Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

Instability in space means that even small crises escalate quickly, and compels a first strike mentality

In the case of a conflict, the presence of operational ASAT capabilities on both sides could be a strong driver for crisis instability. Chinese military authors writing about space doctrine are increasingly focused on the importance of first strikes against U.S. space assets in order to seize the initiative and deter a U.S. attack.68 At the same time, the United States is increasingly worried about Chinese conventional ballistic missile attacks on carrier battle groups and land bases in the Asia-Pacific, which utilize ISR satellites for targeting. In response, the United States is considering “left of launch” capabilities that could include using ASAT systems against Chinese satellites to disrupt the ballistic missile kill chain.69 Thus, a crisis scenario between the United States and China could include a race condition where both sides move to strike first against the other’s space assets, which could cause the situation to escalate out of control.

Space attacks escalate to nuclear war – causes micalc

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to better prepare for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that technological advancements in the coming decades could allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space attack.

The United States is not prepared for attacks on its satellite network

Lamothe 2016

Dan Lamothe. “Space warfare with Russia and china? Pentagon urged to prepare for it” Washingtonpost.com. 1-27-16. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/27/space-warfare-with-russia-and-china-pentagon-urged-to-prepare-for-it/

Picture this: A Chinese fighter jet accidentally crashes into a Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance plane while attempting to buzz it over the South China Sea, killing all on board both aircraft. Fearing U.S. retaliation, China goes a relatively unexpected route: It uses surface-to-air missiles to shoot numerous U.S. satellites out of the heavens in quick succession. Very quickly, the Navy is forced to navigate the Pacific with little use of GPS and degraded communications, causing chaos and uncertainty. The Chinese strikes also have knocked out some of the Pentagon’s ability to control its arsenal of precision-guided weapons. None of this has happened. But the hypothetical scenario points out the reliance the Pentagon has on space and the military technology it keeps in it. Satellites have soared over the earth’s atmosphere for decades, providing the United States with a huge advantage militarily, even at a time when the conventional weapons U.S. rivals have are formidable. [U.S. military wants help to launch satellite-fixing robots into space] A new report released on Wednesday by the Center for a New American Security highlights the vulnerabilities the Pentagon has in space, and calls for a shift in strategy to safeguard it and prepare for conflict there. It’s written by senior fellow Elbridge Colby, a former member of the presidential campaign staff of Gov. W. Mitt Romney (R.-Mass.), and argues that potential adversaries like China and Russia have noticed the degree to which the United States is reliant on its “space architecture,” and begun to seek ways to threaten it. “Indeed, many observers have noted that these potential opponents judge the U.S. space architecture to be the Achilles’ heel’ of U.S. military power, in light of the depth of American reliance on theses systems and the vulnerability of the U.S. military satellite architecture,” the report said. Threats to satellites include not only missiles, but also cyber and electronic attacks that could disable them. In effect, Colby argues, “space is becoming a domain like any other — air, sea, land, and electromagnetic — in which the United States will have to compete and fight the ability to access and exploit the domain rather assume safe and uncontested passage within and use of it.” The Pentagon already has begun to prepare in response. Last year, for example, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter directed the military to begin looking at reducing its reliance on GPS satellites, arguing that the Defense Department probably won’t buy them within 20 years. “Here’s a sentiment and a prediction for you: I hate GPS,” Carter said in a exchange of questions on a blog produced by the investment firm Andreessen Horowitz. “The idea that we are all hooked to a satellite — formerly bought by me to my great resentment — in a semi-synchronous orbit that that doesn’t work in certain circumstances, does not work indoors or in valleys in Afghanistan, is ridiculous.” Colby argued that regardless what steps the military takes, it is unlikely the United States will ever have unchallenged dominance in space again. Therefore, the United States needs to consider adjusting what it will do if a satellite is attacked. During the Cold War, Colby notes, there was the threat that the United States would respond to any attack in space with devastating force. He suggests adopting new norms, including that attacks in space can result in retaliation outside space, like airstrikes on ground targets. “This is crucial to the United States’ particular interests, given the greater current U.S. reliance on space and the consequent preference of its potential adversaries to confine legitimate retaliation in the face of such strikes to space itself,” he wrote. “Yet such a candidate principle stands a strong chance of being more widely accepted as a wide gamut of countries have come to rely on space and appreciate its value and connectivity to the fullest range of civil and military applications.” [Why the Pentagon is wooing Silicon Valley — and the valley is playing hard to get] In a phone interview, Colby said that space is a perfect example of the challenges to American military superiority. There’s no reason to think China and Russia will be restrained there, and that prompted him to raise the questions about how the Pentagon can limit future warfare involving space. “In my mind, we’re going to be picking up a lot of the thinking that kind of stopped with the end of the Cold War,” Colby said. “Some people are like, ‘Well, that’s Cold War thinking,’ and my response is that there was a lot of bad thinking in the Cold War, but there also was a lot of incredibly good and deep thinking in the sense that there was this titanic struggle between the free world and the Communist bloc, and you had some of the best minds to deeply engage with these issues.” Colby said that even if the Russians or Chinese don’t shoot down satellites, they’ll look for ways to jam them and prevent their usage.

