Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange
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- China US relations key to global economic growth and stability- the economic system would collapse without cooperation
- The only alternative to building US-China relations is war and economic collapse
- Economic decline causes war—strong statistical support.
- Solvency
- China says yes- they want to partner with the US on civilian and scientific space activities
Advantage 2- US-China RelationsCurrent relations are tense due to lack of diplomacy over military issues- this makes crises inevitableCOCIANI April 18th 2016 (Riccardo Cociani is a second year undergraduate student in war Studies at King's College London and Chair of the KCL Crisis Team; “Is war with China inevitable?” Published: 18 APRIL 2016 • 6:25PM; KING'S COLLEGE LONDON; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/18/is-war-with-china-inevitable/) Fifth century Chinese military leader Sun Tzu said: “Know yourself and know your enemy and in a hundred battles you will always be victorious." Sun Tzu's The Art of War’s dictum could not be more right when thinking about the current status of the East and South China Seas and what it means for the future of world security. Since 2010, tensions between China and Japan have risen like dragons to fight against each other. The reason? Territory. The dragons have clashed repeatedly, diplomatically and politically, ever since a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels near the disputed islands, known as ‘Diaoyu’ in China, and ‘Senkaku’ in Japan. Tensions remained cold. Even they never reached crisis levels, the dragons rose once again in late 2012 following Japan’s decision to privatise the islands. What seemed like dormant historical disputes, they are once again shaping Chinese and Japanese domestic and foreign policies, leading both countries to ‘warmer’ waters. Again in 2012, the Philippines contested Chinese activity near the Scarborough Shoal, in the South China Sea. Again, land disputes and land reclamation are at the core of the rising tensions, eventually evolving into a crisis. Soon, more and more countries, like Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, have become involved against China’s land reclamation and island-building activities in the South China Sea. Tensions escalated even more following American involvement in the region, first over the East China Sea, and then over the South China Sea. The Council on Foreign Relations classifies both crisis as ‘critical’ for US interests, the same level as the crises in North Korea, Iraq and Syria. What if these crises escalated into a conflict? Are there any diplomatic solutions to these issues? This is what the King’s College London (KCL) crisis Team set to answer. A student-led and student-run Team of War Studies students from King’s war studies department, have spent months researching the current crises in the East and South China Seas. The KCL Crisis Team is responsible for organising and running King’s yearly Crisis Simulation, an event that sees more than 100 students involved, from various UK, US and European institutions. Students act as delegates from the various countries involved in the disputes, such as China, Taiwan, Japan, the US, South Korea and North Korea, and take action according to their nation’s interests, capabilities and according to the developing situations in both seas. The simulation serves as a learning tool where students can learn more about these current crises, as well as learning about the possible risks and scenarios that could develop in the future. Answering ‘What if…?’ is at the core of the KCL Crisis Team’s simulations. And the outcomes of this year’s simulation do not look promising for anyone. The nightmare come true War breaks out between North Korea and Japan, and between China and the US. While China continued the militarisation of their artificial islands in the South China Sea, the US responded by increasing their naval and military presence in the South China Sea, eventually leading to a direct military confrontation between the two countries. While the US was distracted and focused on Chinese military activity, North Korea took the opportunity to conduct false-flag operations in order to attack and destroy Japan. Diplomatic solutions did not even seem close to the horizon. While this was only a crisis simulation, it raises concerns over the current situation. Will war break out between China and the US, or between China and Japan? Will North Korea attack Japan? Our simulation suggests that if China continues to increase their military and naval activities in the South China Sea, without being transparent and communicating the purpose of their activities, misunderstandings and rising tensions could be the spark that starts a war. Over the East China Sea, on the other hand, while the US and China went at it against each other, North Korea took the opportunity to increase their military activities by launching attacks against an ‘abandoned’ Japan, as the US was too ‘distracted’ about China. South Korea found itself in between all this, and had to make difficult decisions over which side to be with. Chaos reigned the waters, and the perfect storm hit. Can war be prevented? Diplomacy unfortunately failed. After numerous discussions and cases made in the United Nations Security Council committee, no decision or action was made to prevent war, let alone decrease military activity in the South China Sea. Bilateral talks only helped to reach limited strategic goals, but not enough to prevent war from occurring. Mistrust and betrayal flowed and rose like waves as the simulation progressed. Therefore, the strongest lesson learnt and recommendation we could offer is to call for an increased diplomatic effort, most importantly, between China and Japan, and between China and the US. The waters and the dragons have risen, and only peaceful, diplomatic discussions can ease the tensions and bring these countries closer. However, the initial challenge is to reach a consensus to firstly meet. Once reached, only