Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011



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FF  vulnerabilities




DOD Petroleum reliance kills heg-Corrupt Supply Holders and Resource Vulnerability


Parthemore & Nagl 10 (Christine Parthemore, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, John Nagl, President of the Center for New American Security, “Fueling the Future Force: Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era”, http://www.cnas.org/node/5023, September 2010) SV

Several factors challenge DOD’s continued reliance on its existing petroleum-dominant energy strategy over the long term: direct risks to U.S. security; troubling supply and demand trends; the often-hidden external costs of fuel consumption; and a changing domestic political and regulatory environment. The Risks of Petroleum Dependence: The growing world demand for petroleum presents major geostrategic risks. High prices and rising demand are a boon to major suppliers and reserve holders such as Iran and Venezuela, which are unfriendly to the United States. It also affects the international behavior of rising powers such as China, which is on a quest to secure access to natural resources that is in turn expanding its influence around the globe. In Mexico, one of the top suppliers of petroleum to the United States, pipelines serve as an increasingly attractive target for dangerous cartels to fund activities that could undermine the Mexican government, destabilize the region and decrease U.S. homeland security.4 American foreign policy itself has been colored by its growing petroleum demands since the 1970s oil crises and subsequent declaration of the Carter doctrine, which stipulated that the United States would consider threats to the Persian Gulf region threats to its “vital interests” due to the strategic importance of its petroleum reserves.5 Dependence on petroleum for 94 percent of transportation fuel is also a dangerous strategic risk for the United States given the leverage oil can provide to supplier countries. Many European allies have experienced such leverage in action with Russia periodically threatening to reduce or cut off natural gas exports to countries highly reliant on their supplies (and in some cases carrying through with these threats). Similarly, national oil companies and OPEC can choose to increase or decrease their production rates to drive changes in the market. The more the United States reduces its dependence on petroleum, the better it can hedge against petroleum suppliers exerting political leverage over U.S. interests, including in times of crisis. At the operational level, heavy reliance on liquid fuels also constitutes a force protection challenge for DOD. Fuel supply convoys have been vulnerable to attack in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where the services have struggled to adapt to the challenges of terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism. In addition to minimizing these risks in the current wars, DOD must also conceptualize and plan for what the future will likely hold for America’s security. The Navy’s battle against pirates off the coast of the Horn of Africa foreshadows the littoral and unconventional challenges that await the United States in the coming decades, as populations continue to migrate toward the world’s coastal area. These types of problems often manifest at major shipping chokepoints (including petroleum transit chokepoints), and addressing them will include distinctive fueling requirements. The Air Force, likewise, confronts dramatic changes in manned and unmanned flight, in addition to the proliferation of space technologies, all of which could dramatically alter fuel needs. In another example, one recently published AirSea battle concept focused on China notes that the type of conflict it outlines could require hardening fueling infrastructure, improving aerial refueling, “stockpiling petrol, oil, and lubricants” and potentially “running undersea fuel pipelines between Guam, Tinian and Saipan.”6 As the character of warfare changes, DOD will have to continue to consider the attraction of fuel supply lines to opponents.

Dependence on foreign oil leaves critical vulnerabilities – military not prepared for energy-scarce world


Hornitschek et al 8 (Mike, Colonel and military researcher - USAF, Coyote Smith – colonel and scientist - USAF, Paul Demphouss – Lt. Colonel USMC, “Strategic Importance,” Ad Astra Spring 2008. )

The very real risks of climate change, energy nationalism and scarcity, unconstrained technology explosion, and potential resource conflicts weigh heavily on the futurist minds of the action officers of the Air Force Future Concepts and Transformations Office and National Security Space Office (NSSO) “Dreamworks.” These officers are charged with visualizing the world 25-or-more years from now, and informing and guiding Air Force and space strategy development. For a military that is fundamentally dependent on high-energy capabilities to protect its nation and the international commons for the good of all humanity, not only are the strategic risks associated with energy scarcity that lie ahead great, but so too are the operational and tactical vulnerabilities for the finest war-fighting and peacekeeping machine humans have ever known. It was from within this Air Force policy incubator and the NSSO that the spark to reexamine SSP as a strategic, operational, and tactical energy solution was struck. Beginning in the 1970s through 2001, the SSP was examined on multiple previous occasions by the Department of Energy (DOE) and NASA, but failed to find a champion in large part because SSP fell between organizational gaps (DOE does energy but not space, and NASA does space, not energy). On the other hand, because of its unique mission, DoD is the first government agency that will have to deal with the harsh realities of a coming energy peak. Self-developed, complex modern weapon systems spend two decades in pre-production and another five in operation—a 70-year life cycle that clearly places any new platforms (and our entire war-fighting doctrine) squarely on the backside of peak oil, and permanently in a hangar unless DoD can reinvent itself to remain relevant in an energy scarce world. Therefore, DoD is in a position of greatest need for examining all alternate energy options. On a more tactical level, the very real high cost in dollars and lives lost to deliver large quantities of fuel and energy supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has informed the military that energy logistics is a reality that begs for a paradigm change.