Space militarization increases the spectrum of possible conflicts- even small scenarios risk escalation

Michael Krepon in 2013, co-founder of the Stimson Center. His areas of expertise are space security and nuclear arms control and proliferation, with a regional specialization in South Asia. Before co-founding the Stimson Center in 1989, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the State Department, and on Capitol Hil Space and nuclear deterrence, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2367/1

Worst-case projections of a failure in space deterrence—as with the worst case projection of a failure of nuclear deterrence—involve catastrophic losses from a surprise attack. For some, the worst case of a “space Pearl Harbor” has displaced Cold War concerns over a disarming “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack against US nuclear forces. Only major powers have the capacity for massive attacks against a wide range of space assets in low Earth and geosynchronous orbits, as well as in between. The most persuasive deterrent against the low probability, but high-consequence nature of worst cases is the evident ability to respond with devastating effect to grievous injury. In the worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue, massive nuclear attack, deterrence was reinforced by clarifying the degree of difficulty for the attacker’s success and the horrific consequences of failure. The worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack postulates that a nuclear response would cause insufficient retribution, or might be withheld to avoid even more fearsome punishment. Those who focus on the worst case of a breakdown in space deterrence argue that the aggressor has a greater likelihood of success than with a surprise nuclear attack, and that the victim will be reluctant to respond by crossing the nuclear threshold. While worst cases lie on the improbable end of the spectrum of possibilities, they cannot be ignored. US and Soviet leaders spent excessive amounts of money and deployed improbable numbers of nuclear weapons to guard against worst cases. The resulting nuclear force postures built to deter bolt-out-of-the-blue attacks were not very reassuring. To the contrary, the buildup of nuclear war-fighting capabilities to deal with worst cases raised insecurity. In a far more constrained budgetary environment, US national leaders must decide now how much of a deterrence and insurance policy to buy against a low probability/high consequence scenario of a massive surprise attack in space. A severe crisis between major powers that plays out in space will reflect the magnitude of the stakes involved—a space age Cuban missile crisis. National leaders contemplating the first move of space warfare will face the same unalterable dilemmas of choice that Kennedy and Khrushchev faced. A leader can choose limited warfare for extremely uncertain gains and the possibility of uncontrolled escalation, or seek victory with the potential of all-out warfare and devastating consequences. In the first-ever severe crisis between major powers in space, both contestants will possess the capacity to deny each other’s pursuit of space dominance. In this way, the nature of the space domain, where offense easily trumps defense, is like the nuclear domain. Consequently, the contestants will be unable confidently to ensure decisive victory by means of surprise attack. Just as protection from fallout in nuclear exchanges cannot be secured, so, too, will the first use of kinetic-energy ASATs be self-denying: mutating debris fields will make large swaths of space inoperable to one’s own satellites, either quickly or over time. The use of non-kinetic-energy ASATs on a modest scale invites retaliation in kind or retaliation across domains. The use of non-kinetic-energy ASATs on a massive scale invites massive retaliation, if not in kind, then across domains. In the event of a severe crisis between Washington and Beijing, would a Chinese leader risk everything with this cosmic throw of the dice? In the event of warfare in space between major powers, national leaders will face an abundance of risk, just as they would in the event of warfare on the ground or at sea. The presumption inherent in worst case projections of space warfare is that disabling violence in space will dissuade conventional military responses and will not spill over to nuclear warfare. This assumption of compartmentalization weakens deterrence in all domains. The “space Pearl Harbor” scenario also assumes that warfare in space, unlike warfare in other domains, can be executed without unwelcome surprises, miscalculations, accidents or breakdowns in command and control. US and Soviet leaders did not presume this to be the case during the Cold War, and US and Chinese leaders need not presume this to be the case in the future. The conclusion reached by Kurt Gottfried and Richard Ned Lebow during a dark Cold War chapter of heightened military competition in space seems equally relevant in a US-China context: “ASATs possess a considerably greater capacity for transforming a crisis into a war, and for enlarging wars, than they do for assisting in military missions or enhancing deterrence.” This conclusion seems equally applicable to space warfare by kinetic or non-kinetic means. With the benefit of hindsight, concerns over the worst case of a bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attack now seem quite overdrawn. While military plans to execute this scenario existed, political leaders sought to avoid executing them. Worst case assessments of a space Pearl Harbor seem unlikely, as well. If a breakdown in space deterrence occurs, it could be as a result of seeking tactical advantage in conjunction with limited military operations. Alternatively, a breakdown of space deterrence could be a defensive act for signaling purposes, as has often been postulated with a breakdown of nuclear deterrence. In either case, deterrence breakdowns are most likely to happen on a limited scale alongside attempts to maintain, as much as possible, the military use of space. While worst-case scenarios appear implausible, there may well be a greater potential ambit for limited warfare in space, since satellite interference and disruption can be reversible. The requirements to shore up deterrence or to compensate for a breakdown of deterrence in these scenarios are far more modest than the requirements to deal with worst cases.