time will tell, but an increased diplomatic effort can only take us closer to such point. The Chinese word for ‘crisis’, 危机 (wēijī), includes the words ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’: diplomacy’s goal is to make these current crises an opportunity to bring peace in the region. Only by communicating will we know and learn more in order to prevent war. Sun Tzu's said: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” China wants to cooperate with the US on space exploration- lifting restrictions is key- this spills over to solve US-China relations broadlyBrian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf The third major focus of Chinese space activities is to increase scientific knowledge and expand commercial activities. Advancement of space capabilities can benefit many industries, facilitate scientific research, boost innovation in relevant areas, and increase commercial profits, such as by launching satellites for foreign customers.50 In the long run, resources invested in space technology could see significant returns. However, many Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the space sector are restricted in the world market or sanctioned by the United States. Chinese astronauts and scientists are also excluded from the U.S.-led international joint program. These restrictions have significantly impaired China’s research and industrial development in the space domain, and the country continues to attempt to persuade the United States to relax, and ultimately abolish, these restrictions.51 Increased technology transfers or trade could help China accelerate its space program and other related research. But even if barriers to technology transfer remain, relaxing restrictions to allow China to participate in joint activities would still have benefits. Chinese participation in joint programs such as human space exploration, the ISS, or other cooperative projects could increase China’s operational know-how in the space domain. And even if there is no bilateral cooperation between the United States and China, a change in U.S. export control policy could allow Chinese companies to dramatically expand their presence in the international commercial space market. The fourth and final focus of China’s space activities is to strengthen cooperation and improve bilateral relationships with other major powers, of which the most prominent is the United States. China has stated that the development of its space capabilities should not be achieved at the cost of bilateral relations or mutual confidence with other states.52 A space arms race may seriously deteriorate China’s external environment and divert precious and limited resources away from urgent domestic areas. In addition, it could shift China’s broader foreign policy and grand strategy from competitive cooperation to total confrontation. The costs of a hostile space arms race and direct conflict with the United States would thus far outweigh the benefits provided by new space capabilities. Therefore, China has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and the formation of international regimes. At the very least, such development should not harm these important diplomatic goals. Effective cooperation in the space domain may help China and the United States show goodwill to each other and set a model for bilateral cooperation to handle security and governance problems. No matter whether this is called a “new type of great-power relationship” or a “new-model major-country relationship,” a desirable Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship in space should not only encourage mutual respect and avoid confrontation but also contribute to solving global challenges such as climate change. China US relations key to global economic growth and stability- the economic system would collapse without cooperationAsh in 15 (Timothy Garton Ash is a historian, political writer and Guardian columnist; “If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war” Published: Friday 16 October 2015 02.00 EDT; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america) What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How to deal with China. The relationship between the emerging and the enduring superpower is the greatest geopolitical question of our time. If Washington and Beijing do not get it right, there will probably be war somewhere in Asia some time over the next decade. Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia and the brutality of Islamic State are medium-sized regional challenges by comparison. Climate change and the world economy cannot be managed without American-Chinese cooperation. All this demands a bipartisan American grand strategy for the next 20 years, but US politics seems incapable of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes. In the South China Sea, China has, by massive dredging operations, turned submerged reefs with names out of the novels of Joseph Conrad – Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef – into artificial islands, and is completing a 3,000m runway on Fiery Cross. President Xi Jinping recently presided over a massive, Kremlin-style parade of China’s military force, with Putin standing beside him as an honoured guest. In support of its claim to a vast area of the South China Sea, within its “nine-dash-line”, China has rammed Philippine fishing boats and buzzed a US spy plane. The US has responded by telling its Asian allies that it will run “freedom of navigation” patrols past the disputed islands. Interestingly, when Chinese warships sailed through US territorial waters around the Aleutian islands last month, the US military reacted coolly, saying the Chinese naval vessels passed “in a manner consistent with international law”. The technical term for this is “innocent passage”. So now watch out for the Chinese reaction when US warships make innocent passage past Fiery Cross or Mischief Reef. Battleships sailing defiantly past disputed islands: what century are we in? All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate domestic crisis. But the Chinese Communist party