Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

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Diplomacy Key

Offer is key

US should begin cooperation efforts by offering confidence building measures, strategic dialogue, and joint space exploration activities

Jeffrey Logan in 2007 Specialist in Energy Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division, China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA474952

Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: ! Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. Regular dialogue would need high-level political support to succeed, but could help address national security concerns. ! Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. ! Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation. Cost-sharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China. Options for Possible Cooperation. ! Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as information exchange on debris management, environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible. ! Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with “strategic communication,”23 an attempt for each side to more accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions. Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of conduct,” or even select military issues could be included. ! Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation, or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political breakthroughs during the Cold War.

Bilateral Key

The best way to sustain heg is through use of global institutions – without cooperation with China, US will lose its influence and power

Meteyer 2005

David O. Meteyer. “The art of peace: dissuading china from developing counter space weapons” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005 pg76-77. Webpage. Accessed 6-28-16. http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1900/05Jun_Meteyer.pdf?sequence=1

Specific to the rise of China, dissuasion has already proved of little utility. The U.S. has attempted to dissuade China from solving the Taiwan issue militarily. However, the Chinese continue to pursue a military capable of overrunning Taiwan, amphibious assault forces, a blue water navy, advanced SAM, and counter space weaponry. Beijing also continues to make strong and even provocative statements about Taiwanese independence. In light of these actions, it appears that dissuasion is failing. The opportunities for dissuasion to succeed with respect to China are similar to those stated in the previous section. Efforts by Washington to dissuade PLA actions and instead channel its efforts in directions more favorable to America are not realistic. This is especially true given China’s growing economy, military modernization, and increasing partnerships with other states. However, U.S. strategists are compelled to do something to protect American influence abroad. Britain faced a similar dilemma when it began to fall from its position as global hegemon during the first half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, Washington is slowly realizing, much like Britain’s leadership, that only so much can be done to protect these high levels of power. Britain’s fall from power was a direct result of the changing international system. The demise of mercantilism, the slow erosion of colonialism, and the industrial revolution combined to create an environment where British naval mastery simply could no longer control the international order in the same manner as it enjoyed previously. Today, American dominance of the international system sits upon a precipice and many theorists argue over if or when China will assume the position of global hegemon. Others debate whether U.S. policies can do anything about the changing dynamics of the world order. The designers of dissuasion are attempting to delay or possibly even secure indefinitely America’s position on top of the world. However, dissuasion will not slow down China’s economic growth, derail its global influence, or channel its security interests somewhere considered more favorable to the U.S. Therefore, it is in Washington’s best interest to promote institutions (e.g., United Nations, World Trade Organization, etc.) that will sustain significant levels of influence even if the PRC should become a greater power.

The only way space heg would be possible is if the US destroyed any chance of opposition – the best way to ensure peace will be collaboration and joint space programs

Meteyer 2005

The U.S. has the most to lose in a conflict that physically destroys space-based platforms. The forthcoming release of President Bush’s space policy will shed a little light on this subject, but some speculate that this policy, like his predecessor’s, will leave the door open for space-based weapons.121 By itself, this is not cause for alarm, but in conjunction with the pre-emptive nature that the administration approaches international relations, it is less than certain that the U.S. will leave space free of destructive devices. American forces clearly have the most to lose should space systems be subject to destruction or negation. Moreover, the cost relative to strategic value gained by weaponizing space to insure these systems is significantly more than can be justified. Furthermore, the technology required to field space weapons is theoretical at best. Granted, the fact that U.S. forces do rely on space so much is a compelling argument to field OCS systems in an effort to protect this reliance. In addition, if it were affordable and doable, then weaponizing space would be a plausible option. Despite U.S. economic and technological advantages, an unrestrained space race would impose significant costs and produce few lasting strategic advantages unless the U.S. can dominate both offensively, by destroying an adversary’s space assets, and defensively, by protecting U.S. space assets.122 However, this is not the case, and when combined with the self-induced strains placed on U.S. persona within the international community, it seems that any diplomatic weight that the U.S. may have at one time possessed has been eroding over the last few years. In essence, if Washington would stop breaking the China in the China Shop, then it may have an opportunity to cash in on its diplomatic influence and convince others that its space policy is in everyone’s best interests. From a strategic perspective, collaboration may reduce the chance of a future conflict, although this has not always been the case. Nonetheless, open communication, shared interests, and a better understanding of each other can go a long way toward reducing tensions. Furthermore, from the tactical perspective, joint space ventures would complicate any attempts by the PLA to target U.S.-only space systems. Granted, it would be impossible to make everything joint, but SATCOM, navigation, and weather systems make a good springboard for such an undertaking and would limit the number of targets available to the PLA should they consider embarking on firing a space weapon. The European Union, Brazil, and others are already working with Beijing on developing new space systems. Washington has allowed some limited U.S. involvement in China’s space program, but may need to reconsider its position and make the Chinese market even more accessible. Therefore, Washington should avoid a space policy that encourages weapons in space and discourages Sino-American space collaboration as a means to dissuade Chinese space programs and protect American systems.

