Request for more space cooperation, us policy prevents any bilateral exchange

Solvency

Cooperation Solves Space Mil

Cooperation prevents escalation of militarization in space

The US has a long history of space diplomacy with opponents—as with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing China as a peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a tough spot with space scientists from outside the agency, some of whom have protested the ban by boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions, there’s also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of coordination between burgeoning space programs will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in costly, in-orbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could provide trust and lines of communication for de-escalation as fears of space militarization increase.

Transparency and dialogue between space programs and policies is key to preventing weaponization

Richard Kaufman, Henry Hertzfeld, and Jeffrey Lewis ‘Space, Security, and the Economy” Published by Economists for Peace and Security September 2008

There is a balance that needs to be maintained between military and commercial uses of outer space. For many years, the nations with large investments in space (principally the US and Russia) avoided placing weapons in space or taking other actions that increase the vulnerability of satellites and other assets. However, there are signs of a growing expansion of the military role in space in line with the assertion by the Bush Administration of the right to exercise space control. Among the more disturbing recent developments are indications of the start of an arms race in space. There should be little doubt that the world is witnessing a low-level and high-stakes arms race in space that no one can win. In January 2007 China fired a missile that destroyed one of its satellites. In February 2008 the US fired a missile that destroyed one of its satellites. These actions followed a train of US initiatives that raised international concerns about what is seen as Washington’s policy of space dominance. Although all the facts about the decisions to launch the missiles are not yet known, it is widely believed that China attacked its orbiting satellite as a demonstration of its capabilities, and as a response to the US assertion of the preemptive right to control access to space. It is also believed, among other possible explanations, that the US attacked its out-of-control satellite as a demonstration of its capabilities and as a response to China’s action. There were sharp responses by many nations, including the US, to what China did, and equally pointed responses by many nations, including China, to what the US did. The two shoot downs are evidence to many observers that after more than 20 years in which anti-satellite (ASAT) tests had been suspended we have entered a new period of space weapons development, anti-satellite testing, and possible deployment of weapons in space. A favorable outcome could result from this dangerous dynamic if it induces world leaders to work out a new understanding that balances the uses of space among the major interests – military, civilian and commercial, and prevents the weaponization of space. The next American President could begin the process. For that to occur the US needs to change its present policy of space dominance, and all nations including the US, China and Russia need to be more transparent about their space programs and policies. As a first step, the US could initiate discussions with other space-faring nations about global space policies.

Space leadership key to US national security and our ability to undermine emerging threats

Polleter, Anderson, Wilson, and Yang in 2015 (Report prepared for the Commission by Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, Jordan Wilson, and Fan Yang of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. “China Dream, Space Dream China’s Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United States” A report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Published: Monday, March 2, 2015)