does face a long-term legitimation crisis. For decades, it has derived political legitimacy from impressive economic growth, which is now slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban and informed society. The Chinese leadership’s crude attempt to command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this year, reminiscent of King Canute’s confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging. They can almost certainly keep the lid on for several years but, as always happens when necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point, the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move, Galtieri-style, against one of China’s Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation would be high. With angry, nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the Chinese nor the American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear weapons. This is not idle scaremongering; it’s something the US military, intelligence and thinktank communities think about all the time, in order to avoid it. Precisely because China’s future course will mainly depend on forces within the country, beyond Washington’s control, the United States needs a wise, consistent, strategic deployment of all the instruments at its disposal. This should be something like the “twin track” strategy adopted by the west during the last two decades of the cold war (although obviously not expecting it to end the same way). On the one hand, there should be no room for doubt in Chinese minds about what the US will accept militarily. US policy should be the opposite of what Barack Obama did over Syria (declare a “red line” and then allow Bashar al-Assad to walk across it with impunity). In China’s case, the US should declare no public red lines but in private communication, and through deeds that speak louder than words, make it clear that they exist. At the same time Washington should redouble its attempts at constructive engagement. There should be intensive efforts to find shared ground on climate change, the world economy and geopolitical issues from North Korea to Syria. The intensive business ties that already exist should buttress the relationship. There is already an extraordinary people-to-people relationship, embracing many millions of better-off Chinese who have studied, worked and lived in the west. This strategy should be coordinated with key US allies who have their own major relationships with China, such as Australia, Germany and Britain, which will welcome Xi on a state visit next week. The China expert Orville Schell suggests that the next US president should appoint a high-level special envoy to China. President Hillary Clinton, he argues – tongue only half in cheek – would have the perfect candidate in Bill Clinton, who has the prestige of a former president, the experience, and negotiating skills. President Marco Rubio could offer the job to Jeb Bush, whose father was US envoy to Beijing in 1974–75 and whose brother, George W, presided over a good relationship with China. Republican presidential candidates make random, sometimes wild comments about China As it looks at the moment, all this is pie in the sky. Republican presidential candidates make only the most random, sometimes wild, comments about China. Dr Ben Carson tweets a photograph of a US aircraft carrier with the words “This is How to Compete with China”. With a mixture of invincible ignorance and bluster, Donald Trump suggests the trouble is that China’s leaders don’t respect Obama. But if Xi just sat down for a couple of beers with dealmaker Trump, all would be well. And Hillary Clinton, the one candidate with serious policy experience of China? This week, she shamelessly reversed her position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the major trade deal with Asia which she has emphatically supported for many years and when secretary of state described as “the gold standard in trade agreements”. Her volte face is made for transparently opportunistic reasons, to pick up the Democrat labour union and protectionist votes that are currently going to Bernie Sanders, who vows to defeat the “bad trade deal”. Here is the tragedy of a policy on which so much depends for us all. The United States has a sophisticated policy community capable of generating the bipartisan and multilateral grand strategy towards China that we need. Unfortunately it has developed a way of doing politics which makes it impossible to sustain such a strategy. To adapt a famous observation by putative special China envoy Bill Clinton: it’s the politics that are stupid. The only alternative to building US-China relations is war and economic collapseStephen J. Hadley et al in 2013 Former US National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush James L. Jones Former US National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama Brent Scowcroft Former US National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush TANG Jiaxuan Former State Counselor, People’s Republic of China LI Zhaoxing Former Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China TUNG Chee Hwa Former Chief Executive, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People’s Republic of China, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, China-US Joint Working Group , http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, Economic decline causes war—strong statistical support.Royal 10 — Jedidiah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, M.Phil. Candidate at the University of New South Wales, 2010 (“Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edited by Ben Goldsmith and Jurgen Brauer, Published by Emerald Group Publishing, ISBN 0857240048, p. 213-215) Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult [end page 213] to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. [end page 214] Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views. SolvencyThe US should offer cooperation on civilian and scientific space activity with China in exchange for joint development of confidence-building-measures over space assets and militarizationBruce