Bilateral dialogue on space is key- the US should offer joint space exploration adventures as a broader framework for confidence building measures and data sharing

BRIAN WEEDEN AND XIAO HE APRIL 26, 2016, Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences., USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-CHINA TIES, http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/

Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.

Solves Deterrence/Space Weaps

Increased transparency between countries on space programs and policies is key to preventing space militarization and miscalculation

By Theresa Hitchens for Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 9 May 2013 https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Transparency.pdf

Although concerns about the safety and security of humankind’s operations in outer space have been with us since the dawn of the space age in 1957, the past decade has seen a steady increase in attention to the issue at the multilateral level. This reflects the ever increasing importance of space activities to life on Earth. Satellites and spacecraft are critical to the functioning of the global economy: including enabling banking transfers, revolutionizing the movement of goods and services, underpinning the Internet, and predicting weather and natural disasters and enabling rapid response. Space operations are also growing in importance for militaries world wide for operations on the ground, and thus the question of space security – and the potential for satellites to become targets during conflict -- impacts directly on national and international security. Finally, more and more nations are active in the space arena: there are now some 1,100 active spacecraft on orbit and more than 60 states and/or commercial entities owning and/or operating satellites. It must be said that progress at the multilateral level in addressing the threats to space security – such as competition over access to orbital slots, the proliferation of space debris, and the specter of space warfare – has been glacially slow. No new treaties regarding space security and/or safety have been signed since 1984, and that treaty, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement), has little legitimacy with only 13 ratifications and four signatures. Nonetheless, one can say that 2010-2011 saw the emergence of a consensus around the notion that multilateral cooperation/action is now required to avoid harmful competition, accidents, and the increased potential for conflict in the global commons of outer space. That now unquestioned assessment has led to movement, on several fronts, towards establishing the underpinnings of a more defined international governance structure for space activities. At the foundation of all of these efforts is the widespread recognition that before new governance practices and/or structures can be developed, transparency and confidence in state to state relationships in space must be increased. There are three current multilateral platforms in which the discussion of TCBMs now have a central role: The UN Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs, established in 2010, that will begin its work in July 2012; the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which started work on a new agenda item, “long-term sustainability of outer space activities,” in February 2010; and the European Union’s effort to attract international accession to a proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space.

Military focus alone ensures a breakdown in deterrence- only augmenting with diplomatic efforts to curb space warfare solves

Michael Krepon in 2013, co-founder of the Stimson Center. His areas of expertise are space security and nuclear arms control and proliferation, with a regional specialization in South Asia. Before co-founding the Stimson Center in 1989, he worked at the Carnegie Endowment, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the State Department, and on Capitol Hil Space and nuclear deterrence, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2367/1

