Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange



Download 1.11 Mb.
Page24/24
Date18.10.2016
Size1.11 Mb.
#2964
TypeRequest
1   ...   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24

Aff At:



Topicality



CBM = Dip Engagement

Diplomatic engagement is confidence building measures and an attempt to reduce conflict in space


Rose 16

(Frank A., April 14, 2016, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “The Role of Diplomacy in Keeping Outer Space Safe, Secure, and Sustainable,” http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/255834.htm)

This complexity and the importance of space to our economy, our national security, and our everyday lives, has heightened the international diplomatic community’s interest in space security considerably. In this dynamic environment, diplomacy can assist in addressing the challenges of developing guidelines for space operations and orbital debris mitigation, and encouraging responsible behavior in space through the development of norms and voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures. Diplomatic engagements also provide an opportunity to enhance a common understanding of the goals and challenges related to the outer space environment, thus creating support for U.S. policy. Our diplomatic efforts are also focused on raising international understanding of the global consequences of conflict in outer space. Preventing or deterring such conflict is a global interest for all countries, because the resulting impacts of that conflict would not be limited to the militaries and countries involved, but would extend to all space-farers and all who depend upon space – which is pretty much everyone on this planet. In addition, diplomacy is an essential element in influencing countries’ calculus related to the development or employment of counterspace systems. The Department of State’s diplomatic efforts can be used to enhance and complement other U.S. Government activities to increase space mission assurance and ultimately deny an aggressor the benefits of attacks in space. Our diplomatic efforts include specific engagements in both bilateral and multilateral fora, in bilateral space security dialogues, and in the various United Nations organizational entities and regional fora. We are committed to using these efforts to prevent conflict from extending into space.

Negotiations over CBMs are a form of diplomatic engagement


Rose in 15 (Frank A. Rose Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance 31st Space Symposium Colorado Springs, CO “Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment” Published: April 16, 2015 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/240761.htm)

In addition, and very importantly, through bilateral and multilateral dialogue and diplomatic engagement we seek to identify areas of mutual interest and hopefully reach agreement on how to prevent those interests from being harmed in peacetime, and in conflict. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found many areas of mutual interest in avoiding potentially destabilizing actions. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, started a fifty-plus-year string of bilateral arms control treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. We also came to agreement in many other realms, including chemical and biological weapons. Simply stated, if the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas of mutual interest in the realm of nuclear deterrence and chemical weapons -- with the tensions and stakes as high as they were -- then in today’s climate we should be able to find areas of mutual interest among all space-faring nations regarding space security. Indeed, I would argue that it is reasonable to assume that most nations, if not all nations, would find it to be in their national interest to prevent conflict from extending into space, knowing that such conflict would degrade the sustainability of the space environment, hinder future space-based scientific activities, and potentially reduce the quality of life for everybody on Earth if the benefits of space-based applications were eroded. Convincing other nations, including China and Russia, of this objective is the role of diplomacy. The United States and China have already implemented some bilateral transparency and confidence building measures (or TCBMs) to prevent the generation of additional debris in space. As part of the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, we reached agreement on the establishment of e-mail contact between China and the United States for the transmission of space object conjunction warnings. Not only does this communication help prevent collision between objects in space, it will help to develop trust and understanding between the United States and China. Over the past few years the United States has also supported a number of multilateral initiatives that should reduce the chances of mishaps, misperceptions and potential miscalculations. Multilateral TCBMs are means by which governments can address challenges and share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and reducing tensions. Through TCBMs we can increase familiarity and trust and encourage openness among space actors.


Information Sharing = Dip Engagement

Information sharing programs constitute as diplomatic engagement


Rose in 15 (Frank A. Rose Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance 31st Space Symposium Colorado Springs, CO “Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment” Published: April 16, 2015 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/240761.htm)

Strengthening Our Deterrent Posture First, we use diplomacy to gain the support of our allies and friends. We have established numerous space security dialogues with our Allies and Partners. These dialogues help them understand the threat, as well as our diplomatic and national security goals, which is critical in persuading them to stand by our side, often in the face of tremendous pressure from our adversaries. Not only have I made numerous trips to meet with our allies in Canada, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific, I have also visited India (where we held our first space security dialogue this March), South Africa, and elsewhere in Africa to raise U.S. concerns about the threats to space systems and to discuss the way forward diplomatically. Furthermore, our Department’s leadership has also carried our message in numerous bilateral and multilateral dialogues. Diplomacy also prepares the way for closer military-to-military cooperation and allied investment in capabilities compatible with U.S. systems. We work very closely with our interagency colleagues in the Department of Defense to make sure our efforts are synchronized so that investments by our allies and friends contribute to strengthening the resilience of our space architectures and contribute to Space Mission Assurance. The resulting deterrent effect created by such a web of integrated capabilities is greater than the sum of its individual parts. For example, the Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense on Space Situational Awareness (or SSA) information sharing agreements with foreign partners. The United States has found international cooperation on SSA to be important, as international partnerships bring the resources, capabilities, and geographical advantages. We have also worked to strengthen military-to-military cooperation in satellite communications and space-based maritime domain awareness.


