Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

Space Militarization Impacts

Nukes

Space competition spills over to nuclear competition- it forces both countries to maintain deterrence through increased nuclear capabilities

These requirements are not controversial, although they may not be affordable in sufficient measure—as was the case with the perceived requirements of nuclear deterrence. The crux of debate over space deterrence is whether to continue to rely very heavily on latent or residual capabilities to engage in warfare, if necessary, or to shift toward more evident, dedicated, kinetic and deployed means of dissuasion. There are several powerful arguments for the United States to continue to rely on inferred rather than heavily demonstrable deterrence in space. To begin with, a non-dedicated, non-deployed, non-kinetic space deterrence posture has been successful in the past. An inferred posture is also more conducive to stabilizing deterrence than the deployment and testing of dedicated, kinetic counter-space capabilities. These hallmarks of an intensified arms competition did not produce a great sense of security in the nuclear domain, and are unlikely to offer a greater sense of security in space. Instead, more demonstrable space deterrence efforts are likely to increase requirements and costs while decreasing assurance. An accelerated competition in the development, testing and deployment of US and Chinese counter-space capabilities is likely to spill over into the nuclear domain. The practical effect of this linkage would be to increase nuclear requirements in China, while retarding reductions in deployed US nuclear capabilities that are in excess of the Pentagon’s needs. In a constrained budget environment, the United States could apply defense dollars more wisely and enjoy added security if this dynamic could be avoided. Another reason to avoid an intensified competition in dedicated and deployed counter-space capabilities is that residual and latent US counter-space capabilities are growing significantly, particularly with respect to new missile defense interceptors. The growth in inferred capability provides the basis to avoid a competition in dedicated, deployed counter-space capabilities—if China is amenable to inferential deterrence.

Space weapons will lead to an outer space arms race and nuclear proliferation

Reaching Critical Will June 27 2016 ‘Militarization, weaponization, and the prevention of an arms race’ Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is the disarmament programme of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space

The weaponization of space will destroy strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security, and disrupt existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. These effects will inevitably lead to a new arms race. Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process. The United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the development of US ground- and sea- based “missile defenses” have already increased tensions with Russia and have led to increased missile proliferation. The deployment of these technologies or the development of space-based technologies will likely cause Russia, as well as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions of their nuclear arsenals and to reject the development of new treaties to regulate nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. In January 2007, China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own ageing weather satellites. The United States, while condemning the test, forged ahead with several space and missile defence projects with dual-use capabilities. In addition, in February 2008, the United States shot down own of it's own failed satellites that was carrying a half-ton of hydrazine rocket fuel (a toxic chemical). The US military shot it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defense system.

Continued attempts by the US at space dominance will lead to further proliferation and decrease global stability

Grego and Wright 2010

Laura Grego: a senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and David Wright: a senior scientist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program. “Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space” Union of concerned scientists November 2010. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf

Concerns about vulnerability in space has led some in the United States to advocate “space dominance”—the United States’ exploitation of its lead in military space capabilities to physically control who could use space and for what purposes. Developing the ability to dominate space in this way against a determined adversary is not realistic, however. For a host of practical and technical reasons, the proposed new missions—controlling the use of space via destructive ASAT weapons13 and satellite-defending weapons and attacking ground targets and ballistic missiles from space—would be ineffective, unreliable, or cost-ineffective when compared with other options. (See the Appendix for a summary of this argument; for an extensive discussion, see Gallagher and Steinbruner 2008 and Wright, Grego, and Gronlund 2005.) At the same time, U.S. pursuit of new space weapons would be counterproductive. Even while understanding the weaknesses of these systems, other countries may still view their development—and the intentions behind their development—as threatening, since even nominally defensive weapons have intrinsic offensive capabilities. Such a U.S. effort could therefore generate tensions and spur some of these countries to pursue space weapons of their own. It also could undermine the cooperation needed to solve some of the most pressing day-to-day risks in space and the diplomatic efforts for best addressing longer-term issues. While using space weapons for attacking or interfering with space assets might seem beneficial in some specific situations, from a broader perspective the United States would be more secure in a world in which such activities were limited or banned. But although the United States has thus far allocated few resources to the development of space-based missile defense, ground attack weapons, and space based ASAT weapons, it also has not formally rejected these options. Moreover, it has dismissed attempts to place legal limits or restrictions on these space-based options or on other types of ASAT capabilities. In particular, the United States refused during the past decade to discuss diplomatic measures to enhance space security at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)—the international community’s body for negotiations—despite the nearly unanimous expressed support of all other countries to begin negotiations on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).14 In 2006, a provision was even added to the NSP to the effect that the United States would oppose the development of any new legal regimes or other restrictions on U.S. access to or use of space, including any arms control proposals that would impinge on U.S. military space acquisitions or operations. Christina Rocca, U.S. ambassador to the CD, told the delegates in Geneva on February 13, 2007, that “we continue to believe that there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for arms control to solve” (Rocca 2007). And in prepared remarks on October 8, 2008, she stated that “the United States has consistently opposed space arms control proposals, as the existing outer space regime is sufficient to guarantee all nations unfettered access to, and operations in, space” (Rocca 2008). Categorical rejection of all international efforts to address space security issues has been counter to U.S. interests, however. By forgoing the possibility of new mutually agreed-upon rules or constraints, the United States—rather than keeping its options open—actually limits what futures are possible. Without constraints on ASAT weapons, for example, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, requiring the United States to expend more effort securing satellites and leading to less predictability and stability in crises.

