Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange



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Key to global economy

China US relations key to Warming, Global Economy, and Asian Stability


Ash in 15 (Timothy Garton Ash is a historian, political writer and Guardian columnist; “If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war” Published: Friday 16 October 2015 02.00 EDT; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america)

What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes. In the South China Sea, China has, by massive dredging operations, turned submerged reefs with names out of the novels of Joseph Conrad – Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef – into artificial islands, and is completing a 3,000m runway on Fiery Cross. President Xi Jinping recently presided over a massive, Kremlin-style parade of China’s military force, with Putin standing beside him as an honoured guest. In support of its claim to a vast area of the South China Sea, within its “nine-dash-line”, China has rammed Philippine fishing boats and buzzed a US spy plane. The US has responded by telling its Asian allies that it will run “freedom of navigation” patrols past the disputed islands. Interestingly, when Chinese warships sailed through US territorial waters around the Aleutian islands last month, the US military reacted coolly, saying the Chinese naval vessels passed “in a manner consistent with international law”. The technical term for this is “innocent passage”. So now watch out for the Chinese reaction when US warships make innocent passage past Fiery Cross or Mischief Reef. Battleships sailing defiantly past disputed islands: what century are we in? All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate domestic crisis. But the Chinese Communist party does face a long-term legitimation crisis. For decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive economic growth, which is now slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leadership’s crude attempt to command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King Canute’s confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging. They can almost certainly keep the lid on for several years but, as always happens when necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point, the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one of China’s Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation would be high. With angry, nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the Chinese nor the American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear weapons. This is not idle scaremongering; it’s something the US military, intelligence and thinktank communities think about all the time, in order to avoid it. Precisely because China’s future course will mainly depend on forces within the country, beyond Washington’s control, the United States needs a wise, consistent, strategic deployment of all the instruments at its disposal. This should be something like the “twin track” strategy adopted by the west during the last two decades of the cold war (although obviously not expecting it to end the same way). On the one hand, there should be no room for doubt in Chinese minds about what the US will accept militarily. US policy should be the opposite of what Barack Obama did over Syria (declare a “red line” and then allow Bashar al-Assad to walk across it with impunity). In China’s case, the US should declare no public red lines but in private communication, and through deeds that speak louder than words, make it clear that they exist. At the same time Washington should redouble its attempts at constructive engagement. There should be intensive efforts to find shared ground on climate change, the world economy and geopolitical issues from North Korea to Syria. The intensive business ties that already exist should buttress the relationship. There is already an extraordinary people-to-people relationship, embracing many millions of better-off Chinese who have studied, worked and lived in the west. This strategy should be coordinated with key US allies who have their own major relationships with China, such as Australia, Germany and Britain, which will welcome Xi on a state visit next week. The China expert Orville Schell suggests that the next US president should appoint a high-level special envoy to China. President Hillary Clinton, he argues – tongue only half in cheek – would have the perfect candidate in Bill Clinton, who has the prestige of a former president, the experience, and negotiating skills. President Marco Rubio could offer the job to Jeb Bush, whose father was US envoy to Beijing in 1974–75 and whose brother, George W, presided over a good relationship with China. Republican presidential candidates make random, sometimes wild comments about China As it looks at the moment, all this is pie in the sky. Republican presidential candidates make only the most random, sometimes wild, comments about China. Dr Ben Carson tweets a photograph of a US aircraft carrier with the words “This is How to Compete with China”. With a mixture of invincible ignorance and bluster, Donald Trump suggests the trouble is that China’s leaders don’t respect Obama. But if Xi just sat down for a couple of beers with dealmaker Trump, all would be well. And Hillary Clinton, the one candidate with serious policy experience of China? This week, she shamelessly reversed her position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the major trade deal with Asia which she has emphatically supported for many years and when secretary of state described as “the gold standard in trade agreements”. Her volte face is made for transparently opportunistic reasons, to pick up the Democrat labour union and protectionist votes that are currently going to Bernie Sanders, who vows to defeat the “bad trade deal”. Here is the tragedy of a policy on which so much depends for us all. The United States has a sophisticated policy community capable of generating the bipartisan and multilateral grand strategy towards China that we need. Unfortunately it has developed a way of doing politics which makes it impossible to sustain such a strategy. To adapt a famous observation by putative special China envoy Bill Clinton: it’s the politics that are stupid.