Space Specific- Dip Engagement

Role of space diplomacy is to cooperate with Russia and China


Rose in 15 (Frank A. Rose Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance 31st Space Symposium Colorado Springs, CO “Using Diplomacy to Advance the Long-term Sustainability and Security of the Outer Space Environment” Published: April 16, 2015 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/240761.htm)

Promoting the Responsible Use of Outer Space Second, we use diplomacy to promote the responsible use of outer space and especially strategic restraint in the development of anti-satellite weapons. Diplomacy has an important role in responding to the development of anti-satellite weapons developments that threaten the outer space environment. Responding both privately and publicly to tests of anti-satellite systems is a critical component of our diplomatic strategy. For example, in 2007, China faced tremendous international pressure following its destructive ASAT test, and this response from the international community appears to have been a factor in China changing its approach. We have not seen a destructive ASAT test since then, although China did conduct a non-destructive test of this system in July 2014. I have not been shy about expressing the U.S. Governments concerns about Chinese anti-satellite tests directly to our Chinese counterparts. We need to continue to call out the disruptive actions of countries like Russia and China both publicly and in cooperation with our allies and partners. The Department of State is also using diplomacy to reduce the chances for conflict extending into space through the promotion of responsible international norms of behavior, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Norms matter because they help define boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior. For example, we have discussed preventing mishaps and reducing potentially destabilizing misperceptions or miscalculations with China. In addition, and very importantly, through bilateral and multilateral dialogue and diplomatic engagement we seek to identify areas of mutual interest and hopefully reach agreement on how to prevent those interests from being harmed in peacetime, and in conflict. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union found many areas of mutual interest in avoiding potentially destabilizing actions. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, started a fifty-plus-year string of bilateral arms control treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. We also came to agreement in many other realms, including chemical and biological weapons. Simply stated, if the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas of mutual interest in the realm of nuclear deterrence and chemical weapons -- with the tensions and stakes as high as they were -- then in today’s climate we should be able to find areas of mutual interest among all space-faring nations regarding space security. Indeed, I would argue that it is reasonable to assume that most nations, if not all nations, would find it to be in their national interest to prevent conflict from extending into space, knowing that such conflict would degrade the sustainability of the space environment, hinder future space-based scientific activities, and potentially reduce the quality of life for everybody on Earth if the benefits of space-based applications were eroded. Convincing other nations, including China and Russia, of this objective is the role of diplomacy.

At: Containment DA



Non Unique

Non uniq. – China Space program is internationally expanding and increasing political and economic power


Zhou 2008 (Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, George Washington University; “Space Policy Volume 24, Issue 3, August 2008, Pages 132–139”)

In October 2003 China became the third country to achieve a human spaceflight capability after the USA and Russia. Just four years later, on 24 October 2007, China launched its first lunar exploration satellite. China is now one of the most actively involved countries in space. With its great progress in space activities, China has built an increasingly integrated and stable space policy. In 2000 the Chinese government issued its first white paper on space, the nation's first formal civil space policy document. In 2006 the government issued the second white paper on space, which provides direction and guidance on China's civil space development. In 2007 the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA), on behalf of the government, announced a Space Development Plan for the Next 15 Years (from 2005–2020) [1] and a Space Science Development Strategy for the Next 15 Years [2]. China is currently developing a long-term space strategy (through 2050). An effective and comprehensive space policy will promote and develop China's economy, technology and other interests. As one of the main development objectives, fundamental policies involving international cooperation were announced in a white paper entitled The Chinese Government will Develop International Space Exchanges and Cooperation [3]. Over the past 10 years China has made some progress in international cooperation and its contributions to the space benefits, the national economy and political objectives. Besides space business and launch services, China has built stable cooperative relationships with Brazil, France, Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA). Within the next 15 years, additional international cooperative projects will be announced in the Space Development Plan for the Next 15 Years; they include, among others, the Small Exploration for Solar Eruptions (SMESE) Project1 and the Kuafu Project.2


Link Turn

Turn – Not cooperating harms our economy, causes more space debris, and leads to an emboldened space race


Zhou 2008 (Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, George Washington University; “Space Policy Volume 24, Issue 3, August 2008, Pages 132–139”)

