Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

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Space coop solves relations

General

China wants to cooperate with the US on space exploration- lifting restrictions is key- this spills over to solve US-China relations broadly

Brian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf

The third major focus of Chinese space activities is to increase scientific knowledge and expand commercial activities. Advancement of space capabilities can benefit many industries, facilitate scientific research, boost innovation in relevant areas, and increase commercial profits, such as by launching satellites for foreign customers.50 In the long run, resources invested in space technology could see significant returns. However, many Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the space sector are restricted in the world market or sanctioned by the United States. Chinese astronauts and scientists are also excluded from the U.S.-led international joint program. These restrictions have significantly impaired China’s research and industrial development in the space domain, and the country continues to attempt to persuade the United States to relax, and ultimately abolish, these restrictions.51 Increased technology transfers or trade could help China accelerate its space program and other related research. But even if barriers to technology transfer remain, relaxing restrictions to allow China to participate in joint activities would still have benefits. Chinese participation in joint programs such as human space exploration, the ISS, or other cooperative projects could increase China’s operational know-how in the space domain. And even if there is no bilateral cooperation between the United States and China, a change in U.S. export control policy could allow Chinese companies to dramatically expand their presence in the international commercial space market. The fourth and final focus of China’s space activities is to strengthen cooperation and improve bilateral relationships with other major powers, of which the most prominent is the United States. China has stated that the development of its space capabilities should not be achieved at the cost of bilateral relations or mutual confidence with other states.52 A space arms race may seriously deteriorate China’s external environment and divert precious and limited resources away from urgent domestic areas. In addition, it could shift China’s broader foreign policy and grand strategy from competitive cooperation to total confrontation. The costs of a hostile space arms race and direct conflict with the United States would thus far outweigh the benefits provided by new space capabilities. Therefore, China has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and the formation of international regimes. At the very least, such development should not harm these important diplomatic goals. Effective cooperation in the space domain may help China and the United States show goodwill to each other and set a model for bilateral cooperation to handle security and governance problems. No matter whether this is called a “new type of great-power relationship” or a “new-model major-country relationship,” a desirable Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship in space should not only encourage mutual respect and avoid confrontation but also contribute to solving global challenges such as climate change.

Cooperation on spaceflight spurs broader cooperation over space- US should use it as a stepping stone toward an arms control agreement over space

Caleb Pomeroy — June 1, 2015, is a postgraduate student at the University of Oxford, focusing on the U.S.-China space relationship, and a member of the Space Generation Advisory Council, Op-ed | Why the U.S. Should Be a Leader in Space Arms Control, http://spacenews.com/op-ed-why-the-u-s-should-be-a-leader-in-space-arms-control/

The United States is strategically positioned to show leadership in this area. Both the pro-weaponization and pro-arms-control camps want security. They differ on how to best achieve it — and this is not new. Having spent the past three days in the U.N. archives laboring over historical documents on this topic, I’m humbled by the deliberation, coordination and cooperation that went into avoiding a Cold War space arms race to accompany the arms race on Earth. Hundreds of letters and pieces of correspondence on this topic show a heated debate over how to ensure the safety of citizens in the United States and rest of the world during the second half of the 20th century. They chose to avoid a space arms race, and though the United States and Soviet Union could have monopolized activities in space at the time, they even chose to bring in the voices of the international community. This gave us the 1967 U.N. Outer Space Treaty. Less than a decade later, rather than weaponizing space, the two adversaries decided that cooperating on a manned spaceflight mission would better protect the safety of both nations. This led to the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz détente mission. During a recent visit to the Oxford Union, Buzz Aldrin explained that this mission helped warm Cold War tensions and resulted in future U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. This sort of political willpower and skillful diplomacy paved the way for the International Space Station. Aldrin went on to say the U.S.-China space relationship could use a healthy dose of this kind of diplomatic acumen today. For some reason, he forgot to mention that the United States should lead the world in a space arms race. It is no mystery that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty needs updating. To ensure the safety of American citizens and the world as a whole, U.S. leadership in space historically has taken the form of developing the best technology, and then knowing when and how to use it. The United States should develop space weapons, but it should also use this opportunity to coordinate with China, Russia and the international community to develop an equitable arms agreement. The United States keeps withholding its support for U.N. arms agreement proposals that others seem to agree on — see the years 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2014. Right now, the United States has slashed space ties with China and Russia, due to security concerns in 2011 and tensions over Ukraine in 2014, respectively. No, it should not neuter itself by signing an inequitable arms agreement. And, yes, cutting space ties shows the United States disagrees with the policies of China and Russia. But if the United States could find agreement with the Soviet Union in 1967 in the midst of a nuclear arms race, no doubt it can find agreement with Russia and China today. The short history of human activity in space has proved that despite disagreements and rhetorical battles on Earth, cooperation is possible in space. Banning space cooperation and leading a space arms race is not the U.S. leadership that beat the Soviets to the moon. Nor is this the U.S. leadership that willingly disclosed classified space intelligence to cooperate on the Apollo-Soyuz mission. The strongest showing of leadership today would be using diplomatic channels to reach an equitable and well-toothed space arms control agreement. Further, the United States could lead updates to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, especially the orbital debris and (ahem) space weapons sections. As private companies increasingly access space and the costs of orbital debris are increasingly felt on Earth, pressures to improve the treaty will come from outside groups — Elon Musk; environmental activists; anyone? For the time being, however, the U.S. government remains the strongest space power and is strategically positioned to take a leading role in finding a solution to the space arms issue.