China’s growing military, economic, and political power has been of increasing concern to the United States. The expansion of its interests, coupled with increasingly assertive behavior, has led to a perception of many in the West that the United States is a country on the decline while China is a country on the rise. At a time when China’s rapid economic growth continues, its military swiftly modernizing, and its political clout increasing, the economic growth of the United States remains slow, and its ability to shape world affairs appears to be on the decline. This has led some to conclude that the Chinese model based on an authoritarian-directed form of capitalism is replacing global acceptance of an American model built on democracy and free markets or that China will replace the United States as the most powerful country.1 China’s rise as a world power has been accompanied by its rise as a space power. China’s ambition to become a space power is driven by a belief in the benefits of space power to contribute significantly to China’s national power. China regards its space program as an important expression of its comprehensive national power and is intended to portray China as a modernizing nation committed to the peaceful uses of space while at the same time serving its political, economic, and military interests.2 It contributes to China’s overall influence and provides capabilities that give China more freedom of action and helps maintain national security. Indeed, China has the ultimate goal of transforming itself from a “major space power to a strong space power” on par with the United States and Russia. In recent years, China has made important progress across a broad range of space technologies, including launchers, satellites, lunar exploration, human space flight, and counterspace technologies. The rise of China’s space program presents military, economic, and political challenges to the United States. As the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states, “Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global economic viability.” 3 China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may thus come at the expense of U.S. leadership in both absolute and relative terms. Uncertainty over China’s pathway to potential major power status, the possibility of a conflict over its territorial claims, and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologies means that China’s improving space capabilities could be used against the U.S. military. China’s space program contributes to the Chinese military’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by providing critical C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support to longrange precision strikes weapons and providing the ability to threaten U.S. space-based assets. Space is also becoming more economically competitive. China’s space program officials believe that space technology is the highest of high technologies, the mastery of which can have positive consequences far beyond the realm of space power to produce tangible benefits for the Chinese people and the national interests of the country. To carry out this plan, China’s space industry has been designated as one of China’s strategic emerging industries, and space technologies figure prominently in China’s science and technology modernization plans. Indeed, China’s space industry has the goal by 2020 to become a “worldclass” aerospace industry on par with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Airbus Group. China has also been able to use its space program to further its diplomatic objectives and to increase its influence in the developing world and among second-tier space powers. China conducts numerous international cooperative activities that provide leadership opportunities, improve bilateral relations, and open up avenues for technology transfer.

Current space law is not enough to prevent escalation – new international laws are needed to prevent space war

Pace 2016

Scott Pace: Space Policy Institute, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. “Space cooperation among order-building powers” Ebscohost. Space Policy, May2016, Vol. 36, p24-27. Accessed 6-27-16

In 2007, Estonia was subject to a wide-ranging series of cyber attacks against government ministries, the parliament, banks, newspapers, and broadcasters. Widely attributed to be of Russian origin due to their sophistication and persistence, the cyber attacks prompted new attention to international law in the cyber domain. In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence convened an international group of legal scholars and practitioners to draft a manual on how to interpret international law in the context of cyber operations and cyber warfare. This effort resulted in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare or simply the Tallinn Manual.4 As might be expected, no such manual or study exists for armed conflict in space. Debates on the use of force in space in international forums quickly reveal a divergence of views and a lack of expert discussions on the interlinked concepts of security, sustainability, and the potential for conflict in space. Some see outer space as a sanctuary, where the use and exploration of outer space is the province of all humankind, and where space activities can only be conducted for peaceful purposes. Others are concerned that the growing use of space for national security purposes could lead to attacks on space systems as part of future conflicts on Earth. To explore these issues, the Secure World Foundation, in collaboration with my home institution, the Space Policy Institute (SPI), convened a workshop on September 9, 2015, in Washington, D.C., to discuss three hypothetical yet plausible scenarios exploring issues of self-defense and conflict in outer space. The workshop included experts from academia, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the public sector in non-official capacities. Some had extensive experiences with space systems while for others space operations were an unfamiliar subject. As part of the scenarios, participants considered questions such as: Does uplink jamming that prevents command and control of a satellite and degrades military capability constitute an armed attack? What is the legal standard for a pre-emptive attack on satellites in self-defense? What is the burden of proof for one country to demonstrate that another country is responsible for damage to its satellites? Can destroying a ground facility be a proportional response to attacks on a nation's satellites? Under what circumstances could the creation of a debris cloud in orbit be considered an armed attack on another country?5 Participants all felt that they had barely scratched the surface of what was needed to truly understand all the legal, political, and operational nuances of armed conflict in space. They pointed to the lack of clarity and consensus on the meaning of existing principles in international space law, and a lack of legal and political mechanisms for resolving situations without use of force. The national security space community overall lacks experience in dealing with jus ad bellum and jus in Bello questions and an even greater lack of expertise and capacity with these issues within the international community. Some experts felt that the experience highlighted the importance of international discussions on norms of behavior and perhaps even new legal agreements, although most cautioned that much more work would be required to increase understanding and build consensus before meaningful discussions were possible. While recognizing the uncertainty and somewhat speculative nature of discussions of self-defense in space, the use of force, and armed conflict in space, several participants felt that the merely continuing status quo for space activities was dangerous. The increasing and somewhat unappreciated reliance on space systems by advanced and developing states could create unpredictable pressures for escalation and crisis instability should those space systems be threatened or lost