The addition of space-based weapons ensures rapid escalation in any future US-China conflict

Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, 8 (Ashley, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, “China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests,” October 2008, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2008/10/01/china-s-space-capabilities-and-u.s.-security-interests/68r, JSkoog)

Third, the growth of China’s space and counterspace capabilities contributes to raising the costs of American victory in any future conflict with Beijing. Should the United States find itself in an unlimited war with China, the outcome cannot be in doubt: Washington will win such a conflict and perhaps even win “decisively”, if there are no restraints imposed on its use of force. The presence of nuclear weapons, however, ensures that such unlimited conflicts are thankfully unlikely. Assuring victory in a limited war with China, however, becomes more problematic not because the United States suddenly loses all its military advantages in such a scenario but because a limited conflict, over Taiwan or elsewhere, would involve restrictive rules of engagement and other political-operational constraints which, even if not ultimately subversive of victory, would nonetheless increase its burdens. Because most future conflicts that can be envisaged with China involve limited wars of some kind or another, Beijing’s increasing space and counterspace capabilities – if well used – could become critical, if not decisive, in some quite representative scenarios. Fourth, China’s evolving space and counterspace capabilities promise to expand the dimensions of the battlespace – virtually and physically – in the context of any future Sino-American conflict. Because space-supported conventional operations will become critical for victory for both sides; because the space component of military actions – that is, the space, ground, and link segments in their totality – is conspicuous, highly valuable, vulnerable, and contains relatively few nodes; because defensive and offensive counterspace operations may be hard to distinguish especially in the early phases of a conflict; because both sides will seek to competitively use space to expand their situational awareness while denying the same advantage to the adversary; and, because Chinese operational planning, given its overall conventional weakness, calls for counterspace operations as an integrated element of its military response, it is likely that a future Sino-American conflict, even if intended to be limited in a political sense, will be unable to either bound its offensive operations to the local battlefield alone or resist the temptation to launch crippling attacks first. The demands of victory, even in limited wars, will thus require that the force applied – in both material and virtual senses – range far beyond the physical battlefront to the “rear”: in the adversary’s homeland, possibly in territories of third-parties, and certainly in the realms of space, electronic combat, and computer network operations. Moreover, it may create strong incentives for “first strikes” because of the perceived benefits to conventional operations arising from being able to blind an adversary decisively, even if only for a short time. In such circumstances, ensuring that a future limited war between China and the United States stays restricted will itself become a significant challenge.