This is an essential qualifier. A continued US preference to avoid a heightened competition marked by repeated displays of dedicated capability to disrupt, damage or destroy space assets depends on Beijing’s acceptance of inferred deterrence. The United States and China have both demonstrated counter-space capabilities. If Beijing decides to ramp up its space warfare capabilities, the Pentagon will not be found wanting in this competition. A far more preferable posture would be one of “contingent restraint,” whereby the Pentagon does not exercise options well within its capabilities, as long as the PLA is similarly constrained. Parallel policies of contingent restraint worked during most, but not all, intervals of the Cold War. This dynamic can also succeed under far less demanding contemporary circumstances. Deterrence is based on threats. Deterrence, by itself, is not reassuring. The Cold War did not become hot because deterrence was complemented by reassurance in the form of diplomatic accords to reduce nuclear dangers. Contingent restraint can be inferential, or it can be reinforced by diplomatic accords. Stable deterrence requires reassurance when competitors possess devastating military options. Washington and Beijing have yet to demonstrate successful diplomatic engagement to moderate a military competition in space. Neither have they agreed on cooperative joint ventures in space, like those that helped diminish pressures to ramp up US and Soviet space warfare requirements during the Cold War. Reassurance during the Cold War took the form of treaties. Senate consent to, and the entry into force of treaties regarding military space capabilities seem unlikely. Executive agreements remain possible, however. One means of reassurance—an International Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations—is readily available. Another, in the form of collaborative ventures in space science and exploration, awaits the commitment of far-sighted leaders.

Solves Arms Race

Cooperation is key to prevent a space arms race

United Nations General Assembly 21 OCTOBER 2009 Debating Outer Space Cooperation, Fourth Committee Hears Growing Number of Actors in Outer Space Could Risk Security of Space Assets, Limit Scope of Peaceful Uses

Agreeing that outer space should only be promoted for peaceful purposes, Pakistan’s representative expressed concern that space, as a “common heritage of mankind”, was under threat of weaponization and an arms race. The insistence by States with major space capabilities on incorporating the use of outer space in respective military doctrines was a dangerous trend, which would limit the scope and progress on peaceful uses of outer space, as well as jeopardize common security. Confidence-building and greater transparency were needed in the space activities undertaken by various States, and negotiation of a comprehensive convention would contribute towards that goal. Speakers also emphasized that the United Nations, through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), should continue to play a pivotal role in ensuring that countries brought the benefits of space activities to people around the world. The representative of Uruguay, speaking on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), said that the Outer Space Committee had built an invaluable heritage in the area of law and international cooperation in outer space, and its essential function in the United Nations system should be maintained and strengthened. International cooperation was the cornerstone to maintaining the use of outer space solely for peaceful uses, and MERCOSUR had high hopes for the sixth Regional Conference of the Americas, which would take place in Mexico next year.

US action is key- US refusal to engage in bilateral agreements on space militarization fuel Chinese buildup- this will lead to an arms race that collapses relations

The end result of the grave concerns by strategic analysts on both sides is likely to be a mixed blessing. It is unlikely that China will directly challenge U.S. national interests in space in the near future because its own space capabilities are still in their infancy. China also realizes that the United States will never limit itself through an arms control treaty in space or other bilateral agreements as long as it still maintains a significant advantage in power and capability. Thus, China’s most likely course of action is not to try to persuade the United States to join a multilateral space regime but rather to develop its own space power rapidly.56 As the United States will continue developing new space capabilities, probably including space-based weapons and offensive counter-space capabilities, China will also have the freedom to develop its own capabilities such as ASAT systems.57 As in the case of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, China can take advantage of the United States’ negative attitude toward space agreements.58 While there may be some limited agreement on norms of behavior or how to reduce tensions while each side is building up its capabilities, ultimately this scenario could result in a new arms race in space. The continued power gap in space will also lead China to link space to other diplomatic and national security issues. Since Beijing has no effective negotiating tools in the space domain, this strategy is seen as one potential way to influence U.S. policy. One example is the debate surrounding the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. If the United States insists on deploying this system on the Korean Peninsula, China may become much tougher on issues such as nuclear transparency and the reduction in nuclear material stockpiles.59 Further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship due to the THAAD system or any other space-related technology may also negatively affect military-to-military communications and other bilateral mechanisms. Of course, this strategy will likely have a negative impact on the overall relationship through hindering cooperation in other issue areas and undermining mutual trust. But for China, linking space to other issues is one of the few negotiating levers at its disposal.