Coop Solves Debris

The time is now – bilateral cooperation with China solves space debris and creates an understanding that space war isn’t the only option

Hitchens 16 [Theresa Hitchens is a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and former director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Coauthored with Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College “Toward a New National Security Space Strategy: Benefiting from Entanglement with China” - See more at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/toward-a-new-national-security-space-strategy-benefiting-from-entanglement-with-china/#sthash.yFpAOC3P.dpuf. Written 06/28/16; accessed 06/28/16]

With a new U.S. administration entering in 2017, all policy bets are on the table. While “space” is increasingly recognized as a vital U.S. national interest, rarely does consideration of space policy stating national goals (ends) or appropriate strategies for achieving those goals (means) get discussed beyond a small cadre of individuals within the security community. We have recently argued in an Atlantic Council strategy paper that such a situation can and has led to misalignment of strategy ends and means, and we urge a “rebalancing” of means – diplomatic and military – in the new administration. Specifically, if stability, sustainability of the space environment, and access to space are enduring space goals, which we think they are, then diplomacy and deterrence by denial must be integral and equal parts of the means used toward achievement, along with traditional military means and deterrence by punishment. Regarding China, entanglement, as a method of deterrence by denial intended to create conditions whereby the real or perceived costs of an antagonistic or nefarious action exceeds the benefits, appears an underutilized approach that could provide useful to both countries. The Chinese space program has advanced by leaps and bounds in recent years, as evidenced in its Shenzhou human spaceflight program and Chang’e robotic lunar exploration program, as well as its full spectrum of dual use satellites and launchers (meaning of value to both civil and military communities and having both offensive and defensive capabilities) with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. China’s 2013 self-designated space science mission to near-Geosynchronous orbit, viewed by the U.S. military and intelligence community as potentially threatening the “sanctuary” of that orbit for its large, “exquisite” satellites, triggered a near-panicked Strategic Space Portfolio Review (SPR) in the United States and, consequently, policy and programmatic movement toward more militaristic answers to space challenges. But not all problems are nails appropriate to be addressed with a hammer. Space is a global commons, where no country owns it but use by one affects use by all. Therefore, it is in the best interests of all user countries to maintain its viability for use, and we believe entanglement expands the potential for countries to work toward that goal. Entanglement here references two or more parties being deeply involved with each other. The entanglement of the U.S. and Russia on the International Space Station provides a useful example of the benefits. Since the 2014 Russian intervention in Ukraine, and especially the 2015 Russian military incursion into Syria, U.S.-Russia relations have been “strained” at best. Bellicose Russian nationalism cum anti-Americanism has been evidenced in a variety of areas of foreign policy, including space. Russia was the “spoiler” of earlier 2015 attempts by the European Union to establish an international code of conduct for outer space activities. And yet, U.S.-Russia cooperation on the ISS remains strong. The technologically intertwined nature of ISS cooperation would make disentanglement an extremely messy divorce. Consequently, regardless of larger geopolitical issues, ISS cooperation continues and requires consistent, continual, valuable dialogue between U.S.-Russian officials from the strategic through the tactical level, something that has been sorely lacking in U.S.-China relations. Opportunities to expand communications should similarly be pursued, and at all levels. As China becomes increasingly dependent on space assets, it organically becomes entangled in the responsibilities of a space-faring nation with a growing stake in containing and abating space debris. China irresponsibly contributed to the space debris issue with its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test that exponentially increased the debris in orbit. Subsequently though, on more than one occasion the U.S. Air Force provided China with warnings, through the State Department, of a potential debris collision with a Chinese satellite, warnings China never acknowledged. But in 2014 China took the unprecedented step of requesting a direct link with U.S. Air Force Space Command for collision warnings. Clearly, China has recognized the debris hazard as a peril to all space faring nations, including itself, thereby giving China a vested interest in working with others toward prevention and abatement. China is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC) that has created guidelines for prevention. A bilateral (or multilateral) active removal project could be a useful step forward for both countries toward addressing an acknowledged threat to space assets, and through entanglement create a need for consistent communication between the U.S. and China regardless of externalities. The benefits of communication are maximized when it takes place at multiple levels. High level, strategic communication ideally provides opportunities for decision-makers to clearly convey their “bright lines.” As we point out in our Atlantic Council strategy paper, if China is unaware of what constitutes U.S. “bright lines” regarding negative behavior in space, during either peacetime or wartime, the risk of unwanted escalation grows. As an example, the Defense Department’s 2016 report to Congress on Chinese military power states that China may be considering using counterspace capabilities to target U.S. early warning and navigation satellites. If true, it shows that there is an enormous misunderstanding by China of the importance to the United States of early warning satellites in the nuclear kill chain—something even the Soviet Union understood, hence the mutual ban on attacking these assets embedded in US-USSR bilateral nuclear-arms-control agreements. Communication at lower levels allows both parties to learn the parameters within which their counterparts operate and make decisions, something that has been especially difficult for the United States because of Chinese cultural and political opacity. Effective deterrence requires both carrots and sticks, and there are a variety of carrots that could be offered through NASA and the U.S. civil space program.