On the other hand, some commentators in the USA worry that cooperation with China will somehow compromise US economic and political progress and even US national security [7]. However, there are several potential benefits for the USA which should be given greater consideration: • Benefits for geopolitical issues and global stability. A country's strategic interests may provide the primary motivation for engaging partner nations in cooperative space ventures. The International Space Station (ISS) is a good example of this. China and the USA are both important countries and a stable relationship between them is a key factor in global stability. Space could be a focal point for promoting this kind of stability. Several European countries and Russia have undertaken cooperative activities in space with China to satisfy their geopolitical demands and other interests. Chinese participation in US-led space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good US–China relations [8], which would be good for US international relations and would provide geopolitical benefits. • The United States will be able to understand more about China's space development and direction through actual cooperation. At the moment the USA observes China's space policy and capabilities through statements in China's white papers. But studying one paper every five years is too limited and does not provide sufficient detail. Some American consulting and research institutions may simply rely on graduate students’ superficial papers to try to gain insight into the direction of China's space development. These are not full-scale or always entirely accurate, and may sometimes result in misunderstandings. If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China's space activities and directions. They may even be able to make some good suggestions for China's space projects and policies. These win–win suggestions should be readily adopted by China's policy makers to extend the two countries’ space and national benefits. • Extending US opportunities for scientific discovery. Scientists in the USA have many interesting ideas and proposals for space science and space exploration, but the US space budget, though huge compared with that of other countries, is still limited. If the USA were to cooperate with China in space science and space exploration, there would be more opportunities for US scientific discovery. For example, in the China–ESA cooperative Double Star Exploration Program, China supplied the launch service and satellite. ESA supplied the back-up scientific instruments of the Cluster mission on the satellites. This helped ESA obtain more scientific data for research through the added payload. Greater research results were achieved. ESA's instruments were valued at €800 000, which alone certainly cannot support a major new European science mission. • More choices and back-up for the USA. Space exploration is an inherently risky activity in which the element of risk can be managed and mitigated but never eliminated. It is necessary for any country to spread and manage risk. More back-up means greater safety. International cooperation can be used to duplicate capabilities which ensure that failure in one area is unlikely to jeopardize the entire mission or project. The most obvious example of this point today is the ISS's reliance on the Space Shuttle and the Soyuz for transporting humans to the station. In the next 20 years the USA and China will be realizing ambitions to fly to the Moon. By cooperating with China, this additional back-up would lower the risks involved in human spaceflight. For example, if Americans return to the Moon and meet with an accident, the Chinese lunar project or crew could supply assistance as a back-up. Usually, such arrangements are discussed and integrated from the very beginning, in the design phase. Unfortunately that does not seem very likely under current circumstances. • Savings on the cost of US space projects to free up funds for more missions. Space science and space exploration activities are all extremely expensive, whether human or robotic. It is sometimes a waste of money and resources for different countries to explore the same unknown with the same scientific goals. Humans around the world should definitely share in pursuing these missions. In contrast, duplicated efforts will result in negative byproducts, such as more space debris and an increased perception of a space race. China's space launch and satellite ability has advanced greatly. Its space budget is also very stable, although total funding is not very high. It is believed that China's civil space budget will grow continually over the next 15 years. If the USA can supply some instruments to or engage in joint research with China, it will be able to save significantly on mission costs associated with instrument development and launch. The USA would thus have more money for other worthwhile projects which other countries do not have the ability to do at present. This would obviously help the USA maintain its “space leadership”. • Some space research, inherently global in nature, involves targets in geographic locations that are important to US interests. Earth observation research is a good example. China's Earth observation data and other useful data and research achievements could enrich US research models or pools in the same fields. Scientists from both countries need to integrate data for research and development. Another example is that US scientists may need China's ground-based magnetic storm data to perfect their space weather prediction model. It will be very helpful to both countries to undertake joint research in these areas. • Benefits for the US space industry. China is a very big market. China's GDP increases by over 10% per year [9], which also means very rapid development and lots of business opportunities. The USA's space industry and its other technology-intensive products are more obviously competitive than China's. If Congress were to assume a more positive posture, the US space industry would be able to expand into China's market and reap significant benefits. This would help to reduce the USA's trade deficit as well. Europe has already entered China's space market and received economic benefits in space business and other areas.

Containment Fails

Space Containment has already failed and continued use fails


Mastalir 2009 (Anthony J. Mastalir Lieutenant Colonel; “The US Response to China’s ASAT Test An International Security Space Alliance for the Future”, USAF Drew Paper No. 8 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962 Contributors: Air University Allen G. Peck, Lt Gen, Commander Air Force Research Institute John A. Shaud, Gen, PhD, USAF, Retired, Director School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Gerald S. Gorman, Col, PhD, Commandant John B. Sheldon, PhD, Thesis Advisor August 2009 PG: 98)

“China’s ASAT test on 11 January 2007 was not nearly as “strategically dislocating” as was the subsequent realization that US national security space is ill prepared to meet the attendant challenges of the contested environment––space. Strategies to contain, coerce, or deter China are futile, as Beijing’s decision to develop space weapons was one toward greater prestige, relevance, and influence as a major space power. A new paradigm has emerged. The best response for the United States is to prepare for a very different future in space, not with weapons in kind, but with enduring solutions to preserve the utility of space exploitation for all nations. These solutions require a vertically and horizontally integrated effort across all four instruments of national power. Drawing on the inherent soft-power element of space, politicians and diplomats must craft the instruments necessary to form a national security space alliance. The unilateral approach to national security space is a broken promise for the future, and space warriors need to adopt the coalition mind-set that their land, sea, and air counterparts have employed for decades. A multilateral space surveillance fusion center must be their highest priority. All stakeholders should apply a horizontally integrated approach to difficult problems such as export control, transparency, and engagement. Space superiority can be America’s destiny, if pursued with the cooperation of like-minded space-faring nations around the world.

Download 1.11 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23   24




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page