To improve any military tension US China relations and bilateral actions must be taken

Kamphausen and Drun April 2016 (ROY D. KAMPHAUSEN is Senior Vice President for Research and Director of the Washington, D.C., office at the National Bureau of Asian Research. JESSICA DRUN is a Bridge Award Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research. “Sino-U.S. Military-to-Military Relations” Roy D. Kamphausen with Jessica Drun the national bureau of Asian research nbr special report #57 | April 2016 PG: 105)

The dimension of military-to-military (mil-mil) relations is one of the long-standing components of the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship. In recent years, the relationship between Washington and Beijing has been marked by not only growing cooperation but also increasing competition. Mitigating the effects of spillover from the latter into the former is a key factor in advancing the overall U.S.-China relationship. Consequently, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), in partnership with the Institute for China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange at Peking University, has undertaken a two-year project that seeks to identify challenges within key strategic domains and put forth pragmatic policy recommendations on how to best manage tensions and enhance bilateral relations. The mil-mil domain is growing ever more consequential in light of recent developments in the Asia-Pacific. Increasing militarization in the region and China’s assertion of its claims in the South China Sea through island-building and patrols by military and paramilitary vessels heighten the need for mil-mil contacts as a means of defusing tensions, ensuring stability, and communicating each sides’ respective objectives and interests to avoid miscalculations. As China’s military expands its breadth and reach in the region, and increasingly beyond, addressing the disconnects between the two militaries will become all the more critical in the years to come. This essay contributes to the debate over the optimal formulation for a bilateral U.S.-China mil-mil relationship. The topic has been addressed from a variety of perspectives to date. An examination of the existing literature on mil-mil relations finds that there is agreement on the utility of this dimension of the bilateral relationship for risk reduction and conflict management, but that barriers exist and certain limitations are necessary in order to safeguard U.S. capabilities and interests. For instance, Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz stress—reflecting a general consensus among experts—that conditions for mil-mil exchanges lie largely in the state of the overall bilateral relationship, and thus any expected progress on the mil-mil front must be preceded by improvements in the broader U.S.-China relationship. James Nolan finds that personnel exchanges neither have much operational value nor contribute to trust-building, but nonetheless have benefits for diplomacy and deterrence. Kevin Pollpeter argues for a security management approach to mil-mil relations over a security cooperation one, which would mitigate risks associated with imbalances in transparency and reciprocity in the relationship.1

Increased Cooperation spills over to other realms

Klomp 2010 (AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE April 2010 AIR UNIVERSITY “IS SPACE BIG ENOUGH FOR A US-SINO PARTNERSHIP?” Jeremiah O. Klomp, Major, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements; Advisor: Lt Col Richard D. Rogers Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama PG: 7)

As partners with China, we could work together to provide benefits for both countries. This path has several significant benefits, to include increased capability to conduct projects due to economic support; an increased dialog with China that may expand into other realms; and increased insight into Chinese internal operations and capabilities. However, it also carries some negative implications, including issues of space situational awareness, space control and military intelligence concerns. If we were to engage China regarding a potential space partnership, these areas would need to be addressed in detail.