Engaging in cooperating with China will allow us to start working on issues such as space debris, our current strategy of disengagement will only set us back

Mike Wall, Space.com Senior Writer | November 3, 2011 12:53pm ET http://www.space.com/13492-china-united-states-space-cooperation-nasa.html

Cooperation between NASA and the Chinese space program is currently minimal. A provision inserted into the 2011 budget resolution by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) bars the use of federal funds to conduct bilateral science exchanges with China. Wolf also spoke at yesterday's hearing, reiterating his support for the ban and the reasoning behind it. It doesn't make sense for the United States to assist China's technological development, he said, given Beijing's poor human rights record and its potential aspirations of global military supremacy. "I have been very troubled by this administration's apparent eagerness to work with China on its space program and willingness to share other sensitive technologies," Wolf said. "I want to be clear: The United States has no business cooperating with the People's Liberation Army to help develop its space program." If the United States wants to be on the right side of history, Wolf said, it will not aid or encourage the Chinese regime in any way. "There will come a day when the Chinese communist government will fall — repressive, totalitarian regimes always do," Wolf said. "And when that day comes, books will be written about who helped sustain this government in their final days. Will U.S. companies feature in that narrative? Will the U.S. government?" Working together Bolden stressed that NASA would continue to abide by the non-cooperation law. But he said he'd be in favor of some carefully controlled exchange with China, as spaceflight and space exploration have become increasingly collaborative enterprises. Meaningful collaboration can occur even between two countries widely regarded as enemies, Bolden said. After all, the U.S. and Soviet space programs worked together during the Cold War, beginning with a joint spaceflight in 1975 called the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. Such engagement with other nations has generally advanced American capabilities in space, Bolden said. "The greatest example I can give you is the benefit of the International Space Station," he said. "Had we followed the philosophy of those who believe that engagement is not the proper course of action, we would not have the International Space Station today." The United States and China could start working together on space debris mitigation, disaster management and planetary science projects, Bolden suggested. The NASA administrator was not alone in supporting some level of cooperation with China in science and space. John Holdren, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, voiced similar sentiments at the hearing. "The notion that China intends to compete with us does not mean that the solution is to disengage with them," Holdren said. "The solution is intelligent engagement — measured, focused, appropriately managed, so that we get the benefits for our own innovation system."