US-China cooperation is key to prevent a space arms race- absent coop, escalation is inevitable

Space cooperation serves as a foundation for the overall bilateral relationship- absent measures of engagement, a space arms race is inevitable and relations will collapse into war

Brian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf

Innovations and activities in space will have a significant impact on the future of the U.S.-China relationship. Both countries have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development.1 Both are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Both countries also see their space accomplishments as critical to boosting national pride and international prestige, in addition to serving as a diplomatic tool to enhance soft power. Over time, space will increasingly play an important role in U.S.-China relations and could serve as either a source of instability or a means of strengthening the relationship. The most significant historical example of how space affected a relationship between major powers was the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.2 During that period, outer space emerged first as a domain for intense political and military competition and potential conflict. But in the 1960s and 1970s, agreements were made between the United States and Soviet Union that reduced the most serious tensions, and over time the space domain became more of a stabilizing force in their relationship and eventually an avenue for cooperation after the fall of the Soviet Union. Both countries developed their own space-based technical capabilities to conduct intelligence and surveillance of each other. This allowed each side to develop a better understanding of the other’s activities and enabled verification mechanisms to underpin arms control treaties and agreements, increase transparency, and reduce tensions.3 The United States and Soviet Union also developed collaborative exchanges between scientists, and even cooperated on human spaceflight with the Apollo-Soyuz program and eventually the International Space Station (ISS).4 Along the way, they needed to overcome significant differences in perception of their relative power. The Soviet Union saw itself as an equal to the United States and pursued a parallel status in all the important domains, including space. But in the eyes of the United States, the two were not equals.5 Partly as a result of this, much of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in space was not true cooperation but rather crisis management: attempting to prevent direct military collision and avoiding intervention in the other’s sphere of influence. While the U.S.-Soviet relationship in space is instructive, there are significant differences with the U.S.-China relationship today. The Cold War featured a hostile stand-off between two superpowers with opposing political and economic ideologies, and much of the rest of the world lined up behind one side or the other. The very real threat of mutual nuclear annihilation hung over every decision and crisis. Given that both sides were evenly matched in space capabilities, bilateral cooperation was an obvious choice. The context today for U.S.-China relations in space is much different. China is much more integrated into the global economic and political system than the Soviet Union was. Globalization has linked many of the world’s economies and lowered barriers to technological diffusion. Instead of two superpowers with allies and blocs lined up on one side or another, a much more complex set of relationships exists among countries, regions, and institutions. At least 60 other countries are involved in space activities in one form or another, with growing diversity of perspectives, interests, goals, and capabilities.6 Although nuclear arsenals still exist, the likelihood of their use is greatly diminished, as is their link to conventional warfighting. There is also a significant difference in capabilities between the United States and China. China has been quickly developing its space capabilities, but the United States still has a decades-long lead in many areas. And while the U.S.-China relationship is important, space is only one of many domains that affects important issues. Moreover, the United States and China have differences in their goals and capabilities for space activities, making it more challenging to find projects in which they can collaborate as equals. Space capabilities are also now much more critical for each country’s national security, increasing the chances and potential consequences of space being part of a potential conflict. All these differences make it difficult to predict precisely what type of impact space will have on the U.S.-China relationship going forward. There is a chance for the space domain to have a positive impact and serve as a stable foundation on which to build a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. At the same time, it also has the potential to be a driver of mistrust and misperceptions that could lead to an overall worsening of relations between the United States and China, and perhaps even outright conflict. Whereas the Cold War relationship between the United States and Soviet Union focused on avoiding conflict, the United States and China should not be satisfied with just crisis control measures and negative cooperation for preventing confrontation. Instead, they need to find a way to realize more comprehensive and positive cooperation in space, which could have security and economic benefits for both. Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that would be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space. The question is how to move beyond just rhetoric.