US China positive relationship promotes stability globally


Jianmin in 14 (The late Ambassador Wu Jianmin was Executive Vice Chairman of China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy, a Senior Research Fellow of the Counselors’ office of the State Council of China, a Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, a Member and Vice President of the European Academy of Sciences, and Honorary President of the International Bureau of Exhibitions (BIE); “‘The China-U.S. Relationship is Basically Good’”; Published: September 26, 2014; https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-us-relationship-basically-good)

A few days ago, I was in Washington, D.C. for a conference. While there, I met some American friends. We had an interesting discussion about what seems to me to be a debate going on in the U.S. about China-U.S. relations: One side believes the China-U.S. relationship is going through a rocky patch and is at a “low point,” with many tough issues surfacing. The other side maintains that the overall China-U.S. relationship is good, notwithstanding the present difficulties. I share the second viewpoint for the following reasons: First, the foundation of the China-U.S. relationship remains strong. Let me quote President Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening of the sixth round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue on July 9: In the past 35 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, relations between China and the U.S. on the whole have moved forward and made historic progress although there have been ups and downs. There are now over 90 mechanisms for dialogue, and last year the bilateral trade volume exceeded $520 billion, bilateral investment accounted for over $100 billion. There are over 41 pairs of friendly provinces or states from both sides, and 202 sister cities. People-to-people exchanges exceeded 4 million every year. China-U.S. cooperation not only benefits our two peoples, but also promotes peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. In both China and the U.S. there are people complaining about the lack of strategic trust between the two countries. They mention quite a few facts to illustrate their worries. No one can deny these facts, but a coin has two sides. A comprehensive vision of the China-U.S. relationship is very much needed. I went to the United States for the first time in 1971 to attend the United Nations General Assembly Session. At that time, trade between China and the U.S. was a mere 5 million U.S. dollars. Last year, it amounted to 520 billion U.S. dollars. In the 1970s, ’80s and even ’90s, such a rapid growth in bilateral trade was beyond anybody’s imagination. If there had been no mutual strategic trust, how could this growth have been achieved? It would simply have been inconceivable. I strongly believe that the mutual strategic trust can be achieved and strengthened through practical projects of cooperation. The two sides countries ought to make a greater effort to increase cooperation in all fields. Second, President Xi Jinping and President Obama have reached an important consensus on the new model of major country relationship. The two leaders held an informal summit in Sunnylands, California, in June, 2013. They agreed to build a new model of major country relationship. They were determined not to let the bilateral relationship slip into a Thucydides’ trap. The summit had historic significance; never in history had an established power and a rising power made such an agreement. The two leaders meant what they said and chose to steer the China-U.S. relationship towards a new model of major country relationship, for the benefit of the two countries and the rest of the world. Third, we have a series of mechanisms through which we can talk to each other and manage our differences. I don’t deny the existence of many problems in our bilateral relationship. But the China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world and no bilateral relationship is problem-free. There are problems when the relationship moves backward. There are problems when the relationship stands still. There are also problems when the relationship moves forward. I think that most problems appear along with advances in the China-U.S. relationship. China and the United States are two quite different countries. We have different histories, traditions, and cultures. We have different political and social systems. It is quite natural that we may have problems. What matters is that we have a series of mechanisms to cope with those problems. President Xi Jinping and President Obama meet frequently. They call each other by telephone from time to time and they exchange letters. At the ministerial level, our two sides meet regularly. In addition to track I exchanges, our “Track II” interactions are active and dynamic on issues of mutual concern. U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice came to China not long ago to prepare for the forthcoming visit of President Obama to China and his participation in the APEC Summit. She met President Xi Jinping, State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Her talks with Yang Jiechi lasted more than eight hours. Both sides are quite happy with that visit, because it has enabled the two sides to enhance mutual understanding, coordinate policies on global issues, and pave the way for the success of President Obama’s forthcoming visit to China. A few weeks ago, I gave an interview to an Asahi Correspondent based in Beijing about the China-U.S. relationship. He focused on the problems. I said there was no denying that there were problems and even that one shouldn’t underestimate them. However, what determine the quality of a bilateral relationship are common interests. The common interests of China and the U.S. far outweigh the differences. In trying to manage our differences properly, through various mechanisms, summit meetings, strategic and economic dialogues, etc., the two sides are learning how best to deal with their differences, and consequently, our bilateral relationship is growing mature. The U.S. is the only superpower in the world today. China is the largest developing country and the second-largest economy. A good, stable, and robust China-U.S. relationship is not only good news for the two countries, but also for the rest of the world.