Without multipolarity in space, there will be no effective way to prevent debris production and accidents from occurring

Grego and Wright 2010

Laura Grego: a senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and David Wright: a senior scientist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program. “Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space” Union of concerned scientists November 2010. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf

The laws of physics dictate that operating in space differs in meaningful ways from operating on land, sea, and air. Successful space policy must take this fact into account. One consequence of these physical laws is that satellites travel in predictable and repeated orbits and are visible to much (or all) of Earth. Tracking from the ground allows an observer to predict a satellite’s future position. As a result, it is intrinsically vulnerable—a determined adversary will have regular opportunities and multiple means to interfere with that satellite. A second consequence is that because all satellite orbits encircle Earth, satellites can interfere with each other. Orbits at the same altitude may cross, creating the potential for collisions between orbiting objects, whether satellites or debris. Additionally, the radio signals sent to or from a satellite can interfere with another one that is near or passing by, as recently occurred with the Galaxy 15 satellite (Weeden 2010). This intrinsic entanglement of orbits means that the safe operation of satellites requires coordination between all operators. A third consequence is that the careless treatment of the space environment by one user can affect all other users. For example, space debris created by any country, whether intentionally or unintentionally, can threaten all satellites at the same altitude. Because debris is the detritus of space operations—it includes spent rocket bodies, defunct satellites, loosened components, and pieces of fragmented satellites—this material typically orbits Earth in many of the same orbits as active satellites. And because debris can stay in orbit for decades or centuries, depending on the altitude, it accumulates over time and poses an ever-increasing threat to satellites. Given these realities, it is clear that the United States cannot create a lasting and secure space environment on its own. Avoiding inadvertent physical or electromagnetic interference, which is particularly pressing in light of its day-to-day threat to satellites, requires a multilateral approach. Some coordination already exists. Countries have long agreed to coordinate orbital locations and transmission frequencies in GEO to prevent interference between satellites and more generally to optimize the use of GEO (i.e., squeezing in the maximum number of satellites). This voluntary coordination is managed by the aforementioned ITU, which develops regulations for geosynchronous satellites, oversees the process of assigning orbital slots, and handles complaints and conflicts. Cooperation is also necessary to address the growing threat from space debris. Providing leadership in the international efforts to address this problem, the United States began working with other countries in the 1990s to develop voluntary debris-mitigation guidelines through the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC);16 these guidelines were adopted by the United Nations in 2007 (NASA 2007). This mitigation effort has been partially successful and, like the ITU, illustrates the benefits of international coordination. But the IADC guidelines are not binding, and no mechanisms are in place to enforce them. As a result, they are not as successful in stopping debris production as they could be, and not as effective as is necessary.17 Debris and overcrowding in space are somewhat less of a problem when satellite operators know where other objects are and can avoid hitting them. Better cooperation in monitoring the orbits of space objects would thus increase the ability of the United States and all other space actors to use this environment safely and efficiently. Toward that end, accurate tracking information about active satellites and debris is needed for managing traffic and coordinating activities in space, and in particular for preventing collisions. The United States has by far the most capable space surveillance system—the SSN—but this system nevertheless has limitations. For example, it lacks the capability to accurately track all potentially hazardous pieces of debris, and it cannot monitor maneuvers and determine changes in orbit with the timeliness that may sometimes be desired. Some of these shortcomings are due to the limited number of sensors and to their scarcity in certain parts of the globe, particularly the southern hemisphere. Better tracking would result from the sharing of tracking data between countries, using data not only from government-owned sensors but also from commercial satellite operators. Whether public or private, satellite owners generally have the best and most timely tracking information for their satellites (and they know when orbital maneuvers are planned); thus combining this information with data from sensor networks could be very useful. To make such data sharing happen on a significant scale and to assure its success, ways to protect sensitive military and commercial information—as well the technical protocols and logistical means to make the shared information useable—need to be developed.

