Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange
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- No Co-op = Space Race
- US Dominance = Conflict
Tension NowConflict LikelyWar with China in space likely in the squo – boiling blood and propagated fear rhetoric leads to military response to challenges; plan solves thisFreese 15 (Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. Published July 21, 2015 at chinausfocus.com. Accessed 06/27/16 http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/escalating-u-s-sino-military-space-rhetoric/) The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) refers to the space environment as increasingly congested, contested and competitive.[4] Simply by virtue of the increased number of spacecraft in orbit certain space orbits are becoming more crowded, or congested. The United States, however, has more spacecraft creating that crowded situation than any other nation. As of January 31, 2015, the United States has 528 satellites in orbit, compared to China’s 132, Russia’s 131 and all other nations combined 434. Unless, however, it is the U.S. expectation that other countries would consider the unfettered use of space as a U.S. entitlement, it is perhaps neither unexpected nor unreasonable that space is increasing congested, and perhaps then by extrapolation contested and competitive. The contested and competitive aspect of the NSSS, especially with regard to China, also flows from rapid and expansive Chinese efforts to modernize its military to include space assets and counter clear U.S. military advantages by asymmetric means. This is where word play becomes especially dicey. Given that most space technology is dual-use, meaning of value to both military and civilian communities and difficult to determine whether the military technology is for offensive or defensive use, almost anything China does in space can be ascribed as threatening to the United States. Missile defense technology exemplifies the dilemma, and how words can shape perceptions. Whereas, for example, the United States has not officially tested anti-satellite technology (ASAT) since the 1980’s, the technical capabilities required for a successful ASAT program are very similar to those of a missile defense program, and the U.S. regularly conducts missile defense tests. In 2007, China conducted a high-altitude, kinetic-hit ASAT test against one of its own defunct satellites, and de facto labeled it as such, a test which created massive amount of space debris and for which it rightfully received considerable international condemnation. Subsequently, in 2008 the United States then destroyed one of its own malfunctioning satellites, ostensibly due to public safety concerns, using modified missile defense technology. The international lesson learned: Missile defense tests are politically acceptable while ASAT tests are not. Consequently, China has conducted “missile defense” tests — not ASAT tests — in 2010, 2013 and 2014. Similarly India, also known to have an interest in ASATs, has also initiated a missile defense program and Russia has raised the possibility of reinvigorating its missile defense program as well. Missile defense is defensive, and therefore acceptable, whereas ASATs are offensive and therefore indicative of space being contested and competitive. Given the accepted narrative of the space environment as congested, contested and competitive, the U.S. must have a response. In keeping with the apparent appeal of three-word catchphrases, the NSSS states that the United States must be prepared to deter, defend and defeat challenges in space. That provides the opportunity for the most Orwellian aspect to the space dialogue, a U.S. push for “offensive counterspace” (OCS). First articulated in 2004, Air Force counterspace doctrine details the planning and execution of operations against space systems and satellites, for both defensive and offensive purposes.[5] Offensive counterspace infers the potential inclusion of preemptive operations. Again, however, words are important, with the terms preemption and prevention inappropriately used as synonymous, as with the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq as a preemptive action.[6] Since a 19th century formulation known as the Caroline test, preemptive self-defense has been upheld as within the bounds of customary international law if the necessity is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Prevention, however, are actions taken in the short term to fend off a longer-term, potential threat. As with Iraq, preventive actions are frequently referred to as preemptive, for political and legal justification. Given the ambiguous, dual-use nature of space technology and the difficulties that come into play with determining accountability for actions taking place hundreds, maybe thousands of miles in space, the potential for error in determining, anticipating and reacting to the activities of others is significant. Chinese space hawks are doing their share to up to provocative and bombastic rhetoric as well. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Chief General Xu Qiliang stated in 2009 that competition between military forces in space is “a historical inevitability.”[7] Though quickly contradicted by then Chinese President Hu Jintao, Qiliang continued to advance through the military ranks to the vice-chairmanship of the Central Military Committee, the first air force officer to do so. Overall, and in keeping with the government proclivity for tri-part descriptors, the space environment between the U.S. and China is one where misunderstanding, misinterpretation and mistrust prevail. China’s space program is rapidly expanding, but starting from a very low on the learning curve. Even though the United States military space budget is approximately $25 billion annually, ten times what China spends, that is seemingly not enough to adequately meet the challenge, and based on “revelations” in an April 2015 60 Minutes television broadcast the United States is in a Chicken-little, the-sky-is-falling position. Air Force General Jon Hyten stated that the 2007 Chinese ASAT test was a “significant wakeup call to our entire military. Until that singular event, I don’t think the broader military realized that that is something we’re going to have to worry about.”[8] Given that the 2001 Space Commission (chaired by soon-to-be Secretary of Defense Donald Rumseld) characterized space as becoming a battlefield along with land, air and the seas, and warned of a “space Pearl Harbor;” the 2002 Joint Doctrine for Space stated “The United States must be able to protect its space assets and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries;” and the 2004 Air Force Counterspace Doctrine stated that, “U.S. Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains spacesuperiority,” it’s hard to reconcile the apparent military surprise with the 2007 Chinese event. Further, it has been almost eight years since that event and the current policy shift. The policy shift appears to coincide with the 2014 Chinese missile defense/ASAT test. Rhetoric since then, as space analyst Victoria Samson at the Secure World Foundation phrased it, has been part of an effort to “prime the pump”[9] to a policy heavily skewed toward military operations. Specifically, “space control,” a term with a historically military, offensive connotation, has become the buzzword in national security space discussion. That term had been widely used by the George W. Bush administration, but put aside by the Obama Administration in favor of “strategic restraint,” a policy that included a full spectrum of policy options, including counterspace operations as well as diplomatic, multilateral approaches to shape the space environment. The latter now seem to have been deemphasized at best, or simply left in the dust. It is likely that the tone of space rhetoric will continue on its current course, focusing on military answers to challenges and threats. While those solutions are a necessary part of maintaining the space environment so it is available for all responsible space faring nations to use, they are necessary but not sufficient answers. Rhetoric and accompanying action must also include earnest efforts to shape the space environment. No Co-op = Space RaceLack of cooperation guarantees a space race that erodes US-China relations broadly, and undermines US hegemony and global economic growthBRIAN WEEDEN AND XIAO HE APRIL 26, 2016, Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences., USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES, http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/ The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. US Dominance = ConflictU.S. reliance on space increases the risk of an attack.Lamrani in 2016, Omar, Omar Lamrani focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248 Space is becoming more congested, contested and competitive. Since the Soviet Union put the first satellite, Sputnik I, into space in 1957, no nation has deliberately destroyed another's satellite in orbit. But there is a growing possibility that battles may soon be waged in space. Although the militarization of space started long ago, a number of technological developments and tests over the past decade show that the race toward its weaponization is accelerating. Driven by Washington's dominance of and strategic dependence on space, U.S. rivals are working to develop and deploy anti-satellite weapons (widely known as ASATs). The technology, which began to be developed during the Cold War, has become an area of intense competition for the world's most capable militaries over the past decade. For the United States, being the leader in military space technologies provides immense advantages. At the same time, its outsized reliance on those technologies entails risks. The current unequal dependence on space, the United States fears, could give adversaries incentive to attack its infrastructure in orbit. Washington is therefore pushing to bolster its capabilities and is preparing for the possibility that a future conflict could escalate into space. As the militarized space race continues, the United States will stay focused on deterrence. A war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal. An Unequal Dependence: Washington's dependence on space infrastructure reflects the United States' dominance in space. The tyranny of time and distance inherently hinders the United States' ability to deploy its military across the globe. But the space domain effectively helps the country to overcome the limitations, allowing for enhanced force projection. As a result, the U.S. military relies heavily on its orbital assets for navigation, intelligence collection, precision targeting, communication, early warning and several other crucial activities. The great advantages that space assets afford the United States have not gone unnoticed by its potential rivals. Though China and Russia, for instance, also rely on space, they are less dependent on their space assets than the United States is. First, neither nation has as much in orbit. In addition, because both put greater focus on their immediate geographic regions, they can use more conventional tools to achieve their objectives. For instance, Beijing, by virtue of geographic proximity, could rely on its ground-based radars and sensors in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, on the other hand, would have to lean on its satellites to support a response in the same area. Despite the United States' superior ability to strike at enemy space constellations — groups of similar kinds of satellites — competitors may determine that the resulting loss of space access would be worthwhile if they could severely degrade U.S. space access. And while the United States is the most proficient nation in space-based warfare, there are limits to its abilities. Satellites in orbit follow predictable movements, have restricted maneuverability and are difficult to defend from an attack. There is little doubt that a full kinetic strike on U.S. satellites, which would inflict physical damage, would invite a devastating response. But tactics designed to degrade the satellites' abilities, rather than to destroy their hardware, could be deemed less escalatory and therefore perhaps worth the risk. These include jamming signals, hacking operational software and dazzling (temporarily blinding) or permanently disabling sensors. Calculating the risk of nonkinetic strikes, which would create little physical damage and could even be reversed, a potential foe would take into account the United States' hesitance to escalate a conflict in space, given its heavy dependence on orbital technology. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2014 2014 -> For want of a nail 2014 -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 2014 -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> International History Bee and Bowl 2013-14 Asian Division Question Set Bowl Round Six 2014 -> United states patent and trademark office 2014 -> Coffs harbour eisteddfod vocal syllabus 2014 -> Listen News Programs Schedule pledge now 2014 -> Slow club announce third album complete surrender Download 1.11 Mb. Share with your friends:
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