US China relations solves upcoming resource shortages


Atlantic Council in 13 (“China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future” Atlantic Council BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Published: September 2013; Chinese Members • Chu Shulong, Deputy Director, Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies, Tsinghua University • Da Wei, Director, Institute of American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations • Du Lan, Assistant Research Fellow, Department of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies • Huang Ping, Director General, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences • Jin Canrong, Professor and Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China • Liu Qing, Associate Research Fellow, Department of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies • Qu Xing, President, China Institute of International Studies • Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies • Wang Fan, Director, Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University • Wang Yizhou, Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University • Zhao Minghao, Research Fellow, China Center for Contemporary World Studies US Members • Mathew Burrows, former Counselor, US National Intelligence Council; Director, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council • Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University • Banning Garrett, Strategic Foresight Senior Fellow for Innovation and Global Trends, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council • Sherri Goodman, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary, CNA • Barry Hughes, Professor and Director, Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver • Robert Manning, Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council • Paul Saffo, Consulting Professor, Stanford University; Senior Fellow, Strategic Foresight Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council • Jonathan Woetzel, Director, McKinsey & Company • Casimir Yost, former Director, Strategic Futures Group, US National Intelligence Council; http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf)

Ensuring resource security. One of the most vexing set of problems for the US and China and for the global community at large will be ensuring resource security in the coming decades as the demand grows dramatically for virtually all resources, including food, water, energy, and nonrenewable natural resources. Potential gaps between resource supply and demand will affect global economic growth and political stability, placing great strains on many countries and even leading to state failure and internal and regional conflict. The US and China will not only be affected indirectly by the impact of such regional developments but also will face the impact of resource constraints directly. Resource scarcities could lead to destabilizing price increases and, if extreme, even military conflict. On the other hand, strategic foresight-informed international cooperation could support measures to mitigate the supply-demand gap, enhance development and dissemination of technological solutions to resource scarcities, and provide assistance, especially food and water, where it is most needed. Monitoring, assessing, and providing warnings and recommendations for joint action to address these issues will be a continual challenge for the Vision Group.


Absent cooperation, military action and economic collapse are probable on a global scale


Stephen J. Hadley et al in 2013 Former US National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush James L. Jones Former US National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama Brent Scowcroft Former US National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush TANG Jiaxuan Former State Counselor, People’s Republic of China LI Zhaoxing Former Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China TUNG Chee Hwa Former Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, China-US Joint Working Group , http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf

The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers,

Cooperation solves: resource wars, environmental degradation, socio-economic instability


Stephen J. Hadley et al in 2013 Former US National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush James L. Jones Former US National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama Brent Scowcroft Former US National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush TANG Jiaxuan Former State Counselor, People’s Republic of China LI Zhaoxing Former Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China TUNG Chee Hwa Former Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, China-US Joint Working Group , http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf

The goal should be to move from emphasizing “balancing of power” against each other to “pooling” the power of the US, China, and other nations and non-state actors to solve global problems and meet long-term challenges. • Strengthening and rebalancing the global economy. The Vision Group can address the long-term challenges presented by the global economy, including economic rebalancing, avoiding protectionism, providing funds for economic and financial stabilization, and bolstering financial safeguards. The group could make recommendations on the best ways to cope with huge stresses on resources, especially food and water, that will be exacerbated by climate change on the one hand and the growth of population, cities, and the middle class on the other. The global economy is likely to be extremely volatile and subject to shocks as well as long-term structural changes such as the shale gas and oil revolution and the third industrial revolution. While some people in both countries express schadenfreude at the economic difficulties of the other, both nations—and the world—will be most successful when each succeeds. And that is more likely to be ensured by close US-China cooperation on the global economy as well as bilateral economic relations. • Ensuring resource security. One of the most vexing set of problems for the US and China and for the global community at large will be ensuring resource security in the coming decades as the demand grows dramatically for virtually all resources, including food, water, energy, and nonrenewable natural resources. Potential gaps between resource supply and demand will affect global economic growth and political stability, placing great strains on many countries and even leading to state failure and internal and regional conflict. The US and China will not only be affected indirectly by the impact of such regional developments but also will face the impact of resource constraints directly. Resource scarcities could lead to destabilizing price increases and, if extreme, even military conflict. On the other hand, strategic foresight-informed international cooperation could support measures to mitigate the supply-demand gap, enhance development and dissemination of technological solutions to resource scarcities, and provide assistance, especially food and water, where it is most needed. Monitoring, assessing, and providing warnings and recommendations for joint action to address these issues will be a continual challenge for the Vision Group. • Cooperation on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and consequence management. China-US cooperation will be increasingly critical to the global response to climate change. New scientific studies warn that the worst-case scenarios for climate change impacts are the most likely outcomes. Scientific assessments also maintain that anthropomorphic climate change is partly responsible for extreme weather events that the world is already experiencing at an increasing rate, from the floods in Pakistan and the heat wave in Russia to the melting glaciers and ice sheets and the “superstorm” Sandy that inflicted unprecedented destruction on New York and New Jersey. It is highly likely that global climate change will be a key issue in the coming two decades as the world faces increasing climate-induced humanitarian disasters and infrastructure destruction requiring immediate and expensive relief as well as costly, long-term adaptation. Climate change likely will increase social and political instability in many areas of the world, including emerging economies and developed countries. It also will likely renew political pressure for emissions reductions, especially by China and the United States, the world’s two biggest emitters. China-US cooperation in all these areas will be critical to whether the world cooperates and how effective any cooperation is in responding to the potentially existential threat posed by global climate change. The two countries also can build on decades of bilateral cooperation on energy and environment to seize opportunities for lucrative joint energy technology development that would substantially benefit Chinese and US businesses as well as lower costs and widely disseminate clean energy technologies.

Now is the time – cooperation with China on global threats and issues key


Stephen J. Hadley et al in 2013 Former US National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush James L. Jones Former US National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama Brent Scowcroft Former US National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush TANG Jiaxuan Former State Counselor, People’s Republic of China LI Zhaoxing Former Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China TUNG Chee Hwa Former Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, China-US Joint Working Group , http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf

The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and interdependence, but past achievements—and further progress—are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US-China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures.


Economy Impacts

Economic decline causes war—strong statistical support.


Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.

First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.

Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4

Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write,

The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)



Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.

Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

Economic wars go nuclear and global.


Kemp 10—Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Geoffrey Kemp, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.


Key to stop terrorism

US China relations solve for China’s economy, SCS, Terrorism, and Warming


Florick and Cronkleton in 2015 (Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to, East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. and Robert Cronkleton is an undergraduate at Creighton University with a focus on environmental policy, renewable energy technology, and East-West relations “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 · SUMMER 2015 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW; http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf PG: 6-8)