We have to include China in space debris operations or the problem is only going to be worse

Marcia S. Smith Posted: 18-Feb-2015 http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/johnson-freese-why-wolf-is-wrong-about-us-china-space-cooperation Staff reporter for Space Policy Online

Joan Johnson-Freese explained to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission today why former Rep. Frank Wolf was wrong to effectively ban all U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation. Wolf retired at the end of the last Congress, but his successor as chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds NASA holds similar views. Johnson-Freese is a professor at the Naval War College and author of "The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze" and "Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate Space." She was one of the witnesses at today's hearing on China's space and counterspace programs. Wolf included language in several Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bills that prohibits NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from engaging in any bilateral activities with China on civil space cooperation unless specifically authorized by Congress or unless NASA or OSTP certifies to Congress 14 days in advance that the activity would not result in the transfer of any technology, data, or other information with national security or economic implications. His indefatigable opposition to cooperating with China was based largely on its human rights abuses and efforts to obtain U.S. technology. He was one of the strongest, but certainly not only, congressional critic of China, always stressing that he loved the Chinese people, but not the Chinese government. Rep. John Culberson (R-TX) is Wolf's successor as chairman of the CJS subcommittee. In December 2013 when rumors swirled that he would replace Wolf, he was interviewed by a reporter for the Houston Chronicle and when asked whether he agreed with Wolf about China replied: "Yes. We need to keep them out of our space program, and we need to keep NASA out of China. They are not our friends." It remains to be seen whether he will include the same language in this year's CJS bill, but Johnson-Freese spelled out why she thinks it is the wrong approach. She provides a comprehensive rebuttal to Wolf's reasoning, but in essence her contention is that "the United States must use all tools of national power" to achieve its space-related goals as stated in U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Strategy, and National Security Space Strategy. Wolf's restrictions on space cooperation simply constrain U.S. options, she argues: "Limiting U.S. options has never been in U.S. national interest and isn't on this issue either." She disagrees with Wolf's assumption that the United States has nothing to gain from working with China: "On the contrary, the United States could learn about how they work -- their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis." For some issues, there really is no choice, she continues. China must be involved in international efforts towards Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) and space sustainability, especially with regard to space debris, a topic given urgency by China's 2007 antisatellite (ASAT) test that created more than 3,000 pieces of debris in low Earth orbit. She notes that since that test and the resulting international condemnation, "China has done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set the United States

New international laws are needed to meet the new dangers of space – without more communication, current dangers will be exasperated

Grego and Wright 2010

Laura Grego: a senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and David Wright: a senior scientist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program. “Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space” Union of concerned scientists November 2010. Website. Accessed 6-27-16. http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf

No country has used dedicated space weapons10 or intentionally destroyed another’s satellite, and space users have developed voluntary debris-mitigation guidelines to help protect the space environment (NASA 2007). Nevertheless, the failure to develop mechanisms for meeting the growing challenges— such as avoiding collisions between satellites and between satellites and debris, as well as resolving potential conflicts over the uses of space—are serious causes for concern. Cooperative relationships between space-faring nations that might provide reassurances and clarity about each other’s intentions in space—between the United States and China, for example—have also been neglected. The OST—the foundational document of space law—and its supporting agreements set out the essential principles behind space governance. But its usefulness in addressing urgent contemporary issues is limited by the minimal attention the space powers have given to refining the treaty’s principles and detailing its rules in the more than four decades since it was signed. Important questions—such as what protections satellites should have from damage and the space environment should have from deterioration, and under what conditions—have been left without clear answers. Additionally, the OST did not set up a forum for resolving differences in interpretation. Although space was a venue for competition during the cold war, and the United States and the Soviet Union explored means of countering each other’s capabilities in space (see, for example, Grego 2010), the two countries both considered unrestrained military competition in space to be counterproductive. Since the cold war ended, civil space cooperation arguably has been one of the most successful aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The two countries have worked together on the International Space Station since the early 1990s, they have cooperated on space launches,11 and bilateral discussions have been initiated in the wake of the Iridium-Cosmos collision of 2009 to better coordinate space operations. But dialogue on more challenging space issues has yet to be pursued. The United States suspended space cooperation with China more than a decade ago, ending a cooperative space relationship that had begun under President Ronald Reagan; for 10 years, China launched U.S. commercial satellites despite worsening relations between the two countries. However, in 1999, following the Cox Commission report,12 this arrangement ceased. In recent years, the possibility of cooperation on civil and commercial projects has been further complicated by U.S. concerns about China’s possible military uses of space.