Joint space ventures open extend dialog in other areas

A key driver in any joint venture is the political implications of the proposed collaboration. Our political relationship with China is tenuous at best, with neither side trusting the other completely, and in general discord respecting sensitive matters, such as the Taiwan issue and human rights discussions. Any joint venture between the US and China, particularly in an area as sensitive as space, may be perceived as waffling on our part which may then be construed as a moral compromise. Jeffrey Logan, a specialist in Energy Policy in the Resources, Science and Industry Division, points out in a special report to Congress that “China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable.”15 However, a joint venture in the name of science may help to reduce barriers and open further dialog into many areas that are currently strained. President Nixon’s so-called “Ping-pong politics,” or using non-contentious means to begin dialog in other areas, may be an effective way to open doors currently closed to US involvement. Conversely, if we are unable to come to a suitable agreement over terms, or if additional accusations of piracy or claims of ‘unintentional technology transfers’ occur, pursuing a partnership may further exacerbate tensions between us. Logan posits that any joint venture with the Chinese may be ineffective, arguing “that increased collaboration will not produce tangible benefits for the United States, especially without a new bilateral political climate.” 16 An event like this, however, could prove to be the catalyst to political advances that could result in improved and expanded political interaction. Just as the sports exchanges in the 1970’s provided 18 opportunities for the friendly exchange of ideas, so might a joint space venture provide opportunities for extended dialog in other areas. Another potential benefit from a partnering relationship with China is that it would allow us to ‘control’ the rate of their development by keeping them dependent on US technology, offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. “Collaborating with China – instead of isolating it – may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship.”17

Cooperation increases innovation

The US should remove barriers to Chinese participation in joint space projects-leads to lower costs and more innovations in space tech

Commercial and private sector cooperation. A final potential, albeit more difficult, area of cooperation is the commercial and private sector. The United States, as well as China to a much lesser extent, is currently experiencing a massive increase in commercial companies engaged in space activities. Lowering the barriers to commercial cooperation and competition and allowing Chinese companies to gradually re-enter the global market could yield significant benefits. Increased competition and supply, particularly in space launch, could lead to lower costs and greater innovation. In addition, SOEs, which conduct the vast majority of China’s commercial space activities, wield important influence in Chinese policymaking. SOEs have pushed for meaningful changes in Chinese policy in other domains and could do so in space if they have the incentive of freer markets to compete in as a result.

Even without specific projects, diplomatic engagement over space cooperation yields benefits for future development

The peaceful use of space as a geopolitical tool for engagement and cooperation. The second major area of overlap between the United States and China is their desire for the peaceful use of space as a geopolitical tool for engagement and cooperation. Both countries have invested significant resources in developing civil space programs for science and exploration that are seen as key areas for building prestige and soft power. The United States and China should develop more bilateral and international cooperation on civil space projects. Continuing to exclude China from such cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities, as some in the United States had hoped, but only ensure that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. The exclusion of civil space cooperation also leaves military-to-military engagement as the only venue for cooperation. Such engagement is more useful for mitigating tensions and crisis instability than for building a positive relationship. However, there are significant challenges to work through in this area. On the U.S. side, Congress will continue to have significant concerns over technology transfer and the potential spillover benefits that civil cooperation could have for the PLA. Both countries also currently have different goals and objectives for their human spaceflight programs. The United States is focused on extending the ISS through 2024 and plans to send humans to an asteroid and Mars by the 2030s.62 Although China also has long-term interests in the moon and Mars, its primary focus for the next two decades is building and operating its own space station in earth orbit, Tiangong 3. Rather than proposing a specific destination or goal for civil space cooperation, the United States and China should instead focus on developing a clear strategy for engagement that mixes both top-down and bottom-up joint initiatives.63 The objectives and potential benefits and risks of the strategy should be well-defined and clearly explained to national interest groups. Top-down initiatives involving high-profile activities such as human spaceflight will require significant involvement and political capital from national leaders to overcome bureaucratic inertia and resistance to cooperation. Bottom-up approaches involving low-profile areas of cooperation such as collaborative scientific research and missions will require organizational champions on both sides.