U.S. policymakers must understand the intricacies of Chinese decision making, especially why Beijing would want to seek new measures to promote strategic stability with Washington; this will help U.S. officials better communicate the proposal. In the past, “trust between the leaders and people of the two countries was overwhelmed by strident and abusive American invective and accompanying pressure against Chinese policies and practices as well as by bitter Chinese counterattacks on the United States and its policies and practices as the world’s ‘hegemon.’” 8 Escaping the trap of poisonous domestic politics requires a greater understanding by senior leaders on both sides of their counterparts’ challenges. For example, China’s economy faces mounting obstacles to maintaining growth. Its tremendous supply of labor during the early reform years has begun to tail off, forcing wage increases that have raised costs for businesses and consumers. Additional pressures, including the retirement bulge, migrant worker populations, and healthcare vulnerabilities, are becoming increasingly insurmountable. Beijing can break this mold, but it must come up with innovative ways to make its economy more effective and efficient. Greater cooperation with the United States presents an opportunity for continued momentum. Unfortunately, the United States is dealing with many of these same issues, as “both societies face the fundamental and long-term task of rebuilding themselves for a new age-economically, socially, and institutionally.”9 By working together on economic and social programs, the United States and China could find joint solutions in some of these areas. Similarly, territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region present a hurdle for Chinese leaders. Only by working with Washington can Beijing acquire the credibility and trust amongst its regional partners to achieve amenable solutions to its territorial challenges. “If handled correctly, [the South China Sea] will demonstrate China’s capacity to maintain good relations with [Association of Southeast Asian Nations];”10 however, the chances of an acceptable outcome will be far greater if Beijing and Washington can effectively find, through partnership, common ground and broad-based solutions to regional security. Communication will address China’s strategic interests and bolster America’s assurance posture vis-à- vis its regional allies. Dialogue on these types of issues reduces the likelihood of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. Fundamentalist Islam poses a more serious domestic security challenge to China than it does to the United States. China’s Uighur population, a Turkic and Muslim minority, has been engaged in a violent political struggle against the state-sponsored emigration of ethnic Hans into Xinjiang. Further compounding matters, some radical Uighurs are fighting with the Taliban.11 Fears over emigration combined with the training received abroad could lead to fundamentalist Uighurs becoming an even more grave challenge for Chinese internal security. These concerns over the Uighurs demand the Chinese Communist Party’s attention and engagement, but to reach amenable solutions it needs external assistance. Working with the United States could significantly improve holistic burden sharing while reducing China’s political footprint in combatting terrorism. Perhaps no two countries have a greater impact on energy and environmental security strategy than China and the United States. China finds itself in an incredibly resource constrained environment without the necessary environmental and resource management capabilities. Moreover, the consequences of environmental degradation are not limited to any particular location and must be solved multilaterally to shape not only the United States and China’s own domestic policies, but also those of their global partners and allies. Beijing and Washington’s advocacy for things such as resource preservation and environmental sustainability is vital to raising awareness and funding. The long-term commitment required to solve these systemic issues further necessitates U.S.-Chinese cooperation. By developing joint resolutions, Beijing and Washington will stand a much better opportunity of garnering international support for real, positive change. The United States’ Justification for a New Engagement Strategy with China Finite budget limitations will motivate Washington to explore cooperative opportunities with Beijing to minimize defense expenditures, while, in parallel, embarking on further options for joint economic growth. Balancing the budget is no easy task for Washington policymakers. Domestic and foreign reasons make it extremely difficult to sacrifice enough programs to begin to run surpluses. To give but one example of a complication, the 2011 Budget Control Act’s significant impacts – “$500 billion over the next nine years, on top of $487 billion” – have already complicated defense procurement strategies.12 The United States can greatly benefit from cooperation with China by leveraging two mechanisms. First, elevating the level of economic cooperation and coordination between the two states will help both economies continue to grow by increasing the tax base. Second, by continuing to sell U.S. Treasury bonds to the Chinese government and private investors, the Unites States creates greater incentives on the part of the Chinese to support the U.S. economy’s success. For budgetary and economic reasons, cooperation between Beijing and Washington is to the United States’ benefit.

Terrorism Impacts

Nuclear terrorism is likely and causes extinction – security experts agree.


Rhodes 9 (Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award, “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” 12-14, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety, RSR)

"The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.