Solves War

Diplomacy is the best way to prevent war in space – providing concrete rules and punishments will deter possible attacks

Grego and Wright 2010

Laura Grego: a senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and David Wright: a senior scientist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program. “Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space” Union of concerned scientists November 2010. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf

Because negotiated agreements can reduce the likelihood and effectiveness of a potential attack, a particularly important role for diplomacy is the setting of clear international norms of behavior and specified consequences for violations. Strong norms and penalties increase the political costs of aggression. Verifiable limits on ASAT-relevant technology and on threatening behavior can also mitigate threats to satellites. Such limits reduce both the readiness of an adversary to interfere with a satellite as well as its confidence that the interference would be successful. Limits also can restrict the operational testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT weapons during peacetime so that they are less reliable and thus less likely to be used in a crisis. Negotiated restrictions can define appropriate uses and behavior for dual-use technology, and they may strengthen the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate applications of such technology. Examples of limits on uses are technological constraints on the capability of satellites to quickly maneuver in orbit; bounds on the power that a laser may transmit into space; and a restriction against coupling a high-powered laser with a satellite-tracking mirror. A limit on behavior is exemplified by, say, how closely or quickly a satellite may approach another without permission. Defining the consequences of certain actions against satellites and developing enforcement mechanisms, together with the creation of a better international space monitoring system, will not only help to deter attacks but also to assign responsibility for those that may occur. Active diplomacy can also put mechanisms into place that help prevent misinterpretation of inadvertent interference with satellites and thus help avoid any consequent escalation. While such measures do not preclude an unpredictable actor—one that is not motivated by “rational” concerns—from doing harm, developing limits is still valuable. Those actors that are most capable of doing significant damage to satellite systems are generally those that are invested in space themselves and likely to see the benefits of these limits.

International Law

The best way to enact rules in space will be through international law – current informal agreements between countries do not do enough to solve current problems

Grego and Wright 2010

The purpose of diplomatic discussions and negotiations on space is to assure the beneficial uses of that environment and prevent hostile or irresponsible ones. This goal may be achieved through agreed-upon rules, institutions, and coordinating mechanisms that would set standards of behavior, create predictability, and define rights, responsibilities, and consequences. Active diplomatic engagement, as well as the agreements it produces, can also help ensure that disputes over the use of space are averted—or at least managed in ways that do not create conflicts or exacerbate crises on the ground. While efforts to control some dangerous technologies are valuable, the primary emphasis of these efforts should be on regulating behaviors rather than technologies. The fact that much space technology is dual-use can make it difficult to construct a detailed definition of “space weapon.” But by focusing on behaviors, making progress on space security does not depend on agreeing on such a definition.18 The CD is seen by many countries as the legitimate forum for discussions on space security. However, to make fruitful space talks more likely, the countries involved might also consider new procedures that avoid the CD’s requirement of reaching consensus on an agenda, which has linked other issues to space security discussions. For example, countries at the CD could agree to allow an agenda to move forward even without unanimous agreement. Consensus could still be required for any formal agreement resulting from the discussions. More generally, the best venue, format, and scope of diplomatic engagement should all be part of initial discussions, during which time they could be chosen through agreement among the countries with the biggest stakes in the issues involved. In addition, such initial discussions should consider not only the range of problems but also the range of possible solutions and outcomes. The goal of negotiations should be to reach agreements, while recognizing that those agreements may take different forms. Less formal types of cooperation—including voluntary codes of conduct, coordination, or transparency measures (which provide information about capabilities or activities but do not constrain them)—may be appropriate solutions to some problems. Other issues may best be addressed with legally binding obligations, verification, and compliance-management mechanisms. These various options should all be considered possible parts of whatever solution is being sought. The temptation to rely entirely on informal agreements may be hard to avoid, as they are sometimes easier to negotiate and are less constraining. However, formal legal agreements have important benefits. They are binding and more durable than informal agreements, they can include more extensive and effective verification and compliance-management mechanisms, and they often establish a body with the legal authority and resources to facilitate implementation and resolve disputes. Because formal agreements are more likely than informal ones to provide the confidence and predictability that is a key benefit of diplomacy, for some issues they will be the most appropriate solutions. These solutions must be guided by the interests of the full spectrum of stakeholders. National security issues, while important, are only one aspect of space activities. The U.S. approach to these discussions (and U.S. policy) should reflect this fact by better balancing military, commercial, and civilian interests in space. Unfortunately, current international forums segregate the discussions of civil and military space issues. The United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which works closely with the UN General Assembly, considers only matters of “peaceful” civilian use of space, while the CD committee on PAROS focuses on arms control and military issues. Currently there is little coordination between these two bodies, though the CD may be able to accommodate a wider range of issues in the course of negotiations.

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