Treaties

Russia and China want treaties limiting space weapons with the US

Isyashenko in 2013 (ANDREI ILYASHENKO, SPECIAL TO RBTH (Russia Beyond the Headlines) “Moscow, Beijing look to avoid an arms race in space” Published: October 17, 2013; http://rbth.com/international/2013/10/17/moscow_beijing_look_to_avoid_an_arms_race_in_space_30911.html)

Taking the stage at the United Nations, Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that Moscow and China will submit for U.N. review a draft resolution on transparency and trust in space activities. He noted that “a lack of legal obligations prohibiting the placement of weapons in space is a factor that is negatively affecting strategic stability and preventing the establishment of new treaties on nuclear weapons.” “The Russian-Chinese draft treaty calling for filling this gap has been on the agenda of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for a long time, but, unfortunately, there has been no progress,” said Ulyanov. The “long time” to which the Russian official referred was five years. Apparently, the antisatellite missile test that the Chinese conducted on January 11, 2007, spurred the impulse to produce a joint initiative. During the test, China destroyed an old weather satellite of its own at an altitude of 530 miles. Incidentally, this is not the first time the development of new arms systems paradoxically led to their disablement. Before 2007, only the United States and Russia possessed such weapons. The first tests of antisatellite systems occurred in the late 1950s. In the 1960s, the United States developed missile interceptors that could strike spacecraft. The Soviet Union conducted the first successful tests of such weapons on January 25, 1967, launching a satellite torpedo into orbit from a mine-launching installation. This event, coupled with the Soviet Union’s successes in space and the “moon race” between the superpowers, led to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which the United States and the Soviet Union signed. The treaty barred signatories from launching into Earth’s orbit any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as banned the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies and the use of any other method to put such weapons in space. However, there was no restriction on conventional weapons in space. Later, the recognition of strategic equality during the years of détente also took a toll. The first Soviet-American treaty on limiting strategic arms — SALT I — included a mutual obligation not to attack spacecraft, guaranteeing control over the fulfillment of this agreement. Incidentally, détente was short lived. In 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan promoted the “Strategic Defense Initiative,” the idea of which was to place in space strike weapons that could hit Soviet strategic missiles in flight. This clearly showed that, in modern conditions, arms in space were the most important element of antiballistic missiles. Therefore, after the United States abandoned the agreement to limit antiballistic missiles, it became apparent that the nation was ready to return, at a minimum, to developing potential space strike weapons — lasers, and kinetic and particle beam weapons. As for destroying early warning satellites (the so-called blind strike) or communications and geolocation satellites, without which military action is now impossible, such weapons have already been ready for a long time. Moreover, China has now joined with Russia and the United States on this issue, and experts posit that China conducted its latest tests of antisatellite weapons this year. The situation is giving rise to an obvious choice: either a race of space weapons directed at celestial and earthly bodies, or a limitation based on international treaties, which is what Russia and China are proposing. The novelty of the situation lies in the fact that, together, since China’s claim to possess space weapons, they have a rather substantial stockpile that makes it possible to discuss official equality. However, the issue has an additional dimension: The reduction of strategic arms that the United States and Russia are carrying out in connection with the 2010 treaty still allows them to preserve a capability that far surpasses China’s capability. However, the United States is already posing the question of future arms reduction. Obama addressed this specifically in a speech in Berlin last July. At issue is a store of up to 300 warheads, which already equals the Chinese arsenal. The reason is that the United States has made substantial advances in the construction of precision-guided, non-nuclear weapons systems. Hence the relevance of nuclear potential is decreasing doctrinally. Moscow insists that it is vital to further reduce nuclear arms in connection with reducing other systems — ABMs, precision-guided and space weapons — and it needs to be done multilaterally, with the involvement of other recognized nuclear powers. At the top of the list is China. The Russian-Chinese joint draft treaty on restricting space weapons, which Ulyanov invoked at the U.N., shows that this position, in essence, has already been agreed to with China. Just such a treaty on space weapons may become an element of these kind of multilateral and multivariable discussions, but it will not be the only way for China and Russia to cooperate in possible talks on nuclear weapons.

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