W. MacDonald in 2008, independent consultant in technology and national security policy management. From 1995 to 1999, he was assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as senior director for science and technology on the National Security Council staff., CFR Council Special Report No. 38 September 2008, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707 The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment. At the same time, the United States and China should both pursue diplomatic options to increase clarity and minimize misunderstanding on space-related matters, and reduce the chances of accidental conflict. This comprehensive mix of military and diplomatic measures is more likely to achieve U.S. space and larger national security objectives than either by itself. As important as deterrence is, however, it should not be the only objective. Given that deterrence failure in space is less unlikely than nuclear deterrence failure, it is in the interest of the United States to prepare for this possibility. Modest, traditional counterspace attacks— such as localized jamming of U.S. satellites and attacks against intheater ground stations—seem almost certain to occur at some point in the future and should not pose a major threat if protective measures and countermeasures are taken. The present asymmetry in U.S. and Chinese space assets affects deterrence. Given that China’s space presence is growing rapidly, the effect of this uneven dependence on space will lessen over the next fifteen to twenty years. In the meantime, the United States should have a clear set of asymmetric deterrence options available—such as inter- ference with internal Chinese lines of communication and control and overall conventional superiority—as a hedge until China’s space infrastructure becomes more substantial. In addition, Washington needs accurate estimates of China’s likely military and civilian space architecture, and improved understanding of China’s offensive counterspace doctrine. Some are attracted to a U.S. posture of dominance in space, and such a vision has superficial appeal. However, this attraction overlooks the serious difficulties that accompany it. Space assets are far more difficult to defend than to attack, and it will be well within China’s capability in the mid term to prevent the United States from attaining a dominant space position. Already China’s economy is growing as fast as that of the United States in absolute terms. One may wish otherwise, but the United States will not be able to maintain its near monopoly on space power into the future, though perhaps, with smaller margins, it can remain preeminent in space for many years to come. The United States faces an attractive space future if it does not let the best be the enemy of the good. U.S. space superiority is possible, but space dominance is not likely. Ground-based offensive assets are more survivable, and hence less destabilizing in a crisis, and are also likely to be less expensive and more reliable. Conversely, space-based offensive assets are vulnerable and have significant potential for crisis instability, offering huge incentives for adversaries to strike first. Thus, what the United States chooses to acquire as its offensive capability should first be evaluated against these criteria, as well as those suggested on page twenty. While the United States has too long abjured possible diplomatic approaches to space, the Bush administration has recently begun to make serious efforts to seek agreement with China and others on nonbinding confidence-building measures and rules of the road. Their efforts are commendable, worthy of prioritized effort, and should be encouraged. Despite differences of view between the United States and China on issues of space, diplomatic progress should be possible, given the overlapping interests of both. Policy Recommendations – The Department of Defense (DOD) should establish stability and space-asset protection as major U.S. objectives in space and work with the State Department to develop framework deterrence principles for U.S. counterspace policy that recognize the primacy of deterring attacks on U.S. space assets and maintaining stability in space. – The president and the National Security Council should modify national space policy to allow negotiated restrictions on the basis of verifiability and U.S. interests and discuss possible negotiating options with U.S. allies prior to beginning discussions with China and other space powers. – Defense and State should assess the impact of different U.S. and Chinese offensive space postures and policies on stability and deterrence in space through intensified analysis and “crisis games,” in addition to war games, to gain a better understanding of the strategic landscape of space and deterrence. – The National Security Council should evaluate the desirability of a “no first use” pledge for offensive counterspace weapons that have irreversible effects. – On a quid pro quo basis, State and NASA should discuss with China the opportunities for greater civilian space cooperation as a confidence-building measure. 36 China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security Program Recommendations – DOD should evaluate all future space programs and initiatives in terms of their contribution to stability and deterrence in addition to its other criteria and place greater emphasis on survivable groundbased offensive capabilities with reversible effects than on spacebased capabilities. – DOD should develop a broad suite of space-asset defensive capabilities, such as shielding, spoofing, avoidance maneuvers, “self-aware satellites,” and others commensurate with the importance of those assets to U.S. military posture. – DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should enhance U.S. SSA capability and augment it with corresponding space intelligence capabilities, as well as with their ability to monitor how U.S. satellites and others are behaving under potential or actual attack conditions. – The Air Force should pursue selected offensive capabilities meeting important criteria—including effectiveness, reversible effects, and survivability—in a deterrence context to be able to negate adversary space capabilities on a temporary and reversible basis. – DOD should diversify its means of providing space information and services across additional space and non-space assets to reduce vulnerability to attack and complicate adversary attack planning. – DOD should refrain from further direct ascent ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as China does, unless there is a substantial risk to human health and safety from uncontrolled space object reentry. Diplomatic Recommendations – The State Department and DOD should expand dialogue with China to establish rules of the road, codes of conduct, and other confidence-building measures, as well as to build upon current militaryto-military dialogue on space issues. 