Supply lines being shut down by route closures – only SBSP avoids fuel tether vulnerabilities


Dinerman 8 (Taylor, journalist at the Space Review “Space solar power and the Khyber pass,” The Space Review, 11/24/08. )
For the second time this year the Pakistani government temporarily shut the main US and NATO supply route from the port of Karachi to Afghanistan. This has exposed the US’s biggest weakness, our dependence on a weak and corrupt Pakistani government for access to the theater of operations. The main problem is not food, ammunition, or equipment—in an emergency those can be carried in transport aircraft—but energy, specifically fuel. In the longer run Pakistan’s closure of the Khyber Pass supply route justifies investment in SSP as a technology that landlocked nations can use to avoid the pressures and threats that they now have to live with. Last year the National Security Space Office released its initial report on space solar power (SSP). One of the primary justifications for the project was the potential of the system to provide power from space for remote military bases. Electrical power is only part of the story. If the military really wants to be able to operate for long periods of time without using vulnerable supply lines it will have to find a new way to get liquid fuel to its forward operating forces. This may seem impossible at first glance, but by combining space solar power with some of the innovative alternative fuels and fuel manufacturing systems that are now in the pipeline, and given enough time and effort, the problem could be solved. The trick is, of course, to have enough raw energy available so that it is possible to transform whatever is available into liquid fuel. This may mean something as easy as making methanol from sugar cane or making jet fuel from natural gas, or something as exotic as cellulosic ethanol from waste products. Afghanistan has coal and natural gas that could be turned into liquid fuels with the right technology. What is needed is a portable system than can be transported in standard containers and set up anywhere there are the resources needed to make fuel. This can be done even before space solar power is available, but with SSP it becomes much easier. In the longer run Pakistan’s closure of the Khyber Pass supply route justifies investment in SSP as a technology that landlocked nations can use to avoid the pressures and threats that they now have to live with. Without access to the sea, nations such as Afghanistan are all too vulnerable to machinations from their neighbors. Imagine how different history would be if the Afghans had had a “Polish Corridor” and their own port. Their access to the world economy might have changed their culture in positive ways. Bangladesh and Indonesia are both Muslim states whose access to the oceans have helped them adapt to the modern world.


Lack of oil cripples national defense – domestic energy and combat situations


Wald et al 9 (General Charles F Wald, Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Former Chairman of the CNA MAB, Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle Astronaut and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command, “Powering America’s Defense,” May 2009. )

Energy for America’s transport sector depends almost wholly on the refined products of a single material: crude oil. Energy for homes, businesses, and civic institutions relies heavily on an antiquated and fragile transmission grid to deliver electricity. Both systems—transport and electricity—are inefficient. This assessment applies to our military’s use of energy as well. Our defense systems, including our domestic military installations, are dangerously oil dependent, wasteful, and weakened by a fragile electrical grid. In fact, the Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest single energy consumer in the nation. In our view, America’s energy posture constitutes a serious and urgent threat to national security—militarily, diplomatically, and economically. This vulnerability is exploitable by those who wish to do us harm. America’s current energy posture has resulted in the following national security risks: • U.S. dependence on oil weakens international leverage, undermines foreign policy objectives, and entangles America with unstable or hostile regimes. • Inefficient use and overreliance on oil burdens the military, undermines combat effectiveness, and exacts a huge price tag—in dollars and lives. • U.S. dependence on fossil fuels undermines economic stability, which is critical to national security. • A fragile domestic electricity grid makes our domestic military installations, and their critical infrastructure, unnecessarily vulnerable to incident, whether deliberate or accidental.




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