A war in space is inevitable absent cooperation because of Space Debris

Billings 2015 (Lee Billings is a senior reporter for Scientific American a newspaper that covers technological developments; “China, Russia and the U.S. are developing and testing controversial new capabilities to wage war in space despite their denial of such work” Published: August 10, 2015; http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/)

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly. “The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.” Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “geosynchronous” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.” Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules—and they don’t have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a “kinetic” method to destroy an adversary’s satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude. More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests’ only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites. That was a wake-up call, says Brian Weeden, a security analyst and former Air Force officer who studied and helped publicize the Chinese test. “The U.S. came to grips decades ago with the fact that its lower orbit satellites could easily be shot down,” Weeden says. “Going nearly to geosynchronous made people realize that, holy cow, somebody might actually try to go after the stuff we have up there.” It was no coincidence that shortly after the May 2013 test, the US declassified details of its secret Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP), a planned set of four satellites capable of monitoring the Earth’s high orbits and even rendezvousing with other satellites to inspect them up-close. The first two GSSAP spacecraft launched into orbit in July 2014. “This used to be a black program—something that didn’t even officially exist,” Weeden says. “It was declassified to basically send a message saying, ‘Hey, if you’re doing something funky in and around the geosynchronous belt, we’re going to see.’” An interloper into geosynchronous orbit need not be an explosives-tipped missile to be a security risk—even sidling up to an adversary’s strategic satellites is considered a threat. Which is one reason that potential U.S. adversaries might be alarmed by the rendezvous capabilities of GSSAP and of the U.S. Air Force’s highly maneuverable X-37B robotic space planes. Russia is also developing its own ability to approach, inspect and potentially sabotage or destroy satellites in orbit. Over the past two years, it has included three mysterious payloads in otherwise routine commercial satellite launches, with the latest occurring in March of this year. Radar observations by the U.S. Air Force and by amateur hobbyists revealed that after each commercial satellite was deployed, an additional small object flew far away from the jettisoned rocket booster, only to later turn around and fly back. The objects, dubbed Kosmos-2491, -2499 and -2504, might just be part of an innocuous program developing techniques to service and refuel old satellites, Weeden says, though they could also be meant for more sinister intentions. Treaties offer little assurance Chinese officials maintain that their military activities in space are simply peaceful science experiments, while Russian officials have stayed mostly mum. Both nations could be seen as simply responding to what they see as the U.S.’s clandestine development of potential space weapons. Indeed, the U.S.’s ballistic missile defense systems, its X-37B space planes and even its GSSAP spacecraft, though all ostensibly devoted to maintaining peace, could be easily repurposed into weapons of space war. For years Russia and China have pushed for the ratification of a legally binding United Nations treaty banning space weapons—a treaty that U.S. officials and outside experts have repeatedly rejected as a disingenuous nonstarter. “The draft treaty from Russia and China seeks to ban the very things that they are so actively pursuing,” Krepon says. “It serves their interests perfectly. They want freedom of action, and they’re covering that with this proposal to ban space weapons.” Even if the treaty was being offered in good faith, Krepon says, “it would be dead on arrival” in Congress and would stand no chance of being ratified. After all, the U.S. wants freedom of action in space, too, and in space no other country has more capability—and thus more to lose. According to Rose, there are three key problems with the treaty. “One, it’s not effectively verifiable, which the Russians and Chinese admit,” he says. “You can’t detect cheating. Two, it is totally silent on the issue of terrestrial anti-satellite weapons, like the ones that China tested in 2007 and again in July 2014. And third, it does not define what a weapon in outer space is.” As an alternative, the U.S. supports a European-led