37 – The State Department and DOD should enter into discussions with China on a KE-ASAT testing ban, as the major near-term need is to address KE-ASAT on both sides, especially at geosynchronous orbit, where lethal space debris would last forever. – President Bush should offer China at least a mutual moratorium on further KE-ASAT testing, if not a formal agreement, and invite other countries to join. – As a confidence-building measure, the State Department and the Department of Commerce should review restrictions on commercial and scientific space activity with China, easing them where possible and prudent (subject to national security caveats) in return for greater Chinese transparency on its military space efforts. China says yes- they want to partner with the US on civilian and scientific space activitiesKwong Apr 26, 2016, Ray ; “Ray Kwong is a cross border business development geek and a Forbes contributing writer. He is currently facilitating talks between China and U.S. interests on such matters as clean energy economics, nanotechnology, commercial aerospace and business aviation. Previously, he was a strategic planning and marketing advisor to a number of Fortune 200 companies including Bank of America, Disney, Edison, McKesson, Sun Microsystems and Time Warner. He is also senior advisor to the USC US-China Institute and a charter member of the Asian International Business Advisory Group, established to promote bi-lateral trade between China and the U.S., most recently serving as its chair of strategic planning. While it sounds way cooler than it really is, he is also a member of the Bloomberg BusinessWeek Market Advisory Board and the McKinsey Quarterly Executive Panel.” Space: China seeks cooperation with the US, Ejinsight, http://www.ejinsight.com/20160426-space-china-seeks-cooperation-with-the-us/ Over the course of six manned missions, the United States sent 24 astronauts to the Moon, 12 of whom actually walked around on the lunar surface, planting flags and stopping here and there to pose for pictures. Manned missions were so A-OK that at least one astronaut famously took time out to hit some golf balls. That’s all to say that when it comes to the Moon, the US has been there, done that. This past Sunday, China, with space ambitions of its own, floated an open invitation to the US for a joint cosmic road trip to the Moon— or to Mars, to your space station or ours, wherever, whenever. “The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It’s true for us, and for the United States too,” said China’s first astronaut Yang Liwei, according to Xinhua, China’s official press agency. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China’s manned space program. Zhou said, “It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development.” “Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind,” Zhou added. Chinese President Xi Jinping asked scientists to help realize China’s dream of becoming a global space giant as the Communist nation marked its first Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government, according to NDTV. “In establishing Space Day, we are commemorating history, passing on the spirit, and galvanizing popular enthusiasm for science, exploration of the unknown and innovation, particularly among young people,” Xi said. He asked space scientists and engineers to make China a space power. “Becoming an aerospace power has always been a dream we’ve been striving for,” Xi added. With or without some sort of collaborative effort with the US, China is nothing but committed. Xu Dazhe, director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), at a press conference on April 22 in Beijing, described China’s Mars mission, slated for 2020, as one which includes an orbiter, lander, and rover which will “walk on Mars”, according to a press release. China is also building its own space station with the core module to be lofted in 2018, followed by another in 2020; the station is expected to be operational by 2022. In 2013, three Chinese astronauts spent 15 days in orbit aboard an experimental space lab, the Tiangong 1, before returning to Earth. Later that year, the Chang’e 3 probe made the first soft landing on the moon since 1976 when it deployed the Jade Rabbit moon rover. The US may have to watch China from the sidelines as NASA scientists are currently forbidden from working with the Chinese space program thanks to a 2011 bill passed by US Congress, citing security concerns. Be that as it may, China still hopes for an American assist, with Xu the CNSA director offering “proof” that NASA is on board. “When I saw the US film The Martian, which envisages China-US cooperation on a Mars rescue mission under emergency circumstances, it shows that our US counterparts very much hope to cooperate with us,” Xu said, according to Reuters. “However, it’s very regrettable that, for reasons everyone is aware of, there are currently some impediments to cooperation,” he said. As nutty as that sounds, crazier things have happened. For chief engineer Zhou, according to Xinhua, the movie simply reflects what most people want. “Many American astronauts and scientists that I have met said they would like to work with us, if given the freedom of choice.” Despite Washington’s ban on cooperation, the two