Attack causes retrenchment- power projection becomes impossible post attack


Watts 05

[CDR Bob Watts is a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and has served six tours at sea conducting drug/migrant operations, most recently commanding the USCGC STEADFAST (WMEC 623). He is currently assigned as the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, where his responsibilities include drafting migrant policy and strategy, including planning for mass migration. A 2006 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security, he has advanced degrees from the Naval War College, Old Dominion University, American Military University, and is a doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada.] Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3



Throughout its history, the United States has been a global maritime nation, dependent upon the oceans for economy, welfare, and defense. In the modern era emphasis on globalization and the world economy has increased this dependence considerably. There are some 95,000 miles of United States’ coastline and 3.4 million square miles of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the U.S. maritime domain. 1 Connecting the continental United States to this zone are over 1,000 harbors and ports, 361 of which are cargo capable. Through these ports enter approximately 21,000 containers daily, representing ninety-five percent of the nation’s overseas cargo, including 100 percent of U.S. petroleum imports. 2 In addition to commerce, there are seventy-six million recreational boaters in the United States. Six million cruise ship passengers visit U.S. ports annually. In the strategic/military sense, a substantial portion of U.S. national power relies on the sea, both in the form of traditional Navy Carrier Strike groups that deploy from ports in the continental United States and the subsequent ability to reinforce deployed forces overseas. Without unimpeded access to the sea, the ability of the United States to project national power is extremely limited. Maritime infrastructure is crucial in maintaining this link to the sea. From naval bases to commercial ports, maritime infrastructure is well developed nationwide and is crucial to both the economic sector and military strategy. Maritime infrastructure is critical to the employment of national maritime power and as such is a logical (if not desirable) target for acts of terrorism by our enemies. A successful attack against a port could incur serious economic and military damage, present an enemy with the opportunity to inflict mass casualties, and have serious long-term detrimental effects on our national economy. Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection (MCIP) presents many challenges in an asymmetric environment. Previous models of maritime defense have focused on protecting ships from traditional naval attack; even when ports and supporting infrastructure have been considered targets, emphasis was on defense against a military threat. The Global War On Terror (GWOT) has created a number of heretofore unconsidered vulnerabilities in this traditional outlook. Many targets that would not be considered legitimate (economic, symbolic, etc.) in a conventional war must now be considered in strategic defensive planning. In conducting these attacks the unimpeded use of the sea is a force multiplier for an enemy dedicated to striking a wide range of potential targets. Possible threats from the sea are wide-ranging and diverse, relying on a combination of asymmetric offensive tactics while exploiting the variety of the littoral. This asymmetric nature of GWOT requires a multi-agency approach to devise effective command and control for modern port defense. The Coast Guard and Navy have made important strides in this area by devising experimental Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOCs) as a component of maritime anti-terrorist force protection. The expansion of this concept into multi-agency maritime homeland security is a logical next step in the evolving problem of port security and defense. This is made evident by examining likely terrorist threats to ports and studying the lessons of the past that apply in this environment which can be used to expand the current command and control system to meet the new threat NEW THREAT MATRIX: PORTS AS TARGETS The GWOT threat to ports is a relatively new element in the spectrum of naval warfare. This is largely due to the evolving nature of the shipping industry and the nation’s growing reliance on sea power. Historically, a nation’s maritime strength has been measured by the size and capability of its merchant fleet and Navy; attacks against a nation’s sea power meant the physical destruction of these ships. Ports, until quite recently, were composed of infrastructure that was relatively easy to replace or replicate, making them relatively low priority targets for an enemy dedicated to striking at maritime strength. This has changed in the modern era of containerization and the increased size and technical nature of ships. In modern times ports have become centers of highly technical, well-integrated infrastructure designed for the rapid loading and unloading of cargo, an evolution that has become highly complex in the era of containerization. Commercially efficient, port cargo operations are also highly dependent on networked operations, making the disruption of the process far simpler for a potential attacker. Additionally, the complexity of this evolution, combined with the increasing size of seagoing merchant vessels (and warships), has greatly reduced the number of commercial ports available for use by global shipping. This has the duel effect of making major ports more important economically and strategically while simultaneously making them more attractive targets for offensive action. The attractiveness of ports as targets for terrorists can be summarized as follows: A. Economic Impact: An unprecedented amount of trade — both imports and exports — relies on shipment by sea. A successful attack on maritime infrastructure would affect this trade in far greater proportion than the actual damage. It is likely that an attack on one port would have a cascade effect on others as increased security measures are applied nationwide. The recent impact of the London bombings can be seen as illustrative of this effect; although there was no indication of additional terrorist activity, security measures were increased at transportation hubs worldwide. Increasing security alerts at a train station is one thing; closing a huge economic entity such as a port is quite another. Delay of shipping in loading and offloading cargo is one of the most costly elements of the shipping process. We must also consider the impact to the shipping industry itself. During the Persian Gulf re-flagging operations of the late 1980s, for example, analysis showed the greatest impact to the shipping of oil was not the damage to tankers inflicted by the warring Iraqis and Iranians (which was, in fact, minimal), but the increased insurance costs of operating in that area. 3 An attack on a U.S. port could have a similar, if not larger, effect. B. High visibility/High Casualties: Ports are not isolated areas, but rather major centers of commerce, usually surrounded by large cities and economic centers. An attack on a port could be highly visible and potentially the scene of mass conflagration. As a result of urban development, most major ports are no longer confined to strictly industrial areas, but rather have become well-developed centers of commerce and entertainment, surrounded by built up waterside areas dedicated to tourism and recreation. Many of these facilities are located next to volatile maritime infrastructure (fuel tanks, docks, etc.) that could create mass conflagration if attacked through large explosive force. Sympathetic detonation, fires, and other catastrophic effects would certainly create mass casualties. C. Ease of attack: Commercial ports are not fortresses. The ocean itself presents a number of distinct advantages to a dedicated attacker, especially when employing maritime suicide terrorism or means to rapidly deliver large explosive force. Water is not only a tremendously efficient transport medium (allowing for rapid transit), but the large amount of legitimate commercial and recreational traffic in ports allows for an enemy to mask movements prior to an attack, making effective defense difficult. Given the importance of ports to our economy and military power, the potential for creating mass casualties, and the ease by which an enemy can attack, a strong case can be made that ports will become a target for future terrorist attacks. If this is the case, we can apply the military planning process to meeting this threat. The first step in this process is looking for lessons learned that could be used in the current scenario: have we faced this threat before, and if so, what can we learn from the experience?

