Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

The US is prepping for space war by dedicating money to offensive space weapons

I am a sometimes-freelance writer, sometimes-blogger, and former graduate student at the University of Oxford. My works have appeared in Asoko News, Capital New York, Esquire, The Economist, Foreign Service Journal, GOOD Magazine, Men’s Journal, Roads & Kingdoms, Slate, and VICE, among numerous other minor publications. I write about anything under the big tent of culture, faith, identity politics, and sexuality—basically anything human beings will fight over.

Earlier this month, at the annual Space Symposium, members of the US military quietly but clearly voiced their concern that war is coming to space. Soon after officials announced that the Pentagon is looking for $5.5 billion to build up its space defense systems by 2020, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James straight up admitted that, looking at the layout of modern space exploration, the US now believes it's facing new and evolving threats to everything it owns above earth. "We need to be ready," James said, according to National Defense Magazine. 'We must prepare for the potentiality of conflict that might extend from earth one day into space." This isn't just bluster from one corner of the government. This year, Congress urged the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to start studying offensive space weapons in addition to defensive systems. The funds allocated for these studies weren't huge—but the very concept of openly pushing for space weaponization is an interesting developing. Ever since 1967, when the US and USSR signed the Outer Space Treaty, expressly banning the use of nuclear weapons in space and establishing a norm of restraint and pacifism to preserve the vital infrastructure of satellites, most of us have come to view space as a neutral zone. Yet as it turns out nothing in the Outer Space Treaty actually forbids the weaponization of space, meaning that so long as we don't use nukes up there, any form of extraterrestrial brutality is on the table. Most nations have been eager to keep the option open, refusing to sign subsequent treaties with more stringent language restricting the militarization of satellites and spaceships. Recent tests of space weapons by China have brought the issue to the fore of defense and security agendas. Since 2007, China has openly tested earth-to-space anti-satellite weapons systems, successfully blowing up their own defunct crafts and threatening the orbital infrastructure on which most modern militaries rely. In turn, the US and Russia have tested a range of offensive and defensive technologies, and other nations, like India, seem eager to join the space arms race now too.

The US is readying for space tension and has already allocated funds for offensive operations

Mr. Weeden holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from Clarkson University, a Master of Science Degree in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and is also a graduate of the International Space University Space Studies Program (2007, Beijing). He is currently a Doctoral Candidate in Public Policy and Public Administration at George Washington University in the field of Science and Technology Policy. Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and has 16 years of professional experience in space operations and policy. His wealth of technical knowledge and expertise allow him to provide critical analysis that supports development of space policy.

Militarization Now- China

China’s active defense causes a tactical strike first mentality

Polleter, Anderson, Wilson, and Yang in 2015 (Report prepared for the Commission by Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. “China Dream, Space Dream China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States” A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Published: Monday, March 2, 2015)

Chinese Military Concept of Operations: A second factor that affects PLA space operations is its concept of operations. Chinese writings place a heavy emphasis on gaining the initiative at the outset of a conflict, including during the U.S. military’s deployment stage. The PLA, like most militaries, would prefer to fight a “quick war with a quick resolution” (速战速决). Based on the their study of war since the 1982 Falklands War, PLA analysts assess that the relatively quick conclusion of modern wars places an emphasis on seizing the initiative at the outset of a campaign. Looking at the 1991 Gulf War, and the initial invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Chinese military analysts assess that the PLA cannot allow the U.S. military to become fully prepared lest they cede victory. In carrying out this concept of operations, the Chinese government states that its national defense policy is “purely defensive in nature” and that it “places the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.” 47 In doing so, China follows a military strategy of active defense (积极防 御), which was been described by Mao Zedong as “offensive defense or defense through decisive engagements…for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.” 48 At face value, an adherence to a defensive national defense policy would seem to be counter to the goal of fighting a quick war with a quick resolution and the need to take the initiative at the beginning of an operation. In fact, there is little operational difference between China’s active defense strategy and an offensive military strategy. Chinese analysts assert that, within the context of protecting China’s national interests, the full range of offensive actions are possible. As a result, active defense is best thought of as a politically defensive but operationally offensive strategy in which China will maintain a rhetorically defensive posture up until the time that war appears imminent. Thus, any U.S. military support or deployment that is deemed a precursor to U.S. action could be grounds for a preemptive strike. In this case, the United States would be considered to have taken a “first shot” at the strategic level that would allow China to conduct first strikes at the operational and tactical levels. Chinese thinking on active defense can be seen in writings on space operations. A 2013 textbook on space operations, for example, argues that China’s space strategy is defensive in nature and thus it will “do all it can at the strategic level to avoid firing the first shot” (emphasis added).49 In other places, however, the authors recommend conducting first strikes at the operational and tactical levels, writing that one should “strive to attack first at the campaign and tactical levels in order to maintain the space battlefield initiative” 50 and argue that fighting a quick war with a quick resolution is one of the “special characteristics of space operations” and that a military should “conceal the concentration of its forces and make a decisive large-scale first strike.” 51