governments held their first civil space talks in September to discuss each other’s plans and policies, Reuters noted, with Xu on record saying that talks would continue this year. Since NASA’s last Moon walk in 1972—the same year Richard Nixon visited China to normalize relations—and the Skylab space station, the focus of the space agency’s manned operations have been the Space Shuttle program (ending in 2011) and ISS Expeditions (ongoing, but scheduled to end in 2024 with a possible extension to 2028). NASA’s current space objectives are to capture an asteroid, tow it into orbit near Earth, and send astronauts to visit the space rock in 2020 as it prepares for a manned mission to Mars in 2030, according to Inquisitr. US action is key- Chinese buildup is happening now because of US refusal to engage in diplomatic solutions- only the plan prevents a space arms raceBrian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf The end result of the grave concerns by strategic analysts on both sides is likely to be a mixed blessing. It is unlikely that China will directly challenge U.S. national interests in space in the near future because its own space capabilities are still in their infancy. China also realizes that the United States will never limit itself through an arms control treaty in space or other bilateral agreements as long as it still maintains a significant advantage in power and capability. Thus, China’s most likely course of action is not to try to persuade the United States to join a multilateral space regime but rather to develop its own space power rapidly.56 As the United States will continue developing new space capabilities, probably including space-based weapons and offensive counter-space capabilities, China will also have the freedom to develop its own capabilities such as ASAT systems.57 As in the case of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, China can take advantage of the United States’ negative attitude toward space agreements.58 While there may be some limited agreement on norms of behavior or how to reduce tensions while each side is building up its capabilities, ultimately this scenario could result in a new arms race in space. The continued power gap in space will also lead China to link space to other diplomatic and national security issues. Since Beijing has no effective negotiating tools in the space domain, this strategy is seen as one potential way to influence U.S. policy. One example is the debate surrounding the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. If the United States insists on deploying this system on the Korean Peninsula, China may become much tougher on issues such as nuclear transparency and the reduction in nuclear material stockpiles.59 Further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship due to the THAAD system or any other space-related technology may also negatively affect military-to-military communications and other bilateral mechanisms. Of course, this strategy will likely have a negative impact on the overall relationship through hindering cooperation in other issue areas and undermining mutual trust. But for China, linking space to other issues is one of the few negotiating levers at its disposal. Transparency and confidence-building measures are key- they lead to information exchanges that diffuse crises, and form a basis for broader US-China relationsBrian Weeden and Xiao He in 2016, Technical Advisor at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C., Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space, the national bureau of asian research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf Transparency and confidence-building mechanisms for managing tensions and crises. The prospects of banning or prohibiting the development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO technologies are slim. RPO technology has many legitimate peaceful uses and potentially significant commercial applications. Both the United States and China are likewise developing their direct ascent kinetic-kill technologies as a result of strong, but different, national interests that are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Moreover, verification challenges associated with the space domain will continue to impede any arms control initiative that is built on bans or limits on deployment of technology or capabilities. A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct ascent and RPO. TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs: information exchange on space policies, information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities.70 Improving information on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in the U.S.-China relationship in this domain. While determining a satellite’s exact capabilities and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000 human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all satellite operators.71 China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and, presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India, and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well.72 As SSA capabilities continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on responsible and irresponsible behavior in space.73 Such agreements should be aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches of national security satellites;74 signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons.75 Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2014 2014 -> For want of a nail 2014 -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 2014 -> Ihbb asian Championships 2014 middle school bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> Ihbb european Championships 2014 Bowl Round 4 First Quarter 2014 -> International History Bee and Bowl 2013-14 Asian Division Question Set Bowl Round Six 2014 -> United states patent and trademark office 2014 -> Coffs harbour eisteddfod vocal syllabus 2014 -> Listen News Programs Schedule pledge now 2014 -> Slow club announce third album complete surrender Download 1.11 Mb. 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