Militarization=nukes

Pollpeter et al 15 (Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, Fan Yang, 3/2/15, “China Dream, Space Dream” China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States: A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, accessed 6/26/16, http://www.uscc.gov/Research/china-dream-space-dream-chinas-progress-space-technologies-and-implications-united-states)

Because space holds such a preeminent position on the battlefield and because overall victory flows from space superiority, many authors advocate the development of space weapons to achieve space superiority. In the words of one source, The development of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) will greatly enhance China’s prospects of winning a regional high-tech war….It is not only necessary, but also feasible to develop such weapons…. To make certain the credibility of deterrence, and to safeguard its security and national interests in the 21st Century, China must apply an asymmetric strategy in accordance with its particular condition, actively researching and developing ASAT weapons.68 Many analysts argue that space will become the center of gravity in future wars and one that must be seized and controlled.69 In fact, analysts argue that the first condition for seizing the initiative is to achieve space supremacy. Because space will become the center of gravity in future wars, they argue, the first shots of a war will take place in space as adversaries vie for its control.70 Chinese military writers point to U.S. space policy and tests of counterspace technologies as evidence that the PLA needs to develop its own weapons. Chinese analysts point to the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy, which stated that “the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit access to or use of space,” and the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy, which states that “the United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them” as evidence that the U.S. government supports the development of counterspace weapons and their use.71 According to Chinese analysts, these include the 1985 test involving the launch of a kinetic-kill vehicle from an F-15, the 1997 test of the MIRACL laser, the 2008 shoot down of an errant satellite with an SM-3 missile, and the test of the XSS-11 satellite to test close proximity maneuvers.72 Chinese analysts offer four reasons why China must develop counterspace weapons. The first reason is to deny an adversary the use of space. In this context, the Chinese military would seek to deny the U.S. military use of information from its space-based assets. Chinese military analysts have noted the dependence of the U.S. military on space and have concluded that the loss of the use of space for the U.S. military may cause it to lose the conflict. A second reason is in response to U.S. missile defenses. Chinese analysts regard the deployment of missile defense systems as giving the United States a de facto counterspace capability. Chinese analysts may also be concerned that the United States will deploy space-based interceptors.73 In this context, China may be concerned that space-based interceptors would negate its nuclear deterrent and require China to develop countermeasures to ensure the viability of its nuclear missile force. A third reason is to protect Chinese space-based assets from attack and to prevent an adversary from using space to attack terrestrial targets.74 In this context, space weapons would protect Chinese spacecraft from attack through the interception of interceptors or co-orbital weapons. It could also include attacking the source conducting attacks against Chinese spacecraft. In addition, Chinese counterspace technologies would defend Chinese territory and forces from space-based attack. In addition to actual warfighting, space power can also be used to coerce. Chinese analysts write that having the ability to destroy or disable an opponent’s satellites may deter an adversary from conducting counterspace operations against Chinese satellites. Space power can also improve the overall capabilities of a military and serve as a deterrent force not just against the use of specific types of weapons, but also as a general capability that can deter a country from even becoming involved in a conflict.75 In carrying out these missions, Chinese analysts discuss a combination of both hard and soft attacks. Soft attacks refer to attacks whose effects are often temporary and do not create debris. These can include the use of electromagnetic radiation, infrared, or laser interference and jamming methods. They can also include computer network operations to infiltrate space information systems in order to steal, tamper with, and delete computer code and information in an attempt to deceive or obstruct adversary operations.76 According to another author: A military satellite cannot connect with the Internet. Therefore, some people think “hackers” cannot attack a satellite’s command and control [system]. But in actuality, the microwave antenna of the satellite control is open, so one can intercept satellite information through technological means and seize the satellites command and control [system]. Using this as a springboard to invade the enemy’s independent network systems is entirely possible.77 Hard attacks, on the other hand, refer to the employment of weapons systems to destroy space- and terrestrially-based space assets. Kill methods include nuclear weapons, kinetic weapons such as missiles and satellites, and high power directed energy weapons such as lasers, particle beams, and microwaves.78 Even before China’s 2007 ASAT test, Chinese analysts preferred soft attack methods to hard attacks because they do not produce debris and often produce temporary effects that can be useful when trying to limit escalation or when targeting third-party satellites. Moreover, the effects of soft methods may be less observable than hard kill methods, which may enable China to attack satellites covertly and thus may be more prone to use in politically sensitive situations.79 Hard kill methods, however, are still considered to be of value and can be used when soft kills are ineffective or unsuitable for the mission.80

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