China sees militarization as necessary

Pollpeter et al 15 (Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, Fan Yang, 3/2/15, “China Dream, Space Dream” China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States: A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, accessed 6/26/16, http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china-dream-space-dream-chinas-progress-space-technologies-and-implications-united-states)

China’s space program has made the most progress in addressing its national security needs. China’s space program assists the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in its efforts to achieve information superiority, defined as the ability to use information freely and to deny the use of information by an adversary. Based on their analyses of U.S. military operations, Chinese military researchers view space as a critical component in making the PLA into a force capable of winning “informatized” wars and recognize the role space plays in the collection and transmittal of information and the need to deny those capabilities to an adversary. Indeed, nearly every Chinese source describes space as the “ultimate high ground,” leading many Chinese analysts to assess that space warfare is inevitable. Because of the preeminence of the space battlefield, analysts writing on space argue that it will become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and controlled. In fact, these analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the initiative is to achieve space supremacy. China’s space program plays a central role in its effort to possess antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Chinese analysts writing on space argue that the development of long-range precision strike weapons “cannot be separated from space power.” Long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles require the ability to locate, track, and target enemy ships hundreds or thousands of kilometers from China’s shores. Such capabilities could also be used to attack U.S. bases and the bases of its allies in Asia as well as targets within the 50 states. Chinese writings also devote much attention to the need to develop counterspace capabilities and offer multiple rationales for why China must develop counterspace weapons. China must be able to protect its own space-based assets from attack and prevent an adversary from using space to attack terrestrial targets. A second reason is to deny an adversary the use of space. Chinese military analysts have noted the dependence of the U.S. military on space and have concluded that the degradation of U.S. space capabilities may result in decisive losses for the U.S. military. Third, counterspace capabilities can be used against space-based missile defense to preserve China’s nuclear deterrent. Finally, space can be used to deter real and potential adversaries from using force, both in space and in other domains.

China is testing its capabilities – two missiles that if equipped can carry 10 nuclear war heads each for as many targets

Chan 15 (Minnie Chan, 10/5/15, “Nuclear space race picks up pace: China unveils rocket capable of firing 20 nukes to defeat US missile shield”,http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1864406/long-march-challenging-us-space-power-chinas-most)

China showed the world how far it had come in developing space weapons as it unveiled its new family of space launch vehicles. The first Long March 6 rocket was successfully launched from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre late last month with a multipayload of 20 small satellites, according to state broadcaster CCTV and the People’s Liberation Army’s mouthpiece, the PLA Daily. The September 20 launch marked China as the third country with such technology, after Russia and the United States. About a week later, on September 29, the official Science and Technology Daily reported that a Second Artillery Corps battalion had launched a midnight full-flight test of a strategic missile. The test proved that the strategic missile force could now operate the entire chain of the C4ISR – computerised command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – systems that the US military uses. “The launch of the Long March 6 will definitely help President Xi Jinping increase his bargaining power on security issues when dealing with US President Barack Obama,” said defence policy specialist He Qisong of the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. “The launch will send a message to the US that the PLA now is capable of breaking its ballistic missile defence system in Asia, because … the multipayload technology can also be used on the DF-41 [long-range nuclear missile].” Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Dong said the Long March 6 technology could also be used on the JL-3, China’s third-generation nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile. The DF-41, which the Pentagon has described as China’s most powerful weapon, has an estimated 12,000km range and can carry up to 10 warheads. The DF-41 and JL-3 combined could carry up to 20 warheads, hitting as many different targets. The PLA has yet to acknowledge the existence of the DF-41, although US media have cited Pentagon sources as saying Beijing has launched at least four full tests of the missile since 2012. The Long March 6, however, was given extensive coverage by CCTV and the PLA Daily. Hong Kong-based military expert Liang Guoliang said state media reports suggested the PLA was capable of sending 20 reconnaissance satellites to space. The Long March 6 is a liquid-propellant, small-load space launch vehicle developed by the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology and based on the strap-on booster for the Long March 5 family of satellite launch vehicles, which is due to make its first trial flight next year, according to Xinhua. “The successful launch of the Long March 6 plus the advanced C4ISR operations will enhance China’s strategic threats to its enemies,” He said. “This means command systems from the PLA’s powerful Central Military Commission … to soldiers at the firing point have all been computerised to support the missile battalion to make all-weather, rapid and accurate shots.”