Economy

Space weapons destroy the economy, even if never used

Richard Kaufman, Henry Hertzfeld, and Jeffrey Lewis ‘Space, Security, and the Economy” Richard Kaufman, a vice chair of Economists for Peace and Security; Jeffrey G. Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative; and Dr. Henry Hertzfeld, a Senior Research Scientist at the Space Policy Institute of the Elliott School of International Affairs. 2008

Developing a new methodology aimed at expanding the scope of the space economy to encompass today’s reality (and tomorrow’s growth) will help document both the importance of space to all nations, peoples, and economies as well as highlight the fragility and dependence many institutions around the world have on space assets which are not readily recognized. The educational value alone in creating and spreading an understanding among all space-faring nations of what and how everyone might be affected if space capabilities were threatened by either human or natural means will help to underscore and give tangible meaning to the importance of space capabilities. Beyond that, there is an increasing concern about nations possibly violating the long-standing legal principle that space should be used for peaceful purposes and the space environment be preserved so that all nations can safely operate their space-based equipment. The purposeful Chinese destruction of their weather satellite in January 2007 that created an enormous amount of space debris was seen as an international wake-up call to reaffirm the world’s convictions on the orderly use of space. Although different from the Chinese action, the recent US destruction in February 2008 of the out-of-control defense satellite 123 is considered by some to again raise the political issue of space weapons. These defense capabilities, even if never used in actual warfare, clearly illustrate the developing potential to disrupt the use of space for commercial and economic gain. If the risk of this disruption increases, funding for business ventures will decrease, reversing the fast-paced trends of the past 15 years. Much more will be lost than a few less commercial operations. The impact on economic growth, on people’s daily lives, and on many services we now take for granted could be very large. The important conclusion is the need to develop additional methods to make people and governments aware of the magnitude of our dependence on all types of space applications that have emerged and become part of our lives. There needs to be a better appreciation of the size and significance of the space economy, and of how much more all nations collectively have to lose than to gain by endangering space assets.

At: Space Mil Solves Arms Race

Empirics prove military superiority will not prevent an arms race – the only way to solve is through diplomatic or economic partnerships

Meteyer 2005

David O. Meteyer. “The art of peace: dissuading china from developing counter space weapons” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005 pg76-77. Webpage. Accessed 6-28-16. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1900/05Jun_Meteyer.pdf?sequence=1

As a strategy, dissuasion may not provide the same level of clarity in application as other defense policies. In addition, it is highly unlikely that American technological superiority can be harnessed in such a manner that potential adversaries give up pursuing their own security interests. No state has done this. Nonetheless, this is exactly what is proposed in the 2005 NDS. The U.S. fighter aircraft fleet is far superior to any other air force in the world. However, this does not stop other states from developing fighters, nor does it prevent them from developing systems to counter this superiority. The SAMs proliferating the globe demonstrates the inevitable pushback approaches undertaken by states confronted with an adversary who possesses superior air power. Similarly, the U.S. Navy enjoys dominance on the seas, but this does not dissuade other states from pursuing naval build up. In fact, it increases the likelihood that others will follow suit. Look no further than the buildup of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Beijing is pursuing a blue water force capable of protecting and maybe even projecting Chinese influence certainly within the Asia-Pacific and possible beyond. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President Reagan in 1983 is poor evidence that a policy of dissuasion can work. It is debatable at best that SDI caused the USSR to do anything, let alone to concede the arms race or bow out of the Cold War. First, SDI in 1983 was far from being technologically feasible. In fact, even given current technology, ground-based ABM systems have proven less than reliable. Moreover, as ABM technologies proceed upwards, costs and challenges soar. The Airborne Laser (ABL) under development at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) California is considerably further behind in research and development than the ground-based concepts frequently tested over the Pacific Ocean.119 To go one step further and try to mount an ABM system aboard a satellite would require vast sums of money and technological breakthroughs. Therefore, any belief that SDI caused the USSR to pause and reconsider its interests is doubtful. Second, even if SDI could have been developed and tested to some degree of reliability, it is also argumentative that it necessarily caused the Soviets to “give up.”120 China and space weaponry are no different today than the USSR and SDI relationship was in 1983. China will pursue whatever is in its best interests, and it will not back down or give up simply because the U.S. fields its own arsenal of space weapons. Therefore, as a strategy, dissuasion’s success is more about diplomatic and economic partnerships and less about military superiority.