Terrorism causes extinction---intelligence key to stop


Nathan Myhrvold '13, Phd in theoretical and mathematical physics from Princeton,  and founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft Corporation , July 2013, "Stratgic Terrorism: A Call to Action," The Lawfare Research Paper Series No.2, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf

Several powerful trends have aligned to profoundly change the way that the world works. Technology ¶ now allows stateless groups to organize, recruit, and fund themselves in an unprecedented fashion. That, coupled ¶ with the extreme difficulty of finding and punishing a stateless group, means that stateless groups are positioned to be lead players on the world stage. They may act on their own, or they may act as proxies for nation-states that wish to duck responsibility. Either way, stateless groups are forces ¶ to be reckoned with.¶ At the same time, a different set of technology trends means that small numbers of people can obtain incredibly lethal power. Now, for the first time in human history, a small group can be as lethal as the largest superpower. Such ¶ a group could execute an attack that could kill millions of ¶ people. It is technically feasible for such a group to kill billions of people, to end modern civilization—perhaps even ¶ to drive the human race to extinction. Our defense establishment was shaped over decades to ¶ address what was, for a long time, the only strategic threat ¶ our nation faced: Soviet or Chinese missiles. More recently, ¶ it has started retooling to address tactical terror attacks like ¶ those launched on the morning of 9/11, but the reform ¶ process is incomplete and inconsistent. A real defense will require rebuilding our military and intelligence capabilities from the ground up. Yet, so far, strategic terrorism has received relatively little attention in defense agencies, and ¶ the efforts that have been launched to combat this existential threat seem fragmentedHistory suggests what will happen. The only thing that shakes America out of complacency is a direct threat from a determined adversary that confronts us with our shortcomings by repeatedly attacking us or hectoring us for decades.




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