China is speeding up their space integration and offensive-defensive capabilities in response to US taking similar actions

Blanchard 14 (Ben Blanchard, 4/15/14, Reuters UK, “China's President Xi urges greater military use of space”, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-defence-idUKBREA3E03G20140415)

China’s president is calling on his country to boost its military power in space by increasing coordination between its air and space defense programs. Speaking at the air force headquarters in Beijing, Xi Jinping told officers "to speed up air and space integration and sharpen their offensive and defensive capabilities,” Xinhua news agency reported late Monday, according to Reuters. The news agency did not elaborate as to how China expects to do this, but state media Tuesday called it a response to the United States’ increasing militarization of space. "The idea of combining air and space capability is not new to the Chinese air force, as a host of experts have underscored the importance of space," the official China Daily newspaper said. China says its space program is for peaceful means, but a Pentagon report released last year claimed Beijing is looking at ways to block its rivals from using space-based assets during a crisis, Reuters reports. An analysis of satellite images also suggests that a Chinese rocket launch in May 2013 was actually a test of an anti-satellite weapon and not a research mission. Jinping previously has said he wants China to become a superpower in space.

Militarization Inevitable

The United States unilateral position on space forces China to militarize

Shixiu in 2007 (Bao Shixiu is a senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China. He formerly served as director of the Institute. He recently was a visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute in the United States. His research focuses on China-U.S. relations in the field of comparative security strategies and the application of deterrence theory. “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space” Published: Winter 2007, pp.2 – 11; China Security)