Attempts at dominance will just end in stalemate – cooperation is the only way to prevent an arms race

Liller 11

Dwayne Liller. “Space deterrence or dominance” Space and defense, Eisenhower Center for space and defense studies, Vol 5 Num 1 Summer 2011, pg46-56. Webpage. Accessed 6-27-16

The Cold War illustrates how nuclear deterrence under mutual vulnerability emerged after deterrence through dominance, pursued by both sides, failed. Faced with a determined adversary, there are only short term advantages. The security dilemma guarantees a response by the other side and the action-reaction cycle ensures that neither gains any lasting security. The Cold War experience shows that, in spite of enormous effort and expense, two competitors can remain nearly as vulnerable in the end as when they started. There was evidence early in the Cold War that the long term reality would not be dominance for either side, but rather managed cooperation due to the de facto condition of mutual vulnerability. The same will likely be true of space. Space assets are vulnerable today and will remain so in spite of all the effort and money the United States can muster. The difference now is that the United States can work to implement that long term reality before spending large amounts of money trying to ward off the inevitable vulnerability. There is an opportunity to avoid a space arms race entirely. In light of the current financial troubles in the United States and elsewhere, it is in the United States best interests that an arms competition in space never occurs. The latest National Space Policy published by the Obama administration in June 2010 is a small step in the right direction. It uses more cooperative language than the previous space policy and avoids the dominance rhetoric, but does not go far enough.45 The next iteration should include specific steps required to move toward long term cooperation with a workable verification regime. Political leadership from the highest levels is required both to guide military efforts and to garner international cooperation and commitment. The effort will not be easy, but it’s much better to do it now than to wait for a space arms race to put a further drain on national coffers.

The time for US space heg is over – the only way to prevent attacks on space infrastructure will be diplomacy

Colby 2016

Elbridge Colby: Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously he served for over five years in the U.S. government, primarily in positions focusing on nuclear weapons, arms control, and intelligence reform. “FROM SANCTUARY TO BATTLEFIELD: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space” cnas.org. January 2016. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Space%20Report_16107.pdf

For the determinant reality is that the era of unchallenged U.S. dominance of space is over. Thus it is probable that some potential U.S. adversaries will, whatever corrective actions the United States is likely to pursue, be able to strike at U.S. space assets, and strike with possibly significant consequences for U.S. military power. Of course the scale and intensity of this threat will vary considerably based on the potential opponent – China and Russia will be more menacing in this respect than North Korea or Iran. But the fact remains that the United States is likely to face – and indeed is already facing – adversaries that can do serious damage to what is a vital component of U.S. military posture. Thus, because some degree of vulnerability in space appears to be inevitable and because the United States is near certain to need to continue relying on space, the United States must find ways to protect its equities in space at least in part by persuading its adversaries not to exploit those vulnerabilities. More precisely, the United States needs to find ways to induce, convince, coerce, deter, dissuade, coax, incentivize, or otherwise persuade potential adversaries that can threaten U.S. space assets not to act on that ability or to limit the extent to which they do.

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