initiative to establish “norms” for proper behavior through the creation of a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer Space. This would be a first step, to be followed by a binding agreement. A draft of the code—which Russia and China prevented from being adopted in last month’s UN discussions—calls for more transparency and “confidence-building” between spacefaring nations as a way of promoting the “peaceful exploration and use of outer space.” This, it is hoped, can prevent the generation of more debris and the further development of space weapons. However, like the Russian-Chinese treaty, the code does not exactly define what constitutes a “space weapon.” That haziness poses problems for senior defense officials such as General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. “Is our space-based surveillance system that looks out at the heavens and tracks everything in geosynchronous a weapons system?” he asks. “I think everybody in the world would look at that and say no. But it’s maneuverable, it’s going 17,000 miles per hour, and it has a sensor on board. It’s not a weapon, okay? But would [a treaty’s] language ban our ability to do space-based surveillance? I would hope not!” Is war in space inevitable? Meanwhile, shifts in U.S. policy are giving China and Russia more reasons for further suspicion. Congress has been pressing the U.S. national security community to turn its attentions to the role of offensive rather than defensive capabilities, even dictating that most of the fiscal year 2015 funding for the Pentagon’s Space Security and Defense Program go toward “development of offensive space control and active defense strategies and capabilities.” “Offensive space control” is a clear reference to weapons. “Active defense” is much more nebulous, and refers to undefined offensive countermeasures that could be taken against an attacker, further widening the routes by which space might soon become weaponized. If an imminent threat is perceived, a satellite or its operators might preemptively attack via dazzling lasers, jamming microwaves, kinetic bombardment or any other number of possible methods. “I hope to never fight a war in space,” Hyten says. “It’s bad for the world. Kinetic [anti-satellite weaponry] is horrible for the world,” because of the existential risks debris poses for all satellites. “But if war does extend into space,” he says, “we have to have offensive and defensive capabilities to respond with, and Congress has asked us to explore what those capabilities would be. And to me, the one limiting factor is no debris. Whatever you do, don’t create debris.” Technology to jam transmissions, for example, appears to underpin the Air Force’s Counter Communications System, the U.S.’s sole acknowledged offensive capability against satellites in space. “It's basically a big antenna on a trailer, and how it actually works, what it actually does, nobody knows,” Weeden says, noting that, like most space security work, the details of the system are top secret. “All we basically know is that they could use it to somehow jam or maybe even spoof or hack into an adversary’s satellites.” For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the saber-rattling between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully eclipsing the more pressing issue of debris. “Everyone is talking about purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to warfighting in space, and it’s like we are back in the Cold War,” Krepon says. “Meanwhile, there are about 20,000 weapons already up there in the form of debris. They’re not purposeful—they’re unguided. They’re not seeking out enemy satellites. They’re just whizzing around, doing what they do.” The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global commons, similar to the Earth’s oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to make and very hard to clean up, so international efforts should focus on preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of deliberate destruction, the risk of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue to grow as more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of accidents increases, so too does the possibility of their being misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile actions in the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space. “We are in the process of messing up space, and most people don’t realize it because we can’t see it the way we can see fish kills, algal blooms, or acid rain,” he says. “To avoid trashing Earth orbit, we need a sense of urgency that currently no one has. Maybe we’ll get it when we can’t get our satellite television and our telecommunications, our global weather reports and hurricane predictions. Maybe when we get knocked back to the 1950s, we’ll get it. But by then it will be too late.”

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