The latest U.S. National Space Policy (NSP) poses a serious threat to the national security of China. This new policy, released in October of 2006, sets out the George W. Bush administration’s vision for defending America’s security in space.1 It reinforces a unilateral U.S. approach to space security which is compounded by the U.S. opposition to any international treaties that limit its access to or use of space.2 Aggregately, Bush’s space policy pursues hegemony in space and poses a significant security risk to China that cannot be left unaddressed. The NSP presents a number of challenges to China’s security environment. First, it grants the United States with exclusive rights to space: the right to use any and all necessary means to ensure American security while at the same time denying adversaries access to space for “hostile purposes.” This sets up an inequitable environment of “haves” and “have-nots” in space, raising suspicion amongst nations. For instance, the NSP declares that U.S. space systems should be guaranteed safe passage over all countries without exception (such as “interference” by other countries, even when done for the purpose of safeguarding their sovereignty and their space integrity). With its significant space assets and military space capabilities, this situation gives the United States an obvious and unfair strategic advantage in space. Second, it refutes international restrictions and undercuts potential international agreements that seek to constrain America’s use of space. This effectively undermines any potential initiatives put forth by the international community to control space weaponization– initiatives that China supports. This U.S. position leads the global community to suspect U.S. unilateralist intentions in space. Lastly, while the policy may not state it explicitly, a critical examination of its contents suggest its intention to “dissuade and deter” other countries, including China, from possessing space capabilities that can challenge the United States in any way– a parameter that would effectively disallow China to possess even a minimum means of national defense in space. The resultant security environment in space is one with one set of rules for the United States and another set of rules for other nations. In such a context, only U.S. security concerns are taken into account with a result of the reinforcement of a zero-sum dynamic to which space is already prone and threatens to pressure others into a military space race. The United States denies that its position on space, as represented by the NSP, will inevitably lead to conflict in space. First, officials in the defense establishment argue that the United States is not opposed to others exploiting space commercially.3 Rather, it only opposes the utilization of space in a way that puts at risk U.S. dominance in space and its military capabilities. In this context, it is argued that if China has purely civilian and commercial interests in space, it should have no problem with U.S. policy in space. Put another way, implicit in much of American thinking regarding China’s intentions in space is a view that if China has no plan to militarize space or has no intention to develop space weapons, U.S. ambitions in space shouldn’t be considered inimical to China’s interests. This position operates on several faulty premises. The first is that the United States is the only country that has national interests at stake in space, implying that China does not have deep national security interests in space or that China’s space assets do not need to be protected. The Chinese government has expressed its desire to develop space peacefully on many occasions, and has pursued treaties to ban weapons and weapon-testing in space. But China also has deep interests, both now and in the future, to exploit space, which are vital to its comprehensive national power and its economic and scientific development and therefore its greater national security. Leaving aside the issue of using space for military purposes, China cannot entrust the protection of its interests in space to another country, no matter their rhetoric or intentions. If the security of the United States requires the absence of that same security for China, then the logic is inherently imbalanced, unfair and one that China cannot accept. The peaceful use of space should not be confused with a lack of national security interests or the deep underlying need to protect them. As a sovereign state, China has an equal right to access space. As the 1967 Outer Space Treaty clearly articulates: Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.4 China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country. For that reason, the U.S. administration’s penchant for “exceptionalism” in space policy poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes. The U.S. position makes another faulty assumption that national space programs and space assets can be effectively dissected into commercial and civilian uses versus military uses and capabilities. This is out of tune with technological developments and military inevitabilities. China’s space program is not transparent in many respects, but neither is that of the United States. The reality is that many space technologies are inherently dual-use and it is therefore very difficult to distinguish sufficiently and effectively the intentions and capabilities in space. Without some kind of mutual understanding on controlling arms in space, suspicion will dominate relations between China and the United States. U.S. actions seem to support the notion that China’s space program is a threat even if China only develops commercial space assets. On the one hand, the United States has rejected Russian and Chinese proposals to negotiate a treaty banning space weapons and their testing.5 According to official U.S. statements, such a treaty is not necessary as there is no military race in space. In reality, the United States rejects such proposals because it would constrain its freedom of action in space. In effect, this provides the United States with the opportunity to weaponize space at a time of its choosing or at a time of its perceived need. Coupled with the fact that a series of American space reports in recent years have argued vehemently for the development of military capabilities to control and dominate space, from a Chinese perspective it appears that the United States aims to deploy space weapons regardless of China’s developments and intentions in space.6 In this context, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others and afford it the ability to protect U.S. interests. While China is committed to upholding international treaties and norms, it also has its own national interests and cannot subsume them to the interests of another country. China may consider the security problems of the United States, but cannot change its national security considerations at their whim. Hence, China must be prepared to avoid being at the mercy of others in space. China must seek countermeasures to deal with this problem accordingly.

China says that military competition in space is inevitable

Peter Foster in Beijing 12:56PM GMT 02 Nov 2009

Peter Foster is the Telegraph's Europe Editor. He was formerly the US editor based in Washington DC, and was formerly based in Beijing, where he covered the rise of China. Before that, he was based in New Delhi as South Asia correspondent. He has reported for The Telegraph for more than a decade, covering two Olympic Games, 9/11 in New York, the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, the post-conflict phases in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan.

