Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011



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Basing impacts




Only FOBs exert air and naval power – prevent Sino-Taiwan war


Martin 5 (Colonel Lawrence M, USAF, “Countering a Strategic Gambit: Keeping US Airpower Employable in a China-Taiwan Conflict,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2005. )

America’s coercive capability in a potential PRC-Taiwan conflict depends on its ability to deploy and employ both naval and air forces for sustained operations in the skies and waters over and around Taiwan. Those deployments will depend on access to regional bases, its ability to deploy and then sustain the force at these bases, and the willingness (or unwillingness) of America’s regional allies to support and assist an intervention. Deployments could be limited by American commitments to other theaters, as the United States must weigh its ability to maintain forces to other theaters while mounting a credible deterrent to aggressive PRC actions. The foundation of American support for Taiwan remains its willingness and ability to deploy credible forces in a timely manner as situations worsen in the western Pacific. Though the United States possesses the world’s most capable force-projection capability, that capability does have limits, especially in East Asia. Carrier battle groups require from three to 16 days to respond to any Pacific crisis; however, their aviation assets possess limited capabilities to sustain combat operations.17 With few nearby airfields, the United States relied heavily on US naval aviation forces to sustain Operation Enduring Freedom. Carrier-based aircraft flew demanding sorties, often seven to 10 hours long, more than 400 nm from their strike group. To execute the long-range, long-duration missions, naval-strike aircraft depended on US Air Force tanker and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to act as force multipliers.18 Though US Navy/Marine Corps tactical-aviation assets flew about 75 percent of coalition sorties over Afghanistan, USAF heavy bombers delivered over 70 percent of the coalition’s munitions tonnage.19 Unlike Operations Desert Storm, Noble Anvil, and Iraqi Freedom, where US-led coalition aviation benefited from the presence of numerous airfields in relatively close proximity to the theater of operations, any potential western Pacific conflict will have to be fought at distances more like those flown in Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan. As a matter of perspective, for Enduring Freedom, naval aviation assets often flew sorties into Afghanistan of over 400 nm one way, while refueling tankers based in Qatar flew over 1,100 nm. Based at Diego Garcia, US heavy bombers traveled over 2,900 nm, each way. During Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait-based coalition forces flew much shorter sorties. Each way, those based near Riyadh traveled about 540 nm and those in Qatar flew around 610 nm. The most effective US naval and air response to a cross-strait threat would combine the Navy’s carrier battle group’s rapid-response and force-projection capability with the Air Force’s ability to dominate and sustain the fight, especially with its force-multiplying C4ISR, aerial-refueling, and strategic-airlift -assets. This joint-force synergy affords the US military the most credible, effective means to penetrate a battlespace close to the PRC’s mainland and prevail. While naval forces possess the inherent ability to deploy anywhere, they operate better when employed with US air forces that need fixed bases to operate. For operations in and around Taiwan, the United States would hope to use its bases on nearby Okinawa (probably Kadena AB, located approximately 350 nm from Taipei) and more distant Guam (probably Andersen AFB, located approximately 1,500 nm from Taipei) (see fig.).

FOBs key to airspace superiority – provides cover and infrastructure


Air Force Doctrine 99 (Study by the Secretary of the Air Force, “Bases, Infrastructure and Facilities,” 11/13/99. )
Aerospace power is only available through the coordination of the total warfare system: the weapon system, the weapon support system, and the basing system. Air Force leaders should recognize the importance and synergy of the basing system in staging, delivering, and sustaining combat power. Aerospace power capabilities depend on cutting-edge delivery systems and their complementary basing systems with an up-to-date, efficient infrastructure. The basing system includes the infrastructure, personnel, materiel, information, and other resources needed to sustain operation of the weapon and weapon support systems. The Air Force generates, flies, fights, and controls its warfighting resources from its bases. The processes, systems, and training of base-level organizations, whether deployed or in garrison, and their ability to enhance the effectiveness of the warfighter’s capabilities is known as the “Blue Order of Battle.” It is here that aerospace power is most dependent and most vulnerable. The base must not only withstand aerial and ground attacks; it must also be capable of supporting concentrated and prolonged air activities against the enemy. Base survival is not enough—the base must be operable and capable of supporting its missions. The following are principles that guide the commander in development of BIF:

Air power key for Asian deterrence – stops WMD and full-scale war


Tellis et al ’98 (Ashley, Ashley J., Senior Political Scientist at RAND specializing in South Asian Security, Chung Min Lee, James Mulvenon, Courtney Purrington, and Michael D. Swaine, “Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Regional Futures and US Strategy,” 1998. )
REGIONAL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report.

Air power key for counterterrorism – enables asymmetric warfare


Peck 7 (Major General Allen, USAF, “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal, March 2007. )

Intelligence made available by air and space forces serves as a critical enabler in IW. In traditional warfare, larger yields and/or quantities of weapons can compensate for targeting uncertainties, but this is generally not the case in counterinsurgency operations, in which unintended collateral damage can undermine support for the government and become a recruiting tool for the insurgency. Currently, over both Afghanistan and Iraq, space-based and air-breathing assets alike continuously monitor the situation on the ground, helping identify insurgents as well as their organizational networks, supporters, and lines of communication and supply. These platforms collect and disseminate a variety of intelligence (signals, communications, imagery, moving-target, full-motion-video, etc.), all integral to the fight. Overhead assets also contribute significantly to the emerging field of forensic analysis, which involves backtracking from ongoing events to determine the sources from which they emanated (e.g., tracing back from explosions of IEDs to locate the bomb-making organizations and facilities that support them). In both Iraq and Afghanistan, airborne assets have developed the capacity to respond quickly to determine the launch points of mortar or rocket attacks, identify suspicious individuals/vehicles and mark them with laser designators for apprehension by ground forces, or, in many cases, destroy them outright. As with other airpower applications, centralized control of intelligence platforms (which minimizes duplication of effort and ensures support for the joint force commander’s highest-priority requirements) enables effective and efficient use of limited ISR assets—key elements of the coalition’s asymmetric advantage in IW. For example, effective ISR enables the air component to bring airpower to bear in support of small coalition or indigenous ground-force units, magnifying their organic capabilities. Precision strike, another highly effective tool of counterinsurgency, permits us to eliminate insurgents in close proximity to civilians or friendly ground forces, thus giving coalition forces a significant firepower advantage. Highly accurate guidance systems, cockpit-selectable fuzes, and munitions of various explosive yields allow Airmen to deliver intended effects precisely while limiting unintended effects. Of course, in certain situations we may need to attack large areas with less discriminate use of firepower—a task for which airpower is also well suited. Air mobility offers another edge in counterinsurgent operations. Our forces exercise this advantage over surface-bound IW adversaries by transporting personnel and cargo while bypassing contested lines of communications, air-dropping supplies, and quickly evacuating the wounded. In Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom last year, the air component flew over 50,000 airlift sorties, transporting over 1,000,000 personnel and 90,000 pallets of cargo that otherwise would have moved via slower, more vulnerable ground-based means of transportation. The mobility advantage also enables the infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration of relatively small ground units. By providing humanitarian assistance, medical support, and transportation for government officials to remote areas, airpower can promote the government’s credibility and improve the quality of life for its population. These types of operations, which directly affect and are immediately visible to the population in question, can have significant effects in the overall campaign against the insurgents. Coupled with relatively small numbers of coalition and indigenous forces, airpower can bring a full spectrum of effects to bear, from humanitarian to electronic to kinetic. In some cases, the mere visible or audible presence of airpower can demonstrate commitment to a population and support to a government as well as shape the behavior of insurgents by reducing their freedom of movement and denying them sanctuaries.




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