blessed by the Russian Orthodox Church, which evidently also falls outside the “ecumenical consensus.” Some religious idealists imagine that disarming the West, mainly the U.S., will inspire and motivate the world to follow suit. Such expectation is based on a fundamentally and dangerously false view of global statecraft and human nature. The power vacuum that American disarmament would create would inexorably lead to a far more dangerous and unstable world where nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would exponentially proliferate. American military and nuclear hegemony for the last 70 years has sustained an historically unprecedented approximate global peace and facilitated an even more unprecedented global prosperity. There is indeed a moral and strategic imperative for America today, which is to deploy its power against further nuclear proliferation and to deter aggression by current nuclear actors, while also developing technologies and defensive weapons that neutralize nuclear armaments. If Iran’s genocidally ambitious regime is in the end prevented from nuclearizing, it will only be thanks to American power. And if it does nuclearize, only American and Israeli nukes, perhaps joined by Saudi nukes, will deter its murderous designs. Christian teaching and humanity should demand no less.


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