Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011



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Budget key to heg




Lack of funding creates a hollow force – prevents modernization and basic training, crippling military security


Carafano, Eaglen & Spring 7 (James Jay - Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Mackenzie - Research Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, and Baker - F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, “Four Percent for Freedom: Maintaining Robust National Security Spending,” 4/10/07. )

Despite intense military activity since 9/11, defense spending is at a historical low and has been for too long. Current and future Administrations and Congress should commit now to spending 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense even after any drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan or Iraq, both to prevent a recurrence of the "hollow force" and to meet the military's immediate modernization needs. Although defense spending has been relatively restrained, expenditures on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have been exploding. Meeting the resource needs for winning the war on terrorism includes maintaining overall defense budgets at 4 percent of GDP while simultaneously recognizing that projected growth in entitlement expenditures will jeopardize the nation's ability to wage war over the long term. This harsh fact makes entitlement reform a national security issue. Avoiding a "Hollow Force." The term "hollow force" was coined in the post-Vietnam War era to describe a military force that lacks the resources to field trained and ready forces, to support ongoing operations, and to modernize. In the past, when America's military has begun to become hollow, the strain has showed first in the National Guard. The same warning signs are evident today, including an austere lack of equipment, heavy reliance on cross-leveling to fill out units preparing to deploy, and a reduction in the levels of unit readiness. However, this problem is not exclusive to the National Guard. The Army and Air Force are already showing signs of funding shortfalls for equipment modernization. Although today's military is not yet hollow, it could become so in less than a decade if funding for military modernization is not adequate over a sustained period of time. Moreover, underfunding defense will actually cost the U.S. more in the long run, including reducing the defense industrial base to a dangerously low level. This leads to an undercapitalized base that is not competitive, driving up costs for the U.S. government and taxpayer. Not spending enough on defense also creates the reality and perception of American weakness, which will increase risk, hinder economic growth, and lower stability in the world. Indeed, robust defense spending saves money. President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup and steady defense funding throughout the 1980s helped to win the Cold War and enabled the U.S. to quickly defeat Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Regrettably, the Administration's defense budget request and emergency supplemental spending bill come at a time when political pressure to reduce defense expenditures is growing. The perception is that the battle in Iraq constitutes the entirety of the war effort and that as this operation winds down, the American people are entitled to a new peace dividend. This notion, coupled with the imminent retirement of 78 million baby boomers, means that the danger of a hollow force is very real. Mandatory spending in the U.S. budget is projected to increase significantly in the coming years. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the share of the U.S. economy devoted to defense spending will actually decrease as a result. Entitlement Reform as National Security Issue. The U.S. government is running a large budget deficit, and the principal reason is the growth in entitlement costs, not increased defense funding since 9/11. Since 1970, the historical ratio between defense spending and entitlement spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security has flipped. In 1970, military spending totaled 7.8 percent of GDP-almost twice the 4.1 percent of GDP spent on the big three entitlement programs. Today, defense spending has fallen to 3.9 percent of GDP while entitlement spending has more than doubled to 8.8 percent of GDP. By 2030, the big three entitlements will absorb roughly 84 percent of all federal revenues, crowding out defense and homeland security and threatening the historically low-tax, high-growth U.S. economy. Congress needs to find a solution to the entitlement spending problem quickly. Consequently, defense is not the problem with the budget, and cutting defense is not the solution. As a nation at war, the U.S. is spending remarkably little on defense. Devoting 4 percent of GDP to defense imposes a reasonable burden on the U.S. economy and is significantly below the mean of roughly 7.5 percent of GDP that the U.S. spent on defense during the Cold War. Spending 4 percent of GDP will not risk losing the war because of economic collapse brought on by excessive defense spending. Further, Congress needs to keep in mind the economic costs of military failure. Military power trumps economic power in the short term. Even a single successful attack on U.S. territory using an electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear weapon would have devastating economic consequences. What the U.S. Should Do. Over the long term, federal spending should be reformed to provide adequate funds for current defense needs, and the shape of the U.S. military should continue to transform to reflect future threats. Rather than decrease defense spending, Congress needs to make a strong commitment to fund the nation's war requirements well into the future; indeed, the next President and future Congresses must also commit to providing for the nation's defense through increased defense budgets. Both Congress and the President should also begin the difficult task of changing public opinion, not following it, by reminding the American people that the ongoing war is not over, regardless of what happens in Iraq, and that the stakes in this war extend to their lives, liberty, and future prosperity. Conclusion. Spending 4 percent of GDP on national defense will allow the U.S. to keep the nation and its service members properly trained, equipped, and ready. In the long term, continuing to underfund defense and then allowing wild fluctuations in defense budgets during times of war will only cost the country more and compromise national security. Congress and the Administration should commit now to spending at least 4 percent of GDP on national security, and they should move swiftly to reform the major entitlement programs that threaten both the budget and the economy over the long term.

Bad budget prevents conflict resolution – Europe, Pakistan and Iran


Kagan 9 (Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “No Time to Be Cutting the Defense Budget,” 2/3/09. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/AR2009020202618.html)

A reduction in defense spending this year would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun. This would make it harder to press allies to do more. The Obama administration rightly plans to encourage European allies to increase defense capabilities so they can more equitably share the burden of global commitments. This will be a tough sell if the United States is cutting its own defense budget. In Afghanistan, there are already concerns that the United States may be "short of breath." In Pakistan, the military may be tempted to wait out what its members perceive as America's flagging commitment to the region. A reduction in defense funding would feed these perceptions and make it harder for Obama's newly appointed special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to press for necessary changes in both countries. What worries allies cheers and emboldens potential adversaries. The Obama administration is right to reach out and begin direct talks with leaders in Tehran. But the already-slim chances of success will grow slimmer if Iranian leaders believe that the United States may soon begin pulling back from their part of the world. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's spokesman has already declared that the United States has lost its power -- just because President Obama said he is willing to talk. Imagine how that perception would be reinforced if Obama starts cutting funding for an already inadequately funded force.



Budget capacity cuts collapse deterrence and cause global wars


Kagan 11 (Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, “The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs,” Weekly Standard Vol. 16 No. 18, 1/24/11. )

American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. • In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its “fair share” of the pain?



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