China, which hopes to put a man on the moon by 2020, has long stated that it supported the peaceful uses of outer space and opposed the introduction of weapons there. However Xu Qiliang, a senior Chinese air force commander, said it was imperative for the PLA air force to develop offensive and defensive operations in outer space. "As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space," he told the People's Liberation Army Daily in an interview to mark last month's 60th Anniversary of Communist China, "this is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back." Although Beijing has also sought to establish an international treaty to control the deployment of weapons in space, China surprised the world in 2007 when it shot down one of its own weather satellites in a test seen by many, including the United States, as a possible trigger of an arms race in space. "The PLA air force must establish in a timely manner the concepts of space security, space interests and space development," Mr Xu added, "We must build an outer space force that conforms with the needs of our nation's development (and) the demands of the development of the space age." Superiority in outer space can give a nation control over war zones both on land and at sea, while also offering a strategic advantage, Xu said, noting that such dominance was necessary to safeguard the nation. "Only power can protect peace," the 59-year-old commander added. China is currently in the process of rapidly modernising its armed forces, investigating the construction hardware such as aircraft carriers as well as cyber warfare techniques that could paralyse enemy's command and control systems. Last year's annual Pentagon report to the US Congress warned that Chinese militarisation was changing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. China, however, dismisses such talk as alarmist and says that its rise will be peaceful. China currently spends 1.4 per cent of GDP on its armed forces, compared with two per cent in Britain and France and four per cent in the United States.

Treating space capabilities and technology as a competition between Washington and Beijing instead of a collaboration leads to militarization, on the ground and in space, and destroys future cooperation

By Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D.Lutes 2007 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a517485.pdf Dr. Phillip C. Saunders and Colonel Charles D. Lutes, USAF, are Senior Research Fellows in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University

One China expert noted that if Washington wants to maximize the chances of dissuading Beijing from deploying and using ASAT weapons, then it should hold broader political and economic cooperation at risk. However, this would be costly for other important U.S. interests. Others agreed that economic interests and the need for cooperation with China on issues such as North Korea limit the degree to which the United States could make China pay a price for developing ASAT weapons. While international criticism of China for conducting the test and for heightening the risk to other satellites through space debris has had some impact on Beijing, calls for responsible behavior in space are unlikely to address the underlying strategic issues. A China specialist noted that the United States is still reluctant to accept a nuclear deterrent relationship with China that constrains U.S. freedom of action; a similar dynamic applies with respect to space. A strategist argued that this constraint is not wholly negative; it presents an opportunity to reexamine U.S. objectives and strategy in Asia and ensure that strategy is consistent with national interests. The Chinese direct-ascent ASAT test raises difficult questions about China’s intentions, U.S. responses, and the impact on broader U.S.-China relations. The United States has a range of potential responses to Chinese efforts to develop ASAT capabilities. Unfortunately, none of the available options is simple, cheap, or likely wholly effective. U.S. policymakers should consider both policy initiatives to limit Chinese deployment of ASAT capabilities and technical and operational measures that would mitigate the impact on U.S. military capabilities if China does deploy ASATs. Deterring the use of ASAT weapons may pose new challenges that differ from previous U.S. experiences with conventional and nuclear deterrence. Both China and the United States will have important choices to make. Beijing will have to weigh the potential military benefits of developing and deploying ASAT weapons against the likely damage to bilateral relations and to its carefully cultivated image as a responsible country focused on peaceful development. Washington must balance the importance of its broader relationship with Beijing against the need to maintain access to space for both military and commercial purposes. These considerations could lead both countries to exercise some degree of restraint in deciding how vigorously to pursue ASAT weapons and other counterspace capabilities. However, strategic and bureaucratic imperatives could also create a negative dynamic that affects the broader U.S.-China relationship. The direct impact might take the form of heightened military competition as the United States responds to Chinese efforts to develop asymmetric capabilities such as ASAT weapons. The indirect impact might be felt if each side comes to view the other as a strategic threat and the competitive dimensions of their relations overshadow the importance of cooperation in pursuit of common interests. This outcome is not inevitable, but the extension of competition into the space domain will complicate efforts to build a stable and constructive bilateral relationship.

Space militarization is inevitable – mutual distrust will fuel US-Sino arms race

Zhang 2011

Baohui Zhang: Associate Professor of Political Science and Director, Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control.” Ebscohost. Asian Survey, Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 51 Issue 2, p311-332. 22p. Accessed 6-26-16. http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=10&sid=a6878c99-469e-4219-a9ef-f78a6bd4d96b%40sessionmgr107&hid=102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=61479667&db=poh

China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact, China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly. China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.”5 The military space relationship between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6

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